Clarence E. Smith v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GLEN E. KOCH II GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Martinsville, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Feb 15 2013, 9:24 am
IN THE CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA tax court
CLARENCE E. SMITH, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 47A04-1206-CR-315
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAWRENCE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael A. Robbins, Judge
Cause No. 47D01-1002-CM-219
February 15, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Clarence E. Smith appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. On appeal, Smith asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct
constituting fundamental error. Smith also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it refused one of his proffered jury instructions. Concluding that the prosecutor’s
actions did not rise to the level of fundamental error and further finding no abuse of
discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 24, 2010, sixty-four-year-old Smith went to the Bedford Police Station to
lodge a complaint against his ex-son-in-law, Bedford Police Sergeant Greg Hagan. Earlier
that day, Smith had passed Sergeant Hagan while driving on State Road 37. Sergeant Hagan
then followed Smith to a gasoline station and parked his police vehicle behind Smith’s
vehicle at the gas pump. Although there was no verbal or physical contact between Smith
and Sergeant Hagan, Smith felt harassed. Smith telephoned the Bedford chief of police,
Dennis Parsley, and Chief Parsley told Smith that he was free to come to the police station to
make a complaint. Smith had lodged complaints against Sergeant Hagan on two previous
occasions.
When Smith arrived at the station, he met with the assistant chief of police, Colonel
Joseph DeWees. Colonel DeWees escorted Smith to his office to take the complaint. After
Smith explained the basis for his complaint, Colonel DeWees informed Smith that he did not
think the complaint had any merit, but told Smith that he could fill out a complaint form
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anyway. Smith responded by saying that he was tired of the police department “covering up
a f**king corrupt police officer.” Tr. at 396. Smith then loudly said, “This is bullsh*t.” Id.
at 337, 350, 396. Colonel DeWees responded, “You’re not going to talk to me that way in
my office, step outside.” Id. at 337, 397.
As Smith and Colonel DeWees returned to the door that opened into the lobby,
Colonel DeWees told Smith to step into the lobby. Smith told Colonel DeWees that he was
not going to leave until he spoke with Chief Parsley. Colonel DeWees again told Smith to
leave and Smith refused, stating that he wanted to go upstairs and speak to Chief Parsley.
While Colonel DeWees was holding onto the lobby door, Smith used both of his hands to
shove Colonel DeWees in the shoulder and chest. Colonel DeWees fell backwards onto the
stairs. After Colonel DeWees pulled himself up, he again ordered Smith to leave. Smith put
his hand on Colonel DeWees’s left shoulder and tried to use his body to push past Colonel
DeWees. This caused Colonel DeWees to fall backward onto the stairs a second time.
Colonel DeWees then got back up, grabbed Smith’s left arm, and stated, “that’s it, Mr. Smith,
you’re under arrest.” Id. at 345, 411.
At this point, Smith declared, “I’m leaving now.” Id. at 412. Colonel DeWees
informed him, “[it’s] too late.” Id. As Colonel DeWees held onto Smith’s left arm, Smith
spun around and grabbed the door handle with his right arm. Smith began tensing his left
arm and moving his shoulder to break Colonel DeWees’s grip. Captain James Lindsey was
in the hallway and came to assist Colonel DeWees. Captain Lindsey told Smith, “you’re
under arrest, stop resisting.” Id. at 347. Captain Lindsey tried to pull Smith’s hand off the
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door handle, to no avail. Finally, Captain Lindsey struck Smith’s forearm with his own
forearm and managed to break Smith’s grip on the door handle. Both Captain Lindsey and
Colonel DeWees tried unsuccessfully to get Smith’s arm behind his back to handcuff him.
Major Brian Turpen ran into the hallway, grabbed Smith by the legs, and took him down to
the floor. Captain Lindsey was then able to handcuff Smith.
On February 25, 2010, the State charged Smith with class A misdemeanor battery on a
law enforcement officer and class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. A jury trial
was held on March 8, 2012. The jury found Smith guilty of class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement and not guilty of battery. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Smith contends that he is entitled to reversal of his conviction based upon
prosecutorial misconduct. To convict Smith of class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement, the State was required to prove that Smith knowingly or intentionally forcibly
resisted a law enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of
the officer’s duties. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1. Smith contends that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by knowingly misstating the law during voir dire and opening and
closing arguments and by making remarks that “indoctrinated” the jury with the proposition
that the forcible resistance necessary to support a conviction for resisting law enforcement
occurs if officers have to do “anything out of the ordinary” to effectuate an arrest.
Appellant’s Br. at 14-15.
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In reviewing a properly preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine
whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, whether the misconduct, under all
of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he would not
have been otherwise subjected. Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 468 (Ind. 2012). To
preserve a prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal, the defendant must ask the trial court,
at the time the misconduct occurs, to admonish the jury or move for a mistrial if
admonishment is inadequate. Id. Smith concedes that although he objected to some of the
prosecutor’s statements in question, he did not request specific admonishment of the jury or
move for a mistrial, and therefore he failed to properly preserve his claim. In cases where a
prosecutorial misconduct claim has not been properly preserved, the defendant must establish
not only the grounds for the misconduct but also the additional grounds for fundamental
error. Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (Ind. 2011). The fundamental error
exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error “make[s] ‘a fair trial
impossible or constitute[s] clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
process … present[ing] an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Id. (quoting
Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).
A. Voir Dire
Smith first claims that the prosecutor knowingly misstated the law while questioning
prospective jurors during voir dire. “The purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a
prospective juror can render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the law and the
evidence.” Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Ind. 2000). Proper examination may
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include questions designed to disclose the jurors’ attitudes about the type of offense charged.
Perryman v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) trans. denied (2007). The
parties may also attempt to uncover the jurors’ preconceived ideas about a defense the
defendant intends to use. Id. To reveal the jurors’ attitudes and ideas, the parties may pose
hypothetical questions, provided they do not suggest prejudicial evidence not adduced at trial.
Id. However, questions that examine jurors as to how they would act or decide in certain
contingencies or when presented with certain evidence are improper. Id.
Here, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors various hypothetical questions and made
comments characterizing what types of behavior would constitute forcible resistance. For
example, at one point the prosecutor explained, “It’s something extra ordinary. It’s not
Superman. It’s not getting down into a fight. Anything the officer has to do out of the
ordinary would be resisting forcibly okay. Juror eight, are you okay with that?” Tr. at 111.
Similarly, the prosecutor asked, “Okay, now juror twenty-one, you’re under arrest, okay.
And you push off, so you push away from me. Do I have forcible resist?” Tr. at 153. These
comments were made and these questions were asked in general terms and were not put into
any context specific with this case.
Contrary to Smith’s contention, the prosecutor’s characterization of what type of
behavior would constitute forcible resistance is consistent with current Indiana law. In
criticizing the prosecutor’s characterization, Smith relies solely upon the language used by
our supreme court in Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. 1993). The Spangler court held
that a person “forcibly resists” when “strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law
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enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 723. However, more
recently, our supreme court approved the language used in Spangler to define “forcibly
resist” but went on to modify that language by explaining that “the force involved need not
rise to the level of mayhem” and that a “modest level of resistance” such as “stiffening one’s
arm when an officer grabs hold to position them for cuffing” would suffice. Graham v.
State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965-66 (Ind. 2009). The court explained that the “forcible” element is
met when evidence demonstrates that “the police ha[ve] to get physical” to secure the
defendant’s compliance. Id. at 966. Accordingly, we disagree with Smith that the
prosecutor’s characterizations and related questions constituted a misstatement of current
Indiana law.
We do, however, agree with Smith that the prosecutor’s phrasing in some isolated
instances did appear to be directed at ascertaining how jurors would decide when presented
with various evidentiary scenarios. This type of questioning was not pervasive and most of
the questions were proper and relevant to gauge the jurors’ preconceived ideas about what
types of behavior would constitute forcible resistance. To the extent that the prosecutor’s
comments and questions were improperly argumentative or to the extent that the prosecutor
may have been using voir dire as an opportunity to educate jurors as to the law, we conclude
that an admonishment by the trial court cured any possible prejudice or potential for unfair
harm. Following one of Smith’s objections, the trial court sua sponte admonished the jury as
follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, the law will be given to you by this Court in its
preliminary and final instructions. What you’re being asked now may or may
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not be the, the law in this case. It is hypotheticals that are being presented to
you for discussion, that’s all. You may continue.
Tr. at 110. Under the totality of the circumstances presented, Smith has failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor’s comments and questions regarding forcible resistance during voir dire
made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor’s
comments and questions did not amount to fundamental error.
B. Opening and Closing Arguments
Similar to his assertions regarding voir dire, Smith claims that the prosecutor
committed misconduct during opening and closing arguments by again characterizing
forcible resistance as anything “out of the ordinary” and also repeatedly stating to the jury
during closing argument that Indiana law supports this characterization. Tr. at 648. We
consider statements made by the prosecutor in the context of the argument as a whole. Seide
v. State, 784 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “It is proper for a prosecutor to argue
both law and fact during final argument and propound conclusions based on his analysis of
the evidence.” Id.
As we explained above, the prosecutor’s characterization of forcible resistance as a
very modest type of resistance, although perhaps incomplete and somewhat oversimplified, is
indeed consistent with current Indiana law. Even if we were to conclude that any of the
prosecutor’s comments were improper, we must emphasize the extremely narrow
applicability of the fundamental error doctrine. Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind.
2002). The prosecutor’s improper actions must present an undeniable and substantial
potential for unfair harm. See id. When there is overwhelming independent evidence of a
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defendant’s guilt, improper statements made by a prosecutor may be harmless. See Hand v.
State, 863 N.E.2d 386, 394-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The record reveals that, after being told
that he was under arrest, Smith spun his body around, grabbed the door handle, refused to let
go of the handle, stiffened his arm, and moved his shoulder back and forth, all in an attempt
to break Colonel DeWees’s grasp and avoid being handcuffed. Indeed, officers had no
choice but to grab Smith by the legs and take him to the ground to gain compliance. There is
no question that this resistance was forcible. In light of this overwhelming independent
evidence of Smith’s guilt, we conclude that error, if any, in the prosecutor’s comments during
opening and closing arguments was harmless rather than fundamental.
II. Jury Instruction
Smith next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his proposed
final instruction 7 specifically defining forcible resistance. The purpose of jury instruction is
to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable
it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Fowler v.
State, 900 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). When evaluating a trial court’s rejection of
a tendered instruction, we look to: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the
law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and (3)
whether the substance of the proffered instruction is covered by other instructions. Short v.
State, 962 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). As a general rule, instruction of the jury
lies with the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of that
discretion. Cravens v. State, 836 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (2006).
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Smith’s proposed final instruction 7 stated,
“One ‘forcibly resists’ when ‘strong, powerful, violent means are used to
evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.[’]”
Aguirre v. State, 953 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Spangler
v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993)). “Forcibly resists” does not include
all acts of resistance, obstruction, or interference. Stansberry v. State, 954
N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 723).
“Forcibly resists” excludes some actions that are not passive. Aguirre, 953
N.E.2d at 596 (quoting Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724).
Appellant’s App. at 311.
Here, although Smith’s proposed instruction correctly recited some of the language of
Spangler and its progeny, the instruction was an incomplete statement of the current state of
the law and thus was properly refused by the trial court. It is well settled that use of certain
language in appellate opinions does not necessarily make that language proper for
instructions to a jury. Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003). Indeed, as we stated
earlier in our discussion, our supreme court has since softened the Spangler definition of
“forcibly resist.” See Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 965-66. Due to the court’s more recent
modification and explanation of the Spangler language regarding what constitutes forcible
resistance, the instruction tendered by Smith was an incomplete statement of current law.
Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the tendered
instruction.
On appeal, Smith maintains that the prosecutor’s remarks during voir dire and opening
and closing arguments regarding forcible resistance necessitated the giving of his instruction
defining that term, especially in light of the fact that the substance of the instruction was not
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covered by any other instruction. 1 However, Smith made no such argument to the trial court.
To the contrary, our review of the record indicates that following the trial court’s rejection of
Smith’s proposed final instruction 7, Smith made no objection or argument to the trial court
regarding the prosecutor’s remarks or the necessity for his instruction defining forcible
resistance. Tr. at 622. Accordingly, we agree with the State that Smith did not afford the
trial court the opportunity to consider this argument and/or to correct any error without the
need for an appeal. Indiana Trial Rule 51(C) requires that a party distinctly state the matter
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection as a prerequisite for claiming error on
appeal regarding the trial court’s instruction of the jury. Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618,
626 (Ind. 2001). The purpose of this rule is to protect the trial court from inadvertent error.
Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 1997). Absent a specific objection, Smith has
waived this argument on appeal. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
1
We note that the trial court also refused the State’s proposed final jury instruction 7 defining
“forcibly” in the context of resisting law enforcement. Appellant’s App. at 159.
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