Olie McNeal v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANDREW FALK
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Feb 19 2013, 9:19 am
CLERK
IN THE of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
OLIE MCNEAL, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1207-CR-364
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Teresa A. Hall, Commissioner
Cause No. 49G16-1205-CM-31203
February 19, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Olie McNeal appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor battery. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the conviction indicate that prior to May 3, 2012, McNeal
and Kimberly Snowden dated and lived together for a few weeks. In the days prior to May 3,
2012, McNeal and Snowden had a fight. Snowden and her friend, Melissa, went to
McNeal’s apartment on May 3, 2012, to talk about the fight. While Snowden was at
McNeal’s apartment, McNeal asked Snowden for money. When Snowden refused the
request, McNeal became angry. McNeal put Melissa in a headlock. This made Snowden
mad and she told McNeal to take his hands off her friend. Snowden walked up to McNeal
and was “leaning against” him. Tr. at 19. McNeal then punched Snowden “pretty hard” in
the neck. Id. at 19-20. Snowden felt like she was going to “pass out” as a result of the blow.
Id. at 20. McNeal also pushed Snowden in the back and caused her to fall forward.
Snowden called 911. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Joel Reierson
responded to the scene. When he arrived, Officer Reierson noticed that Snowden was visibly
upset and he observed red marks on the right side of her neck. McNeal had fled the scene.
On May 15, 2012, the State charged McNeal with class A misdemeanor battery. Following a
bench trial held on June 21, 2012, the trial court found McNeal guilty as charged. This
appeal followed.
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Discussion and Decision
McNeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.
2007). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider
conflicting evidence most favorably to the judgment and will affirm the conviction unless no
reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.To convict McNeal of class A misdemeanor battery, the State was required to prove
that he knowingly or intentionally touched Snowden in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that
resulted in bodily injury to Snowden. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. Here, Snowden testified
that McNeal punched her in the neck. Her neck turned red and the blow made her feel like
she was going to pass out. Snowden testified that she developed a bruise on her neck a few
hours later.
McNeal concedes that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is enough to sustain
his conviction. See Gregory v. State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans.
denied (2009). He further concedes that this Court may not reweigh the evidence.
Nevertheless, McNeal invokes the “incredible dubiosity rule” and argues that we may
impinge upon the factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses when
confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly
uncorroborated testimony. Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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Application of the incredible dubiosity is rare, and the standard to be applied is whether the
testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could
believe it. Id. The rule applies only when a witness contradicts herself in a single statement
or while testifying, and does not apply to conflicts between multiple statements. Id.McNeal makes no assertion that Snowden’s testimony was coerced, equivocal, or
contradictory. McNeal boldly maintains that Snowden was obviously a disgruntled ex-
girlfriend and her testimony was therefore inherently improbable. We disagree with McNeal
that Snowden’s testimony was so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could
believe it. The trial court had an opportunity to hear Snowden’s testimony and to determine
her credibility, and McNeal has directed us to no legitimate reason to impinge on the
province of the factfinder and reassess that credibility. Moreover, we note that Officer
Reierson corroborated Snowden’s testimony when he testified that, upon his arrival at the
scene, he observed that Snowden was visibly upset with red marks on the right side of her
neck. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain McNeal’s battery conviction.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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