Martez Brown v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
Jul 30 2013, 7:32 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID W. STONE IV GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MARTEZ BROWN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A02-1212-CR-1007
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David A. Happe, Judge
Cause No. 48C01-1012-MR-783
July 30, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Martez Brown and two friends decided to rob a known drug dealer at his home in
the middle of the night at gun point. The drug dealer and his girlfriend were shot and
killed, and the trio left the house with thousands of dollars, drugs, and other property.
Following a bench trial, Brown was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of
Class B felony robbery for his role in the crimes and sentenced to 150 years. Brown now
appeals arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder convictions as an
accomplice, the trial court abused its discretion in finding five aggravators, and his
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We find
that the evidence is sufficient to support Brown’s murder convictions as an accomplice,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the five aggravators, and Brown has
failed to persuade us that his 150-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
heinousness of the crimes and Brown’s poor character. We therefore affirm the trial
court.
Facts and Procedural History
It was no secret that Stephen Streeter made his money selling marijuana and had
done so for five years. Stephen dated Keya Prince, and the two of them lived at 2308
Menifee Street in Anderson, Indiana. People regularly visited the house on Menifee
Street to purchase marijuana from Stephen, often in cash. Stephen owned two handguns,
a 9 mm and a .40 caliber. Stephen also had an X-box and two large flat screen televisions
in the house on Menifee Street.
2
Around Thanksgiving 2010, Stephen had approximately $25,000 in cash. On the
Friday after Thanksgiving—November 26—Therron Ivey spent the day at Stephen and
Keya’s house playing X-Box with Stephen, leaving around 8:00 p.m. Also on the
evening of November 26, Stephen and Keya’s neighbor, Mary Barclay, texted Keya and
asked her to check on her children, who were home next door with her brother. Keya
responded that she would check on Mary’s children and then text her back. Keya,
however, never texted Mary back. When Mary got home around 1:30 a.m. on Saturday,
she called and texted Keya again, but Keya did not respond. Mary went to Stephen and
Keya’s house numerous times, but there was never any response. Stephen and Keya’s
cars were in the driveway, though.
On Monday, November 29, 2010, police were called to 2308 Menifee Street for a
welfare check. When Anderson Police Department Officer Paul Parks arrived at the
house, several concerned family members were present. Officer Parks requested backup,
and Officer Mark Dawson arrived. The officers knocked on the front door several times,
but there was no response. The officers walked around the house, checking windows as
they went. They eventually came across a window that was slightly ajar and looked in.
They saw a person lying in a bed facedown and yelled, but again they received no
response. The officers also smelled “an odor . . . associate[d] with . . . [a] decaying
body.” Tr. p. 84. The officers called their sergeant to see if they could enter the house.
After receiving permission, the officers kicked in the locked front door. They went
directly to the bedroom where they had seen the person in the bed and saw blood around
3
the person’s head. Suspecting a homicide, the officers secured the scene and called for
detectives.
Detectives discovered and identified the bodies of Stephen and Keya. Stephen
was on the bed, and Keya was on the floor next to the bed against a wall. According to
Detective Jake Brooks, as soon as he walked into the house, he smelled an odor of
“decaying body.” Id. at 95. Stephen was “a little bit decomposed,” while Keya was “less
decomposed.” Id. at 168. Stephen had been shot in the back of the head, and Keya had
been shot in the chest. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsies estimated
the date of death to be November 27 or 28 based on the decomposition of the bodies. Id.
at 178.
In the meantime, a crowd of “[s]everal hundred” people gathered outside Stephen
and Keya’s house. Id. at 94. They were angry, upset, crying, yelling, and trying to get
inside. Every officer assigned to second shift was sent to 2308 Menifee Street to contain
the crowd, which included physically restraining some of the people and arresting others.
When police processed the scene, two televisions and a game system were missing
from the house. Also, only one of Stephen’s two guns was found.
Tips started coming in from Crime Stoppers, and within ten hours of the bodies
being found, Detective Brooks had the names of Jacob Fuller, Na-Son Smith, and
sixteen-year-old Brown as persons of interest in this case.1
On the morning of Saturday, November 27—before Stephen’s and Keya’s bodies
were found—Jacob, Na-Son, and Brown brought two flat-screen televisions, an X-Box,
1
Na-Son Smith and Jacob Fuller were each sentenced to 150 years for their roles in these crimes.
See Smith v. State, Cause No. 48A02-1210-CR-872 (Ind. Ct. App. July 25, 2013), and Fuller v. State,
Cause No. 48A02-1210-CR-848 (Ind. Ct. App. July 10, 2013).
4
and a couple of shoe boxes to Felisha Grant’s home and left them there. But after Felisha
learned about the murders, she “told them to come and get they [sic] stuff. Cause I didn’t
want nothing to do wit [sic] it.” Id. at 105.
In the early morning hours of Tuesday, November 30, Theodore Chilton, who
lived at 1417 Arrow Avenue in Anderson and was getting ready to go to work, called 911
to report that he had just observed two young black males throw a black semi-automatic
handgun into his next door neighbor’s yard. At about the same time, Officer Ian
Spearman was patrolling the area and stopped two young black males, later identified as
Jacob and Na-Son, for a curfew violation. Officer Spearman was advised through
dispatch to use extreme caution when dealing with Jacob and Na-Son because someone
had just reported that two young black males had thrown a handgun into a nearby yard.
Police took Jacob and Na-Son into custody and found the handgun in the front yard of
1415 Arrow Avenue. The handgun was later determined to have fired a shell casing and
a projectile recovered from the crime scene at 2308 Menifee Street as well as the bullet
recovered from Keya’s body. Id. at 234-35. Jacob’s fingerprint was lifted from the
magazine recovered from the handgun. Id. at 313.
Brown sold a 9 mm handgun to Josh Steele for $200. Josh sold the gun to
someone else, who then sold it to Rayshawn Ross on November 29, which was “[t]he day
that they found out the bodies was [sic] in the house.” Id. at 301. At the urging of his
aunt, Rayshawn turned the gun over to the police because he figured that it was the gun
taken from Stephen and Keya’s house during the robbery. Id. at 300.
5
Approximately one week after the bodies were found, police executed a search
warrant at Brown’s residence. Brown, his mother, and his sister were present at the time.
When Brown was taken into custody, he had a different 9 mm handgun on his person;
Brown later explained during his interview with police that this was the same gun that he
used during the robbery at Stephen and Keya’s house. Also during the interview, Brown
exhibited knowledge of the crime scene that police had not yet shared with the public,
such as the location and position of the bodies, the location of the gunshot wounds, and
how much money was taken. Id. at 363, 367. After initially denying any involvement in
the murders, Brown eventually told police that he, Jacob, and Na-Son went to Stephen’s
house to rob him on late Friday night/early Saturday morning; Jacob drove the trio there.
They targeted Stephen because they had heard about him. State’s Ex. 172, p. 24. When
they got to the house, they “rushed in.” Id. All three of them had guns—Brown had a 9
mm, Na-Son had a shotgun, and Jacob had a .40 caliber. Brown had his gun “behind
[his] back, like over on the side.” Id. at 41. They rushed Stephen to the ground and tied
him up. Id. at 26. Then, they grabbed Keya, who had emerged after hearing all the noise.
When the detective asked Brown what they did next with Stephen and Keya, Brown
responded, “Killed both of them.” Id. Brown said that while he was “looking for money
and the bud,” id. at 29, he heard a gunshot—Jacob had shot Keya. Brown explained his
reaction as follows, “I jumped a little bit. Then Na-Son looked at me, the look in his eyes
was seeing like it was on, and my heart dropped. So then it just happened.” Id. at 27.
When Stephen heard the gunshot, he jumped. Na-Son ordered Stephen to the bed to
“[s]how him some love” and so that he could “rest in peace” and then shot him in the
6
back of the head. Id. at 79; see also id. at 26. According to Brown, they grabbed “all the
stuff [they] could grab and then vanished out.” Id. at 27. When asked how long he was
inside the house, Brown quipped, “[N]ot that long. I was in and out. ‘Cause I’m the
come in quick type.” Id. at 44. Brown kept $7000 for himself. They also took several
pounds of marijuana, a 9 mm handgun, two televisions, a Wii, and an X-Box. When
asked why Jacob and Na-Son shot Stephen and Keya, Brown explained that they were
afraid they would be recognized. Id. at 36. At the time of the interview, Brown had
already spent his $7000 on two trips to Walmart and the mall. He also bought a $1000
necklace in Indianapolis.
Police retrieved surveillance video from Walmart from Saturday, November 27.
Dottie Hart, who works in asset protection, noticed the three men depicted on the store’s
surveillance video acting obnoxious in the store. Dottie recognized Jacob, who had a
“wad of money” that included $100 bills. Tr. p. 289. Police also obtained photographs
from Jacob’s and Na-Son’s cell phones showing Brown, Jacob, and Na-Son holding up
large amounts of money, fanning out the bills. State’s Ex. 157(a).
The State charged Brown in adult court with two counts of murder, Class A felony
robbery, Class A felony burglary, and Class D felony theft. The State later requested a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Eventually, Brown waived jury trial, and a
bench trial was held in late October-early November 2012. The State’s theory was that
although Brown did not pull the trigger, he was an accomplice to the murders of Stephen
and Keya. Tr. p. 409. At the conclusion of the evidence, the State dismissed the burglary
charge as well as its request for LWOP. The trial court found Brown guilty of the
7
remaining charges. A sentencing hearing was held. The court reduced Brown’s robbery
conviction to a Class B felony because of double-jeopardy concerns and did not enter
judgment for theft because it found that it merged with robbery. The court identified five
aggravators, most of which the court found to be “powerful”: (1) Brown’s criminal
history; (2) Brown conspired with Jacob and Na-Son to commit the offenses; (3) multiple
deaths were caused; (4) the offenses were committed in the presence of a person under
the age of eighteen (but the trial court gave this aggravator little weight because it was a
member of the trio, Jacob, who was under the age of eighteen); and (5) Brown recently
violated the conditions of his probation. Id. at 430; Appellant’s App. p. 8. The court
identified two mitigators: (1) Brown’s young age and (2) Brown engaged in limited
cooperation with law enforcement by providing a statement. Appellant’s App. p. 8.
Concluding that the aggravators “powerfully” outweighed the mitigators, the court
sentenced Brown to sixty-five years for each murder conviction and twenty years for
robbery, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of 150 years. Tr. p. 431;
Appellant’s App. p. 8.
Brown now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Brown raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support his murder convictions as an accomplice. Second, he contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding all five aggravators. Last, he contends
that his sentence is inappropriate.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
8
Brown contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder convictions
as an accomplice. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the
credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). The
evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in
a light most favorable to the conviction. Id. “[W]e affirm if there is substantial evidence
of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
To be convicted of murder as an accomplice, the defendant must knowingly or
intentionally aid, induce, or cause the commission of a murder by another. Ind. Code §
35-41-2-4. A defendant may be charged as the principal but convicted as an accomplice.
Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012). Generally, there is no distinction
between the criminal liability of an accomplice and a principal, although evidence that
the defendant participated in every element of the underlying offense is not necessary to
convict a defendant as an accomplice. Id. “There is no bright line rule in determining
accomplice liability; the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine
whether a person was an accomplice.” Id. (quotation omitted). We consider four factors
to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the
crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose
commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of
crime. Id. That a defendant was present during the commission of a crime and failed to
oppose the crime is not sufficient to convict him. Id. But “presence at and acquiescence
9
to a crime, along with other facts and circumstances,” may be considered. Id. (quotation
omitted).
Brown argues that the trio’s plan was to rob “a drug dealer” and that there was “no
reason for [him] to anticipate that [Jacob] and [Na-Son] would kill [Stephen] and [Keya]
for no discernible reason.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7-8. Brown also argues that a “double
murder is not the probable and natural consequence of the common plan to commit
robbery.” Id. at 8. Accomplice liability applies to the contemplated offense and all acts
that are a probable and natural consequence of the concerted action. Kendall v. State, 790
N.E.2d 122, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Thus, the accomplice is liable “for
everything . . . which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one
of its natural and probable consequences, even though it was not intended as part of the
original design or common plan.” Id. at 132 (quotation omitted).
We find that the evidence establishes that the murders of Stephen and Keya were
indeed the natural and probable consequences of the trio’s plan to rob Stephen. The
record shows that the trio, each armed with a gun, went to the home of a known drug
dealer in the middle of the night and rushed the front door to gain entry. After restraining
Stephen, they grabbed Keya. When police asked Brown what they did next with Stephen
and Keya, Brown callously responded, “Killed both of them.” State’s Ex. 172, p. 26.
Brown said that he was searching for money and drugs when Jacob shot Keya. Na-Son
then gave Brown the look like “it was on,” id. at 27, at which point Stephen was ordered
to the bed and shot by Na-Son in the back of his head. Brown said that Keya and Stephen
were killed because they were afraid they would be identified. The trio then took
10
everything that they could from the house and left. After Brown counted and flaunted his
$7000 in cash, Brown went shopping and spent the money within a week. Brown also
sold the gun they took from Stephen’s house.
The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from Kelly v. State, 719 N.E.2d
391 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied, upon which Brown relies on appeal. In Kelly, our
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment on the evidence for one of the
defendant’s three murder convictions because the evidence showed that the defendant left
the scene before the third victim was shot and there “was a complete lack of evidence that
the confrontations and murder were anything other than spontaneous and ‘spur of the
moment.’” Id. at 396. In contrast, this case involved a planned and armed home robbery
of a known drug dealer, and Keya and Stephen were shot while Brown was actively
participating in the robbery. Contrary to Brown’s argument, the murders in this case
were not spur-of-the-moment killings, see Appellant’s Br. p. 8; rather, they were the
natural and probable consequence of a planned and armed home robbery of a known drug
dealer. The evidence is sufficient to support Brown’s convictions for the murders of
Stephen and Keya under accomplice liability.
II. Abuse of Discretion
Brown challenges all five aggravators identified by the trial court. Sentencing
decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as
the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against
11
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.
A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to
enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes
aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a
sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4)
entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.
Id. at 490-91. Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating
and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot
now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors. Id. at
491.
Brown first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding his criminal
history as an aggravator. A defendant’s history of juvenile adjudications is a proper
aggravating circumstance. Sexton v. State, 968 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
reh’g denied, trans. denied. The record shows that Brown committed his first delinquent
act in December 2006 at the age of twelve—Class D felony criminal mischief if
committed by an adult—and committed the murders and burglary in this case in
November 2010 at the age of sixteen. During the intervening years, Brown amassed a
lengthy juvenile record. On June 12, 2007, Brown was arrested for Class D felony theft
and pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor criminal conversion. Brown was again
arrested on July 28, 2007, for Class D felony theft; this was reduced to Class A
misdemeanor criminal conversion and disposed of through the same plea agreement as
12
above. On May 21, 2008, the prosecutor referred Brown to probation for Class D felony
criminal trespass. Also on May 21, 2008, Brown was again arrested for Class D felony
theft. The allegation was found true, and Brown was ordered to spend thirty days in
secure detention. On July 25, 2008, Brown was yet again arrested for Class D felony
theft. A true finding was entered for the reduced charge of Class A misdemeanor
criminal conversion, and Brown was continued on probation.
On January 5, 2009, Brown was arrested for Class B felony robbery resulting in
bodily injury and two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.
On April 24, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, a true finding was entered for Class D
felony theft as a reduced charge to robbery and both batteries as charged. Brown was
ordered to participate in the Madison County Youth Center Day Treatment/Day
Reporting Program. Just five days after this judgment, Brown was arrested for Class B
felony burglary and Class D felony theft. A true finding was entered for both counts, and
Brown was placed in the Youth Opportunity Center as well as on supervised probation.
On November 12, 2010, a true finding was entered against Brown for Class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and he was ordered to attend substance-abuse
counseling. On November 23, 2010, Brown was arrested for a litany of offenses, and he
eventually pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class B
misdemeanor reckless driving, and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle
without ever receiving a license. In February 2011, Brown was charged with several
crimes that were committed on Friday, November 26, 2010, which is the same night that
Jacob, Brown, and Na-Son committed the crimes in this case. Brown eventually pleaded
13
guilty to Class B felony burglary and was sentenced to the Department of Correction for
six months. While incarcerated in the Madison County Jail awaiting trial in this case,
Brown committed three conduct violations for possession of a weapon or anything that
can be used as a weapon; destroying, damaging, or defacing jail property; and possession
of unauthorized items. In the PSI, Brown’s overall risk assessment score put him in the
“VERY HIGH” risk category to reoffend. Appellant’s App. p. 66b.
Brown nevertheless argues that “[f]or purposes of sentencing for 2 murders and
robbery [Brown’s] unrelated juvenile offenses do not justify the maximum sentence
which was imposed.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We disagree. Brown’s juvenile history
shows a steady and unabated path from violating people and their property to murdering
Stephen and Keya and taking cash, drugs, and other property from their home. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in identifying Brown’s criminal history as an
aggravator.
Brown next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding multiple
victims as an aggravator because the “fact that two people were killed is a material
element of the crimes of two murders.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10-11. Brown’s argument is
misplaced. It is well settled that multiple victims constitute a valid aggravating
circumstance that a trial court may consider in imposing consecutive or enhanced
sentences. O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. 2001); see also Serino v. State,
798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003) (“[W]hen the perpetrator commits the same offense
against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the
14
fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person.”).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this aggravator.
Brown next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding as an
aggravator that Brown committed the offense in the presence of a person less than
eighteen years old. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a)(4) provides that the trial court
may consider as an aggravator that the person:
(A) committed a crime of violence (IC 35-50-1-2); and
(B) knowingly committed the offense in the presence or within hearing of
an individual who:
(i) was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the person
committed the offense; and
(ii) is not the victim of the offense.
One of the purposes of this statute is that society wants to guard against having juveniles
involved in crimes. See Patterson v. State, 846 N.E.2d 723, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Brown argues that because Section 35-18-1-7.1(a)(4) “does not address crimes
committed by two minors,” it does not apply here. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. To the
contrary, by expressly excepting victims of the offense but establishing no age
requirement for the defendant, we find that this section squarely applies to the facts of
this case. See also Patterson, 846 N.E.2d at 728-29 (finding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding as an aggravator that the defendant was eighteen when he
committed murder in the course of a robbery with his fourteen-year-old accomplice).
Moreover, the trial court gave this aggravator little weight because the person under age
eighteen, Jacob, was Brown’s accomplice. Tr. p. 430. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in identifying as an aggravator that Brown, although a minor himself,
committed the crimes in the presence of one of his accomplices who was also a minor.
15
Brown next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding as an
aggravator that he had recently violated his probation. Brown argues that he was placed
on probation on June 19, 2009, but the record “does not state how long he was placed on
probation.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The record, however, shows that Brown was referred
to probation in September 2010 for a curfew violation and for two cause numbers
involving adjudications from 2008, Brown was not released from probation until May 11,
2011—well after the events in this case. Appellant’s App. p. 62, 63. In any event, the
trial court actually found that Brown “recently violated the conditions of probation,
parole, or other supervision that [he] had through the courts,” which “is an indicator that
options other than prison would likely not be practical or successful for [him].” Tr. p.
430. Therefore, even if the record was unclear about the official length of Brown’s
probation, the record is clear that Brown was given several different chances to succeed
during his four years in the juvenile-justice system, but he failed at all of them. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding this aggravator.
Finally, Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding as an
aggravator that he “engaged in this horrible series of crimes and an organized conspiracy
with other people.” Id. He claims that the fact that he acted with others was essentially
an element of the crime since he was convicted as an accomplice. In another double-
murder case, this Court held that the evidence showing the defendants’ careful planning
of the murders reflected the deliberate nature of the crime, and the degree of planning for
the murders and the fact that two people were killed were “part of the nature and
circumstances of the crime.” Hull v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1250, 1257-58 (Ind. Ct. App.
16
2005). Because this case required advanced planning in that the trio specifically targeted
a drug dealer and went to his house in the middle of the night armed with guns, we find
that the trial court properly considered Brown’s organized planning with Jacob and Na-
Son as an aggravator.2
III. Inappropriate Sentence
Finally, Brown contends that his 150-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offenses and his character. He asks us to reduce the murder sentences to the
“minimum” with “the murder sentences made consecutive and the robbery sentence
concurrent to the murder sentences,” that is, ninety years. Appellant’s Br. p. 16.
Our rules authorize revision of a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “[A] defendant
must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness
standard of review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is
inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a
given case. Id. at 1224.
2
To the extent that Brown argues that the trial court did not accord sufficient mitigating weight to
his age at the time of the crimes, we note that the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating and
mitigating factors is not reviewable for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.
17
A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between
forty-five and sixty-five years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-3. A person who commits a Class B felony shall be imprisoned for a
fixed term of between six and twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten years.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Here, the trial court sentenced Brown to sixty-five years for each
murder conviction and twenty years for his Class B felony robbery conviction and
ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of 150 years.
This sentence falls within statutory guidelines.
As for the nature of the offenses, the trial court described the crimes as a
“community tragedy.” Tr. p. 429. Jacob, Brown, and Na-Son planned to rob a known
drug dealer at his home in the middle of the night while armed with guns. While Brown
was searching the house for drugs and money, Jacob shot Keya. Na-Son then gave
Brown “the look,” at which point Stephen was ordered to the bed and Na-Son shot him in
the back of the head. The murders are particularly cold-blooded and senseless—Stephen
and Keya did not appear to resist in any way after the trio gained entry to their house and
were killed simply because the trio did not want to leave behind any witnesses.
Prosecutor Rodney Cummings told the trial court during closing arguments that he had
encountered several cases in his years as a prosecutor that were difficult to understand,
but none quite like this one because it was hard to understand “how such young people
can grow up so hard and in such a short life.” Id. at 401. And although Brown did not
pull the trigger, he was armed with a gun and was an active participant in the crimes.
18
Brown’s character is no better. According to Brown’s presentence investigation
report, he began consuming alcohol and marijuana at the age of ten and used marijuana
daily. Appellant’s App. p. 66b. Brown committed his first crime at the age of twelve—
criminal mischief involving at least $2500, a felony if committed by an adult. Brown has
steadily broken the law in an escalating pattern ever since. As the trial court aptly
explained, even though Brown was just sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, he
“committed early on to a life involving crime and hurting other people.” Tr. p. 431. For
example, Brown had adjudications for battery resulting in bodily injury in 2009, burglary
in 2010, and another burglary committed at about the same time as the crimes in this
case. As the trial court found, Brown exhibited no remorse “whatsoever,” id., and he
exhibited a disturbing callousness about these crimes—ranging from his description of
the type of burglar he was, to his explanation of simply killing Stephen and Keya, to
flaunting his share of the money after the fact in the pictures.
Although Brown was convicted as an accomplice and received the same sentence
as the shooters, Jacob and Na-Son, given his active role before, during, and after the
crimes, we do not find that Brown’s status as an accomplice in the murders in any way
warrants a reduction in his sentence. See Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 467 (our Supreme Court
noting that it had reduced sentences for accomplices “whose role in a murder was
substantially less blameworthy than the principal’s”). Given the heinousness of these
crimes and Brown’s extremely poor character, we conclude that Brown has failed to
persuade us that his sentence of 150 years is inappropriate.
19
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
20