Jose Garcia v. G. Wm. Walker Construction

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Oct 03 2013, 5:29 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
SANDRA O’BRIEN DANIEL M. COOPER
Hobart, Indiana Merrillville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOSE GARCIA, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1305-EX-437
)
G. WM. WALKER CONSTRUCTION, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD
The Honorable Linda Hamilton, Chairman
Cause No. C-190692
October 3, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Claimant, Jose Garcia (Garcia), appeals the Indiana Worker’s
Compensation Board’s (Board) determination that his injury did not arise out of his
employment with Appellee-Respondent, G. Wm. Walker Construction (Walker
Construction).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Garcia raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the Board erred
in its determination that his injury did not arise out of his employment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March of 2006, Garcia was employed by Walker Construction and was working
at a construction site across from the Munster Landfill. In and around the Munster
Landfill, a number of seagulls congregated, depositing a large amount of avian
excrement. On March 29, 2006, Garcia was washing out the back of a truck with a hose
when the hose slipped from his hand and splashed muddy soil into his face. Two to three
days later, Garcia started to experience cold symptoms and had trouble breathing. His
symptoms worsened in time, and on April 18, 2006, Garcia went to the emergency room
after waking up with “one eye up and one eye down,” a severe debilitating headache,
fatigue, and confusion. (Appellant’s App. p. 52). A spinal tab revealed a cryptococcal
fungus infection and he was diagnosed with cryptococcus meningitis. Cryptococcus is a
type of fungus found in the soil, typically in association with bird droppings and which
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can cause cryptococcus meningitis. Garcia remained in hospital care until June 20, 2006.
Following his discharge, he received home health care, as well as nursing and physical
therapy for several months. In October of 2010, Garcia returned to work, for a different
employer.
On January 31, 2008, Garcia filed an Application for Adjustment of Benefits with
the Board. On April 19, 2012, the Single Hearing Member of the Board conducted a
hearing on Garcia’s application. On July 26, 2012, the Single Hearing Member issued
his findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Garcia did not meet his
burden of proof and therefore his claim was not compensable under the Indiana Workers
Compensation Act. He found in pertinent part that:
6. During the time [Garcia] was hospitalized and received treatment, no
one on his team of treating physicians gave an opinion as to the manner in
which [Garcia] contracted meningitis.
7. [] [T]he Discharge Summary from [his doctor] notes “the unknown
cause of the meningitis.”
***
12. The first medical report linking the meningitis with [Garcia’s]
employment with [Walker Construction] was issued by Dr. Fortson over
five (5) years after [Garcia] contracted the disease.
13. Dr. Fortson has experience and expertise in the area of Family Practice
and Disability Evaluation.
14. Dr Fortson’s theory on how [Garcia] contracted meningitis contradicts
[Garcia’s] theory on the method of infection.
15. Dr. Lee issued an expert opinion on the cause of [Garcia’s] meningitis.
16. Dr. Lee is Board Certified in the fields of Infectious Disease and
Internal Medicine.
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17. Dr. Lee found that none of [Garcia’s] employment related exposures
were risk factors for meningitis.
18. Dr. Lee specifically found that there have been no reported cases of a
person contracting meningitis in the manner claimed by [Garcia].
19. Dr. Lee also found that for [Garcia] to contract meningitis in the
manner prescribed by Dr. Fortson would require extended exposure,
however [Garcia] testified that he was only on the jobsite for two to three
(2-3) days.
20. Dr. Lee ultimately found no causation as there is no evidence that
seagulls, or other birds, in the area of [Garcia’s] employment were actual
carriers of Cryptococcus.
21. Dr Fortson’s experience and expertise, as outlined in his curriculum
vitae (CV) does not indicate that he is specifically qualified to issue an
opinion on the causation of a disease such as meningitis and his opinion is
therefore assigned less weight.
22. Dr Lee’s experience and expertise, as outlined in her curriculum vitae
(CV), show her qualifications to opine as an expert on the causation of
meningitis and her opinion is therefore assigned great weight.
23. [Garcia] claims he contracted meningitis through exposure to the fecal
matter or seagulls; however, [Garcia] failed to offer any evidence showing
any of the following:
a. That the specific variety/species of seagull native to Northwest
Indiana has ever been known to carry meningitis;
b. That there has ever been a case in Northwest Indiana or the
surrounding region of a person contracting meningitis through
exposure to seagull feces;
c. That there were any cases of meningitis in Northwest Indiana or
the surrounding region linked to exposure to the feces of any bird in
the Spring/Summer of 2006 or any other time; or
d. That any co-worker on the jobsite or any employee of the nearby
landfill (who faced exponentially higher exposure) contracted
meningitis, or any other potentially related illness, from any source,
known or unknown.
24. [Garcia] in his testimony at the hearing, admitted that seagulls are
commonly found throughout Northwest Indiana.
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25. [Garcia] also testified at hearing and noted in his discovery responses
that, during the same time period as the injury/exposure, he routinely did
landscaping and lawn care at several rental properties and his own home, all
located in and around East Chicago in Northwest Indiana.
26. Even if the Board were to accept [Garcia’s] basic premise that he
contracted meningitis through some form of exposure to the feces of
seagulls or other birds, [Garcia] has failed to prove any of the following:
a. That he contracted meningitis at work and not from other potential
exposures;
b. That there were increased rates of meningitis around the jobsite;
or
c. That there were any other cases of meningitis in the area
surrounding the worksite.
27. Dr. Lee found that [Garcia’s] meningitis was most likely caused by an
underlying case of sinusitis.
28. Dr Lee’s explanation offers the simplest answer that fits all the
evidence in the case.
(Appellant’s App. pp. 14-16).
Garcia appealed to the Board. On April 29, 2013, after a hearing, the Board issued
its opinion, adopting the Single Hearing Member’s decision.
Garcia now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Garcia contends that the Board erred in its determination that his meningitis did
not arise out of his employment. On appeal, we review the decision of the Board, not to
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but only to determine whether
substantial evidence, together with any reasonable inferences that flow from such
evidence, support the Board’s findings and conclusions. Bertoch v. NBD Corp., 813
N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (Ind. 2004). In so doing, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.
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Ag One Co-op v. Scott, 914 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We first review the
record to determine whether there is competent evidence of probative value to support the
Board’s findings, and then determine whether the findings support the decision. Id. at
863. As a general matter, we are bound by the Board’s findings of fact and may only
consider errors in the Board’s conclusions of law. Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Roush, 706
N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). However, we may disturb the Board’s factual
determinations if we determine that the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a
result contrary to that reached by the Board. Id. We review the Board’s conclusions of
law de novo. Bertoch, 813 N.E.2d at 1160.
Garcia’s sole issue focuses on the Board’s evaluation of the presented expert
testimony. Specifically, he claims that Dr. Lee’s report includes “glaring
inconsistencies” and its conclusion is “antithetical to the accepted understanding of how
[c]ryptococcus meningitis is transmitted.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). Pointing to the medical
articles cited by Dr. Lee in support of her thesis, Garcia painstakingly disseminates their
content to reach his conclusion that these articles “certainly do not support her opinion,
making her unreliable despite her qualifications.” (Appellant’s App. p. 9). Instead,
Garcia urges us to adopt the findings of Dr. Fortson as “credible evidence that [Garcia]
contracted cryptococcal meningitis from exposure to bird droppings at his work place.”
(Appellant’s App. p. 11).
Garcia’s argument merely challenges the credibility (and weight thereof) of the
respective expert witnesses. Most tellingly, Garcia invites us, based on “the credible
evidence,” to reverse and remand the Board’s order. (Appellant’s App. p. 12). However,
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it is well established that “[w]here the evidence of expert witnesses is conflicting, it is the
Board’s prerogative to solve the conflicts.” Roebel v. Dana Corp., 638 N.E.2d 1356,
1360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Here, the Board’s findings reflect a careful weighing of the
expert’s conclusions as tailored to the facts before us. The Board understood the
differences between the experts and made a careful analysis of their respective positions
while mindful of the weaknesses underlying each report. We cannot impinge upon the
Board’s resolution of these questions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that Garcia’s injury did
not arise out of his employment.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J. and ROBB, C. J. concur
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