Gabriel Senteney v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
May 29 2014, 10:20 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
GABRIEL SENTENEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1309-CR-818
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Amy M. Jones, Judge
Cause No. 49F08-1209-CM-62126
May 29, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Gabriel Senteney1 appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement, following a bench trial. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the
State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Finding the evidence sufficient,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 6, 2012, Officer Gene Donovan, Sergeant David Coonce, and other
officers from the Marion County Sheriff’s Department went to a residence to serve a felony
arrest warrant on Senteney. The female who answered the door of the residence stated that
Senteney was not there. Officer Donovan explained that the officers had a right to enter the
residence to search for Senteney. Officers began searching the residence, continually
announcing their presence and purpose and ordering Senteney to come out. The officers
were confident that Senteney was hiding inside the residence because an officer stationed
outside on the perimeter of the residence saw an individual he thought was Senteney look out
a window.
When Officer Donovan reached the back of the residence, he observed what appeared
to be a porch storage area full of clothing racks and a cabinet. Officer Donovan tugged on
the knob of one of the cabinet’s doors, but the door did not open. Officer Donovan briefly
left the porch area to search the attic of the residence. When that search failed to reveal
1
We note that both parties spell the appellant’s last name “Senteny” rather than “Senteney.” We
choose the latter spelling as the judgment of conviction and trial transcript both refer to the appellant as
Senteney.
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Senteney’s whereabouts, Officer Donovan returned to the porch. Officer Donovan again
attempted to open the cabinet. This time the cabinet door “gave a little bit” but quickly shut
again “like somebody was pulling on it.” Tr. at 10, 16. Officer Donovan was eventually able
to pull the door open and discovered Senteney curled up inside the cabinet in a fetal position
with his hands on top of his knees.
Officer Donovan ordered Senteney to exit the cabinet, but Senteney refused. Sergeant
Coonce then entered the porch, identified himself to Senteney, and ordered him to exit the
cabinet. When Senteney failed to comply with the order, Sergeant Coonce grabbed
Senteney’s arm and pulled him out of the cabinet so that he was face down on the floor.
Senteney refused the officers’ repeated requests to put his arms behind his back and instead
tucked both arms under his chest. When Sergeant Coonce attempted to pull Senteney’s arms
out from under his body, he noticed that Senteney’s arms were “definitely tense.” Id. at 19.
It took three officers to physically pull on Senteney’s arms to effectuate the handcuffing
process due to Senteney’s refusal to cooperate. Id. at 19-20.
The State charged Senteney with two counts of class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. A bench trial was held on July 21, 2013. At the close of the State’s evidence,
the trial court granted Senteney’s motion for involuntary dismissal of one of the counts.
Thereafter, the trial court found Senteney guilty of one count of class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
To convict Senteney of class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State was
required to prove that Senteney knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or
interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the
execution of the officer’s duties. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1. Our supreme court recently
reiterated its well-known holding that a person “forcibly resists” law enforcement when
“strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official’s rightful
exercise of his or her duties.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ind. 2013) (quoting
Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993)). In Walker, the court also reiterated its
subsequent clarification of the Spangler holding in which the court explained that “the force
involved need not rise to the level of mayhem” and that a “modest level of resistance” such
as “stiffening one’s arm when an officer grabs hold to position them for cuffing” would
suffice as forcible resistance. Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965-66 (Ind.
2009)). The “forcible” element is met when evidence demonstrates that “the police had to
get physical” to secure the defendant’s compliance. Graham, 903 N.E.2d. at 966.
Here, Senteney used, at the very least, a modest level of resistance to interfere with
Sergeant Coonce’s attempt to handcuff him. Senteney held his arms under his chest on the
floor and also tensed his arms when Sergeant Coonce grabbed hold to position them for
cuffing. Senteney concedes that stiffening one’s arms is sufficient to support a finding of
forcible resistance but argues that our case law does not indicate that tensing one’s arms is
similarly sufficient. We are not persuaded by Senteney’s attempt to distinguish between
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stiffening one’s arms and tensing one’s arms, as both acts suffice as forcible resistance
because they require officers to “get physical” in order to secure a defendant’s compliance.
See id. The State presented sufficient evidence to show that Senteney forcibly resisted
Sergeant Coonce, and therefore we affirm his conviction for class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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