Raymond B. Baker v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the Dec 10 2013, 9:34 am
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JILL M. ACKLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Acklin Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Westfield, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RAYMOND B. BAKER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 24A01-1304-CR-163
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Clay M. Kellerman, Judge
Cause No. 24C02-1203-FD-343
December 10, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
Following a jury trial, Raymond Baker was convicted of two counts of neglect of a
dependent, both Class D felonies, and sentenced to two years on each count, to be served
concurrently, with six months suspended. Baker appeals his convictions, raising the sole
issue of whether sufficient evidence was presented to support his convictions.
Concluding there was sufficient evidence that Baker committed neglect of a dependent as
charged, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Cynthia Blanton is a school bus driver for Franklin County Schools. Baker’s two
daughters, A.B. and H.B., ride Blanton’s bus. On the morning of February 27, 2012,
A.B. and H.B. missed the bus. Admittedly upset with the girls for missing the bus, Baker
initially told them they would have to stay home from school that day but eventually
decided to take them to the school. At some point, Baker realized he might be able to
catch the bus en route rather than going all the way to the school. Blanton testified that
as she drove north toward the school on Johnson Fork Road, a car traveling south on
Johnson Fork Road was in her lane. She was approaching a T-intersection with
Sharptown Road to her right and assumed the car was going to try to make a left turn
onto Sharptown Road in front of the bus. She honked her horn, but the car remained in
her lane. To avoid what she felt was an inevitable collision, Blanton steered the bus into
the southbound lane and went left of the car, narrowly avoiding a telephone pole on the
west side of Johnson Fork Road directly opposite Sharptown Road. Rather than turning
onto Sharptown Road as Blanton had assumed it would, the car came to a stop at an angle
alongside the bus, and A.B. and H.B. stepped out and walked to the doors of the bus.
2
Through the closed doors, Blanton told the girls to go back to their car because she was
not allowed to pick them up at an unscheduled stop. Additionally, Blanton was
frightened by the encounter and was unwilling to open the doors to Baker. Regardless,
Blanton testified that the car was stopped close enough to the bus that she would have
been unable to open the doors if she had been inclined to. Baker became angry, and
Blanton testified that he swore at her. Baker denied swearing at Blanton but admitted
giving her the finger. A.B. and H.B. got back in the car, and according to a student on
the bus that day, Baker pulled away before the girls had their doors shut. Blanton
reported the incident to the school when she arrived and provided a list of students on the
bus at the time.
The State charged Baker with two counts of neglect of a dependent, Class D
felonies, for knowingly or intentionally placing his two daughters in a situation that
endangered their lives when he “drove his automobile at a high rate of speed directly in
the path of a school bus” while his daughters were passengers in the car. Appellant’s
Appendix at 45-46. Baker was also charged with thirty-six counts of criminal
recklessness, Class D felonies, one count for each identified person on the bus. A two-
day jury trial was held in February 2013. The State made the following comments during
its closing argument:
The Neglect of a Dependent; the Defendant knowingly or intentionally
placed [A.B. and H.B.] in a situation that actually and appreciatively
endangered the life or health and when they’re a dependent. . . .
Endangered their life or health; you heard [a student on the bus] testify that
because of the way the car was over in this lane, the bus was going to hit
right at her door. That was . . . that was lights out and she didn’t see any
way to avoid it, she was so appreciative the way this happened. If you look
at the . . . the seconds [on a video from the bus], this happened quickly,
very quick . . . . [Blanton] blew the horn, went to the left; veered to the left
3
and stopped and then who took off first? It’s on video, he did. He sped off,
was he angry? The kids weren’t even in the car. They’re telling me they
had their seatbelt on; they didn’t have an opportunity to put their seatbelt
on, they didn’t get their door closed. It’s impossible. . . . We didn’t hear
conflicts in the testimony on what happened when this Criminal
Recklessness act occurred. Remember I told you that’s our burden of
proof, those elements only. Not what happened before, not what happened
after. I’m saying it’s important, but when it comes down to it, did the State
prove it’s [sic] case beyond a reasonable doubt? What happened in that
five, eight seconds . . . . But when it came, come [sic] to the crucial part of
the testimony, did they deviate at all? No. That bus was coming at them, a
crash was imminent, there’s no way to avoid it. That’s never been deviated
upon.
Transcript at 319-21. A trial court entry for the second day indicates that after retiring to
deliberate, the jury “notifies the Court that it has a question. Both the State of Indiana
and the Defendant were notified and agreed as to the appropriate response would be to
instruct the jury to re-read the instructions.” Id. at 82. The question was “Can it be
neglect of a dependent when Baker left the scene with his girls and doors were not closed
vs. as stated in Count 37 & 38.” Id. at 122. After being instructed to re-read the jury
instructions, the jury found Baker not guilty of the counts of criminal recklessness but
guilty of the two counts of neglect of a dependent. Baker now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
Our standard of reviewing a sufficiency claim is well-settled:
We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses,
and respect the jury’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence.
We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the verdict. We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier
of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
4
II. Evidence of Neglect of a Dependent
Baker contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty
of neglect of a dependent, as evidenced by the jury question indicating it was seeking
facts other than those alleged in the information as a basis for a guilty verdict.
Specifically, Baker contends that “[b]ecause the jury did not find that the State produced
sufficient evidence that Baker committed the crime as charged, the jury erred in returning
a verdict of guilty.” Brief of Appellant at 11.
It has long been held that appellate courts “will not speculate as to the wisdom,
motive, or reasoning of the jury in reaching its verdict.” Wallace v. State, 492 N.E.2d 24,
25 (Ind. 1986). We may only ascertain whether there was sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable inference may be drawn from the evidence which could have allowed a
finding of guilt. See Delarosa, 938 N.E.2d at 697. A conviction for neglect of a
dependent requires the State to prove that “[a] person having the care of a dependent . . .
knowingly or intentionally . . . places the dependent in a situation that endangers the
dependent’s life or health . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1). The State alleged in the
information against Baker that he committed neglect of dependent by driving his vehicle
at a high rate of speed directly in the path of a school bus. Here, there were at least two
eyewitnesses who testified that Baker drove a vehicle on the wrong side of the road
directly in the path of a school bus. There is no question that his daughters were
passengers in the vehicle at the time. In addition, video of the incident as recorded by
cameras on the bus was shown to the jury. From that evidence, a reasonable inference
that Baker endangered his daughters’ lives could be made.
5
We also would not characterize the State’s case as Baker does: that the State
“emphasized” the evidence that Baker drove away from the scene before his daughters
were securely in the car. Br. of Appellant at 10-11. The State did elicit testimony from
both Blanton and a student on the bus that Baker drove away before the girls’ doors were
shut, and the State did mention that evidence in its closing argument. However, in the
context of all of the testimony and the entirety of the State’s closing argument, the
references to Baker’s leaving were brief and meant to comment on Baker’s general
demeanor and to point out credibility issues with the girls’ testimony. See Tr. at 319-20
(“He sped off, was he angry? . . . [The girls are] saying, ‘Yeah, we put our seatbelt on,
yeah we didn’t get the door closed yet.’ Bologna, nothing makes sense. Use your
common sense, your life’s experiences, your knowledge.”).
Given that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the verdict, the
fact that the jury asked a question about other evidence that could also prove the crime is
immaterial. The trial court responded to the jury’s question by telling it to reread the
court’s instructions. The jury instructions are not included in the record before us, either
in written or transcribed form, but we believe it safe to say the instructions included the
statutory definition of neglect of a dependent, the text of the charging information, and
instructions regarding the burden of proof and the “reasonable doubt” standard. A jury is
presumed to follow the court’s instructions. Morgan v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1010, 1019
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. It would not be uncommon for there to be evidence
beyond that specified in the information which could prove the crime, but we are
concerned only with whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the crime as charged,
and in this case, we hold that there was. To say, as Baker does, that the jury question
6
indicates the jury did not find that the facts alleged by the information were sufficient to
prove the crime but found him guilty anyway is impermissible speculation into the jury’s
fact-finding process. See Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting
the defendant’s argument “requires that we speculate on the jury’s thought process,
which we do not do.”), trans. denied.
Conclusion
Sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could have found Baker
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of neglect of a dependent, and the
judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
7