Patrick Lewis v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res Jun 26 2013, 8:39 am
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
G. ALLEN LIDY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Roscoe Stovall, Jr., & Associates Attorney General of Indiana
Mooresville, Indiana
JONATHAN R. SICHTERMANN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PATRICK LEWIS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 67A05-1210-CR-527
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE PUTNAM SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Charles D. Bridges, Judge
Cause No. 67D01-1104-CM-236
June 26, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Patrick Lewis appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.
We affirm.
Issue
Lewis raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient
evidence to rebut Lewis’s self-defense claim.
Facts
On April 22, 2011, Lewis and his wife, A.L., got into an argument. Lewis wanted
to go to bed, but A.L. was instant messaging on her cell phone with her aunt and was not
ready to go to bed. Lewis plugged in a camera that interfered with the wi-fi, and A.L.
was unable to use the wi-fi on her cell phone. A.L. unplugged the camera, but Lewis
plugged it back in. When A.L. unplugged it again, Lewis started pulling wires out of the
wireless router. A.L. then picked up Lewis’s laptop computer and slammed it down,
breaking it. Lewis “came after” A.L. and punched her in the face with a closed fist. Tr.
p. 20. Lewis knocked A.L. to the ground and was “on top of” her, when his father
interrupted the altercation. Id. at 21.
The State charged Lewis with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. At Lewis’s
bench trial, he argued that he hit A.L. in self-defense. Lewis claimed that A.L. hit him
with the laptop and another object and that he punched her in self-defense. The trial
court found Lewis guilty as charged and noted:
I do feel like the State has met their burden, due in part, well
actually not in part, due to Mr. Lewis’s testimony, it was
inconsistent with the injuries shown in the photograph and
2
also, Mrs. Lewis’s testimony on State’s Exhibit One, the
bottom photo clearly shows blood pooling in her ear, which
would certainly corroborate her story that she was lying on
her back, so yes, it is a close call. Clearly both parties needed
to be arrested. So, I am going to enter the Judgment of
Conviction, Mr. Lewis for Domestic Battery.
Id. at 38. The trial court sentenced Lewis to one year with all suspended to probation
except for time already served. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: “The
reason I’m suspending the entire sentence, . . . it was questionable, at least in my mind,
who struck whom first and why and based on that information, I’m not willing to have
Mr. Lewis do any more jail time.” Id. at 45. Lewis now appeals.
Analysis
Lewis argues that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. A valid claim
of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.
Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). “A person is justified in using
reasonable force against another person to protect himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-
2(a).1 A claim of self-defense requires a defendant to have acted without fault, been in a
place where he or she had a right to be, and been in reasonable fear or apprehension of
bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). Further, a mutual
combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she
may claim self-defense. Id. at 801; see I.C. § 35-41-3-2(e)(3) (“[A] person is not justified
in using force if: . . . the person has entered into combat with another person or is the
1
Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2 was subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 161-2012, Section 1,
effective March 20, 2012, and Pub. L. No. 13-2013, Section 139, effective April 1, 2013.
3
initial aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to
the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or
threatens to continue unlawful action.”).2
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence
claim. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support
the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. When a
claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden
of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Id. If a defendant is convicted despite
his or her claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could say
that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 800-01.
Lewis argues that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim. According to
Lewis, he presented evidence to show that he was in a place where he had the right to be,
he was without fault, and he had a reasonable fear of bodily harm. He further argues that
the State failed to rebut this evidence by showing that his force was unreasonable, he was
the initial aggressor, he was a mutual combatant who entered into the fray willingly and
did not call an armistice, or he continued in the action after the need for self-defense no
longer existed. Lewis points to the trial court’s allegedly equivocal statements regarding
Lewis’s guilt.
2
Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 161-2012, Section 1, effective March 20, 2012, and Pub. L. No.
13-2013, Section 139, effective April 1, 2013.
4
We cannot say that the trial court’s statements indicated confusion regarding
whether Lewis was guilty of domestic battery. 3 The trial court pointed out that Lewis’s
explanation of the events was inconsistent with the physical evidence, which indicated
that A.L. was on the ground, bleeding, for part of the altercation. That evidence was
consistent with A.L.’s testimony. The trial court did indicate that it was unclear whether
Lewis or A.L. was the initial aggressor in the incident. However, his conviction is
sustainable based on other evidence.
The evidence most favorable to the conviction indicates that, after A.L. broke his
laptop, Lewis “came after” her and punched her in the face with a closed fist. Tr. p. 20.
He knocked her to the ground and was “on top of” her, when his father interrupted the
altercation. Id. at 21. The State’s evidence permitted the trier of fact to infer that Lewis
did not reasonably fear bodily harm when he started hitting A.L. The evidence also
permitted the trier of fact to infer that Lewis was a willing participant in the violence.
Further, “[t]he amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be
proportionate to the urgency of the situation.” Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “When a person uses more force than is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished.” Id.Lewis’s use of force against A.L. was disproportionate to the situation.
3
In support of his argument that the trial court’s statements were equivocal, Lewis relies on Willis v.
State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008). However, in Willis, our supreme court reversed a conviction based on
the defense of the parental discipline privilege, not based on any equivocal statements by the trial court.
Lewis’s argument fails.
5
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to rebut Lewis’s claim of self-
defense. In much of his argument, Lewis is merely requesting that we reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, clearly
rejected Lewis’s version of the events. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Lewis’s
conviction.
Conclusion
The evidence is sufficient to rebut Lewis’s claim of self-defense. We affirm his
conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
6