Antonio Hughley v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
/
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 17 2013, 5:46 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN (JACK) F. CRAWFORD GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Crawford & Devane Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTONIO HUGHLEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1301-CR-40
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-1108-FA-54867
Octoher 17, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Anotonio Hughley appeals his convictions for dealing in cocaine, as a Class A
felony, and dealing in marijuana, as a Class D felony, following a jury trial. Hughley
presents three issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury a
reasonable theory of innocence instruction.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it refused Hughley’s request for a
hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), regarding
the validity of the search warrant.
3. Whether the State committed a discovery violation warranting a new
trial.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of August 2, 2011, Officer John Schweers and other officers with
the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) were looking for the driver
of a white Impala who had fled on foot after his car crashed at the corner of 30th Street
and Euclid Avenue following a high speed chase. Officers lost track of the driver after he
fled his car, but a “concerned citizen” reported that the suspect was in the area of 30th
and Gladstone Avenue “near a yard with a red car with fancy wheels.” Appellant’s App.
at 21. Officers on the scene found a red Buick LeSabre with chrome wheels parked in
front of the house at 3058 Gladstone Avenue. A police dog had also tracked the driver’s
scent to that area.
Officer Schweers and Lieutenant Thomas Black knocked on the front door of the
house, and Hughley opened the door. The officers explained that they were looking for a
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driver who had fled after a high-speed chase. Hughley told the officers that he lived there
with his girlfriend and that the driver was not there. Looking past Hughley into the living
room, the officers saw three men sitting on a couch. After determining that none of the
men in the house matched the description of the Impala’s driver, Officer Schweers asked
to look through the house to make sure the man they were searching for was not inside.
Hughley consented. The officers then asked Hughley and the other three men to stand on
the front porch in order to “secure” the house and proceeded to look through the house
for the driver. Id. at 60.
While inside the house, Officer Schweers saw in plain view on the kitchen table a
Smith and Wesson revolver, later identified as a .38 Special, along with a “powder
substance that based on his training and experience he believed to be cocaine[.]” Exh. 12
at 8. And “[i]n the downstairs bedroom L[ieutenant] Black observed in plain view a bag
of what he believed to be based on his training and experience marijuana.” Id. Officers
secured the scene and contacted a narcotics unit, and Detective Joshua Harpe executed a
probable cause affidavit in support of a search warrant.
Upon execution of the search warrant officers discovered cocaine and scales in the
refrigerator and marijuana, firearms, and baggies elsewhere in the house. In his pocket
Hughley had a key to the home and nearly $4000 in cash. And the officers found mail
addressed to Hughley at 3058 Gladstone Avenue.
On August 5, the State charged Hughley with six counts: possession with intent to
deliver cocaine in excess of three grams, as a Class A felony; possession of cocaine, as a
Class A felony; possession of cocaine and a firearm, as a Class C felony; unlawful
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possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony; dealing in marijuana,
as a Class D felony; and possession of marijuana, as a Class D felony. On December 28,
Hughley filed a motion to suppress and a request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Specifically, Hughley requested a hearing to determine
whether the search warrant was based on probable cause shown by perjury or with
reckless disregard for the truth of the statements in the supporting affidavit. The trial
court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on January 19, 2012, and later denied the
same, but the court denied the motion for a Franks hearing. The trial court also denied
Hughley’s motion to certify those orders for interlocutory appeal.
A jury trial was held September 25 and 26, 2012. At the start of trial, the State
dismissed the count charging possession of cocaine, as a Class A felony. The jury
returned guilty verdicts on all remaining counts, and the trial court entered conviction on
the charges of dealing in cocaine, as a Class A felony, and dealing in marijuana, as a
Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Hughley accordingly. Hughley now appeals
his convictions.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Jury Instructions
Hughley first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
proffered jury instructions. As we have discussed,
“[t]he purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law
applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to
comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’”
Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Chandler v. State,
581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. 1991)). Instruction of the jury is left to the
sound judgment of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
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of discretion. Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
trans. denied. Jury instructions are not to be considered in isolation, but as
a whole and in reference to each other. Id. The instructions must be a
complete, accurate statement of the law which will not confuse or mislead
the jury. Id. at 930-31. Still, errors in the giving or refusing of instructions
are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the
jury could not properly have found otherwise. Id. at 933 (citing Dill, 741
N.E.2d at 1233).
Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Further:
In reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we consider: (1) whether the
instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) whether there was evidence
in the record to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the
substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions given by the
court.
Simpson v. State, 915 N.E.2d 511, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), trans.
denied.
Hughley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his
proffered jury instructions on the reasonable theory of innocence. Such an instruction
informs the jury that “proof by circumstantial evidence must be so conclusive and sure as
to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480,
482 (Ind. 2012). A jury instruction on the “reasonable theory of innocence” is
“appropriate only where the trial court finds that the evidence showing that the conduct of
the defendant constituting the commission of a charged offense, the actus reus,[1] is
proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 490. Where such is the case, “the
jury should be instructed as follows: In determining whether the guilt of the accused is
1
“The Latin phrase ‘actus reus’ refers to the ‘wrongful deed that comprises the physical
components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with the mens rea [the criminal state of mind],
to establish criminal liability.” Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 488 n.5 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 41-42
(9th ed. 2009)).
5
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive and
sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” Id. at 481.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence supports giving the
reasonable theory of innocence instruction. Hughley contends that he was entitled to the
instruction because the State offered circumstantial evidence to prove possession with
intent to deal cocaine and possession with intent to deal marijuana. He points out that he
had never “admit[ted] possessing the cocaine in the refrigerator, no one saw him place it
in the refrigerator, and no fingerprints or DNA associated [him] with the bags of cocaine
and marijuana.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. In essence, his argument is that the State did not
prove the elements of the offenses with direct evidence because his possession of the
contraband was merely constructive. We cannot agree.
To prove constructive possession of the cocaine and marijuana, the State was
required to show that Hughley had both: (1) the intent to maintain dominion and control
over them; and (2) the capability to maintain dominion and control over them. See
Hundley v. State, 951 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Control in
this sense concerns the defendant’s relation to the place where the substance is found:
whether the defendant has the power, by way of legal authority or in a practical sense, to
control the place where, or the item in which, the substance is found. Id.“Direct evidence is ‘[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.’” Hampton, 961 N.E.2d
at 489 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 636 (9th ed. 2009)). “Conversely, circumstantial
evidence is ‘[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or
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observation.’” Id. Here, the State proved Hughley’s capability to maintain dominion and
control by direct evidence, namely: Hughley was in the home when the police arrived, he
told police that he lived in the house, he had a key to the house on his person, and the
officers found in the house mail addressed to Hughley at that address. Thus, the State did
not rely strictly on circumstantial evidence to prove control. Hughley concedes as much
in his brief when he states that the case against him was “almost entirely circumstantial.”
Appellant’s Brief at 7. Because direct evidence was admitted at trial to prove the actus
reus of both offenses, possession, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Hughley’s request to instruct the jury on the reasonable theory of innocence. See
Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 490.
Issue Two: Franks v. Delaware Hearing
Hughley next contends that the trial court erred when it denied him an evidentiary
hearing under Franks v. Delaware on his motion to suppress. In particular, Hughley
challenged the veracity of the probable cause affidavit used to obtain the search warrant
of his home. The relevant section of Franks provides:
Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s
request . . . .
438 U.S. at 155-56.
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more
than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross
examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an
offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant
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affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a
statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily
explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.
The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted
today is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.
Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the
subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there
remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of
probable cause, no hearing is required. On the other hand, if the remaining
content is insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing. Whether he will prevail at that
hearing is, of course, another issue. (Footnote omitted).
Id. at 171-72.
Here, Detective Harpe prepared the probable cause affidavit in support of the
request for the search warrant based on information reported to him by Officer Schweers
and Lieutenant Black:
Inside [the home at 3058 Gladstone], Officer Schweers saw in plain view
on the kitchen table a Smith and Wesson revolver along with a powder [sic]
substance that based on his training and experience he believed to be
cocaine. In the downstairs bedroom Lt[.] Black observed in plain view a
bag of what he believed to be based on his training and experience
marijuana. Officers then secured the scene and contacted [the] East District
Narcotics Unit.
Exhibit 12 at 8. When officers executed the search warrant, they did not recover any
cocaine from the kitchen table or any marijuana from the downstairs bedroom. Based on
that fact, Hughley contends that Detective Harpe’s affidavit was executed with a false
statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.
But Officer Schweers testified at trial that in the kitchen he had seen a handgun
and a “white powdery substance piled—spread along the table that [he] immediately
believed to be cocaine.” Transcript at 227. Regardless of whether any cocaine was
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recovered from the kitchen table, that information, without more, was sufficient to
support the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, even if we do not consider the
allegation of marijuana in the downstairs bedroom, the affidavit set out sufficient
probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant based solely upon Officer
Schweers’ report that he had observed in plain view what he believed in his training and
experience to be cocaine. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. As such, Hughley has not shown
that the trial court erred when it denied him an evidentiary hearing under Franks.
Issue Three: Discovery Violation
Finally, Hughley contends that the State committed a discovery violation when it
led him to believe that DNA evidence had been submitted for testing when, in fact, it had
not. In support, he refers generally to the “rules of fair discovery,” Appellant’s Brief at
21, and asserts that it was “incumbent upon the State prosecutor to tell defense counsel
that he had decided not to test the DNA samples,” id. at 22. Hughley cites no order from
the trial court setting out relevant discovery orders that may have been violated.
However, he cites Beauchamp v. State, 788 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Thus, we
consider the facts of that case.
In Beauchamp, the State failed to call as a witness on direct examination a medical
expert who had been identified to Beauchamp in discovery. Indeed, Beauchamp had
taken the expert’s deposition, and the expert had testified that he had no opinion on the
cause of the victim’s injuries. But at trial, the State produced that expert as a rebuttal
witness, testifying that Beauchamp’s version of events could not have caused the victim’s
injuries. The court held that the State had been aware of the expert’s change in opinion,
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as evidenced by the State’s readiness to offer his testimony in rebuttal, but had not
complied with the trial court’s standing discovery order and the “requirement under
T[rial] R[ule] 26(E)(1) that the parties supplement the substance of their expert’s
testimony in a timely fashion.” Id. at 894. The court held that the prejudice to
Beauchamp resulting from such “rope-a-doping”2 warranted a new trial. Id.But Beauchamp in inapposite. Here, Hughley has not shown that the State
committed a discovery violation by failing to test the DNA evidence. The State filed in
December 2011 a notice of its intention to consume the DNA evidence in testing. 3 The
State did not share discovery of any DNA evidence before trial, which put Hughley on
notice that no such evidence would be offered at trial. At no time did Hughley request
the results of DNA evidence in discovery, nor did he object to the consumption of the
DNA evidence. And the State had no obligation to test the DNA or put on any particular
evidence except as necessary to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Hughley
has not shown that the State committed a discovery violation when it did not test the
DNA evidence. We affirm Hughley’s convictions.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
2
“Rope-a-doping,” a term commonly used in the sport of boxing, refers to an instance in which
“one fighter pretends to be trapped against the ropes while his opponent wears himself out throwing
punches.” Beauchamp, 788 N.E.2d at 894.
3
Contrary to the State’s assertion in its appellee’s brief, the filing of a notice that the DNA
evidence would be consumed in testing was not tantamount to notice that the defense “knew in advance
that there would be no DNA swabs tested.” Appellee’s Brief at 19. The notice could just as easily be
read to indicate that the DNA testing planned would consume all of the DNA evidence.
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