Victoria Anderson v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 13 2013, 8:44 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RUTH JOHNSON CHANDRA K. HEIN
Marion County Public Defender Agency Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
VICTORIA ANDERSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1207-CR-603
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Rebekah Pierson-Treacy, Judge
The Honorable Shatrese Flowers, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F19-1203-CM-13956
March 13, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
Victoria Anderson was convicted of one count of Criminal Mischief,1 a class B
misdemeanor. On appeal, she contends that her conviction should be reversed because
the alleged victim’s testimony at trial was incredibly dubious.
We conclude that the doctrine of incredible dubiosity does not apply in this
instance because the victim’s testimony was neither inherently contradictory nor coerced,
and a law enforcement officer partially corroborated the victim’s testimony.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
On the morning of February 21, 2012, Melissa Thomas looked out her apartment
window and observed Anderson, her former co-worker, puncturing the tires of her
vehicle. Thomas ran outside to yell at Anderson, but she was not sure if Anderson heard
her. Thomas then called the police to report the incident.
During a subsequent investigation, Thomas reported that Anderson had also
vandalized her vehicle earlier that month. According to Thomas, the earlier incident
consisted of Anderson pouring paint over the vehicle and puncturing all four of the
vehicle’s tires. Thomas claimed to have reported this incident to the police; however, she
said that no officers responded because they were all busy in downtown Indianapolis.2
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2.
2
This alleged incident occurred during the weekend when Indianapolis hosted the Super Bowl.
2
The State charged Anderson with two counts of criminal mischief as class B
misdemeanors, one count for each alleged incident. At a bench trial held on June 28,
2012, Thomas recounted her version of the incidents.
Regarding the first incident, Thomas stated that she was inside her apartment on
February 4, 2012, when she observed Anderson near her vehicle. Thomas stated that she
then watched as Anderson “poured paint all over [Thomas’s] car . . . [and] flattened all
the tires.” Tr. p. 17. She recalled calling the police, who “said that they [were] going to
send somebody but they [were] so busy downtown that it would take a couple of hours.”
Id. at 19. However, no officers ever responded. Thomas then cleaned the paint from her
vehicle while it was still wet. Thomas reported that she “took pictures [of the paint on
her vehicle] but couldn’t no body [sic] see it.” Id. at 27.
After this incident, Thomas reported that she “had started sleeping with [her]
window open . . . to see if [she] could hear [Anderson] comin’.” Id. at 20. On the
morning of the second incident, Thomas saw Anderson puncturing her vehicle’s tires
through her open window. Thomas ran outside to confront Anderson, who was leaving,
and Thomas called the police.
Officer Shannon Harmon of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
testified that when he arrived at the scene, Thomas was “emotional . . . and stressed about
the incident.” Tr. p. 33. He recalled observing three flat tires on Thomas’s vehicle.
However, Officer Harmon did not recall Thomas reporting an earlier incident or seeing
paint on Thomas’s vehicle.
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Anderson testified that she and Thomas “had a fling” while they were co-workers.
Id. at 40. Anderson claimed that she had ended the relationship in October 2011 when
her husband found out about it. Anderson further claimed that she was not involved in
the second incident because she “probably” would have been getting her children ready
for school. Id. at 43.
Because of a discrepancy about the date of the first incident, the trial court
dismissed Count II. However, Anderson was found guilty as charged on Count I, which
pertained to the later incident. Anderson now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Anderson’s sole contention on appeal is that her conviction should be reversed
under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. More particularly, Anderson claims that
Thomas’s rendition of the facts was so “inherently improbable” that this Court should
find Anderson not guilty as a matter of law. Appellant’s Br. p. 1.
Generally, we do not reweigh the evidence presented or judge witness credibility.
Reed v. State, 748 N.E.2d 381, 395 (Ind. 2001). Rather, we will affirm a conviction if
there is probative evidence or reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Id.Notwithstanding these general principles, the incredible dubiosity doctrine
provides an extremely narrow exception. Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind.
1994). It applies only “in those rare cases where a sole witness presents inherently
contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete
lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Reed, 748 N.E.2d at 395-96.
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Conversely, the doctrine is inapplicable when testimony is corroborated by additional
witnesses or circumstantial evidence. Thompson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (Ind.
2002).
In the present case, Thomas was unequivocal about her allegations, and there was
no evidence presented that Thomas’s testimony was coerced. Tr. p. 20-21. Moreover,
Thomas was not the State’s sole witness. By testifying that he responded to Thomas’s
complaint and observed three flat tires on her vehicle, Officer Harmon partially
corroborated Thomas’s allegations. Id. at 32-33. Accordingly, the doctrine of incredible
dubiosity is inapplicable here.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
5