Richard Boylls v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Feb 11 2014, 6:28 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JESSE R. POAG GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Newburgh, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RICHARD BOYLLS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 82A05-1306-CR-307
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge
Cause No. 82D02-1208-FB-889
February 11, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Richard Boylls appeals his conviction for class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine.1 The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused
its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained during a warrantless search of Boylls’s
house. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 3, 2012, Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s Deputy Joshua Patterson was on
routine patrol on Big Cynthiana Road in Evansville. His windows were cracked open, and as
he drove through an intersection, he detected a strong chemical odor. He turned his police
vehicle around, drove back to the area, and summoned another officer, Deputy Tony Toopes,
to the scene. Deputy Toopes also detected the strong chemical odor. Based upon their
training and experience, both officers recognized the odor as that associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine. The two deputies parked their police vehicles and set out
on foot to investigate the source of the odor.
The deputies determined that the odor was emanating from Boylls’s house. Boylls’s
small house was located approximately forty to forty-five feet from his aunt’s larger home on
the same property. The deputies observed lights on in Boylls’s house and heard voices of
what they believed could be two to four people inside. The chemical odor emanating from
the house was “really, really pungent” and “overwhelmingly strong.” Tr. at 128-29. Sounds
1
Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-1.1 provides in pertinent part that a person who knowingly or
intentionally manufactures methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, commits class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine.
2
and smells coming from the home were especially prominent due to the “large inch to two
and a half inch gaps” between the windows and the window frames of the house. Id. at 131.
Deputy Toopes knocked on the front door of the house, identified himself, and asked
Boylls to come outside. Boylls responded from inside the home and stated that he was not
coming outside. The deputies continued to speak to Boylls from outside the house as they
walked around the perimeter. Deputy Toopes observed a large open trash can outside the
back door. He looked down inside the can and saw empty pseudoephedrine packages and
other items he believed to be consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Other
officers who arrived at the scene went to the adjacent home on the property to speak to
Boylls’s aunt.
Boylls continued to refuse repeated requests to exit the house. Deputy Toopes
informed Boylls that officers believed that he was cooking methamphetamine inside the
house and that Boylls and anyone else inside needed to come out. Boylls was very concerned
about his dog and wanted reassurances that officers would not harm his dog. After an
exchange that lasted “quite some time,” Boylls exited the house, closing the door behind him.
Id. at 133. Officers temporarily placed Boylls in handcuffs. Boylls told officers that no one
else was inside the house. Because officers had earlier heard additional voices and also heard
running and banging noises from inside, they continued to knock and request for any
occupants to exit the house. After a few minutes, another individual, Ross Flint, exited the
house. Officers then permitted Boylls’s aunt to call for Boylls’s dog, and the dog exited the
house. Because officers were still concerned that others could be inside, they entered the
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house to conduct a protective sweep. Officers were inside the house for approximately four
minutes and looked only in areas where a person could hide. No other individuals were
found inside the house.
After exiting the house, Deputy Toopes removed Boylls’s handcuffs, gave him a
Miranda and Pirtle advisement of rights,2 and asked him for consent to search the house.
Boylls verbally consented and signed a written consent to search. Officers from the drug task
force arrived and searched the house, finding numerous items consistent with the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
The State charged Boylls with class B felony dealing in methamphetamine, class D
felony possession of precursors, class D felony maintaining a common nuisance, class A
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.
Boylls subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his
house. His motion to suppress was denied following a hearing. A two-day jury trial began
on April 29, 2013. At the outset, the State moved to dismiss four of the charged counts and
proceeded to trial solely on the dealing charge. During trial, Boylls renewed his objection to
the admission of evidence obtained during the search. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found Boylls guilty of class B felony dealing in methamphetamine. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
Boylls contends that all evidence seized during the warrantless search of his house
should have been excluded as products of an illegal search. Although Boylls originally
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634 (1975).
4
challenged the admission of the evidence through a pretrial motion to suppress, he now
appeals following a jury trial and challenges the admission of that evidence at trial.
Therefore, the issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence at trial. Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied
(2010). A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence. Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and
circumstances presented. Id. When reviewing the admissibility of evidence, we do not
reweigh evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We also
consider uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.We begin by noting that the challenged evidence was seized during a warrantless
search of Boylls’s house that occurred after Boylls gave officers both verbal and written
consent to search. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ….” As a general rule, warrantless
searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind.
2006). “One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a voluntary and
knowing consent to search.” Crocker v. State, 989 N.E.2d 812, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(quoting Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied.
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We find dispositive here that Boylls does not challenge the validity of his verbal and
written consent to search his house. Indeed, he focuses solely on the reasonableness of the
officers’ protective sweep of the house that occurred prior to his consent. However, as noted
by the State, Boylls makes no claim or argument that the officers’ conduct somehow “vitiated
his subsequent consent.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Thus, the evidence he now challenges was
obtained pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, Boylls has
failed to establish a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.3 The trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it admitted the evidence.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
3
Boylls similarly fails to challenge the validity of his consent pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the
Indiana Constitution.
6