Jonathan D. Carpenter v. State of Indiana

FOR PUBLICATION
Feb 20 2014, 6:39 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DONALD C. SWANSON, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JONATHAN D. CARPENTER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A05-1304-CR-207
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Wendy Davis, Judge
Cause No. 02D04-1207-FD-1008
February 20, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Jonathan D. Carpenter appeals the admission of evidence obtained from a warrantless
search of his house. He argues the initial warrantless search of his house violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 13, 2012, police and animal control officers were called to Carpenter’s
residence on a report four dogs were fighting in Carpenter’s yard. When they arrived, the
dogs were still fighting, but one had retreated under a deck and seemed wounded. The dogs
were covered with mud and blood, and they kept running in and out of the house through an
opened sliding glass door.
Animal Control Officer Bryan Miller climbed over the fence into Carpenter’s yard and
captured three of the four dogs. One dog had run into the house through the sliding glass
door and had not come back outside. Officer Miller and Sergeant Derrick Westfield of the
Fort Wayne Police Department entered Carpenter’s house to search for the dog and to
determine if the dogs had injured anyone inside the house. Sergeant Westfield announced his
identity and asked anyone inside the house to come out. There was no response.
Officer Miller and Sergeant Westfield observed feces and urine throughout the house,
and they noticed what appeared to be blood on the walls, though it was unclear whether the
blood was human or canine. As they walked through the house searching for the dog, they
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located two rooms with “plastic sheeting and ventilation.” (Suppression Tr. at 23.)1 One of
the doors to the rooms was slightly cracked open and there was a strong light coming from
inside. Officer Miller and Sergeant Westfield entered the room, where they found marijuana
plants.
Officer Miller and Sergeant Westfield went upstairs to search for the dog, and found it
in a room with a closed door that had a hole in the bottom of it. The room contained a mason
jar full of marijuana. Officer Miller and Sergeant Westfield captured the dog and determined
there were no people in the house. Carpenter returned to the house before the police left and
was taken into custody.
Sergeant Westfield told narcotics officers what he observed in Carpenter’s residence
and took an officer to the house. Based on Sergeant Westfield’s observations, the narcotics
officer prepared a probable cause affidavit and obtained a search warrant. Police entered
Carpenter’s house and confiscated marijuana and other controlled substances.
The State charged Carpenter with Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance,2
Class D felony possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana,3 Class A misdemeanor
possession of paraphernalia,4 and three counts of Class D felony possession of a controlled
substance.5 Carpenter filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his house, and the
1
The transcripts for the Motion to Suppress hearing and the trial are numbered separately, and we will refer to
them as “Suppression Tr.” and “Trial Tr.” respectively. Indiana Appellate Rule 28(A)(2) mandates the pages
of the transcript “shall be numbered consecutively regardless of the number of volumes the Transcript
requires.”
2
Ind. Code § 36-48-4-13(b)(2).
3
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.
4
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b).
5
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7(a). One of the counts was dismissed before trial.
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trial court denied it.
At his bench trial, Carpenter renewed his objection to the admission of the evidence
found in his house. The trial court found Carpenter guilty as charged.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When, as is the case here, the trial court denies a motion to suppress, and the
defendant makes an objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, we review the
admission of that evidence for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584,
586-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at
587.
1. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement
officials to obtain a valid warrant before conducting searches or seizures. State v. Straub,
749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, “on occasion the public interest
demands greater flexibility than is offered by the constitutional mandate” of a warrant.
Rabadi v. State, 541 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ind. 1989). The exceptions to the warrant requirement
are “few in number and carefully delineated,” United States v. United States Dist. Court for
Eastern Dist. Of Mich., Southern Division, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Exigent circumstances
are an exception to the warrant requirement and have been found:
(1) where a suspect is fleeing or likely to take flight in order to avoid arrest; (2)
where incriminating evidence is in jeopardy of being destroyed or removed
unless an immediate arrest is made; (3) where a violent crime has occurred and
entry by police can be justified as means to prevent further injury or to aid
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those who have been injured; and (4) in cases that involve hot pursuit or
movable vehicles.
Straub, 749 N.E.2d at 597-98. The State has the burden to demonstrate exigent
circumstances to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that accompanies
warrantless searches and seizures. Id. at 598.
Carpenter argues no exigent circumstances permitted the officers to enter his home6
without a warrant. He distinguishes Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2006), reh’g
granted on other issues, 848 N.E.2d 278, and Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009), where warrantless entry into the curtilage of a house was permissible under certain
circumstances. He argues those cases “find that the protection of animals could support a
limited search of property outside the home, [but] neither supports a conclusion that an
injured animal creates sufficient exigent circumstances to support a warrantless search inside
of a home.” (Br. of Appellant at 8) (emphasis in original). We disagree.
Police were called to Trimble’s house to investigate a report of animal neglect
involving a dog named Butchie. The report indicated Butchie “had no food or water, his leg
was injured, his ears and genitals appeared frostbitten, and he seemed to be starved.”
Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 800. Trimble argued the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to suppress evidence of Butchie’s condition because the evidence was
obtained in violation of Trimble’s Fourth Amendment rights. Our Indiana Supreme Court
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In his brief, Carpenter also makes a passing argument regarding the legality of the officers entering his
backyard by going over the three-foot-high chain link fence. However, Carpenter did not present this argument
before the trial court, and therefore it is waived. See State v. Delph, 875 N.E.2d 416, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(argument raised for first time on appeal is waived), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
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held Trimble had “no legitimate privacy interest in the appearance of a dog that has been tied
up outside in an area readily observable by the public,” id. at 803, and exigent circumstances
to justify a warrantless search existed based on Butchie’s condition, which indicated animal
neglect.
In Davis, police were called to Davis’ home to investigate a report of malnourished
dogs and a foul odor. Police found several malnourished dogs chained up in the yard, items
used to train dogs for dog fighting in an open shed, and an animal carcass in the back of a
truck. As in Trimble, the police investigation extended only into the curtilage of Davis’
home, and Davis argued the evidence from such a warrantless search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. We determined animal cruelty was an exigent circumstance that justified
a warrantless search of the curtilage of Davis’ property.
Trimble and Davis dealt with whether the conditions of animals could constitute
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless searches of areas outside of the homes. In the
case before us, the investigation extended into the house only when one of the dogs, which
was covered in blood, entered the home through an open door and would not come out.
Exigent circumstances permitted the police to execute a warrantless search of
Carpenter’s home. On arrival at Carpenter’s home, officers observed four dogs covered in
blood; three of them were attacking the fourth and acting aggressively. The three dogs ran in
and out of the house via an open sliding door. One of the dogs entered the house and would
not come out. Officer Miller testified he entered Carpenter’s house through the open door
because “due to the staining, possible blood on this animal, I didn’t know if I had a victim or
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not inside the residence or other dogs who were victims inside the residence . . .”
(Suppression Tr. at 13.)7 The trial court did not err when it denied Carpenter’s motion to
suppress the evidence against him because the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe a
violent crime might have occurred, properly executed a search of the premises for that
purpose, and the search did not violate Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Alspach v.
State, 755 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (warrantless entry based on exigent
circumstances when police observed a trail of blood leading to an apartment, the door to the
apartment was slightly ajar, and police did not receive a response on announcing their
presence, even though police did not observe a violent crime on entering the apartment),
trans. denied.
2. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
Though the text of the search and seizure clause of the Indiana Constitution is similar
to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, our Indiana Supreme Court has
articulated a separate analysis. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). The
State has the burden of showing that, given the totality of the circumstances, the intrusion
was reasonable. Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001).
“In determining reasonableness under Section 11, we recognize that Indiana citizens
are concerned not only with personal privacy but also with safety, security, and protection
7
Carpenter argues the police should have stopped their search upon locating the missing dog, and their
continued search of the house exceeded the scope of the authorized search. A search extending beyond the
exigencies presented violates the Fourth Amendment. Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 301 (Ind. 1995). The
exigent circumstance that justified the warrantless search was concern there might be an injured person;
finding the dog did not end that circumstance. Therefore, the officers’ continued search of the house for the
purpose of locating an injured person did not exceed the scope of the exigencies.
7
from crime.” Saffold v. State, 938 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted),
trans. denied. To determine reasonableness, we consider: (1) the degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law
enforcement’s needs. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.
Regarding factor one, officers testified they were concerned there was an injured
person inside the house based on the dogs’ aggressive behavior, the fact the dogs were
covered in blood, and the dogs’ actions of running in and out of the house through an open
door, with one dog eventually remaining in the house. See VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d
258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (entry into a residence to protect others from bodily harm is
reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution), trans. denied.
Regarding factor two, the degree of intrusion was reasonable, as the aim of the entry was to
aid a possibly-injured person. See Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 (Ind. 2006) (“It is
because of concerns among citizens about safety, security, and protection that some
intrusions upon privacy are tolerated, as long as they are reasonably aimed toward these
concerns.”). Finally, regarding factor three, the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion
an injured person was in the house, and thus the law enforcement need was reasonable to
retrieve that person or to stop the dog inside the house from continuing to attack the person,
had that been the case in the house. See Benefiel v. State, 578 N.E.2d 338, 345 (Ind. 1991)
(potential danger to human life “certainly outweighed appellant’s reasonable expectations to
privacy.”), cert. denied 504 U.S. 987 (1992).
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Based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the warrantless search of
Carpenter’s house violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
because the officers had reasonable suspicion there was an injured person inside the house.
Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Carpenter’s motion to suppress the
evidence.8
CONCLUSION
The warrantless entry into Carpenter’s home did not violate his Fourth Amendment or
Article 1, Section 11 rights against unlawful search and seizure. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
8
Carpenter also contends his convictions should be overturned for insufficient evidence. However, that
argument presumes all the evidence he challenged should have been suppressed. As we hold the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to suppress, we need not address his sufficiency of the evidence
argument.
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