Kari Everhart v. Founders Insurance Company

FOR PUBLICATION Sep 11 2013, 9:17 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN P. NICHOLS MATTHEW J. JANKOWSKI
Anderson & Nichols Kopka Pinkus Dolin & Eads, PC
Terre Haute, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KARI EVERHART, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A01-1303-PL-128
)
FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY )
)
Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Phillip I. Adler, Judge
Cause No. 84D02-1109-PL-8980
September 11, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Kari Everhart appeals from the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Founders Insurance Company (“Founders”) and from the denial of Everhart’s motion to
correct error. Everhart raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the court
erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 14, 2009, an incident took place at Club Coyote in West Terre Haute,
Indiana, in which Everhart sustained injuries including a broken elbow. At the time,
specifically between January 10, 2009 and January 10, 2010, Club Coyote had insurance
coverage provided by Founders under Policy Number CPIN000061 (the “Policy”). 1 The
Policy, under Section I discussing classes of coverage, states:
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of “bodily injury”[2] . . . to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the
insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will
have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking
damages for “bodily injury” . . . to which this insurance does not
apply. . . .
Appellant’s Appendix at 36. Paragraph 2 of Coverage A listed exclusions denoting
instances in which coverage under the Policy would not apply, specifically listing
exclusions as Paragraphs 2.(a) through 2.(o). The Policy also contained an attached
We observe that the named insured on the Policy is listed as “TOP HAT INC DBA CLUB
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KOYOTE.” Appellant’s Appendix at 33. We refer to the insured in this matter as “Club Coyote.”
2
The Policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person,
including death resulting from any of these at any time.” Appellant’s Appendix at 48.
2
endorsement entitled “INDIANA CGL ENDORSEMENT – ASSAULT AND/OR
BATTERY EXCLUSION” (the “Endorsement”), which states the following:
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
A. The following exclusions are added to paragraph 2. Exclusions of
SECTION I -- COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY . . . :
This insurance does not apply to:
1. Assault and/or Battery/Negligent Hiring
“Bodily injury”. . . arising from:
(a) assault and/or battery committed by any insured, any “employee”
of an insured, or any other person;
(b) The failure to suppress or prevent assault and/or battery by any
person in subparagraph 1.(a) above;
(c) The selling, serving or furnishing of alcoholic beverages which
result in an assault and/or battery; or
(d) The negligent:
(1) Employment;
(2) Investigation;
(3) Supervision;
(4) Reporting to the proper authorities, or failure to so report;
or
(5) Retention
of or by a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally
responsible and whose conduct would be excluded by
subparagraphs 1.(a) through 1.(c) above.
Id. at 84.
On March 4, 2011, Everhart filed a complaint for damages against Club Coyote in
Cause No. 84D02-1103-CT-1708 (the “Underlying Action”).3 On September 27, 2011,
Founders filed its complaint for declaratory judgment in Cause No. 84D02-1109-PL-
3
Specifically, Everhart brought suit against Club Coyote and Paul and Nancy Allsup, the owners
of the premises of Club Coyote.
3
8980 (the “Declaratory Judgment Action”) against Everhart and Club Coyote seeking a
declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either party in the Underlying
Action.4 On October 24, 2011, Club Coyote filed its answer to Founders’ complaint, and,
on November 16, 2011, Everhart timely filed her answer. On July 3, 2012, Founders
filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting memorandum, and designation of
evidence. On October 5, 2012, Everhart filed her response to Founders’ summary
judgment motion along with a designation of evidence. Everhart designated, as Exhibit
B, her answers to interrogatories submitted in the Underlying Action. Interrogatory
Number 6 (“Interrogatory No. 6”) asked for Everhart to “[d]escribe in detail how the
incident described in [her] Complaint happened, including what [she was] doing
immediately before and leading up to the time the accident occurred,” and she responded
as follows:
I was standing at the very left end of the long bar. I looked to the middle of
the bar where patrons are served and saw the patron who was shoved into
me & the bartender Mike Davis were sharing some words. The Mike [sic]
grabbed the patron by the back of the head and bounced his head off of the
bar approximately 3 to 4 times & then shoved him into a small crowd of
people standing in front of the bar. The patron was then shoved a second
time by Brice Elson, in my direction. The patron then stumbled & fell
violently grabbing me by the left shoulder, bringing me to fall underneath
of him,- throwing my right arm out to catch my fall, breaking my arm in
several places.
Id. at 106.
4
Specifically, Founders names in its complaint for declaratory judgment Everhart, “Top Hat, Inc.
d/b/a Club Koyote,” and the Allsups. Appellant’s Appendix at 28. On February 8, 2012, the Allsups
were voluntarily dismissed by Founders pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 41(A)(2) based upon a January 26,
2012 Fact Stipulation by All Parties stating that the Allsups were not entitled to defense or indemnity
from Founders in the Underlying Action.
4
The court held a summary judgment hearing in the Declaratory Judgment Action
on November 20, 2012, and on November 26, 2012, the court granted summary judgment
in Founders’ favor, specifically finding that “[i]n viewing [Everhart’s] answer to
[Interrogatory No. 6] . . . it would appear that her description of what occurred on the
evening in question which resulted in her alleged injury and damages does fit within the
definition [of battery] as described by the Indiana Court of Appeals” in the case of Singh
v. Lyday, 889 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied.5 Id. at 7. On
December 17, 2012, Everhart filed her motion to correct error, Founders filed its response
to Everhart’s motion to correct error on January 4, 2013, and, following a hearing on the
motion on February 13, 2013, the court entered an order denying Everhart’s motion on
February 19, 2013.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue is whether the court erred in granting Founders’ motion for summary
judgment. When a trial court’s ruling granting or denying summary judgment is
challenged on appeal, the procedure and standard under Indiana law is clear. Our
standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2010). The moving party “bears the initial burden of making a prima
facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 970 N.E.2d
633, 637 (Ind. 2012). Summary judgment is improper if the moving party fails to carry
its burden, but if it succeeds, then the non-moving party must come forward with
5
Although the court’s grant of summary judgment was also entered against Club Coyote, Club
Coyote has not sought review of the court’s order and is not a party to this appeal.
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evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We construe
all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party and resolve all doubts as to the
existence of a material issue against the moving party. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d at 5. An
appellate court reviewing a challenged trial court summary judgment ruling is limited to
the designated evidence before the trial court, see Ind. Trial Rule 56(H), but is
constrained to neither the claims and arguments presented at trial nor the rationale of the
trial court ruling, see Woodruff v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784,
790 (Ind. 2012) (“We will reverse if the law has been incorrectly applied to the facts.
Otherwise, we will affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by
evidence in the record.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012); Wagner v. Yates, 912
N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009) (“[W]e are not limited to reviewing the trial court’s reasons
for granting or denying summary judgment but rather we may affirm a grant of summary
judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence.”).
The entry of specific findings and conclusions does not alter the nature of a
summary judgment which is a judgment entered when there are no genuine issues of
material fact to be resolved. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. 1996). In the
summary judgment context, we are not bound by the trial court’s specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Id. They merely aid our review by providing us with a statement
of reasons for the trial court’s actions. Id.
Also, we generally review rulings on motions to correct error for an abuse of
discretion. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009); Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2008),
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reh’g denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom. Lighty v. Lighty, 879 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g
denied.
The provisions of an insurance contract are subject to the same rules of
construction as are other contracts. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 935 N.E.2d 190, 192
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Thus, the construction of Founders’ Policy presents a pure question
of law that we review de novo. Id. “If its terms are clear and unambiguous, courts must
give those terms their clear and ordinary meaning.” Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836
N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ind. 2005). Courts should interpret a contract so as to harmonize its
provisions, rather than place them in conflict. Id. “We will make all attempts to construe
the language of a contract so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or
meaningless.” Rogers v. Lockard, 767 N.E.2d 982, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “A
contract will be found to be ambiguous only if reasonable persons would differ as to the
meaning of its terms.” Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. 2002), reh’g
denied. “When a contract’s terms are ambiguous or uncertain and its interpretation
requires extrinsic evidence, its construction is a matter for the fact-finder.” Johnson v.
Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ind. 2010).
Also, in the context of an insurance policy, “[w]here there is ambiguity, insurance
policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer” and “[t]his is particularly true
where a policy excludes coverage.” Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945, 947
(Ind. 1996), reh’g denied. “This strict construal against the insurer is driven by the fact
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that the insurer drafts the policy and foists its terms upon the customer. ‘The insurance
companies write the policies; we buy their forms or we do not buy insurance.’” Id.
DISCUSSION
Everhart argues that “[t]he exclusion cited by Founders is not applicable in the
instant case” because “the proximate cause of her injuries and damages was negligence
on the part of . . . Club Coyote” and “the exclusion relied upon . . . is for intentional acts.”
Appellant’s Brief at 6. Everhart argues that “[c]learly, [she] has never contended that any
employee or patron of . . . Club Coyote did anything intentionally,” and she points
specifically to Interrogatory No. 6 for this proposition. Id.
Founders argues that “[t]he admissions contained in the parties’ pleadings
demonstrate that there is no dispute that Everhart sustained the alleged injuries . . . as a
result of a battery” and it is “axiomatic that an allegation in a pleading which is left
uncontested is deemed admitted under the rule governing the effect of failure to deny.”
Appellee’s Brief at 8-9. Founders underscores that Everhart admitted in her answer the
allegations contained in Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Founders’ complaint for declaratory
judgment which stated that Everhart was assaulted and/or battered while working at Club
Coyote which resulted in the damages in the underlying case, and Founders argues that
the Endorsement “is directly applicable to such claims . . . .” Id. at 9. Founders argues
that the conduct described by Everhart in her answer to Interrogatory No. 6 is within the
scope of the definition of battery under Indiana law, that coverage for her injuries is
excluded by the plain language of the Endorsement to the policy issued by Founders to
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Club Coyote, and that accordingly summary judgment in Founders’ favor was
appropriate.
As noted by Founders in its arguments and by the trial court in its order, this court
has previously recognized that Indiana follows the definition of battery provided by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
One is liable for the tort of battery if “(a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or third person, or
an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (b) a harmful contact with
the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” Mullins v. Parkview
Hosp., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 13 (1965)). “A touching, however slight, may
constitute an assault and battery.” Knight v. Ind. Ins. Co., 871 N.E.2d 357,
362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Singh, 889 N.E.2d at 360. Also, Subsection (a) of the Endorsement excludes coverage
for batteries “committed by any insured, any ‘employee’ of an insured, or any other
person.” Appellant’s Appendix at 84.
This case turns on whether Everhart’s version of the events of what transpired and
caused her injuries, as stated in Interrogatory No. 6, was a battery, because, if so,
coverage under the Policy would be excluded pursuant to the Endorsement. Again,
Interrogatory No. 6 states:
I was standing at the very left end of the long bar. I looked to the middle of
the bar where patrons are served and saw the patron who was shoved into
me & the bartender Mike Davis were sharing some words. The Mike [sic]
grabbed the patron by the back of the head and bounced his head off of the
bar approximately 3 to 4 times & then shoved him into a small crowd of
people standing in front of the bar. The patron was then shoved a second
time by Brice Elson, in my direction. The patron then stumbled & fell
violently grabbing me by the left shoulder, bringing me to fall underneath
of him,- throwing my right arm out to catch my fall, breaking my arm in
several places.
9
Id. at 106.
Thus, according to Everhart, the bartender grabbed a patron by the head, bounced
his head about three or four times against the bar, and shoved the patron into a crowd of
people. Then, a second person, Brice Elson, shoved the patron in her direction, and the
patron grabbed her as he fell and brought Everhart to the ground, resulting in her
breaking her arm. The record is not clear whether or not Elson was an employee of the
insured, Club Coyote, but as noted above such a distinction is immaterial in deciding this
case. The Endorsement excludes coverage for batteries committed by both employees of
the insured and any other persons, and, as noted by Indiana’s definition of battery, a
battery results if an individual acts intending to cause harmful contact with not only the
person contacted, but also a third person, and harmful contact directly or indirectly
results. There is no dispute that Elson intentionally pushed the patron, a third person, that
the patron came into contact with Everhart, and that Everhart was harmed as a result by
breaking her arm, and accordingly, Everhart was the victim of a battery on the premises
of Club Coyote. We therefore conclude that the court did not err when it granted
summary judgment in favor of Founders. See Fordyce v. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d 746,
751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (noting that if the defendants had intended to cause a battery on
another but “succeeded by mistake in injuring the plaintiff, then they were liable to the
plaintiff to the same extent as if he had been their intended victim . . .”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Founders and its denial of Everhart’s motion to correct error.
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Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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