Brittney Watson v. State of Indiana

FOR PUBLICATION Dec 19 2013, 7:02 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARIELENA DUERRING GREGORY F. ZOELLER
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JOSEPH Y. HO
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BRITTNEY WATSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1303-CR-91
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff, )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Roland W. Chamblee, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 71D08-1012-MR-9
December 19, 2013
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Brittney Watson (“Watson”) appeals her conviction for Murder, a felony,
presenting the sole issue of whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction. We
affirm.1
Facts and Procedural History
During the evening of November 29, 2010, Watson, Cornelius Miller (“Miller”),
and several other individuals were involved in a confrontation in a parking lot in South
Bend. Watson called Miller a “rapist” because of his alleged internet posting of nude
photos of Watson’s friend. (Tr. 327.) Miller responded by punching Watson in the face
several times. Miller’s girlfriend, Ashley Shaw (“Shaw”), then engaged in a fistfight
with Watson for “about five minutes.” (Tr. 329.) Shaw and Miller got into Shaw’s
vehicle to leave, but Watson attempted to jump on top of the moving vehicle. Shaw
drove her vehicle into Watson.
Witnesses heard Watson make threats, including: “somebody is going to die” and
“I’m going to have my brothers and them come down here and kill your b---- a--. I’m
going to have them shoot your f-----g house up.” (Tr. 62, 78.) Upon leaving, Watson
telephoned the father of her child, Steven Rice (“Steven”), and Steven’s brother, Stephon
Rice (“Stephon”), to report that she had been beaten.
Approximately two hours later, Steven and Stephon appeared at the home where
Watson was staying. Both were armed. Stephon was accompanied by his mother’s
boyfriend, Rene Vasquez (“Vasquez”) and Steven was accompanied by his cousin,
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We held oral argument in this case on December 2, 2013, at New Palestine High School in New
Palestine, Indiana. We wish to thank our host and commend counsel for their able advocacy.
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Brandon Rogers (“Rogers”). The brothers, Watson, and Rogers discussed “going to
fight” Miller. (Tr. 279.) Stephon expressed his intention to kill Miller.
At some point, Stephon observed a parked vehicle and approached it. Apparently
believing that Watson’s assailant was inside, Stephon confronted the passengers, saying:
“I’m going to kill everybody. Somebody is going to die tonight.” (Tr. 302.) Watson
stopped him, protesting that he had targeted the wrong man.
Watson left in a vehicle with Steven and Rogers; Stephon and Vasquez followed.
Watson directed the men to the residence shared by Miller and Shaw. At the apartment,
she urged the brothers, “You all better do what we came here to do.” (Tr. 303.)
Although she expressed an interest in going inside to “fight a girl who was in the house,”
Watson ultimately remained in the vehicle. (Tr. 304.) When Miller answered his door,
Steven and Stephon fired multiple shots at him. Miller was struck twice and killed.
Watson fled the scene.
Watson was charged with Miller’s murder. At trial, the State’s theory was that
Watson acted as an accomplice. She was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifty
years imprisonment, with five years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Watson was convicted of violating Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1, which
provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being
commits murder. When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, but will consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Drane v. State,
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867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable
fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.Watson claims that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction because
the State failed to establish the requisite element of intent. More specifically, Watson
argues that when the State alleges the commission of murder by aiding or abetting, a
knowing mens rea is insufficient and the State must prove that the defendant acted with
the specific intent that the victim be killed. We disagree with Watson’s contention that
the State bore a heightened burden of proof as to intent because Watson was an
accomplice and not the actual shooter.
Under the accomplice liability statute, “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally
aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense. . . .”
Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Our supreme court has noted that “there is no separate crime of
being an accessory to a crime or aiding and abetting the perpetrator of a crime; rather, a
defendant may be convicted as a principal upon evidence that he aided or abetted in the
perpetration of the charged crime.” Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind.
2000). An actor who would have been considered an accessory under the common law
now vicariously commits the actual offense. Id. That is, even where the court or jury
utilizes the accomplice liability statute to determine guilt, the individual is considered to
have been convicted on the weight of his or her own action, and the individual who aids
another person in committing a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Id.Watson directs our attention to Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind.
2000), in which our supreme court reversed convictions for aiding attempted murders due
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to insufficiency of the evidence to prove that Bethel had the specific intent to kill the
victims. The Bethel Court relied upon Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1991)
for the “well-settled” proposition that a conviction for attempted murder requires proof of
specific intent to kill, and concluded:
[T]o convict for the offense of aiding an attempted murder, the State must
prove: (1) that the accomplice, acting with the specific intent to kill, took a
substantial step toward the commission of murder, and (2) that the
defendant, acting with the specific intent that the killing occur, knowingly
or intentionally aided, induced, or caused the accomplice to commit the
crime of attempted murder.
Bethel, 730 N.E.2d at 1246.
Here, however, the jury need not have found – consistent with Spradlin – that
Watson must have possessed the specific intent to kill Miller. The State alleged the
commission of a completed murder as opposed to an attempted murder. “The defendant
must have had the specific intent to commit murder in order to be found guilty of
attempt[ed] murder. There is no comparable requirement for the murder charge.” Echols
v. State, 722 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2000). See also Garrett v. State, 714 N.E.2d 618, 622
(Ind. 1999) (observing that the requirement of a specific intent to kill applies only in
attempted murder cases, and not in murder cases where the defendant may be convicted
upon a showing of either an intentional or knowing killing).
As to an accomplice, he can be found guilty of murder if he either knew or
intended that the victim would be killed by a principal. For example, in Taylor v. State,
840 N.E.2d 324, 336-37 (Ind. 2006), an appeal from the denial of a post-conviction
petition challenging an accomplice murder conviction, our supreme court observed: “If
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Taylor knowingly or intentionally aided and abetted Bowling to kill Anderson, Taylor
can be found guilty of murder so long as (1) Bowling killed Anderson and (2) Taylor
knew or intended that Anderson would be killed.” The Taylor Court explicitly held: “a
defendant can be guilty as an accomplice even if the principal does not act ‘knowingly or
intentionally.’” Id. at 328.
In determining accomplice liability, the fact-finder can consider factors including:
(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in a
crime; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct
before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. Wieland v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1198,
1202 (Ind. 2000). A defendant’s presence during the commission of the crime or his
failure to oppose the crime, standing alone, are insufficient to establish accomplice
liability; however, a fact-finder may consider them along with the defendant’s course of
conduct and his companionship with the one who commits the crime. Echols, 722
N.E.2d at 807.
The probative evidence supporting Watson’s conviction includes the following.
After Watson was beaten by Miller, she told Carlia Wells, the mother of Miller’s
children: “I’m going to have my brothers come back and kill your baby daddy.” (Tr.
330.) Other witnesses heard similar threats. Watson immediately placed calls to Steven
and Stephon, who then arranged rides to South Bend. Watson told her friend, Jarika
Studway, that the brothers were on their way and “bringing their .9s with them.” (Tr.
31.) Watson was present when Stephon threatened to kill Miller; she did not oppose the
plan to kill Miller and in fact subsequently spoke up to stop Stephon from shooting the
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wrong man. Ultimately, Watson directed the armed men to Miller’s residence and urged
them to “do what we came here to do.” (Tr. 303.) According to one of the State’s
witnesses, Watson appeared “glad” when she received a telephone call and told the caller
that Miller had been killed. (Tr. 292.)
From the foregoing, the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt
that Watson either knew or intended that Miller would be killed and acted in concert with
Steven and Stephon to accomplish the deed. The evidence is sufficient to support her
conviction for Murder.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
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