Debra Sue Miles v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Feb 28 2014, 10:11 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MATTHEW J. McGOVERN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DEBRA SUE MILES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 82A01-1304-CR-179
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge
Cause No. 82D02-1110-FA-1104
February 28, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Debra Sue Miles appeals her conviction of Class A felony dealing in
methamphetamine.1 She argues the State did not present sufficient evidence she committed
the crime. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2, 2011, police arrived at Miles’ apartment in search of a person believed
to be staying there with her son, Larry. When police arrived, they smelled an odor consistent
with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Police knocked on the door of Miles’ apartment
for ten to fifteen minutes, and heard rustling around and whispering inside the apartment.
The police used a battering ram to open the door.
Once inside they found Miles, Debra Monyhan, and Larry on a bed just inside the
front door in varioius rooms in the apartment. Police found items indicative of
methamphetamine manufacturing, including red flakes indicative of ground pseudoephedrine
pills, Liquid Fire, multiple containers of salt, an HCl generator, and coffee filters. The police
also found methamphetamine, methadone, and marijuana in the apartment. In the alley near
Miles’ apartment, the police found other precursors and a trash bag containing what
responding Officer Dave Barron testified was a “one-pot meth lab” (Tr. at 195) inside.
The State charged Miles with two counts of Class A felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Class D felony possession of a controlled substance,2 and Class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana.3 The State also alleged Miles was an Habitual
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7(a).
3
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(b).
2
Offender. At the end of Miles’ jury trial, the trial court dismissed all the charges except one
count of Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine. The jury found Miles guilty and Miles
pled guilty to being an Habitual Offender. The court imposed a thirty-year sentence for
dealing, with a thirty-year enhancement for the habitual substance offender adjudication.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s decision. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder’s role, and not ours, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when we are confronted with conflicting
evidence, we consider it most favorably to the judgment. Id. We affirm a conviction unless
no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference reasonably may be
drawn from it to support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 147.
To prove Miles committed Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine, the State had
to prove she knowingly or intentionally manufactured, financed the manufacture of,
delivered, or financed the delivery of methamphetamine in a quantity of three grams or more.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b). At trial, the State argued Miles committed the crime as an
accomplice. Under the accomplice liability theory, “[a] person who knowingly or
intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that
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offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant
acted as an accomplice: “(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with
another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of
conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458,
466 (Ind. 2012). The mere fact a defendant was present during a crime and did not oppose
the crime is not sufficient to convict her based on accomplice liability. However, “presence
at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and circumstances” may be considered.
Id. Miles argues she was merely present in the apartment when the police discovered her
son in the process of making methamphetamine. We disagree.
Miles was present and “trying to be asleep” (Tr. at 153) when police arrived, and she
did not answer the door for ten to fifteen minutes even though the police were “beating on
the door.” (Id. at 151.) Officer Jeff Taylor testified that, after knocking on the door, he
could hear “voices and you could hear people moving around.” (Id. at 42.) While Larry hid
the materials he used to make methamphetamine, Miles “just [sat] there on the bed.” (Id. at
133.) To enter the apartment, the police had to use a “ram” to open the door. (Id. at 48.)
In Miles’ bedroom, the police found methamphetamine and items used to produce
methamphetamine, including a HCl generator made from a green two-liter bottle, a two-
pound container of salt, and pseudoephedrine tablets. The police found other precursors in
Larry’s bedroom and in the only bathroom in the apartment. There was a chemical smell so
strong that other tenants in the apartment building “came down choking and vomiting
actually on the sidewalk right in front of, right in front of the house.” (Id. at 41.) One
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officer testified the smell was consistent with the smell emitted from the manufacture of
methamphetamine. However, despite these strong odors detectable to people outside the
apartment, Miles told police “[s]he had no clue what was going on inside the place. She
pretty much took her medication and went to bed and didn’t know anything else.” (Id. at 78.)
There was sufficient evidence Miles was an accomplice to Larry’s methamphetamine
manufacturing. See Fowler v. State, 900 N.E.2d 770, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (evidence
sufficient to support conviction of dealing in methamphetamine based on accomplice liability
when police found precursors in almost every room, vapors consistent with
methamphetamine production were readily apparent, and defendant helped carry precursors
into the house). Miles’ arguments to the contrary are invitations to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (appellate court will not reweigh
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Accordingly, we affirm Miles’ conviction of
Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DEBRA SUE MILES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 82A01-1304-CR-179
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
RILEY, Judge, dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm Miles’ conviction for
dealing in methamphetamine. Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1)(A), -(b)(1). Based on the
record before me, I do not find that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt establishing
that Miles “knowingly or intentionally aid[ed], induce[d], or cause[d] another person to”
manufacture methamphetamine. I.C. § 35-41-2-4.
In order to uphold a conviction under the theory of accomplice liability, there must be
evidence of affirmative conduct by a defendant, “either in the form of acts or words, from
which an inference of common design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may
reasonably drawn.” Vandivier v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied. It is well-settled that a defendant’s mere presence or failure to oppose the
commission of a crime may be considered in light of the totality of facts and circumstances as
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tending to show participation but, standing alone, are insufficient to establish accomplice
liability. Id.The evidence establishes that, at the time of her arrest, Miles was fifty-four years old
and suffered from numerous health impairments. Her adult son, Larry, had moved into her
apartment following his release from prison several months earlier. Both Larry and Miles’
step-cousin, Monyhan, who was visiting Miles when police arrived, explained to police and
testified during Miles’ trial that Miles had absolutely no involvement in manufacturing
methamphetamine. In a sworn affidavit, Larry claimed responsibility “for any and all illegal
items found” in Miles’ apartment and stated that Miles “told me not to have illegal items in
her home[,]” but Miles “was very sick and I did what I wanted to do and she couldn’t stop
me.” (Appellant’s App. p. 27). Although Larry admitted that he had manufactured
methamphetamine on prior occasions, he testified that this was the first time he had done so
in Miles’ apartment, so she was not aware of what he was doing. Additionally, Larry and
Monyhan both testified that, as the police were beating on the door, Miles was lying in bed
and did nothing to help Larry discard the drugs or hide the precursors. Larry explained in
detail as to how and where he hid the items recovered when police searched Miles’
apartment, including that he brought the green HCl generator bottle and Liquid Fire into the
house that night and hid the green bottle in Miles’ room as the police were knocking; that he
took everything from his pockets and shoved it into the laundry basket before lying down on
the bed; that the scales belonged to him; that he hid the coffee filters in the gray storage tub
full of his clothes; and that he had taken the bag of trash from his friend’s car and dumped it
7
in the alley.
The majority relies on Fowler v. State, 900 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), where
this court upheld a conviction under accomplice liability for dealing in methamphetamine.
Similar to the facts in Fowler, Larry used Miles’ residence as a methamphetamine lab, police
found methamphetamine precursors in each room of the apartment, the apartment had a
strong chemical odor, and police discovered finished methamphetamine product in the home.
See id. at 775. However, unlike in Fowler where the defendant actually carried a bag of
precursors into his house for a friend, there is no evidence that Miles ever handled or
obtained any ingredients, that she assisted Larry in procuring any materials, or—even if she
was aware of his activities—that she consented to Larry bringing such items into her home.
See id.Both the State and the majority emphasize the finding of methamphetamine precursors
in Miles’ bedroom as indicative of Miles’ role in “provid[ing] the kitchen” for Larry.
(State’s Br. p. 6). However, they disregard the non-traditional layout of Miles’ apartment.
The apartment consists of a kitchen, a bathroom, and two other rooms. Miles slept in the
middle room, which also doubled as a TV/living room area; the back room served as Larry’s
bedroom. Thus, Miles did not have privacy or exclusive use of her “bedroom,” so there is
little significance in the finding of precursors. The State also argues—and the majority
agrees—that Miles neglected to turn Larry into the police or answer the door when the police
were knocking, but this does not amount to affirmative conduct undertaken by Miles in order
to facilitate Larry’s drug production.
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The State presented evidence that methamphetamine and precursors were found in the
shared residence of Miles and Larry but set forth no other evidence to establish that Miles
was more than merely present in her own home. It is not the role of this court to reweigh
evidence or assess witness credibility, but there must be evidence in the record to show that
Miles affirmatively acted to aid, induce, or cause Larry to manufacture methamphetamine.
See Green v. State, 937 N.E.2d 923, 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Here, there
is no such evidence. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the State failed to present
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to uphold Miles’ conviction for dealing in
methamphetamine and would reverse.
9