Bart Whitesitt v. Town of Knightstown

FOR PUBLICATION Nov 18 2013, 5:33 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
ANTHONY J. SAUNDERS KIRK A. HORN
New Castle, Indiana Mandel Horn, P.C.
Carmel, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BART WHITESITT, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 33A04-1302-MI-00072
)
TOWN OF KNIGHTSTOWN )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Brian D. Hill, Special Judge
Cause No. 33C03-1109-MI-011
November 18, 2013
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Bart Whitesitt (“Whitesitt”) appeals the Henry Circuit Court’s order entering
summary judgment in favor of the Town of Knightstown (“the Town”) in which the trial
court determined that the Town did not violate Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1 when it
abolished the Knightstown Town Court (“the Town Court”). As we reach the same
conclusion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The Town established the Town Court in 1970 by Ordinance Number 5-6-1970.
The court’s jurisdiction was limited to adjudication of traffic infractions and
misdemeanors.1 Whitesitt became the Town Court Judge on January 31, 2011, after the
prior judge resigned. Whitesitt was appointed to complete the prior judge’s four-year
term, which ended on December 31, 2011.
Also in January 2011, the Henry County Prosecutor notified the Town that it
would no longer refer misdemeanor offenses to the Town Court. Due to the resulting
revenue shortfall from the lack of court costs and fines, on July 21, 2011, the Town
passed Ordinance 7-2011 abolishing the Town Court.
On September 6, 2011, Whitesitt filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and
alleged that the Town violated Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1 when it abolished the
Town Court. Whitesitt and the Town filed cross motions for summary judgment, and a
hearing was held on January 28, 2013. The next day, the trial court issued an order
1
City and town courts “are of necessity courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction.” See Gill v. State, 232
Ind. 36, 39, 111 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1953).
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granting the Town’s motion for summary judgment and denying Whitesitt’s motion.
Whitesitt now appeals.
Standard of Review
Whitesitt argues that the trial court erred when it granted the Town’s motion for
summary judgment. Our standard of review of summary judgment appeals is well
established:
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is
the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts that the
parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether there is a
“genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In answering these questions,
the reviewing court construes all factual inferences in the non-moving
party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to the existence of a material issue
against the moving party. The moving party bears the burden of making a
prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and once the
movant satisfies the burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party
to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.
Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009)
(citations omitted). The party appealing a summary judgment decision has the burden of
persuading this court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous.
Knoebel v. Clark County Superior Court No. 1, 901 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 (Ind. Ct. App
2009). Where the facts are undisputed and the issue presented is a pure question of law,
we review the matter de novo. Crum v. City of Terre Haute ex rel. Dep’t of Redev., 812
N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Finally, our standard of review is not altered by
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the fact that the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins.
Grp. v. Blaskie, 727 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Discussion and Decision
Our resolution of the issue presented in this appeal hinges on our application of
Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1. Therefore, we initially observe that statutory
interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is reviewed de novo. Ind.
Pesticide Rev. Bd. v. Black Diamond Pest & Termite Control Inc., 916 N.E.2d 168, 181
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. De novo review allows us to
decide an issue without affording any deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. Our goal
in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the
legislature. Id. When a statute has not previously been construed, our interpretation is
controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction.
Id. We review the statute as a whole and presume the legislature intended logical
application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results.
See Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (quotation omitted), trans denied.
Whitesitt argues that when it abolished the Town Court, the Town violated Indiana
Code section 33-35-1-1, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) During 2006 and every fourth year after that, a second or third class city
or a town may by ordinance establish or abolish a city or town court. An
ordinance to establish a city or town court must be adopted not less than
one (1) year before the judge’s term would begin under section 3 of this
chapter.
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(b) The judge for a court established under subsection (a) shall be elected
under IC 3-10-6 or IC 3-10-7 at the municipal election in November 2007
and every four (4) years thereafter.
(c) A court established under subsection (a) comes into existence on
January 1 of the year following the year in which a judge is elected to serve
in that court.
(d) A city or town court in existence on January 1, 1986, may continue
in operation until it is abolished by ordinance.
(Emphasis added).
Whitesitt argues that 2006, 2010, and every fourth year thereafter are the only
years that the Town could legally abolish the Town Court, pursuant to subsection (a) of
the statute; therefore, the Town violated the statute when it passed Ordinance Number 7-
2011 on July 21, 2011, abolishing the Town Court. Further, he contends that the
“purpose” of subsection (d) “is to provide for the continued existence of a Town Court
organized under previous versions” of this statute and “not to force every town that had a
town court prior to 2006 . . . to re-create that Court every time the statute was amended[.]”
Appellant’s Br. at 7-8.
In response, the Town argued, and the trial court agreed, that pursuant to
subsection (d) of the statute, a city or town court established prior to January 1, 1986, is
exempt from the restriction contained in subsection (a). Because the Town Court was
established well before January 1, 1986, the trial court concluded that the Town did not
violate section 33-35-1-1 when it abolished the Town Court in 2011.
The original version of the statute was codified at Indiana Code section 33-10.1-1-
3, and the substance of the statute was nearly identical to the current version, but
subsection (a) provided that a second or third class city or town could establish or abolish
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a city or town court during 1982 and every fourth year thereafter. Similarly, subsection
(d) provided that a city or town court in existence on January 1, 1982, could continue in
operation until abolished by ordinance. The statute was amended in 1986 to substitute
the year 1982 to 1986 in subsection (a) and to change the date in subsection (d) to
January 1, 1986. The statute was recodified in Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1 in 2004,
but the substance of the statute remained the same. In 2006, the statute was amended to
its present version, which substituted the year 2006 for 1986 in subsection (a), but
subsection (d) was not changed.
The history of the statute and the plain language of subsection (d) lead us to
conclude that city and town courts that existed prior to January 1, 1986, can be abolished
by ordinance at any time. Subsection (d) unambiguously provides that city or town
courts in existence on January 1, 1986, will continue to operate until abolished by
ordinance. Unlike subsections (b) and (c) of the statute, which expressly relate only to
town courts established under subsection (a), subsection (d) does not contain any
reference to subsection (a). The General Assembly’s intent to treat courts established
prior to January 1, 1986, differently from those established after that date is clear under
the plain language of subsection (d) when it is considered within the entire context of the
statute. To reach any other conclusion would render subsection (d) meaningless. We
presume our General Assembly does not enact useless statutes or statutory provisions and
intends to avoid unjust or absurd results. Hall Drive Ins Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 773
N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind. 2002). Statutes are to be applied in a logical manner consistent
with public policy and convenience with each section being considered with reference to
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all other sections. Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 866 N.E.2d 740,
743 (Ind. 2007).
Moreover, we observe that in State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407 (Ind. 2000), our
supreme court held that Article Seven, Section One of the Indiana Constitution confers
upon the General Assembly the power to both create and to abolish courts unless the
court’s existence is constitutionally mandated. In Monfort, the legislature passed a bill in
1995 abolishing Jasper Superior Court No. 2, which was statutorily created as a court of
general jurisdiction in 1990. Judge Monfort challenged the constitutionality of the law,
and our supreme court concluded that while the legislature had the power to abolish the
court, doing so in the middle of a judge’s term violated the separation of powers
provision of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 412. “‘A court of general jurisdiction,
whether named in the Constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the
Constitution, cannot be directed, controlled, or impeded in its functions by any of the
other departments of the government.’” Id. (quoting Board of Commissioners v. Albright,
168 Ind. 564, 578, 81 N.E. 578, 582-83 (1907)).
Whitesitt relies on Monfort only to argue that a legislative body cannot abolish a
court “except by following the correct statutory procedure.” Appellant’s Br. at 8.
Whitesitt relies on his own interpretation of Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1 to support
his claim that the statute confers authority on the Town to abolish the Town Court only in
“the years 2006, 2010, 2014 and every four years thereafter.” Id.Whitesitt’s reliance on Monfort is misplaced because the circumstances in
Monfort are not analogous to those present in this case. The Town Court is one of
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inferior and limited jurisdiction and was created under the authority the General
Assembly conferred upon the Town. 2 Furthermore, in Monfort, our supreme court
observed that “there is authority for the proposition that the separation of powers doctrine
applies only to state governments and its officers, not municipal or local governments.”
Id. (citation omitted).
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1(d)
provides that a town or city court created prior to January 1, 1986, may be abolished by
ordinance at any time. Because the Town Court was in existence well before January 1,
1986, the Town’s enactment of Ordinance 7-2011 abolishing the Town Court was
statutorily authorized under Indiana Code section 33-35-1-1. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
2
The Town Court was abolished effective October 31, 2011, two months before the end of Whitesitt’s
term. However, the Town voted to pay Whitesitt for those remaining two months of his term.
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