James E. Robinson v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of May 27 2014, 7:15 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAMES E. ROBINSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JAMES E. ROBINSON, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 12A02-1308-PC-775
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CLINTON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Justin H. Hunter, Judge
Cause No. 12D01-1009-PC-2
May 27, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James E. Robinson appeals the post-conviction court’s summary denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Robinson raises a single issue for our review, namely,
whether the post-conviction court erred when it denied Robinson’s petition without
holding an evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 29, 2002, Robinson pleaded guilty to murder, a felony. The trial court
sentenced him to sixty years in the Department of Correction. Robinson did not pursue a
direct appeal.
On September 28, 2010, Robinson filed his pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. According to Robinson’s petition, he was entitled to post-conviction relief because
he had “[r]eceived ineffective assistance of counsel [at the] Guilty Plea Hearing” and
because his “Plea Agreement was not knowingly, voluntarily, and [i]ntelligently
entered.” Appellant’s App. at 18. As factual background for his allegations, Robinson
stated:
(a) Counsel advanced pleading guilty without developing expert opinion
or background information that [was] highly relevant to an evaluation of
defendant’s mental defect and mental health.
(b) Counsel advised defendant to enter into Plea Agreement and Guilty
Plea Hearing [sic] while defendant was not competent to stand trial. See
Guilty Plea Hearing, Attorney-client files, Exhibit “B-B” pg 2, and newly
discovered evidence.
Id. at 18-19. Robinson then stated the name and address of his trial attorney. Robinson’s
petition stated no other information relevant to his allegations, no exhibits were attached
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to Robinson’s petition, and Robinson in no other way clarified what he meant by the
“newly discovered evidence” he alleged to have discovered.
On April 12, 2013, Robinson filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on his
petition. On May 13, the court ordered the parties to “present evidence that each side
wishes for the court to consider by written submission, within sixty days. Thereafter, the
[c]ourt will determine whether to schedule an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 3. Rather than
respond to the court’s request, on June 21 Robinson filed a second motion for an
evidentiary hearing. On July 19, the court found that “[n]o evidence was submitted in
furtherance of Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” pursuant to the
court’s May 13 Order, and, as such, the court denied Robinson’s petition with prejudice.
This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Robinson appeals the post-conviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. Post-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a “super-
appeal” but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules.
Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001) (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule
1(1)). Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of
proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. P-C.R. 1(5). A
petitioner who appeals the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief faces a rigorous
standard of review, as the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and the
reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-conviction court. Kien v.
State, 866 N.E.2d 377, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The appellate court must
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accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings
are clearly erroneous. Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. 2007). If a post-
conviction petitioner was denied relief, he or she must show that the evidence as a whole
leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion than that reached by the
post-conviction court. Ivy v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied.
If post-conviction pleadings show conclusively that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief, the court may deny the post-conviction petition without further proceedings. P-
C.R. l(4)(f). Where a court disposes of a petition accordingly, we review the court’s
decision as we would a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d
748, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. The court errs in disposing of a petition in
this manner unless the pleadings show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Id. at
752-53. The petitioner has a burden “only to plead facts that raise[] an issue of possible
merit.” Id. at 754. When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and the
facts pled raise an issue of possible merit, the petition should not be summarily denied.
Id. at 756. But “without specific factual allegations in support of the claim of inadequacy
of representation no evidentiary hearing is required.” Tyson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 855,
858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Sherwood v. State, 453 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Ind. 1983)),
trans. denied. The post-conviction court shall make specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law on all issues presented, whether or not a hearing is held. P-C.R. 1(6);
Clayton v. State, 673 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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Here, Robinson contends that his “petition alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective at the competency and sentencing hearing and that his trial counsel never
performed any investigation into [Robinson’s] state of mind.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. In
support of his argument on appeal, he relies on Sherwood and Clayton. In Sherwood, our
Supreme Court reversed the post-conviction court’s summary denial of the petitioner’s
claim for relief in light of the following factual basis alleged in the petition:
In his petition appellant stated: “I would also like to file a motion to get a
new trial on the grounds that according to my lawyer I would be place[d] in
a hospital to do my time.” He also stated: “My lawyer did not give me
proper counsel.”
Given this state of the record, we cannot agree with the State’s
contention that appellant made no allegation as to the existence of a
question of law regarding the adequacy of representation.
***
. . . In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the facts are determined in
an evidentiary hearing, unless the State in its answer admits to the
petitioner’s factual allegations or it is required that the facts as alleged by
the petitioner be deemed as admitted due to the State’s failure to file an
answer to the petition. In the case at bar the State denied the facts alleged.
This was enough to invoke the need to hold an evidentiary hearing. This is
true no matter how unlikely it seems that appellant will be able to produce
evidence in support of his claim.
453 N.E.2d at 189 (citations omitted). In Clayton, we reversed the post-conviction
court’s summary denial of the petition for post-conviction relief, stating:
In the petition, Clayton alleged that he was originally offered a guilty plea
requiring a two-year suspension of his driver’s license. He also alleged that
he refused this offer, and an offer requiring a one-year suspension was
made. He further alleged that he would not have pled guilty if his trial
counsel would have informed him that the one-year suspension under the
guilty plea would begin after a one-year administrative suspension.
673 N.E.2d at 786.
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We must agree with Robinson that his petition stated enough factual background
to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. Although the State asserts that Robinson “failed
to allege[] specific factual allegations to support his petition,” Appellee’s Br. at 6, the
State is clearly mistaken. Again, in his petition Robinson specifically alleged that:
(a) Counsel advanced pleading guilty without developing expert opinion
or background information that [was] highly relevant to an evaluation of
defendant’s mental defect and mental health.
(b) Counsel advised defendant to enter into Plea Agreement and Guilty
Plea Hearing [sic] while defendant was not competent to stand trial. See
Guilty Plea Hearing, Attorney-client files, Exhibit “B-B” pg 2, and newly
discovered evidence.
Id. at 18-19. That is, Robinson alleged that his trial counsel had failed to investigate
Robinson’s mental health and that Robinson’s mental condition nullified his guilty plea.
While Robinson’s petition is not the polestar for how to write a petition for post-
conviction relief, it is as adequate as the petition in Sherwood, which our Supreme Court
held entitled the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. See 453 N.E.2d at 189.
Moreover, we are not persuaded by the State’s contention that Robinson was
obliged to inform the post-conviction court of his evidence prior to an evidentiary hearing
and in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing. “In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the
facts are determined in an evidentiary hearing, unless the State in its answer admits to the
petitioner’s factual allegations . . . .” Id. The State did not admit to Robinson’s factual
allegations, and, thus, his allegations were by themselves “enough to invoke the need to
hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id.
Finally, we note that Post-Conviction Rule 1(6) required the post-conviction court
to “make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented, whether
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or not a hearing is held.” The court here failed to comply with this rule. This failure is
an additional reason for remand. Clayton, 673 N.E.2d at 786.
Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
VAIDIK, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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