Lloyd Hedstrom v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, Jul 18 2014, 8:58 am
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KRISTINA J. JACOBUCCI GREGORY F. ZOELLER
La Porte, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LLOYD HEDSTROM, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 46A05-1401-CR-00012
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAPORTE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Thomas J. Alevizos, Judge
Cause No. 46C01-1207-FA-411
July 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Lloyd Hedstrom (“Hedstrom”) pleaded guilty in an open plea in LaPorte Circuit
Court to two counts of Class A felony child molesting and was sentenced to eighty years
incarceration. On appeal, Hedstrom claims that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him, that his sentence is inappropriate, and that the trial court erred in its
determination that he is a credit restricted felon as to one of the counts.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Hedstrom and that his sentence is not inappropriate, but remand this case to the trial court
to amend its sentencing order and abstract of judgment in accordance with the credit
restricted felon statute, Indiana Code section 35-41-1-5.5.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2008, a few months after Hedstrom was released from the Department of
Correction following twenty-seven years of incarceration for a felony murder conviction,
he married N.H. and began living with her and her young son, I.H. At some point in
2008, Hedstrom began to submit to and/or perform oral sex on I.H. Hedstrom and N.H.
divorced in January 2010, but continued to cohabitate, and Hedstrom continued to abuse
I.H. In July 2012, Hedstrom performed oral sex on six-year-old M.N.1 in the presence of
I.H., who was twelve years old at the time.
On July 19, 2012, the State charged Hedstrom with four counts of Class A felony
child molesting involving I.H. and one count of Class A felony child molesting involving
M.N. Hedstrom initially pleaded not guilty. However, two months later, at a September
1
The record is unclear as to the nature of M.N.’s relationship with Hedstrom.
2
27, 2013 hearing, Hedstrom entered into an unwritten open plea agreement in which he
agreed to plead guilty to Count I, Class A felony child molesting involving I.H. and
Count V, Class A felony child molesting involving M.N. The State agreed to dismiss the
three remaining counts.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on December 11, 2013. After hearing
arguments by Hedstrom and the State, the trial court found Hedstrom’s criminal history,
which included four previous felony convictions, including felony murder, to be an
aggravating circumstance. The trial court also found as an aggravating factor the
“constant and continuing nature of the offense” and the fact that Hedstrom was in a
position of trust with regard to I.H. Sentencing Tr. pp. 33-34. The trial court found as a
mitigating circumstance that Hedstrom pleaded guilty to two of the five counts of child
molesting with which he was charged. The trial court concluded that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The trial court sentenced
Hedstrom to forty-three years executed on Count I and thirty-seven years executed on
Count V. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for an
aggregate sentence of eighty years executed in the Department of Correction. The trial
court also found Hedstrom to be a credit-restricted felon as to both convictions.
Hedstrom now appeals his sentence.
I. Abuse of Discretion
Hedstrom first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Sentencing decisions “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed
on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
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(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court may abuse its
sentencing discretion by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement, (2) finding
aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported by the record, (3) omitting mitigating
factors clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or (4) giving
reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. Because a trial court no
longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other
when imposing a sentence, it cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing
to properly weigh such factors. Id. at 491. If a trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing, remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with
confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly
considered reasons that enjoy support in the record. Id. at 491.
Hedstrom first challenges the trial court’s finding of the aggravating circumstance
that he was in a “position of trust” with respect to I.H. Sentencing Tr. p. 33. Hedstrom
notes that he was no longer I.H.’s stepfather at the time of the molestations to which he
pleaded guilty,2 and argues that the State failed to introduced evidence to show that
Hedstrom “was regularly in a position of control over I.H.”; that he “actively sought
opportunities to supervise I.H.”; or that he “sought to establish a position of trust or
confidence with respect to I.H.” Appellant’s Br. at 8.
The State presented evidence that Hedstrom was, for nearly two years, I.H.’s
stepfather, that Hedstrom was living with I.H. and I.H.’s mother at the time of the
2
Hedstrom apparently pleaded guilty only to the counts arising from his 2012 molestation of I.H. and
M.N., although the record is not clear in this regard.
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molestations, and that Hedstrom cared for I.H. when I.H.’s mother was in jail for child
support issues. This evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court to find that
Hedstrom was in a position of trust with respect to I.H. See Rodriguez v. State, 868
N.E.2d 551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the defendant was in a position of
trust with child-victim where defendant co-habited with victim’s mother and victim spent
significant amount of time visiting defendant’s home); Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d
1093, 1099-1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that defendant was in a position of
trust with child-victim where defendant lived in same neighborhood, victim’s father had
known defendant for multiple years and trusted him to watch his daughter); Hines v.
State, 856 N.E.2d 1275, 1280-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (consideration of position of trust
aggravator was appropriate where child molest victim was spending the night with
defendant’s daughter at defendant’s residence), trans. denied. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding this to be an aggravating circumstance.
Hedstrom next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning little
weight to the mitigating circumstance that he pleaded guilty. Hedstrom initially pleaded
not guilty, but changed his plea to guilty moments before the depositions of I.H. and
M.N. were to begin, ostensibly out of concern about “the negative impact that deposition
testimony would have” on the children. Appellant’s Br. at 10. He acknowledges that the
trial court considered his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance, but argues that, by
imposing an aggregate sentence of eighty years, the trial court “effectively gave little to
no weight” to his plea. But, as our Supreme Court held in Anglemyer, we cannot say that
a trial court abuses its discretion when it weighs aggravating and mitigating factors. 868
5
N.E.2d at 490-91. Accordingly, Hedstrom’s challenge fails. The trial court could have
easily concluded that Hedstrom’s decision to plead guilty was simply a pragmatic
decision, especially in light of the timing of the decision, which occurred moments before
the victims were to be deposed. Furthermore, Hedstrom received a substantial benefit
from his plea; the State dismissed three Class A felony charges, substantially reducing the
potential sentence Hedstrom could have received. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. See also
Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Lindsey v. State, 877 N.E.2d
190, 198-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Hedstrom also claims that his difficult childhood, which included the divorce of
his parents, sexual abuse, and placement in foster homes, “tend[ed] to excuse or justify
his conduct.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Because Hedstrom failed to raise this argument at the
sentencing hearing, he has waived this claim on appeal. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
492 (holding that defendant’s failure to advance mitigating circumstances at sentencing
precluded appellate review of alleged mitigating circumstances); Pennington v. State, 821
N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that defendant waived his claim because
he failed to raise proposed mitigators at the trial court level). Waiver notwithstanding,
Hedstrom’s argument still fails. Our supreme court has held that, while “evidence about
the defendant’s background and character is relevant” to sentencing decisions, “evidence
of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight.” Coleman v. State, 741
N.E .2d 697, 700-701 (Ind. 2000). See also Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ind.
1998) (“Evidence of a troubled childhood does not require a trial court to find it to be a
mitigating circumstance”); Hines v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
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(Sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by failing to assign significant mitigating
weight to defendant’s history of having been sexually abused as a child, in sentencing
him on his conviction for child molesting, as defendant chose to create more victims by
becoming an abuser himself, and sentencing court was not obliged to afford any weight
to defendant’s history, in that defendant never established why his past victimization led
to his current behavior).
Hedstrom also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that his
two sentences be served consecutively instead of concurrently. However, we note that a
single aggravating circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Lavoie v. State, 903 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the trial court found
three valid aggravating circumstances. And the fact that he molested two different
victims supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent
sentences. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “when the perpetrator commits the
same offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to
vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one
person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003); see also Upton v. State, 904
N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (Trial court’s finding that defendant had sexually
molested multiple victims was permissible aggravating factor in support of order that
sentences run consecutively). Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering that Hedstrom’s sentence for Count I be served
consecutive to his sentence for Count V.
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II. Inappropriate Sentence
Hedstrom also claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his
offense and his character. Even if a trial court acted within its statutory discretion in
imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize
independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.
Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B), which provides that the court on appeal “may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Id.Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision,
because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due consideration to that decision and because we
understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing
decisions. Id. While we have the power to review and revise sentences, the principal
role of our review should be to attempt to level the outliers, and identify some guiding
principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes,
but not to achieve what we perceive to be a “correct” result in each case. Fernbach v.
State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans denied (citing Cardwell v. State,
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The appropriate question is not whether another
sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate. Former v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). And it is the
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defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court
is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Hedstrom pleaded guilty to Class A felony child molesting. The sentencing range
for a Class A felony is twenty to fifty years incarceration, with the advisory sentence
being thirty years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. Here, the trial court sentenced Hedstrom
to thirteen years more than the advisory, but seven years less than the maximum on Count
I and seven years more than the advisory on Count V. We conclude that both the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender support this sentence.
Hedstrom argues that “there are cases where the nature of the offense is more
heinous and the impact more substantial” and that “[n]othing in the record suggests that
Mr. Hedstrom used any type of weapon in the commission of the offenses and it was not
alleged that the victims suffered serious bodily harm.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. However,
Hedstrom’s position of trust over I.H. at the time of the abuse and M.N.’s young age
made both victims especially vulnerable as easy prey for Hedstrom, which demonstrates
the particularly depraved nature of his offenses. See Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1093(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (Enhancement of sentence, five years beyond the presumptive thirty
years, for Class A felony child molesting, was not inappropriate where defendant violated
a position of trust with at least one victim); Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007) (Defendant’s aggregate eight-year sentence was not inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender; defendant touched nine-year-
old child’s genitals on several occasions over the course of a few months, and in doing
so, he violated the position of trust he held with child, who stayed with her mother at
9
defendant’s home when mother had visitation). Here, the nature of the offense supports
the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Hedstrom also argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offender. He contends that a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation concluded that he
posed moderate risk of reoffending and that, because his eighty-year sentence amounts to
a life sentence due to his age (fifty-six years at the time of sentencing), the trial court
“treated him as though he poses a substantial and serious risk of reoffending.”
Appellant’s Br. at 14. He also again maintains that his difficult childhood and the fact
that he pleaded guilty to two of the charges brought against him cause his sentence to be
inappropriate in light of his character. Our view, however, is that Hedstrom’s character
supports the trial court’s sentencing decision. Hedstrom has an extensive criminal
history, including four previous felony convictions, one for felony murder. He repeatedly
molested I.H., a child over whom he had a position of trust, and molested M.N., a six-
year-old child, in I.H.’s presence. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Hedstrom
has not met his burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of his offenses and is character.
III. Credit Restricted Felon
Finally, Hedstrom argues that the trial court’s sentencing order and abstract of
judgment should be amended to reflect that Hedstrom is a credit restricted felon for his
conviction for child molesting as to M.H. only.
A credit restricted felon is defined in relevant part as follows:
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[A] person who has been convicted of at least one (1) of the following
offenses:
(1) Child molesting involving sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
conduct (IC 35–42–4–3(a)), if:
(A) the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one
(21) years of age; and
(B) the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.
Ind. Code § 35-41-1-5.5.3
As a credit restricted felon, Hedstrom would earn credit time at a reduced rate of
one day of credit for every six days that he is imprisoned. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-6-
3(d), -4(b).
Because the record indicates that I.H. was twelve years old at the time of the
offense to which Hedstrom pleaded guilty, we agree with Hedstrom that he is a credit
restricted felon for his conviction for molestation of six-year-old M.N. only. Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court erred when it found that Hedstrom is a credit-restricted
felon as his conviction for molestation of I.H..
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hedstrom, and
Hedstrom’s eighty-year aggregate sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender. As to Hedstrom’s classification as a credit-
restricted felon for his conviction for molesting I.H., we reverse and remand with
3
This statute has since been repealed. See now Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-72, which provides that:
“Credit restricted felon” means a person who has been convicted of at least one (1) of the
following offenses:
(1) Child molesting involving sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct (IC
35-42-4-3(a)), if:
(A) the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years
of age; and
(B) the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.
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instructions to the trial court to revise its sentencing order and abstract of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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