Jeffrey M. Steffen v. State of Indiana

FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
Aug 13 2012, 9:02 am
before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the CLERK
of the supreme court,
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law of the case. tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN RIPSTRA GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jasper, Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEFFREY M. STEFFEN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 19A04-1110-CR-588
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DUBOIS CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable William E. Weikert, Judge
Cause No. 19C01-1003-FC-59
August 13, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issues
Following a jury trial, Jeffrey Steffen appeals his four convictions of intimidation
and his single conviction of theft, all Class D felonies. Steffen raises three issues, which
we consolidate, reorder, and restate as two: whether the trial court reversibly erred in
allowing into evidence items found in Steffen’s vehicle, and whether sufficient evidence
was presented to sustain each of his five convictions. Concluding that by allowing the
challenged items into evidence the trial court committed harmless error, and that
sufficient evidence was presented, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In February 2010, Steffen purchased a moped from Lindsey Denton. At the time
of the sale, Denton told Steffen she would give him the key in about one week, but did
not do so.
On March 21, 2010, Steffen happened to drive by Denton’s home and decided to
stop to get the key from Denton. Four people were inside Denton’s home when Steffen
arrived: Denton, Jordon Shelton, Jason Walters, and Alex Snedeker. Steffen routinely
carried a licensed handgun, thus he was armed as he walked up Denton’s driveway.
From inside, Shelton witnessed Steffen remove a key from the ignition of Snedeker’s
moped in the driveway. The four then stepped outside and began to argue with Steffen.
The argument became heated, and eventually Steffen displayed to the four his
handgun on his hip. Steffen threatened to pistol whip anyone who challenged him. The
tension continued to rise as at least one of the four picked up a rock, and police were
called. When police arrived, Steffen threw the key in the yard, displayed his handgun to
an officer, and was arrested. During his arrest, officers found another handgun strapped
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to Steffen’s ankle; during an inventory search of Steffen’s vehicle, which they towed,
they discovered a third handgun, ammunition, and an ammunition magazine.
A jury found Steffen guilty of four counts of intimidation and one count of theft,
all as Class D felonies. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced
Steffen to five one-year terms to be served concurrently, all suspended to one and one-
half years of probation. Steffen now appeals his convictions.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Packer v. State, 800 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We will reverse
a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.B. Items in Steffen’s Vehicle
Over Steffen’s objection, the trial court allowed the State to introduce into
evidence the inventory log of his car, and also a handgun found therein, and allowed the
State to display to the jury ammunition and an ammunition magazine also found in
Steffen’s car during the inventory search. There was no allegation that Steffen’s
possession or storage of these items in his vehicle was unlawful, and there is no
suggestion in the record that these items were relevant to the charged offenses.
Our supreme court has recognized that the introduction into evidence of weapons
not used in the commission of the crime and not otherwise relevant to the case may have
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a prejudicial effect. Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d. 884, 890 (Ind. 2001). Error in the
admission of evidence is harmless, however, if it does not affect the substantial rights of
the defendant. Id. (quotation omitted) (concluding that a defendant’s substantial rights
were not violated by the introduction of a gun and ammunition unrelated to the offenses).
The improper admission of evidence is also harmless if the erroneously admitted
evidence is “merely cumulative of other evidence in the record.” Bryant v. State, 802
N.E.2d 486, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
The evidence which Steffen argues the trial court erred in allowing into evidence
was merely cumulative of other evidence in the record, namely, Steffen’s testimony.1
When asked on direct examination how often Steffen wears firearms, he stated:
It was like, let me use the analogy, putting a T-shirt on, I think, or a shirt. It
was like putting on my underwear every day, or you know, it’s something
that was always on. I always had a gun in the car. The gun was in the car
twenty-four seven for years.
Tr. at 239 (emphasis added).
Steffen now argues that for the State to introduce evidence which made it clear to
the jury that Steffen had a gun and ammunition in his vehicle was so prejudicial that it
affected his substantial rights, but Steffen told the jury himself that he always has a gun
in his car. The erroneous admission of cumulative evidence is not reversible error. See
Robinson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind. 1998) (concluding that admission of five
1
While objecting to the State’s introduction into evidence of the inventory log, Steffen indicated he
planned to object when the State later attempted to introduce into evidence the gun found in his vehicle. See
Transcript at 167-69. The trial court’s response is somewhat unclear and could be read such that Steffen might have
believed that he did not need to make a contemporaneous objection, even for the record and without detail. While
the failure to object contemporaneously generally waives an issue for appellate review, we acknowledge that the
failure of Steffen to object here might have been in reliance on the trial court’s ambiguous statement. In any event,
we do not rely on this failure to object or the evidence thus introduced into evidence to determine this issue.
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hearsay statements were not reversible error because all five were confirmed by
witnesses’ trial testimonies).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not evaluate the credibility
of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
Rather, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. (citation omitted). The judgment will be affirmed
if that evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to
support the judgment. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 834 (Ind. 2000).
B. Intimidation
To convict Steffen of each count of intimidation, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Steffen communicated to each person a threat to commit a
forcible felony with the intent that each person was placed in fear of retaliation for the
lawful act of confronting Steffen about Snedeker’s key. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1. A
“threat” is an “expression, by words or action, of an intention to . . . unlawfully injure the
person threatened . . . .” Id. at 35-45-2-1(c)(1). “‘Forcible felony’ means a felony that
involves the use or threat of force against a human being, or in which there is imminent
danger of bodily injury to a human being.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-138.
While Steffen concedes that he displayed his gun to the four people at Denton’s
home, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he did so to communicate
a threat for the purpose of intimidation. Our supreme court addressed a similar argument
in Johnson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 755, 756 (Ind. 2001). In Johnson, the defendant made
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multiple derogatory statements to an out-of-uniform officer, and when the officer began
to exit his vehicle to confront the defendant, the defendant lifted his jacket to display the
top of an automatic handgun and stated, “Don’t even think it.” Id. at 756. Our supreme
court affirmed the defendant’s intimidation conviction because the defendant introduced
the gun into an emotionally charged environment and suggested a willingness to use it as
needed. Id.
Steffen’s conduct paralleled that of Johnson. Here, witnesses testified that an
argument occurred, that Steffen displayed his gun and threatened to “pistol whip” anyone
in the group that challenged him, and that they believed he would do so. On appeal
Steffen refers us to contrary evidence presented, but we do not reweigh evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to
sustain Steffen’s four intimidation convictions.
C. Theft
To convict Steffen of theft as a Class D felony, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Steffen knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized
control over Snedeker’s key with the intent to deprive Snedeker of its value or use. See
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). Steffen argues that he should not have been convicted of theft
because the evidence does not support a finding that he intended to deprive Snedeker of
the key’s value or use.
When Steffen arrived at Denton’s residence, Shelton witnessed Steffen take the
key out of Snedeker’s moped. Snedeker later requested Steffen return the key, but
Steffen declared he would not do so until Denton gave to Steffen the key to his recently
purchased moped. Steffen held onto Snedeker’s key until officers arrived to diffuse the
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situation and arrest Steffen, at which point Steffen threw the key into Denton’s yard. The
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support the jury’s finding that Steffen took
the key, intended to deprive Snedeker of the key’s value or use for an indefinite period of
time, and in fact did so while Snedeker was requesting its return. Sufficient evidence was
presented and we affirm Steffen’s theft conviction.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court committed harmless error in allowing into
evidence items from Steffen’s vehicle. We also conclude that sufficient evidence was
presented to sustain his five convictions, and therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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