Richard Green v. State of Indiana

Oct 03 2013, 5:47 am
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
T. MICHAEL CARTER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Scottsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RICHARD GREEN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 36A01-1212-CR-571
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable William E. Vance, Judge
Cause No. 36C01-1008-FB-37
October 3, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Richard Green (Green), appeals his conviction for armed
robbery, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1; and his adjudication as an habitual
offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Green raises one issue which we restate as: Whether the State presented sufficient
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for armed robbery.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2010, fifty-four-year-old Green met nineteen-year-old Harry Piepmeyer
(Piepmeyer) while they both were imprisoned on unrelated charges. They became
friends and would talk about robbing banks together. Green was released from prison
prior to Piepmeyer. On April 1, 2010, Piepmeyer was released and picked up by Green;
Green took Piepmeyer to breakfast and they talked again about robbing banks. The
following day, Piepmeyer and Green drove in Green’s car to Lafayette where Green
purchased disguises from several costume stores. On April 3 and 4, 2010, Piepmeyer and
Green drove around, scouting out several banks in Scottsburg, Columbus, and Seymour,
Indiana. Green suggested that the People’s Bank in Seymour would be easiest to rob
location-wise as it was located across the street from elevated railroad tracks which
would facilitate their escape.
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On the morning of April 5, 2010, Green drove Piepmeyer to a location near
People’s Bank. Green told Piepmeyer that he would wait for him on the opposite side of
the railroad tracks. Green had also advised Piepmeyer of what to say during the robbery
and had asked him to wear the disguise, which included a black wig and a black beard
and mustache.
At approximately 11 a.m., Piepmeyer walked into the People’s Bank, brandishing
a weapon, which was later determined to be a BB gun, and announced the robbery.
Piepmeyer pointed the BB gun at a customer and ordered him to the ground. After
waving the BB gun around, Piepmeyer pointed it at the tellers, placing teller Adilee
Fegley (Fegley) in fear for her life. He demanded that the tellers hand over the bank’s
money or he would “kill” them. (Transcript p. 206). Fegley and the other tellers handed
Piepmeyer the money, in the amount of $16,557. When Piepmeyer left the bank, he met
up with Green and they drove away in Green’s car. Green divided the money, giving
Piepmeyer $5,000 and keeping the rest for himself.
After the robbery, Green and Piepmeyer continued to hang out and exchange
phone calls. Despite Green’s urging to commit more bank robberies, Piepmeyer refused.
After that, Piepmeyer became afraid of Green, started to ignore his phone calls, and
purchased a handgun for his protection.
Piepmeyer became a suspect in the People’s Bank robbery when authorities
matched his DNA to a necktie that he had discarded near the place of the robbery. When
confronted with the DNA evidence, Piepmeyer confessed to the robbery and divulged
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Green’s involvement. Piepmeyer pled guilty to armed robbery, as a Class B felony and
received a ten-year sentence with two years suspended.
On August 12, 2010, the State filed an Information charging Green with armed
robbery, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-1. On April 4, 2011, the State amended the
Information, adding a habitual offender Count, I.C. § 35-50-2-8. On October 16 through
October 18, 2012, the trial court conducted a jury trial. At the close of the evidence, the
jury found Green guilty as charged. On November 16, 2012, during the sentencing
hearing, the trial court sentenced Green to seventeen years for armed robbery, enhanced
by twenty years for being a habitual offender, resulting in an aggregate sentence of thirty-
seven years.
Green now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Green argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for armed robbery. When reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Walker v. State, 984 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
We may look only to the evidence most favorable to the judgment and reasonable
inferences therefrom and will affirm if we conclude that evidence of probative value
exists such that a reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the underlying crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
To convict Green of robbery, a Class B felony, the State was required to establish
that Green knowingly or intentionally took property from another person (1) by force or
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the threat of force or (2) by putting the person in fear, while armed with a deadly weapon.
See I.C. § 35-42-5-1. Green’s sole contention revolves around the element of a deadly
weapon.1 He maintains that, under the particular circumstances, Piepmeyer’s brandishing
of a BB gun cannot be categorized as a deadly weapon.
Indiana Code section 35-41-1-8 (2010) defined a deadly weapon as
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), deadly weapon means the
following:
(1) A loaded or unloaded firearm.
(2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser [] or electronic stun
weapon [], equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in
the manner it:
(A) is used;
(B) could ordinarily be used; or
(C) is intended to be used;
is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.
Although not firearms, pellet or BB guns can be considered deadly weapons.
Merriweather v. State, 778 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Whether a weapon is a
deadly weapon is determined from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and
the circumstances of the case. Id.
Besides the bank’s security camera video, which had captured the robbery in
progress, the trial court also admitted into evidence BB gun packaging, which had been
recovered from Green’s residence. At trial, Piepmeyer testified to Green’s involvement
in the robbery and affirmed that the packaging was “similar to” the BB gun used in the
robbery. (Tr. p. 310). The packaging included a warning label, which provided: “Do not
1
It should be noted that a defendant is criminally liable for the use of a weapon by an accomplice even in
the complete absence of evidence that the defendant was personally armed. See Wilson v. State, 513
N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind. 1987).
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brandish or display this airgun in public—it may confuse people and may be a crime.
Police and others may think it is a firearm.” (State’s Exh. 9). Although no actual gun
was ever recovered, it is not necessary that the weapon be admitted into evidence at trial.
Brown v. State, 360 N.E.2d 830, 833 (Ind. 1977).
Teller Fegley testified that Piepmeyer entered the bank, brandishing a gun. He
held the gun “up to our customer’s chest” and he was pointing “at all of [them].” (Tr. p.
206). She stated that Piepmeyer demanded the money or he would “kill” her. (Tr. p.
206). Fegley indicated that she perceived the weapon as a “real gun” and it placed her in
fear of her “life.” (Tr. p. 207). We have previously held that a victim’s testimony that he
or she saw the defendant use what was believed or figured to be a gun is, by itself,
sufficient proof of the use of a deadly weapon. Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d 845, 851
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. See also Rogers v. State, 537 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Ind.
1989) (holding that a disabled gun was a deadly weapon where “the realism of the
weapon coupled with [defendant’s] threatening behavior caused the victims to fear for
their lives.”). Therefore, based on the evidence before us, we conclude that the State
presented sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to reasonably infer that a deadly weapon
was used during the commission of the robbery.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Green’s conviction.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J. and C. J. ROBB concur
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