Jesse Doyle, Jr. v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Oct 09 2013, 8:52 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
LEANNA WEISSMANN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JESSE DOYLE, JR., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 15A01-1303-CR-132
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge
Cause No. 15C01-1112-FA-32
October 9, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
Over the course of an approximately three-year time period in 1995 to 1998,
Appellant-Defendant Jesse Doyle, Jr. repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with his
approximately nine-to-twelve-year-old daughter, E.D. Doyle was subsequently charged with
one count of Class B felony incest and one count of Class A felony child molesting. On
January 8, 2013, Doyle pled guilty to one count of Class C felony incest. In exchange for
Doyle’s guilty plea, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana agreed to downgrade the incest
charge from a Class B felony to a Class C felony and to dismiss the Class A felony child
molesting charge. The parties agreed that sentencing would be left to the discretion of the
trial court.
Prior to the pronouncement of Doyle’s sentence, Doyle indicated that he wished to
withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied Doyle’s request and, on February 26, 2013,
imposed an eight-year sentence. On appeal, Doyle contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Doyle also contends that his
eight-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The factual basis entered during the January 8, 2013 guilty plea hearing provides that
between September 1, 1995 and August 1, 1998, Doyle, a person eighteen years of age or
older, engaged in sexual intercourse with E.D., knowing that E.D. was his biological
daughter. This sexual abuse of E.D., who was approximately eight to twelve years old at the
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time, occurred repeatedly during the alleged time period.1
On December 20, 2011, the State charged Doyle with one count of Class B felony
incest and one count of Class A felony child molesting. On January 8, 2013, after the jury
had been selected but prior to the beginning of trial, the parties filed a “Negotiated Plea
Agreement.” Appellant’s App. p. 65. The trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing during
which the parties discussed the plea and set forth a factual basis. Pursuant to the terms of the
plea agreement, the State agreed to amend the charging information to reduce the charge of
incest from a Class B felony to a Class C felony. Doyle agreed to plead guilty to the Class C
felony incest charge. The parties also agreed that sentencing should be left to the sole
discretion of the trial court. During the guilty plea hearing, the parties also clarified that the
Class A felony child molesting charge would be dismissed in exchange for Doyle’s guilty
plea. Following the guilty plea hearing, the trial court accepted Doyle’s guilty plea and
scheduled a sentencing hearing for February 21, 2013.
During the February 21, 2013 sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
E.D. and E.D.’s mother. Both E.D. and her mother testified about how the abuse had
negatively affected E.D.’s life and requested that the trial court impose a maximum sentence.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement
and scheduled a pronouncement hearing for February 26, 2013.
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E.D. reported the sexual abuse by Doyle after learning that Doyle had molested another child. With
respect to the allegations relating to the other child, Doyle was subsequently convicted under Cause Number
15C01-1105-FA-10 (“Cause No. FA-10”) of Class A felony attempted child molesting and Class C felony
intimidation. Doyle was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifty years. Doyle’s Class A felony attempted child
molesting conviction was subsequently affirmed on appeal. See Doyle v. State, 15A05-1301-CR-39 (Ind. Ct.
App. Aug. 14, 2013).
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At some point between the February 21, 2013 sentencing hearing and the February 26,
2013 pronouncement hearing, Doyle sent two “Inmate Request Forms” to the trial court in
which Doyle indicated that he wished to withdraw his plea. Appellant’s App. pp. 73, 81. In
addition, during the pronouncement hearing, Doyle’s counsel indicated that Doyle wished to
withdraw his guilty plea. In making this request, Doyle expressed the belief that his trial
counsel had indicated that similar charges that were pending in Ripley County would be
dismissed if he pled guilty in the instant matter. Doyle did not present any other evidence in
support of his belief. The trial court subsequently denied Doyle’s request and continued with
the pronouncement hearing. At the conclusion of the pronouncement hearing, the trial court
sentenced Doyle to an eight-year term of imprisonment. The trial court further ordered that
Doyle’s sentence in the instant matter should be served consecutively to the fifty-year
sentence imposed in Cause No. FA-10.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
Doyle contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to
withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Doyle claims that his plea was induced by an illusory
promise that charges of a similar nature that were pending in Ripley County would be
dismissed if he pled guilty in the instant matter.
A request to withdraw a guilty plea prior to the pronouncement of a sentence is
governed by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b). Initially we note that Indiana Code section
35-35-1-4(b) requires that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea be in writing and verified.
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Doyle did not file a written verified motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Rather he filed two
unverified inmate request forms and made an oral statement at the beginning of the
pronouncement hearing, expressing his desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Despite Doyle’s
failure to comply with the requirements of Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b), we will
nonetheless review Doyle’s claims on the merits.
After entry of a plea of guilty … but before imposition of sentence, the
court may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of guilty … for
any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by
reliance upon the defendant’s plea.… The motion shall state facts in support
of the relief demanded, and the state may file counter-affidavits in opposition
to the motion. The ruling of the court on the motion shall be reviewable on
appeal only for an abuse of discretion. However, the court shall allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty … whenever the defendant proves that
withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). Doyle does not claim, much less prove, that he has suffered a
manifest injustice as a result of pleading guilty. As such, the grant or denial of Doyle’s
motion was within the discretion of the trial court. See Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).
A trial court abuses its discretion as to plea agreements only “when the
failure of the trial court to grant the motion would result in either a manifest
injustice to the defendant or in substantial prejudice to the State.” Weatherford
v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind. 1998). The trial court’s ruling on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea arrives in our Court with a presumption in favor of the
ruling. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). One who appeals an
adverse decision on a motion to withdraw must therefore prove the trial court
abused its discretion by a preponderance of the evidence. Weatherford, 697
N.E.2d at 34. We will not disturb the court’s ruling where it was based on
conflicting evidence. Id.
Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 244-45 (Ind. 2000). Upon review, we will examine the
statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was
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offered freely and knowingly. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001).
In the instant matter, upon receiving the plea agreement, the trial court conducted a
guilty plea hearing. During the guilty plea hearing, the trial court engaged Doyle in the
following conversation regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea:
Court: Is it your intention to withdraw your earlier plea of not
guilty and enter a plea of guilty here today pursuant to
the terms and conditions of this [plea agreement]?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
****
Court: You have been represented by [trial counsel], are you
satisfied with his representation?
Defendant: Yes, sir, I am.
Court: All right. At this time I want to go over this proposed
[plea agreement]…again, I will be reviewing that with
you at this time. The [plea agreement] says the State of
Indiana will amend Count I of the Charging Information
to Incest, a Class C Felony, under Indiana Code 35-46-1-
2, and I have received a proposed…a Motion to Amend
and a proposed Order as well as a proposed Amended
Information which would read, “I, [investigating
detective], do affirm under penalties for perjury that on
or about between September 1, 1995, and August 1,
1998, in Dearborn County, State of Indiana, that you a
person eighteen years of age or older, date of birth:
11/18/64, did engage in sexual intercourse with E.D.
when Jesse Doyle, Jr. knew that E.D. is related to him
biologically as his daughter. All of which is contrary to
the form of the statute in such cases and provided, to-wit:
Indiana Code 35-46-1-3, and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Indiana.” These charges are
signed by [the investigating detective] and they’re
approved by the Prosecuting Attorney’s office. Any
questions about the nature of these allegations?
Defendant: No, sir.
Court: And, [trial counsel], is there any objection to the
amendment as proposed?
[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
Court: The Motion to Amend is granted. The [plea agreement]
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again says that you would…continues and says that you
would enter a plea of guilty to Amended Count I of the
Charging Information, Incest, a Class C Felony, which
I’ve just read to you, and furthermore it says that
pursuant to your plea of guilty you would be sentenced
by the Court at the sole discretion of the Court pursuant
to Indiana sentencing laws. Do you understand that, sir?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: And, sir, this [plea agreement] appears to bear your
signature. Did you sign it?
Defendant: Yes, sir, I did.
Court: Did you read it before you signed it?
Defendant: Yes, sir, I did.
Court: Did you discuss it with your attorney?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: Have I correctly stated the terms of this [plea agreement]
as you understand them to be?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: Also, I need to advise you that…Counsel, there is a
possibility that this sentence could be run consecutive
with another sentence. Is that correct?
[The State]: Yes, Your Honor.
[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Recently imposed by this Court. Concurrent sentencing
means that sentences for these different offenses would
be served at the same time…that would be concurrent. If
they were served consecutive, that means you would
serve and complete one sentence, and after you’ve served
and completed one sentence you would then serve and
complete the other sentence, they would be served one in
addition to the other, they would be stacked on top of
each other. Do you understand the difference between
concurrent and consecutive sentencing?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
****
Court: Okay. Sir, one other thing I do want to clarify with you,
is it’s my understanding you also have charges of a
similar nature pending in Ripley County. Is that correct?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: And, that the issues involving concurrent and
consecutive sentencing could very well apply in that
jurisdiction as well. Do you understand that?
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Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: Based upon your conviction here. Do you understand?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
****
Court: Have you or anyone else received any promises besides
this [plea agreement] or been given anything of value to
have you enter the plea of guilty you’re making here
today?
Defendant: No, sir.
Court: Has anyone forced or threatened or placed you or anyone
else in fear to have you plead guilty to these charges?
Defendant: No, sir.
Court: Is the plea you’re offering here today your own free
choice and decision?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: Is it still your intention to plead guilty to the charge as
amended?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Court: At this time I need to know, sir, how do you plead to the
offense as amended of Incest, a Class C Felony?
Defendant: Guilty, Your Honor.
Guilty Plea Hr. Tr. pp. 14-21 (second through sixth ellipses in original).
Doyle’s statements indicate that Doyle did not expect for the Ripley County charges to
be dismissed in light of his plea in the instant matter. The trial court clarified that the instant
guilty plea could have sentencing ramifications for the Ripley County charges. Doyle
responded affirmatively that he understood that, if he were found guilty of the charged
conduct in Ripley County, consecutive sentencing could potentially apply because of his
guilty plea in the instant matter. Nothing in the record apart from Doyle’s self-serving
statements indicates that the parties agreed to or even contemplated the dismissal of the
Ripley County charges as a part of Doyle’s plea deal.
Furthermore, to the extent that Doyle likens his situation to that discussed in Lineberry
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v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), we note that the instant matter can easily be
distinguished from Lineberry. In Lineberry, the defendant pled guilty after being promised
that he could proceed with the appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence
from trial. The evidence demonstrated that both the defense and the State acknowledged that
this promise was made to the defendant despite the fact that the defendant’s guilty plea would
render any such appeal moot. 747 N.E.2d at 1156-57. Again, in the instant matter, unlike in
Lineberry, there is no evidence supporting Doyle’s self-serving claim that his plea was
improperly induced by a promise that the Ripley County charges would be dropped.
The court’s questions to Doyle during the above-quoted conversation between Doyle
and the trial court suggest an appropriate attempt to probe beneath the surface of the plea
agreement and, if not elicit Doyle’s true motivation for pleading guilty, at least determine that
the plea was knowing and voluntary. In addition, Doyle’s statements during said
conversation adequately demonstrate that Doyle voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty. As
such, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Doyle’s request to
withdraw his guilty plea.
II. Appropriateness of Sentence
Doyle also contends that his eight-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of his offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The Court may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “‘concentrate less on comparing the
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facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on
the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced,
and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.’” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is
inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
With respect to the nature of Doyle’s offense, the record demonstrates that Doyle
repeatedly compelled his then-nine-to-twelve-year-old daughter, E.D., to engage in sexual
intercourse. Doyle violated a position of trust by repeatedly sexually abusing E.D. E.D.
testified at the sentencing hearing about how Doyle’s actions had negatively affected her life.
Specifically, E.D. stated the following:
Over the course of my young life there have been events that have left me
feeling emotionally, physically and socially withdrawn from the world. Those
events have unfortunately been caused by my so-called father. He has not only
degraded me by dirty acts, but has left me scared and uncomfortable…not only
with myself, but at the time with my family and friends. As a young girl in my
pre-teen years I was threatened into believing he would hurt me or my family,
and out of fear I never spoke a word, that is when I became angry and hated
the times he felt compelled to keep me away from a world that he deemed
beneath him. It hurt me to no end growing up and not being able to indulge in
things kids my own age were doing.… Going to school wasn’t always a good
thing, there were times that I kept to myself and felt out of place.… At the
time I was afraid to speak of these events to anybody, and with that I live
everyday with this anger believing the consequences from not telling, but what
I’ve come to realize is that my family would have believed me and stood by me
and made it all right. I also go through every day with embarrassment and
shame for the fact of what exactly happened and by the hands of my so-called
father, a father that is supposed to love, cherish and protect their child. I don’t
see where it says to molest, hurt or abuse them.… All these feelings and
haunted words have been unspoken for too long. To feel shame…not just for
me, but my family who never knew, and siblings who were just as scared as
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me to speak up, more shame follows in the respect of a sister who later fell
under the same abuse after mine began, and a brother who knew his dad’s dark
secrets and never knew how to help his sisters.
Sent. Tr. pp. 33-35 (first and last ellipses in original). Doyle, for his part, claims that while
his actions were “distasteful,” they are of the type “one would expect” for a charge of incest.
Appellee’s Br. P. 10. We disagree and note that we find Doyle’s actions to be nothing short
of deplorable.
With respect to Doyle’s character, Doyle claims that, notwithstanding his convictions
for and pending charges relating to child molestation, his criminal history is relatively minor.
Doyle argues that because he is someone who “struggles with a problem that has never been
treated and he’s never before been sent to prison,” Appellant’s Br. Pp. 10-11, his character is
such that would warrant an advisory sentence. We disagree.
The record demonstrates that Doyle is a repeat child molester. In addition to the
instant conviction, Doyle’s criminal record also includes a conviction for Class A felony
attempted child molesting and pending charges in Ripley County for Class A felony child
molesting and Class B felony incest. There are also allegations of uncharged acts of child
molestation against Doyle’s other daughter. Doyle’s criminal history also includes prior
convictions for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class D felony
intimidation, and Class C felony intimidation. This criminal history does not reflect
positively on Doyle’s character.
In light of the deplorable nature of Doyle’s criminal actions as well as Doyle’s history
of being a repeat child molester, we conclude that Doyle’s eight-year sentence is wholly
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appropriate.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
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