Dayron Bell v. State of Indiana

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
YVETTE M. LAPLANTE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana
JOSEPH Y. HO
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Dec 31 2013, 9:12 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DAYRON BELL, )
)
Appellant-Contemnor, )
)
vs. ) No. 82A01-1306-CR-271
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge
Cause No. 82D02-1209-MR-1149
December 31, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dayron Bell appeals the trial court’s order finding him in contempt. Bell raises
four issues for our review, but we consider only the following dispositive issue: whether
this appeal is moot because Bell has served his sentence and none of Bell’s issues on
appeal justify our review under the public interest exception. We dismiss.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 28, 2013, Bell attended the murder trial of his brother, Christopher.
During the trial, Bell threatened at least one of the witnesses. The trial court promptly
brought the trial to a halt and instructed the State to call “whoever heard the statements”
to the witness stand. Transcript at 4.
The State first called Ricky Hill. Hill testified as follows:
Q [D]id you hear certain threats made by a person who[ is] in the
courtroom now?
A Yes I did.
Q What were the substance of those threats?
A . . . a young man out there in the audience . . . turned to look [at the
witnesses in the hallway] and told them “I’m ten (10) times worse than my
brother.”
Q Okay. Did he make any mention about their testimony?
A He had said something before that and I didn’t hear that.
Id. at 5-6. Hill then identified Bell as the person who had made that statement.
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The State then called Darryl Meriweather.1 According to Meriweather:
Q Were you out in the hallway about ten (10) minutes ago?
A Yes.
Q And did you have an opportunity to . . . hear what Mr. Bell said out
there?
A Yes.
Q And what did he say?
A He said, “Better not nobody testify against his brother or it will be
three (3) times worse.”
Q Who did he say that to?
***
A Well I think he was directing it towards [an eyewitness’s mother].
Q Okay, okay. There’s several people standing out there is that right.
A Yeah, because we were all standing there together, so it could had
been all of us. But, it looked more like to me it was her.
Id. at 11.
The court then ordered Bell to the witness stand. Bell denied that he had
threatened any of the witnesses. The court then found as follows:
[H]ere’s the problem I got. We got a witness called by the State, an
eyewitness to a murder, whose home was broken into last night, and was
beaten, and obviously someone is trying to intimidate her. And I hear
you’re out there shooting your mouth off which is a polite way of putting it.
[T]his is a Court of Law, Mr. Bell, we decide things not the way we do in
the street or in the alley. We don’t bully people, we don’t try to get over on
1
The exact spelling of Meriweather’s name is not clear based on the record on appeal. We
follow the spelling used by the State in its brief, which the State represents is based on the spelling
Meriweather gave during a deposition.
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people, we don’t intimidate people. This is contempt of court and I’m
finding you in Contempt of Court. . . . I believe these folks are telling me
the truth and say what you said.
Id. at 17-18. The court ordered Bell to jail for the remainder of the trial.
Following the trial, on June 3 the court appointed a public defender for Bell, and
on June 7 the court held a sentencing hearing. At that hearing, the court rejected Bell’s
argument that the contempt order was for indirect contempt and instead found that the
order was for direct contempt, stating that “it occurred in or very near the actual trial
itself, it directly impacted the trial at the time the trial was . . . in . . . progress. It
happened literally right outside the door of the courtroom.” Id. at 27. The court then
restated its rationale for finding Bell in contempt and ordered him to serve ninety days in
the Vanderburgh County Jail with no good time credit. This appeal ensued. Bell was
released from his sentence on August 25.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
On appeal, Bell asserts that the trial court erroneously determined him to be in
direct contempt, rather than indirect contempt, and that, because of this mistake, the trial
court denied him certain due process protections normally available for indirect contempt
proceedings. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5. Bell alternatively asserts that, even if the trial
court’s determination that he was in direct contempt was correct, the court still denied
him certain statutory safeguards. See I.C. § 34-47-2-4.
But the parties agree that this appeal is moot because Bell has served his contempt
sentence and has been released. As we have explained:
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where the principal questions at issue cease to be of real controversy
between the parties, the errors assigned become moot questions and this
court will not retain jurisdiction to decide them. Stated differently, when
we are unable to provide effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed
moot, and we will not reverse the trial court’s determination where
absolutely no change in the status quo will result.
Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotations
omitted), trans. denied. There is no question that any decision we were to render on
Bell’s claims would result in “no change in the status quo.” Id. As such, Bell’s appeal is
moot.
Nonetheless:
“Although moot cases are usually dismissed, Indiana courts have long
recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under an exception to
the general rule when the case involves questions of ‘great public interest.’”
[In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)]. Typically, cases falling in
the “great public interest” exception contain issues likely to recur. Id.In re Commitment of J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).2 Here, Bell asserts
that the “public interest exception” applies to his case for the following four reasons:
[First, t]his court has previously held that “the question of whether good-
time credit applies to a sentence for criminal contempt, and further, whether
a contemnor’s sentence is reasonable are ones of significant import which
may continue to evade review.” [Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 200-01]. [Second,
and s]imilarly, the question of whether or not the perceived intimidation of
a witness outside the presence of a judge, but inside the courthouse, during
a murder trial is direct or indirect contempt[] may continue to evade review
due to the short nature of contempt sentences. [Third], due process rights
and the violation thereof are matters of great public importance. [Fourth],
for as long as there are trials and witnesses, these types of situations are
likely to occur.
2
Both parties cite Jones for the definition of the public interest exception, but in Jones this court
stated that the public interest exception applies when “the issue arises in a context which will continue to
evade review.” Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 200. Our Supreme Court has rejected the “additional
element . . . that the case must be likely to evade review.” In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37 n.2.
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Appellant’s Br. at 6.
The only one of Bell’s four rationales that might merit invoking the public interest
exception is his concern that the trial court here improperly held him in direct contempt
rather than indirect contempt. But there is an established body of law on the differences
between these two types of contempt. See, e.g., In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95-96 (Ind.
1994) (clarifying the distinction between direct and indirect attempt and discussing
numerous authorities). Any review we gave to this issue here would not add to this body
of law, but would merely apply existing law.
We also reject the other grounds alleged by Bell for why we should not dismiss his
appeal. Since the end of 2011, this court has applied the public interest exception to
consider only the following issues: “the proof necessary for [an] involuntary
commitment,” In re Commitment of T.K., 993 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. decision pending; “what suffices as ‘reasonably particular’ in a request for public
records submitted under the Access to Public Records Act,” Anderson v. Huntington
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 983 N.E.2d 613, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; and
“whether a residency restriction can be a condition of a convicted child molester’s
parole[] when the statute authorizing the imposition of that condition was not in effect at
the time he committed the offense,” Gaither v. Ind. Dep’t of Correction, 971 N.E.2d 690,
694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).3 Nothing in the facts of Bell’s case persuades this court that the
3
In a fourth opinion, a divided panel of this court considered an appeal involving “issues of
competitive bidding and the expenditure of taxpayer money.” Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville Vanderburgh
Sch. Corp., 984 N.E.2d 668, 676-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. granted. However, our Supreme Court
has granted transfer in that opinion, thereby vacating it. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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issues raised by Bell are of “great public importance.” See In re Commitment of J.B.,
766 N.E.2d at 798.
In essence, Bell’s argument for applying the public interest exception conflates an
exception reserved for “questions of great public importance” with mere error review.
See id. That is not the purpose of this limited exception, and we will not deviate from our
general rule of not deciding moot cases based on these facts. Accordingly, we decline
Bell’s invitation to apply the public interest exception to this appeal, and we dismiss
Bell’s appeal as moot.
Dismissed.
BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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