In Re: The Paternity of B.H.: S.H. v. B.B.

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Feb 07 2013, 8:52 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
MICHAEL B. TROEMEL JASON W. BENNETT
Lafayette, Indiana Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP
Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN RE: THE PATERNITY OF B.H., )
)
S.H., )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 54A01-1208-JP-340
)
B.B., )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Harry A. Siamas, Judge
Cause No. 54C01-9011-JP-132
February 7, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
S.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying his child support
obligation to B.H. (“the child”) based on a determination following an evidentiary
hearing that the child is incapacitated. Father presents a single issue for review, namely,
whether the trial court erred when it granted a petition filed by B.B. (“Mother”) to modify
child support eight months after the child had reached the age of twenty-one.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
B.H. was born to Father and Mother on June 12, 1990. Father ultimately
acknowledged paternity, and, on June 27, 1991, the trial court entered an order
establishing paternity and a child support obligation (“Paternity Order”). The Paternity
Order required Father to pay thirty-seven dollars weekly child support “during the
minority of said child or until further order of the court[.]” Appellant’s App. at 17.
About the same time the Paternity Order was entered, the child was diagnosed with
mental and physical disabilities:
He has two conditions. One’s called Duarte syndrome, he’s missing an
entire gene sequence which affects every system in his body from mental
disability to heart murmurs, cataracts, muscle atrophy, and then spastic
dysplasia which is another form of mental disability which he has been
diagnosed with moderate mental disability.
Transcript at 9. Father had contact with the child intermittently until the child was
approximately five years old.
As B.H. grew up, Father continued to pay child support as provided in the
Paternity Order, and Mother kept Father informed of the child’s medical costs, although
2
Father did not contribute to those costs. When the child turned eighteen years old,
Mother applied for guardianship of him, and Father consented to the guardianship. At
some point B.H. received a certificate of completion from Fountain Central High School,
but he was not able to earn his high school diploma “because his mental handicap
prevented him from completing ISTEP testing.” Appellant’s App. at 60. From ages
nineteen through twenty-one, B.H. was enrolled in a special needs program in Fountain
County.
When B.H. turned twenty-one years old, Father discontinued paying child support.
Eight months later, on February 10, 2012, Mother filed a verified petition to modify child
support alleging the child to be incapacitated and an affidavit for rule to show cause
based on Father’s cessation of paying child support. On June 18, the hearing date for
Mother’s pleadings, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s petition and her affidavit
for rule to show cause. The trial court heard evidence on all pending motions and took
the matter under advisement, allowing the parties time to submit supplemental authority.
And on July 5, the court entered an order granting Mother’s motion to modify,
determining a child support arrearage, and denying Father’s motion to dismiss (“the
Order”). The Order provides, in relevant part:
Father argues that under Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6[] the child is
emancipated and that his duty to pay child support has terminated.
[Mother] filed a Verified Petition to Modify on February 10, 2012, eight
months after [the child] turned 21. In the petition, Mother alleged that [the
child] suffers from incapacity. Father argues that the petition to modify is
barred by laches as Mother had ample time to file a petition to modify prior
to [the child] turning twenty-one. . . .
***
3
TIMING OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION TO MODIFY
***
Indiana does not require that the issue of incapacitation be raised
prior to a child’s 21st birthday. However, the onset of the incapacity must
occur prior to the child’s 21st birthday. The parent seeking termination of
child support has the burden to prove the child’s age. Thereafter, the
burden of proof shifts to the parent who opposes the termination of child
support to prove that the adult child is incapacitated. Liddy v. Liddy, 881
N.E.2d [62,] 67 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2008)].
LACHES
***
Father’s reliance on the doctrine of laches is misplaced as this is a
child support case. Even if the doctrine may apply to the case, the evidence
does not support that Mother’s delay in filing her petition within eight
months after [the child’s] 21st birthday was unreasonable or that the delay
prejudiced Father.
INCAPACITY
***
Mother has the burden to prove by [a] preponderance of the evidence
that [B.H.] is incapacitated. None of the evidence standing by itself
satisfies her burden. The fact that [the child] is under guardianship or that
the Social Security Administration has found him to be disabled does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that [B.H.] is incapacitated for child
support purposes. However, the totality of the facts presented make it more
likely than not that [B.H.] is incapacitated within the meaning of I.C.[ §]
31-14-11-18. . . .
Id. at 55-60. The trial court found that Father’s cessation of child support was not willful
and, therefore, denied Mother’s rule to show cause. But the court determined that Father
had a support arrearage, ordered him to pay the arrearage over time, and modified child
support to be $147 per week to be phased in over a set schedule. Father now appeals.
4
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Mother filed a petition requesting child support for B.H. beyond the statutory age
of emancipation. At trial, Father argued that Mother’s petition was barred by laches
because she had filed it eight months after B.H. had turned twenty-one years old. The
trial court rejected the laches argument. On appeal, Father maintains that this court
“should create a new standard in untimely petitions to modify child support in cases
where there is an incapacitated child to take into account the prejudices that go against
the parent who is paying the support.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. We must reject Father’s
argument.
Father’s argument in essence reframes his argument that laches bars consideration
of Mother’s petition. In general, the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support
cases. Gray v. Schachel (In re P.W.J.), 846 N.E.2d 752, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(citation omitted). “This is so because Indiana courts will not penalize a child for his or
her parent’s delay in pursuing child support.” Id. (citations omitted). Because Father’s
argument merely reframes his laches argument, and laches is not applicable here, Father’s
argument is without merit.
In any event, case law supports the trial court’s decision to award child support
even though Mother filed the petition to modify based on incapacity several months after
B.H. had reached the age of majority. As relevant in the present case,
[t]he duty to support a child under [law] ceases when the child becomes
twenty-one (21) years of age unless any of the following conditions occurs:
(1) The child is emancipated before becoming twenty-one
(21) years of age. . . .
5
(2) The child is incapacitated. In this case the child
support continues during the incapacity or until further
order of the court.
Former Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(1), (2).1 “The purpose of the statute ‘is to require that
parents provide protection and support for the welfare of their children until the children
reach the specified age or no longer require such care and support.’” Hirsch v. Oliver,
970 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1124
(Ind. 2002)).
In Dennison v. Dennison, 696 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the child suffered
from a debilitating seizure disorder, but mother did not file any petition seeking to extend
the child’s support obligation before the child turned twenty-one years old. As a result,
the trial court determined that the child “became emancipated” on her twenty-first
birthday. The mother filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. The
mother appealed, and this court held that the
undisputed evidence reveals that [the child] is physically disabled and her
capacity for maintaining gainful employment is severely limited. Contrary
to the trial court’s judgment, no emancipation occurs where a child is so
physically or mentally disabled that she cannot provide for herself.
Because we find that the undisputed evidence leads to a result contrary to
that reached by the trial court, we reverse.
Id. at 91.
Mother filed the petition to extend child support eight months after B.H. turned
twenty-one years old, and the hearing on that petition occurred four months later. And
1
Effective July 1, 2012, Indiana Code Section 31-16-6-6 was amended by lowering the age of
emancipation from twenty-one years to nineteen years. B.H. turned twenty-one years old and Mother
filed the verified petition to modify child support before the effective date of the amended statute.
Therefore, we apply the former statute in this case. See DeKalb County Welfare Bd. v. Lower, 444
N.E.2d 884, 888 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
6
the opinion shows that both parties were aware of the child’s seizure disorder. While
circumstances may exist in which prejudice from such a delay may be so egregious as to
warrant reconsideration of the argument Father presents here, the facts in this case do not
support a change in the applicable standard, namely, that child support beyond the age of
emancipation may be awarded if the custodial parent shows that the child is incapacitated
and that the incapacity started before the age of twenty-one. And there is evidence to
show that Father had reason to know of the child’s incapacity.2
We reject Father’s request that we impose a new standard under which Mother’s
petition, filed after the child’s twenty-first birthday, should not have been considered on
the merits because of prejudice to Father caused by the delay in filing. The holding in
Dennison shows that a parent may request after a child’s twenty-first birthday the
extension of child support due to that child’s incapacity. And Father does not dispute the
incapacity finding. Thus, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
2
Again, B.H. was developmentally delayed as a toddler, while Father still visited with the child,
and Mother sent medical bills to Father when the child was older.
7