Arlisha Williams v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, and UPS Ground Freights, Inc.

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 03 2013, 7:01 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ARLISHA WILLIAMS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHY BRADLEY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ARLISHA WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1211-EX-959
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT and UPS GROUND )
FREIGHT, INC., )
)
Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Cause No. 12-R-4211
July 3, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arlisha Williams appeals the determination by the Review Board of the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development (“the Board”) that she is not entitled to
unemployment benefits. We affirm.
ISSUE
Williams claims that the evidence does not support the Board’s decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 30, 2012, Williams began working for UPS Ground Freight, Inc.
(“UPS”), in Indianapolis as a part-time truck loader. She worked until May 2, 2012, and
then she did not return to work. Williams told a supervisor that she had a medical
condition, had concerns about working in the trucks in the heat, and would speak to her
doctor about it. The following week, she called in each day to report she would not be
there. She did not call at all during the week after that, and UPS deemed her employment
to be terminated.
Williams applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy determined that she was
entitled to benefits. UPS appealed. An administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) held a
hearing, at which Williams and a UPS representative appeared and submitted evidence.
After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Williams voluntarily left her employment
without good cause and reversed the deputy’s determination.
Williams requested review by the Board. The Board did not hold a hearing or
accept additional evidence. After its review, the Board adopted and incorporated the
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ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Williams claims the Board erred in determining that she voluntarily left
employment without good cause. As an initial matter, the Board asserts that Williams
has waived her claims for appellate review because: (1) Williams did not file an
Appellant’s Appendix and (2) Williams’s Appellant’s Brief lacks citation to authority and
cogent argument. We hold pro se litigants such as Williams to the same standard as
trained attorneys. T.R. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 950 N.E.2d 792,
795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). At the same time, we prefer to resolve cases on the merits
whenever possible. Id. Here, despite the defects in Williams’s brief and the absence of
an Appendix, there is a sufficient record for us to address the merits of Williams’s appeal.
Thus, we reject the Board’s claim of waiver.
The Board’s decision is conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Ind.
Code § 22-4-17-12(a) (1995). On appeal, the standard of review is threefold: (1)
findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed
questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal
propositions are reviewed for correctness. Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of
Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011). When reviewing findings of basic
fact, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. J.M. v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012). Rather,
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we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Board’s findings, and we reverse
only if there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. Id.The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide benefits to
those who are involuntarily out of work, through no fault of their own, for reasons
beyond their control. Davis v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d
488, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Consistent with this purpose, a stricter standard is
imposed upon those who voluntarily quit working. Id. An employee who has voluntarily
left his or her employment without good cause in connection with the work is ineligible
for unemployment benefits. Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(a) (2009). The question of whether
an employee quit without good cause is a question of fact to be determined by the Board.
S.A. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 936 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). The claimant has the burden to prove that good cause existed. Id. The reason for
quitting must be job-related and objective in character, excluding purely subjective and
personal reasons. Id. at 337-38.
Here, Williams contends that she received permission from a supervisor to stay
home from work on May 3, 2012, due to a death in the family. She further contends that
she was unable to reach the supervisor on subsequent days and instead later spoke to a
human resources employee, who told her that her employment would be terminated.
These contentions are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The
evidence most favorable to the ALJ’s findings, which the Board adopted, is that Williams
called in on a daily basis for a week to report that she could not return and thereafter did
not communicate with her supervisor. She never spoke with her supervisor about
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whether she was terminated. Although she had expressed concerns about whether the
nature of the work posed a threat to her health, she never went to the doctor. This is
sufficient evidence from which the Board could determine that Williams left her
employment without good cause.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Board’s decision.
Affirmed.
BROWN, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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