Mary Osborne v. State of Indiana

FILED
May 12 2016, 8:24 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer M. Lukemeyer Gregory F. Zoeller
Voyles Zahn & Paul Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mary Osborne, May 12, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1511-CR-1931
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Richard
Appellee-Plaintiff. Campbell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 29D04-
1412-CM-10052
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Mary Osborne (Osborne), appeals the trial court’s denial
of her motion to suppress
[2] We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
[3] Osborne raises one issue on interlocutory appeal, which we restate as follows:
Whether the warrantless seizure of Osborne violated the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On December 14, 2014, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer Jason Arnold
(Officer Arnold) of the Fishers Police Department was assisting two other
police officers with an operating while intoxicated investigation on 116th Street
in Fishers, Hamilton County, Indiana. (Tr. p. 12). During the course of that
investigation, dispatch advised that a clerk working at the Marathon gas station,
located “near 116th Street and Brook[s] School Road[,]” had reported that “a
female subject . . . was stuck underneath her vehicle in the parking lot.” (Tr. p.
13). Officer Arnold responded to the call and drove to the gas station, which
was approximately “a mile to a mile and a half” away. (Tr. p. 14). En route,
dispatch apprised Officer Arnold of the vehicle’s license plate number and that
it “was a black passenger car, possibly a BMW.” (Tr. p. 14).
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[5] As Officer Arnold neared the gas station, he received “an update from dispatch
that the female had gotten herself out from under the vehicle and was leaving.”
(Tr. p. 15). When he arrived at the gas station, he observed a vehicle matching
the reported description driving away. Although he did not witness the
driver—later identified as Osborne—commit any traffic violations, Officer
Arnold initiated a traffic stop. He stated that
[d]ue to the nature of the call[,] I felt that it was necessary to stop
the individual and check on [her] welfare. It’s not very normal
activity. It’s not every day I receive this kind of call so I thought
it was necessary to check on the welfare and the well[-]being of
the individual.
(Tr. p. 16). He added that he “was concerned that [Osborne] potentially could
have been seriously injured, broken bones or anything. Or something was
wrong with [her] that started this whole thing to begin with because it’s not
normal behavior.” (Tr. p. 17).
[6] Officer Arnold approached the driver-side window, and although he did not
observe any blood or other apparent injuries, he indicated that “there could be
something wrong with her . . . internally. I couldn’t see her feet or legs really
from where I was at. She could have had a broken bone down there that I
couldn’t see. So I went to inquire from her if she had anything wrong with her
that I didn’t know about.” (Tr. p. 22). He asked, “Ma’am, are you okay; are
you hurt?” (Tr. p. 21). Osborne informed Officer Arnold that “she was fine”
and declined medical treatment. (Tr. p. 23). Nevertheless, Officer Arnold
remained “concerned because . . . it’s not normal behavior. . . . I didn’t know if
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maybe she ha[d] something else going on, what was it that caused this or
whatever. And I asked her what happened; what caused her to get trapped
underneath her vehicle.” (Tr. p. 23). Osborne explained that her vehicle has a
manual transmission, and “when she exited the vehicle at the gas station she
must have forgotten to put the parking brake on and it rolled back on top of
her.” (Tr. p. 23).
[7] Osborne’s explanation convinced Officer Arnold that she was not in need of
medical or other assistance. However, as he was questioning her, Officer
Arnold noticed signs of possible impairment, including the odor of alcohol on
her breath, red and watery eyes, and slurred speech. When Officer Arnold
asked whether Osborne had consumed any alcohol, she stated that she had a
beer about one hour earlier. According to the probable cause affidavit, Officer
Arnold conducted several field sobriety tests, which Osborne failed. In
addition, Officer Arnold administered a portable breathalyzer test, which
indicated that Osborne’s alcohol level was 0.12. After being transported to the
Hamilton County Jail, Osborne submitted to another breath test, which
revealed that her alcohol level was 0.10. On December 19, 2014, the State filed
an Information, charging Osborne with Count I, operating a vehicle while
intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.
Code § 9-30-5-2(a)-(b); and Count II, operating a vehicle with an alcohol
concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of the
person’s breath, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-30-5-1(a)(2).
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[8] On June 24, 2015, Osborne filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the course of the traffic stop. She argued that the warrantless seizure—
i.e., the traffic stop—violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. On
September 15, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing, and on October 5,
2015, the trial court issued a Suppression Order, denying Osborne’s motion.
The trial court noted that “[o]ne exception [to the warrant requirement] is the
noncriminal, noninvestigative community caretaking function, which is used
with caution in order to ensure that it is not used as a pretext for a criminal
investigation.” (Appellant’s App. p. 29). The trial court concluded that
“Officer Arnold stopped [Osborne’s] vehicle as part of his ‘community
caretaking’ function”; therefore, the warrantless seizure did not run afoul of
either the federal Constitution or the Indiana Constitution. (Appellant’s App.
p. 28).
[9] On October 29, 2015, Osborne filed a motion to certify the Suppression Order
for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted on November 2, 2015.
On December 11, 2015, our court accepted jurisdiction over the case. Osborne
now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[10] Our standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well
settled. Similar to sufficiency matters, we must “determine whether substantial
evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling.” Litchfield
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v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind. 2005). We do not reweigh the evidence, and
we consider any conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Id. Additionally, “[u]nlike typical sufficiency reviews, . . . we will consider . . .
the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Gunn v. State, 956
N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling as
long as it is sustainable on any legal theory apparent in the record. Allen v.
State, 893 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “When the
trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress concerns the
constitutionality of a search or seizure, . . . it presents a question of law, and we
address that question de novo.” Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind.
2014).
II. Fourth Amendment
[11] Osborne claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during the course of the traffic stop because the stop itself
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth
Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects[] against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend IV. This protection is extended to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (Ind. 2001).
A warrant supported by probable cause is typically required in order for a
search or seizure to be reasonable. Breitweiser v. State, 704 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999). Warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
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and well-delineated exceptions.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1995).
The State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[12] “A traffic stop of an automobile and temporary detention of its occupants
constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Bush v.
State, 925 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). However, it is well established that a traffic stop
is akin to an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
whereby a police officer “may stop and briefly detain an individual for
investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer
has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity even if the officer lacks probable
cause to make an arrest.” Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied; Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Thus, while “[a] law enforcement officer must have probable cause to instigate
a full-blown arrest or a detention that lasts for more than a short period[,] . . . a
traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is based on an observed
traffic violation or if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person
detained is involved in criminal activity.” Killebrew v. State, 976 N.E.2d 775,
779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Reasonable suspicion must be based on
“more than mere hunches or unparticularized suspicions.” Potter v. State, 912
N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528,
533-34 (Ind. 2003)).
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[13] In this case, there is no dispute that Officer Arnold’s traffic stop was not based
on his observation of any traffic violation or suspicion of criminal activity.
Nonetheless, the State maintains that “Officer Arnold’s concerns for
[Osborne’s] health and safety justified the slight intrusion of a traffic stop.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 11). The trial court agreed with the State and found that
Officer Arnold had properly stopped Osborne pursuant to his community
caretaking function.
[14] The concept of a “community caretaking function” was first articulated in Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 443 (1973), where, following an accident,
officers conducted a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle in an effort to
locate a firearm that the driver was known to possess in order “to protect the
public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps
malicious hands.” There, the Supreme Court stated that due to
the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become
disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the
extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or
office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may
believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many
more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike
federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for
want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.
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Id. at 441. As further described by our supreme court, the community
caretaking function “is ‘a catchall for the wide range of responsibilities that
police officers must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement activities.’”
Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-
Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1992)).
Thus, “[t]he police are expected not only to enforce the criminal laws but also
to aid those in distress, abate hazards, prevent potential hazards from
materializing, and perform an infinite variety of other tasks calculated to
enhance and maintain the safety of communities.” Id.
[15] The community caretaking function “is a narrow exception to the privacy
protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Killebrew, 976 N.E.2d at 782. In
Indiana, it has been applied as an exception to the warrant requirement only in
cases where the police must conduct an inventory search because they are
impounding a vehicle. See, e.g., Woodford, 752 N.E.2d at 1281; Jones v. State,
856 N.E.2d 758, 762-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In those cases, the
State is required to “demonstrate that: ‘the belief that the vehicle posed some
threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was consistent with
objective standards of sound policing, and . . . the decision to combat that threat
by impoundment was in keeping with established departmental routine or
regulation.’” Ratliff v. State, 770 N.E.2d 807, 809-10 (Ind. 2002) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Woodford, 752 N.E.2d at 1281) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
[16] In the present case, the trial court concluded that
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Officer Arnold was not engaged in a criminal investigation when
he made the stop[] because he had observed no traffic violations.
But he was concerned about the physical and mental condition of
the driver. Officer Arnold stopped the vehicle as part of his
“community caretaking” function. Needless to say, it is highly
unusual for a person to get stuck under his or her own vehicle at
a public gas station. Even if the person was not injured, there
was the possibility of some type of mental impairment.
(Appellant’s App. p. 28). On appeal, Osborne contends that “[t]he trial court
created an exception to the warrant requirement that does not exist under these
circumstances.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6). On the other hand, the State is
essentially requesting that we affirm the trial court’s extension of the
community caretaking function exception to validate a traffic stop where an
officer neither observes a traffic violation nor has any reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. According to the State, “[a] driver impaired by
physical injury or mental condition endangers both themselves and the public
by operating a vehicle on public roads.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 12).
[17] Our court has previously declined to extend the community caretaking function
to Fourth Amendment privacy protections in a case where a police officer “was
attempting to ensure the safety of the public by stopping a potentially impaired
driver.” Killebrew, 976 N.E.2d at 782-83. In Killebrew, a police officer
conducted a traffic stop after observing that the defendant’s turn signal was
activated but the defendant continued through an intersection without turning,
which is not a traffic violation. Id. at 778, 781. Although the officer did not
observe any traffic infractions, he believed that the driver might be impaired
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based on the turn signal. Id. at 778. Because the purpose of the officer’s stop
was to investigate whether the defendant was intoxicated, we found that “his
subsequent search was an extension of a criminal investigation and was not a
product of an administrative caretaking function.” Id. at 783. Conversely, in
the case at hand, Officer Arnold testified that the initial purpose of his stop was
to check on Osborne’s welfare because he believed she might need medical
attention, and the stop only converted to a criminal investigation after Officer
Arnold detected the odor of alcohol on Osborne’s breath. Nevertheless, we find
no published Indiana decisions that have extended the community caretaking
function beyond inventory searches of impounded vehicles.
[18] Subsequent to Cady—wherein the United States Supreme Court conceived the
community caretaking doctrine, numerous other state courts have adopted the
community caretaking function as an exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement in situations beyond inventory searches of impounded
cars. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. For instance, the trial court in the instant case
was persuaded by State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594 (Wash. 2003). In Acrey, police
officers responded to an anonymous call that juveniles were fighting on a city
street; when the officers located the juveniles, they discovered that “no one had
been fighting, no one was injured, and no criminal activity was underway.” Id.
at 596. Yet, because “it was after midnight on a week night in a commercial
area with no open businesses and no nearby residences[,]” the officers directed
the minor boys to sit on the sidewalk while the officers called their parents. Id.
The defendant’s mother requested that the officers drive him home, so before
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placing the defendant in the squad car, the officers conducted a pat-down
search for weapons, which yielded marijuana and cocaine. Id. at 596-97. The
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the seizure—arguing that his
detainment exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry stop; in turn, the State
posited that the defendant’s “encounter with the police officers involved the
‘routine check on health and safety’ aspect of the ‘community caretaking
function’ exception.” Id. at 599-600.
[19] The Acrey court recognized that “[m]any citizens look to the police to assist
them in a variety of circumstances, including delivering emergency messages,
giving directions, searching for lost children, assisting stranded motorists, and
rendering first aid.” Id. at 599 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, the court stated that “[i]n determining whether an officer’s
encounter with a person is reasonable as part of a routine check on safety, we
must balance the ‘individual’s interest in freedom from police interference
against the public’s interest in having the police officers perform a community
caretaking function.” Id. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
reasonableness inquiry requires balancing the competing interests “in light of all
the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. at 599. Ultimately, the Acrey
court concluded that the officers reasonably acted within their community
caretaking capacity by detaining the minor defendant in order to contact his
mother. Id. at 602.
[20] Like the Acrey court, it appears that the other state courts that have adopted the
community caretaking function exception “have required, at a minimum, that
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the officer’s actions must be measured by a standard of reasonableness.” Poe v.
Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). However, the specific
tests utilized to determine whether an officer acted reasonably “are not
consistent across all of the jurisdictions.” State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 474
(Mont. 2002). Moreover, “[t]he core of the community-caretaking doctrine . . .
has been left with little doctrinal guidance from the Supreme Court other than
the vague command of reasonableness.” State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 273
(Iowa 2012)). Thus, “[e]laboration of the doctrine has been left to other courts,
especially state courts. This latter development is not surprising in light of the
fact that community caretaking is generally the role of local police rather than
federal officers.” Id. at 273-74.
[21] Our review of case law in other jurisdictions reveals that a significant number of
states employ some version of a totality of the circumstances test to assess
whether an officer’s community caretaking conduct (in the context of a traffic
stop) is unreasonable such that it violates the Fourth Amendment. 1 In a similar
1
See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (requiring the officer to possess a subjective
belief that an individual is in need of immediate assistance “in view of all the surrounding circumstances”);
People v. McDonough, 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (Ill. 2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to “be
performing some function other than the investigation of a crime” and that the search or seizure “be
reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s
reasonableness “is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances”); Trejo v. State,
76 So. 3d 684, 689 (Miss. 2011) (asking “whether a reasonable person, ‘given the totality of the circumstances,
would believe [the individual] is in need of help’ or that the safety of the public is endangered”); State v. Rohde,
864 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that a court should “assess the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the stop, including all of the objective observations and considerations, as well as
the suspicion drawn by a trained and experienced police officer by inference and deduction”), review denied;
State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 188 (Tenn. 2013) (requiring that “the totality of the circumstances must be
considered to determine whether the police officer was acting within a community caretaking role” which
Tennessee classifies as a consensual encounter, rather than a seizure, under the Fourth Amendment); Wright
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vein, other courts simply require that there be objective, specific and articulable
facts that would lead an officer to reasonably believe that a citizen is in distress,
peril, or otherwise in need of assistance. 2 Finally, there is also a line of
decisions that require imminent danger or life-threatening circumstances before
an officer may initiate a traffic stop on less than reasonable suspicion. 3
[22] Using a combination of elements from the states’ various tests, Wisconsin
implemented a three-pronged analysis “for evaluating claims of police
community caretaker functions.” State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 605 (Wis.
2009). Under Wisconsin’s approach, a court must determine “(1) that a seizure
within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment has occurred; (2) if so,
whether the police conduct was bona fide community caretaker activity; and (3)
v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (allowing an officer to “stop and assist an individual
whom a reasonable person—given the totality of the circumstances—would believe is in need of help” and
setting forth the following relevant factors to consider: “(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by
the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had
access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not
assisted—presented a danger to himself or others”); Acrey, 64 P.3d at 599 (discussed above); and Ullom v.
Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 122 (W. Va. 2010) (requiring the State to establish four elements, including, in part,
that “[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable and prudent police officer would have perceived a
need to promptly act” and that the officer “must be able to articulate specific [and objectively reasonable]
facts that, taken with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the intrusion”).
2
See, e.g., Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 820 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Agreda v. State, 152 So. 3d 114, 116 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Poe, 169 S.W.3d at 58; Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475-76; and State v. Button, 86 A.3d 1001,
1003 (Vt. 2013).
3
See, e.g., Meeks v. State, 479 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016) (requiring an “objective basis for
believing that someone in the vehicle was in immediate need of medical assistance or was in imminent
danger”); State v. Barzacchini, 17 N.E.3d 1186, 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (permitting a community
caretaking stop where “a law enforcement officer [has] objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is
an immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury”); and Provo City v.
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (implementing a three-step analysis, which demands, in
part, that the circumstances objectively “demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb”), aff’d, 875 P.2d
557 (Utah 1994).
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if so, whether the public need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the
privacy of the individual.” Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987)). During the second step—i.e., whether the police
conduct was bona fide community caretaker activity—“a court considers
whether police conduct is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’” Id. at
606 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 441). This determination is based on an
examination of the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of
the police officer’s conduct. Id. at 608. While a police officer’s subjective intent
may be a factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances, when “an
objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown,
that determination is not negated by the officer’s subjective law enforcement
concerns.” Id. The third step—the balance of public needs against individual
privacy interests—assesses whether the officer’s exercise of his/her community
caretaker function was reasonable. Id. at 610. “The stronger the public need
and the more minimal the intrusion upon an individual’s liberty, the more likely
the police conduct will be held to be reasonable.” Id. at 611. Wisconsin courts
consider the following factors in balancing these interests:
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency of the
situation; (2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the
seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt authority
and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and
(4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to
the type of intrusion actually accomplished.
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Id. Applying this test, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that an officer
properly acted within his community caretaker function when he stopped to
offer assistance to a driver who was parked on the side of the road with his
hazard lights flashing. Id. at 601, 612. See Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277
(espousing a test similar to Wisconsin’s, but in determining whether an officer
was engaged in bona fide community caretaker activity, Iowa considers
whether the conduct falls within “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the
automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, [or] (3) the ‘public servant’
exception”); and State v. Smathers, 753 S.E.2d 380, 386 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014)
(adopting Wisconsin’s test).
[23] Like the “majority of state courts throughout the country” that have adopted
the community caretaking exception, we recognize that law enforcement
officers do have community safety and welfare duties beyond their criminal
investigatory duties. Smathers, 753 S.E.2d at 384. Accordingly, we find that the
community caretaking function exception may be used as a means of
establishing the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.
We further find that the three-pronged test utilized by Wisconsin “provides a
flexible framework within which officers can safely perform their duties in the
public’s interest while still protecting individuals from unreasonable
government intrusions.” Id. at 386. We now apply this test to the specific facts
of Osborne’s case.
[24] First, as to whether there was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, there is no dispute that Osborne was seized when Officer Arnold
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conducted the traffic stop. Turning to the second prong—whether the police
conduct was bona fide community caretaker activity, we find that Officer
Arnold articulated a basis for conducting the traffic stop that was unrelated to
his criminal investigative duties. He testified that his “main focus was the
concern for the individual’s safety. Were they [sic] hurt[?] Did they [sic] need
paramedics[?] You know, was it something serious[], the severity of the
injuries, if any. Things like that.” (Tr. p. 18). While Officer Arnold may have
possessed some subjective belief that Osborne was impaired when he initiated
the stop (given his testimony that he “was concerned because . . . it’s not
normal behavior”), he stated that the basis for the traffic stop was to ascertain
whether Osborne required medical attention, which is an objectively reasonable
bona fide caretaking function. (Tr. p. 23).
[25] Lastly, the third step requires a balance of the public’s need against the
individual’s privacy interests to determine whether the officer’s conduct was
reasonable. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 610. Here, we conclude that the public
need and interest did not outweigh the intrusion into Osborne’s privacy.
Officer Arnold responded to a call that an individual “was stuck underneath her
vehicle.” (Tr. p. 13). No further details were provided regarding the manner in
which the person was “stuck” or the severity thereof. (Tr. p. 13). Before he
even arrived at the scene, Officer Arnold learned that the individual—
Osborne—had freed herself and was leaving the gas station. There was no
indication from the reporting source that Osborne was injured, in need of
medical attention, or otherwise in distress; nor did the caller suggest that
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Osborne had demonstrated any other concerning conduct indicative of a mental
impairment.
[26] Moreover, Officer Arnold drove behind Osborne and did not personally observe
any specific behavior that would give rise to a concern that she was in need of
assistance, such as swerving, weaving, or erratic driving. See Poe, 169 S.W.3d at
59 (finding the community caretaking exception did not apply where an officer
stopped an apparently lost driver in order to offer directions as there was “no
evidence such as a flat tire, flashing lights, jumper cables, a raised hood or any
other indication that [the defendant] required assistance”); and Button, 86 A.3d
at 1002, 1004 (concluding that the objective grounds did not provide a
reasonable basis to believe the driver was in distress where a vehicle stopped on
the shoulder of a back-country road, where it posed no danger to oncoming
traffic” and where the defendant “had not been driving erratically”). Instead,
the fact that Osborne freed herself from her “stuck” position and was able to
safely drive her vehicle without any incident indicates that the situation did not
warrant immediate assistance. (Tr. p. 13).
[27] Furthermore, during the hearing, Officer Arnold stated that if Osborne had
requested medical attention, his response would have been to summon
paramedics. We note that if Osborne had desired medical attention, she could
have easily asked for help at the gas station instead of driving away. See
Smathers, 753 S.E.2d at 387 (noting that the public’s need and interest in a
police officer conducting a stop after observing a motorist strike a large animal
outweighed the defendant’s individual privacy interest, in part, because the
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seizure occurred on a “rural and dimly lit stretch of road” and “there was a
lower probability that [the] defendant could have gotten help from someone if
she needed it”); see also McDonough, 940 N.E.2d at 1109-10 (finding the
community caretaker function exception applied where a car was parked
alongside the road with its emergency flashers activated because “[t]he public
has a substantial interest in ensuring that police offer assistance to motorists
who may be stranded on the side of a highway, especially after dark and in
areas where assistance may not be close at hand”). If there had been any
articulable facts prior to the stop to support Officer Arnold’s belief that Osborne
was in immediate need of assistance—such as more details about the nature of
the incident from the individual who called or any indication that Osborne
sustained injuries which affected her ability to drive—then our conclusion
would likely be different. Instead, based on the facts before this court, we
cannot say that Officer Arnold’s traffic stop was justified pursuant to his
community caretaking function. 4 Therefore, the evidence obtained as a result
of the invalid traffic stop should have been excluded.
CONCLUSION
[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the community caretaking function of
police officers may apply to justify a traffic stop where the officer does not
otherwise observe a traffic violation or have a reasonable suspicion that
4
Because we conclude that Officer Arnold’s traffic stop was invalid under the Fourth Amendment, we need
not address Osborne’s separate argument that the traffic stop violated her rights under Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution.
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criminal activity is afoot. However, based on the facts of this case, we conclude
that the exercise of Officer Arnold’s community caretaking function was not
reasonable and, therefore, violated Osborne’s Fourth Amendment rights.
[29] Reversed and remanded.
[30] Pyle, J. concurs
[31] Kirsch, J. dissents without separate opinion
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