Jeremiah D. Wilkes v. State of Indiana

Apr 29 2014, 10:53 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PAULA M. SAUER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEREMIAH D. WILKES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 32A01-1303-CR-120
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Jeffrey V. Boles, Judge
Cause No. 32C01-1107-FB-38
April 29, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Jeremiah D. Wilkes appeals his two convictions of Class B felony sexual misconduct
with a minor.1 He alleges the court’s admission of hearsay and vouching testimony denied
him his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the summer of 2010, thirty-year-old Wilkes cared for five children while the
mothers of those children went out for the evening. After the four younger children went to
sleep, fourteen-year-old W.V. played a game on his mother’s computer, while Wilkes sat
nearby using his own laptop. Wilkes asked W.V. to show his penis to Wilkes. W.V. said he
would consider Wilkes’ request, and W.V. returned to playing his video game. Thirty
minutes later, Wilkes asked W.V. if he had decided, and W.V. said, “I guess.” (Tr. at 305.)
Wilkes pulled down W.V.’s pants and placed his mouth on W.V.’s penis. Wilkes asked
W.V. if he had ever had a “blow job,” (id. at 306), and proceeded to fellate W.V. Wilkes
then sat on the couch and asked W.V. to put his mouth on Wilkes’ penis. W.V. placed his
mouth on Wilkes’ penis, but “it tasted really bad.” (Id. at 308.) Wilkes had W.V. use his
hand to bring Wilkes to orgasm.
A few months later, in a conversation about whether a friend was bisexual, W.V. told
the friend that he had been either raped or sexually abused by a man. Then, nearly a year
after the incident, W.V. told his mother and an investigation began.
The State charged Wilkes with two counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a
minor, and a jury found Wilkes guilty. The court imposed two concurrent eight-year
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9.
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sentences, both to be served as three years executed and five years of probation.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Wilkes alleges he was denied the right to a fair trial by the erroneous admission of
hearsay and vouching testimony. We typically review allegations of error in the admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012). However, as Wilkes concedes, he did not object at trial to most of the evidence about
which he now complains on appeal. Thus, he waived those allegations of error, see id., and
we may not reverse his convictions unless he demonstrates fundamental error. Id. Error is
fundamental error when it is a “blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for
harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.”
Id. (quoting Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).
a. Hearsay Testimony
Wilkes first alleges fundamental error from the presentation of hearsay testimony.
Hearsay is a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind.
Evidence Rule 801. G.H., one of W.V.’s classmates, testified that W.V. mentioned “he was
raped or sexually abused by somebody.”2 (Tr. at 373.) A forensic interviewer testified W.V.
disclosed a “sexual abuse incident,” (id. at 389), “an encounter between him and an adult
2
Wilkes also complains that the State referred to G.H.’s testimony in its opening argument. However,
arguments of counsel are not evidence, Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), and the
court so instructed Wilkes’ jury. Counsel’s general statements about G.H.’s expected testimony did not repeat
any allegation or suggest G.H. would identify Wilkes. Accordingly, we cannot say counsel’s reference to
G.H.’s testimony prejudiced Wilkes.
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male by the name of Jeremiah,” (id. at 393), in which “they both performed blow jobs on one
another.” (Id. at 394.) W.V.’s pediatrician testified “I understood that he had been, uh,
forced to have both penal [sic] oral contact with the penis inserted in his mouth and then also
to have put his mouth on somebody’s penis.” (Id. at 407.) Finally, a physician report stated:
“Per the god-father, [W.V.] recently disclosed to his mother that Jeremiah Wilkes, an adult
male friend of [W.V.’s] mother, had ‘used blackmail’ to force him to give and receive oral-
penile contact.” ((State’s Ex. 10 at 1.)
Assuming arguendo those statements were inadmissible hearsay, we cannot find
fundamental error in their admission. W.V. was the first witness to testify, and he gave
detailed testimony regarding the evening in question and was cross-examined by defense
counsel. The brief statements from those other four sources did not provide any new
evidence; rather, as Wilkes concedes, each of them provided testimony “consistent with
W.V.’s . . . testimony.” (Br. of Appellant at 6, 7, 8, & 9.) Admission of hearsay is not
grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted. Mathis v.
State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Because the statements were cumulative
of W.V.’s testimony, no fundamental error occurred from the admission of those statements.
See Nunley v. State, 916 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding hearsay testimony d
did not create reversible error where victim testified first, victim was subject to cross
examination, and other witnesses provided only brief testimony consistent with testimony
victim had already provided), trans. denied.
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b. Vouching Testimony
Wilkes also asserts error in the admission of alleged “vouching” testimony from
Detective Terry Judy. Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) provides: “Witnesses may not testify to
opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of
allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” Under Rule
704(b), adults may not opine whether a particular child was “prone to exaggerate or fantasize
about sexual matters [because] indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony
that the child witness is telling the truth.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind.
2012), reh’g denied.3
Detective Judy testified that W.V.’s reports were “consistent.” (Tr. at 352.) Detective
Judy indicated he told Wilkes he did not “see a reason why [W.V.] would come out and lie
about this stuff . . .,” (id. at 355), and Wilkes also did not know “why [W.V. would] make
something like this up.” (Id.) Finally, Detective Judy testified that he discussed with Wilkes
whether there was any chance W.V.’s mother would have encouraged W.V. to make these
allegations, but that he never asked W.V.’s mother about whether she had anything to do with
the allegations because “I didn’t figure it was relevant and I didn’t believe that that was the
case [because] this wasn’t in [a] custody battle and uh I didn’t believe that that was the
reason that [W.V.] would have said this.” (Id. at 360-61.)
3
Although Wilkes cited the controlling Supreme Court precedent, Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d 1230, (Br. of
Appellant at 9), the State did not acknowledge Hoglund. It instead cited earlier decisions and asserted: “Our
supreme court [ ] has made a distinction between direct and indirect vouching testimony, prohibiting the
former but allowing the latter.” (Br. of Appellee at 13 (quoting Bradford v. State, 960 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012).) As the decisions on which the State relies are inconsistent with Hoglund, we decline to
follow them.
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These statements by Detective Judy amount to the type of indirect vouching that our
Supreme Court held inadmissible in Hogland. See Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1258
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding opinions regarding whether the child victim was “coached,”
“truthful,” “believable,” and “wouldn’t lie” constituted vouching prohibited by Hogland),
trans. denied. However, the error in admitting the testimony was harmless.
“[E]rrors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they affect the
substantial rights of a party.” Hogland, 962 N.E.2d at 1238. Accordingly, error is harmless
“if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the
reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the
conviction.” Id. In light of the other evidence in the record, the admission of this vouching
testimony was harmless. See, e.g., id. at 1240 (holding no fundamental error in admission of
vouching testimony from multiple witnesses).
c. Cumulative Error
Finally, Wilkes asserts the combination of those errors, taken cumulatively,
constituted fundamental error. We disagree.
In support of his argument, Wilkes notes W.V. testified Wilkes was uncircumcised,
while Wilkes and the medical professionals testified that Wilkes is circumcised. However,
we decline to find fundamental error in the admission of the cumulative hearsay and the
indirect vouching testimony discussed above simply because a teenager victim assigned the
wrong medical to label his molester’s penis. W.V. drew a picture that accurately depicts
Wilkes’ penis – including the relative size of the “flap of skin,” (id. at 392), that W.V.
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thought was foreskin. (Compare State’s Ex. 5 (W.V.’s drawing) with State’s Ex. 6
(photograph).) Because W.V.’s picture and explanation clarified why he inaccurately
labelled Wilkes’ penis as uncircumcised, we decline to find any additional prejudice in the
admission of the evidence discussed above. See, e.g., Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1240 (holding
no reversible error from admission of evidence where victim’s testimony provided
‘substantial evidence of [defendant’s] guilt”).
CONCLUSION
No fundamental error occurred from the admission of hearsay testimony that was
merely cumulative of the victim’s own testimony, and the vouching testimony was harmless
in light of the weight of the evidence in the record. Even when considering all that evidence
cumulatively, we hold no fundamental error occurred. Accordingly, we affirm Wilkes’
convictions.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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