Hugo Torres v. City of Hammond and City of Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety

FOR PUBLICATION
Jun 25 2014, 10:58 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
DAVID PAUL ALLEN STEVEN J. SERSIC
Hammond, Indiana KEVIN C. SMITH
KRISTINA KANTAR
Smith, Sersic
Munster, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
HUGO TORRES, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 45A03-1306-PL-205
)
CITY OF HAMMOND and CITY OF )
HAMMOND BOARD OF PUBLIC )
WORKS AND SAFETY, )
)
Appellees-Defendants. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge
Cause No. 45D01-1302-PL-15
June 25, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Hugo Torres appeals a trial court decision upholding an order by the City of
Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety (“the City”) to demolish his house. As Torres
did not have the benefit of an impartial decision maker in the proceeding that ordered
demolition of his property, we reverse.1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Torres owns a residence in Hammond. In October of 2012, the City declared the
residence uninhabitable. The building commissioner issued an order to repair or demolish it.
In January 2013 the City conducted a hearing on the order. The board that conducted the
hearing and ordered the demolition was comprised of the city controller, the city engineer,
and the city attorney. As the city attorney served on the board, the City’s case was argued by
his assistant city attorney. After the hearing, the board found the house posed a health and
safety danger to nearby occupied residences and ordered the house demolished. The trial
court affirmed the City’s order.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Torres was deprived of his due process right to an impartial decision maker when the
Hammond city attorney served as a deciding member on the board of public works and safety
at a hearing where the assistant city attorney represented the City.
Due process requires a neutral, or unbiased, adjudicatory decision maker. Scholars
and judges consistently characterize provision of a neutral decision maker as one of the three
or four core requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decision making. Rynerson v. City
1
Because we reverse on that ground, we need not address Torres’ other allegations of error.
2
of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 967 (Ind. 1996). In City of Hammond v. State ex rel. Jefferson,
411 N.E.2d 152, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), we determined Jefferson’s hearing was improper
when, as in the case before us, an assistant city attorney represented the city while the city
attorney sat as a decision making member of the public works and safety board. Id. at 155.
Jefferson was alleged to have violated rules and tardiness policies, and the Fire Chief
recommended his dismissal. Proceedings were conducted before the Hammond Board of
Public Works and Safety, of which the city attorney, McIllwain, was a member. McIlwain
indicated he would serve only in his capacity as a board member, and the assistant city
attorney represented the city in the action against Jefferson. The board suspended Jefferson
and placed him on probation. Jefferson appealed the board’s findings to the trial court,
which reversed the board’s decision. The trial court determined Jefferson was not afforded a
fair hearing because the city attorney’s office participated in both the prosecution and
decision-making processes.
We agreed, relying on City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 261 Ind. 670, 310 N.E.2d 65
(1974), in which our Indiana Supreme Court held a city attorney cannot serve the dual
functions of board member and advocate for the city in the same proceeding. We explained
in Jefferson:
We do not believe, following the language and reasoning of the Court
in [Stewart], that the appearance of impropriety evident in the instant case is in
any respect cured merely because the city attorney’s vote against Jefferson was
not necessary to constitute a quorum and to order his suspension. Thus,
although the City of Hammond argues in its brief that even apart from the city
attorney, two members of the statutory three-member board voted in favor of
suspension, we find compelling the following language supporting the
conclusion in [Stewart]:
3
In the case before us, this viewpoint would be even more
significant because without the city attorney, the board was
without a quorum. However, it is our opinion that the
appearance of bias arising from the duality in this case
overshadows the actualities, whatever they may be, to such
extent as to invalidate the proceedings.
Moreover, we consider it impossible, in cases such as the one at bar, to
determine in what manner the combination of the city attorney’s improper
participation in the proceedings and presence on the Board while his assistant
prosecuted the case may have influenced the thinking of the other voting
decisionmakers.
Similarly, we do not believe the instant case is distinguishable from
[Stewart] merely because the city attorney utilized his assistant to prosecute the
case against the fireman and thus did not personally assume conflicting roles.
See State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Superior Court of Hancock County, (1979) Ind.,
386 N.E.2d 942, where it is suggested that a deputy prosecuting attorney would
be disqualified in any circumstance where the prosecuting attorney becomes a
witness or is otherwise disqualified from acting in his official capacity. In this
context, we note the Court in [Stewart], in disapproving the language of Guido
v. City of Marion, (1972) 151 Ind. App. 435, 280 N.E.2d 81, condemned the
appearance of bias even where an assistant city attorney is employed, stating
“(n)or do we think the basic problem was solved in Guido’s case (Guido was a
police officer brought before the appropriate board in a similar proceeding) by
the injection of the assistant city attorney as counsel, while the city attorney
proceeded to participate in the determination.” [Stewart], 261 Ind. at 681, 310
N.E.2d at 71.
Jefferson, 411 N.E.2d at 154 (emphases and some citations omitted).
In Rynerson, our Indiana Supreme Court noted the “inquiry into whether the
arrangement before us violates due process is subject to the presumption that the members of
the board are persons of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging the
particular controversy fairly and will act with honesty and integrity.” 669 N.E.2d at 968
4
(internal quotation omitted). We acknowledge that presumption. But the inquiry is also
subject to
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses as to
whether an administrative body adjudicating a matter in which an individual
who sits as a member of the board in other matters poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment2 that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.
*****
[I]t is appropriate to take into account concerns about the practical operation of
administrative agencies, including their variety, complexity, and flexibility,
when analyzing whether their administrative mechanisms violate due process.
Id. (emphasis and footnote added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Rynerson Court found no due process violation when the city attorney served on
the City of Franklin Board of Public Works and Safety. But there, the city attorney recused
himself from the board in order to represent the city in the disciplinary proceedings against
Rynerson. The city attorney could participate as a member of the Board as long as he did not
participate in the proceedings before it. Id. at 970.
The city attorney’s recusal from the board in order to serve as the city’s advocate in
Rynerson makes Rynerson inapposite to the case before us, and Jefferson controls. We must
accordingly hold Torres’ due process rights were violated where an assistant city attorney
argued the case against Torres before a board on which the city attorney participated as a
2
The dissent correctly notes Torres does not “point to any evidence . . . establishing the city attorney’s actual
bias or prejudice.” (Slip op. at 10.) But Rynerson does not require Torres to provide evidence of actual bias or
prejudice. Rather, Rynerson instructs us to consider whether the makeup of the board “poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden[.]” 669 N.E.2d at 968 (emphasis added). In the
case before us, as in Stewart, “the appearance of bias arising from the duality in this case overshadows the
actualities, whatever they may be, to such extent as to invalidate the proceedings.” 261 Ind. at 70, 310 N.E.2d
at 680 (emphasis added).
5
member. We reverse the trial court’s order.
Reversed.
VAIDIK, C.J., concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion.
6
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
HUGO TORRES, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 45A03-1306-PL-205
)
CITY OF HAMMOND and CITY OF )
HAMMOND BOARD OF PUBLIC )
WORKS AND SAFETY, )
)
Appellees-Defendants. )
RILEY, Judge, dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion, reversing the trial court’s
decision on the ground that Torres “did not have the benefit of an impartial decision maker in
the proceeding” before the Board. Slip Op. p. 2. Focusing on the membership of the Board,
which consisted of the city controller, the city engineer, and the city attorney, the majority
decided that in line with City of Hammond v. State ex rel. Jefferson, 411 N.E.2d 152 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980), a city attorney may not sit on a decision-making board while the assistant city
7
attorney3 acts as prosecutor for the city. I do not find Jefferson to be controlling of the case at
bar.
As noted by the majority, due process requires a neutral, unbiased, or adjudicatory
decision-maker. Rynerson v. City of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 967 (Ind. 1996). Scholars
and judges consistently characterize the provision of a neutral decision-maker as one of the
three or four core requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decision-making. Id. Our
supreme court first confronted the due process requirement of a neutral decision-maker in
City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 310 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. 1974), where a city firefighter faced
disciplinary charges before the city’s public works and safety board. Concluding that it was
“imperative that a strict test of impartiality be applied to the factfinding process,” the court
found that it was improper for the Mishawaka city attorney both to prosecute the disciplinary
complaint against the firefighter and chair the board responsible for adjudicating guilt and
imposing sanctions. Id. at 69. Building on this principle, we held In Jefferson that a fair
hearing is not provided when an assistant city attorney represents the city in a hearing in
which the city attorney sits as a decision-making member of the public works and safety
board. Jefferson, 411 N.E.2d at 153.
Although both Jefferson and Stewart concerned firemen disciplinary hearings, our
supreme court revisited these principles and adopted them for other administrative decision-
makers in adjudicative proceedings in Rynerson. The majority determined Rynerson
3
It should be noted that, in this instance, the assistant city attorney was an outside or contract counsel.
However, I.C. § 36-4-9-12 states that “Officers, departments, boards, commissions, and other agencies of
the city may not employ attorneys without the authorization head of the department of law.”
8
inapposite because of the city attorney’s recusal from the board in order to serve as the city’s
advocate; however, in its haste to disregard the case, the majority ignores Rynerson’s broader
question in which our supreme court evaluated “whether it is constitutional for a member of
an administrative body to serve as an advocate or prosecutor before the body in a certain type
of adjudicative proceeding so long as the member does not participate in any such
adjudicative proceeding.” Id. at 967.
Relying on Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975), the
Rynerson court formulated a two-step inquiry applicable to the analysis of whether a
combination of the prosecutorial or advocacy function and the adjudicative function in the
same administrative decision-makers violates due process. Commencing from the
presumption that “the members of the board are persons of conscience and intellectual
discipline, capable of judging the particular controversy fairly and will act with honesty and
integrity,” the combination of functions must be subject to
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses as to
whether an administrative body adjudicating a matter in which an individual
who sits as a member of the board in other matters poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.
Id. at 968 (citing Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55) (emphasis added).
The second step of the inquiry is more practical and focused on “concerns about the
practical operation of administrative agencies, including their variety, complexity, and
flexibility, when analyzing whether their administrative mechanisms violate due process.”
Rynerson, 669 N.E.2d at 968.
9
Giving due consideration to the presumption of honesty, integrity, and
conscientiousness, I find that the present situation is free from an appearance of impropriety
as Torres fails to point to any evidence—besides the city attorney’s mere presence on the
Board—establishing the city attorney’s actual bias or prejudice.4 Nor was there any actual
bias or prejudice on the part of the two other participating members of the Board.5
Moreover, turning to the practical step of the Rynerson inquiry and considering
whether the city attorney could “easily” be replaced from the Board, our supreme court
pointed out in Rynerson, that a city’s board of public works and safety
is responsible for an enormous amount and variety of city business. The board
supervises the streets, alleys, sewers, public grounds and other property of the
city and is responsible for their repair and condition. It is responsible for the
custody and maintenance of all real and personal property of the city and
designs, orders, contracts for and executes the construction of all buildings and
other structures needed for public purposes and all work required to improve
or repair any real or personal property owned or used by the city. The board
has substantial condemnation, rental and purchase powers, authority to build,
alter and maintain drains and severs, and responsibility for refuse removal. . . .
As can be seen from this partial list, much of this work will require the
assistance of the city attorney. . . .
Id.at 969-70.
4
It should be noted that due process itself does not prohibit the city attorney from serving on a three-
member administrative board, while his assistant city attorney is serving as a prosecutor. In fact, as
pointed out in Rynerson, Withrow flatly rejected this proposition: “It is also very typical for the members
of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal
complaints instituting enforcement proceedings and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode
of procedure . . . does not violate due process of law.” Rynerson, 669 N.E.2d at 969 n.3 (citing Withrow,
421 U.S. at 56).
5
As such, I find it curious that Torres did not allege a due process violation because of the city engineer’s
membership on the Board. As city engineer, he was necessarily closely aligned with the building
commissioner, the housing inspectors, and the Hammond Inspections Department who condemned Torres’
property to demolition and whose evidence the B oard considered in reaching its decision.
10
Therefore, as the proceeding in the instant case involved the repair and demolition of
an uninhabitable residence, the city attorney could participate in the hearing as a member of
the Board. Absent some demonstrable actual bias, I cannot conclude that Torres’ due process
rights were violated. I would affirm the trial court’s decision in every respect.
11