Indiana Gas Company, Inc. and Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company v. Indiana Finance Authority and Indiana Gasification, LLC

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NORMAN T. FUNK A. DAVID STIPPLER
LIBBY GOODKNIGHT RANDALL C. HELMEN
Krieg DeVault, LLP Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
ROBERT E. HEIDORN LARRY J. WALLACE
JOSHUA A. CLAYBOURN JAMES A. L. BUDDENBAUM
Vectren Corporation TRAVIS W. MONTGOMERY
Evansville, Indiana Parr Richey Obremskey Frandsen & Patterson
Indianapolis, Indiana
CLAYTON C. MILLER
Bamberger Foreman Oswald & Hahn, LLP KARL L. MULVANEY
Indianapolis, Indiana MICHAEL R. LIMRICK
DAVID T. McGIMPSEY
JEROME POLK Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP
Polk & Associates, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
MARK W. COOPER FILED
Oct 30 2012, 8:55 am
TODD A. RICHARDSON Indianapolis, Indiana
JOSEPH P. ROMPALA
Lewis & Kappes, P.C. JEFFERSON A. LINDSEY CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
Indianapolis, Indiana Rockport, Indiana tax court
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
INDIANA GAS COMPANY, INC. and )
SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS AND )
ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., )
)
Appellants-Respondents, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1112-EX-1141
)
INDIANA FINANCE AUTHORITY and )
INDIANA GASIFICATION, LLC, )
)
Appellees-Petitioners. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION
The Honorable James D. Atterholt, Chairman
Cause No. 43976
October 30, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants-Respondents, Indiana Gas Company, Inc. and Southern Indiana Gas
and Electric Company, both d/b/a Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana, Inc. (collectively,
Vectren); Ohio Valley Gas Corporation; Ohio Valley Gas, Inc.; Sycamore Gas Company;
Arcelor Millal USA; Haynes International, Inc.; Rochester Metal Products Corporation;
Vertellus Specialties, Inc.; Countrymark Refining & Logistics, LLC; Corn Products
International, Inc.; Citizens Action Coalition; Spencer County Citizens for Quality of
Life; Valley Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club appeal the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission’s (the Commission) judgment in favor of Appellees-Petitioners, the Indiana
Finance Authority (IFA); Indiana Gasification, LLC (IG); Lincolnland Economic
Development Corp. (Lincolnland), and the Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor
(OUCC) with respect to the Commission’s approval of a Substitute Natural Gas Purchase
and Sale Agreement (Contract) between the IFA and IG.1
1
Citizens Gas & Coke Utility; Citizens Gas of Westfield; Community Natural Gas Company, Inc.;
Midwest Natural Gas Corporation; Indiana Natural Gas Corporation; Eli Lilly & Company; United States
2
We reverse.
ISSUES
Arcelor Millal USA; Haynes International, Inc.; Rochester Metal Products
Corporation; Vertellus Specialties, Inc.; Countrymark Refining & Logistics, LLC; and
Corn Products International, Inc. (collectively, the Industrial Group)2 raise two issues on
appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the
Commission erred in approving the Contract when the Contract defined “retail end use
customer” in a manner contrary to the statutory definition of the same term.
Vectren; Ohio Valley Gas Corporation; Ohio Valley Gas, Inc.; and Sycamore Gas
Company (collectively, the Utilities); and Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc.;
Spencer County Citizens for Quality of Life; Valley Watch, Inc.; and the Sierra Club
(collectively, the Citizens Groups) raise two additional issues on appeal, which we
consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the Commission exceeded
its jurisdiction when it approved the Contract.
As a separate issue, the IFA, IG, and Lincolnland present us with the following
issue, which we restate: Whether the Utilities and the Industrial Group have standing to
appeal the Commission’s approval of the Contract.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Steel Corporation; Northern Indiana Public Service Company; Kokomo Gas & Fuel Company; and
Northern Indiana Fuel & Light Company, Inc. have also been parties to these proceedings. However,
they have not filed separate briefs on appeal.
2
Eli Lilly & Company and the United States Steel Corporation were members of the Industrial Group
during the Commission proceedings, but are not members of the group on appeal.
3
Substitute natural gas (SNG) is a pipeline quality gas produced from coal through
a manufacturing process called coal gasification. It serves as an alternative to natural gas
and is used to fuel gas appliances in many Indiana homes and businesses. In 2009, the
Indiana General Assembly expressed approval of SNG production in Public Law 2-2009,
which has since been codified as the Substitute Natural Gas Act (the SNG Act) in Ind.
Code § 4-4-11.6. In the SNG Act, the General Assembly included its findings that:
“[t]he furnishing of reliable supplies of reasonably priced natural gas for sales to retail
customers is essential for the well being of the people of Indiana;” and “[o]btaining low
cost financing for the construction of new coal gasification facilities is necessary to allow
retail end use customers to enjoy the benefits of a reliable, reasonably priced, and long
term energy supply.” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-12. In accordance with these findings, the SNG
Act outlines procedures governing the production, purchase, and sale of SNG. It
authorizes the IFA to enter into contracts for the purchase, transportation, and delivery of
SNG, and allows the IFA to establish rates and charges to retail end use customers for the
SNG.
On March 26, 2009, two days after the Governor signed Public Law 2-2009, the
IFA issued a request for proposals (RFP) in which it solicited coal gasification project
proposals from suppliers of SNG. IG sent its response to the RFP on April 9, 2009 and
was the only entity that responded. Leucadia National Corporation (Leucadia), a New
York-based developer in the coal gasification business, incorporated IG as a limited
4
liability, special purpose entity for the sole purpose of developing a coal gasification
facility (the Plant) near Rockport, Indiana.
IG’s proposed plan was to build, own, and operate the Plant, which it estimated
would cost $2.7 billion to develop. IG expected to receive $800 million of the amount
needed, which was equivalent to 30% of the total estimated cost, in the form of private
capital from Leucadia. IG also expected to receive a federal loan guarantee from the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) for the remaining $1.875 billion. Depending
upon its financing, legal proceedings, and environmental permitting requirements, IG
planned to commence construction of the Plant in the third quarter of 2012 and to begin
delivering SNG in the first quarter of 2016.
On January 14, 2011, the IFA and IG executed the Contract, which details the sale
and purchase of the SNG that IG plans to produce at the Plant. The Contract provides
that the IFA will buy up to a fixed annual amount of 38 million MMBTUs3 of SNG from
IG for a period of 30 years, to be measured from the day SNG production at the Plant
begins. In exchange, the IFA will pay IG a base amount, adjusted to account for new
taxes, changes in governmental requirements, net incremental revenues, and net CO2
revenues. The base amount will be calculated by adding: (1) the sum of a fixed capital
cost of $3.50 per MMBTU; (2) certain operation and maintenance expenses; (3) the
actual cost of fuel used by IG, adjusted for various factors; and (4) the cost of
transporting the SNG to the IFA.
3
An MMBTU is the equivalent of one dekatherm (dth).
5
The Contract also specifies that once the IFA has bought the SNG from IG, it will
sell the SNG on the open natural gas market for either a profit or loss, which will then be
passed along to the ratepayers of Indiana regulated gas utilities who are classified by I.C.
§ 4-4-11.6-10 as “retail end use customers.” If the price of the SNG exceeds the market
price of natural gas, the IFA will sell the SNG at a loss and will pass 100% of the
difference to the retail end use customers in the form of charges on their monthly gas
bills. If the price of SNG is lower than the market price of natural gas, IG and the retail
end use customers will each receive 50% of the profits.
In order to mitigate the charges to the retail end use customers, IG specified in the
Contract that it will set up a $150 million “Consumer Protection Reserve Account.”
When the IFA sells SNG at a loss, it will first take the difference from this Reserve
Account rather than pass along the cost to the retail end use customers. The IFA will
only pass along charges to the retail end use customers once the Reserve has been
depleted. Likewise, when the IFA sells the SNG for a profit, it will replenish the Reserve
before it passes along any net savings to retail end use customers.
As required by I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7, which specifies that a contract for the purchase
of SNG must provide a guarantee of savings for retail end use customers, IG guarantees
$100 million of savings to retail end use customers, measured in 2008 dollars. Under the
Contract, there are three ways in which retail end use customers may realize these
savings other than through the sale of the SNG on the natural gas market. First, if
customers have not realized the savings by the end of the 30-year term, IG may cover the
6
shortfall in cash. Second, the IFA may extend the Contract by up to an additional twenty
years. During this extension, the IFA may purchase the SNG from IG at lower prices in
the hopes of making up the shortfall. Third, the IFA may force a sale of the Plant in
order to make up for the difference. If it appears in year twenty-five of the Contract that
the Plant will not be worth $100 million at the end of the thirty years, the IFA may
receive a reduction in the price of SNG beginning in year twenty-six.
On December 16, 2010, the IFA and IG filed a joint petition with the Commission
seeking approval of the Contract and requesting that the Commission order Indiana
regulated gas utilities to enter into utility management agreements (UMAs) with the IFA
so that the IFA could pass proceeds and costs to retail end use customers through the
utilities, if necessary. Pursuant to I.C. § 8-1-1.1-4.1 and the SNG Act, the OUCC
appeared as a party in this proceeding on behalf of ratepayers, consumers, and the
public.4 On January 3, 2011, Vectren filed a petition to become either a named
respondent or an intervenor in the proceedings. On January 24, 2011, the Commission
entered a docket entry naming Vectren as a respondent. That same day, the IFA and IG
filed an amended petition identifying all of the Indiana regulated gas utilities as
respondents.
On January 26, 2011, Lincolnland and the Industrial Group, then comprised of
Arcelor Mittal USA, Eli Lilly & Company, and the United States Steel Corporation, filed
petitions to intervene. On January 27, 2011, Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, Citizens Gas
4
Pursuant to the SNG Act, the IFA is required to consult with the OUCC before negotiating or entering
into a purchase contract for SNG.
7
of Westfield, and six regulated local distribution companies5—Community Natural Gas
Company, Inc.; Midwest Natural Gas Corporation; Indiana Natural Gas Corporation;
Ohio Valley Gas Corporation; Ohio Valley Gas, Inc.; and Sycamore Gas Company (the
Six LDCs)—appeared in the matter. On February 2, 2011, the Citizens Groups filed a
joint petition to intervene. On February 10, 2011, by a docket entry, the Commission
granted Lincolnland and the Industrial Group’s petitions to intervene. Finally, on
February 17, 2011, the Commission granted the Citizens Groups’ joint petition to
intervene.
On April 18, 20, and 25, 2011, the Commission held public field hearings
throughout the state in order to solicit public comments on the Contract and the proposed
Plant. Subsequently, the Commission received written testimony and exhibits submitted
by the parties, and then on May 2, 4, 5, 6, 12, and 13, 2011, the Commission held an
evidentiary hearing at which it heard live testimony.
Two of the most significant disputes between the parties at the hearing were
whether the Contract provides a guarantee of savings for retail end use customers and
whether the Contract definition of “retail end use customer” conflicts with its statutory
definition. Vectren presented evidence that, during the 30-year term, the cost of the
Contract to Indiana’s retail end use customers might total between 1.7 and 4 billion
dollars, as measured in 2008 dollars. The IFA and IG, in turn, claimed that the Contract
5
Local distribution companies (LDCs) are local gas utilities that serve the public pursuant to public utility
laws and that are under the regulation of the Commission. “LDCs” and “gas utilities” are synonymous.
8
will likely provide savings of $500 million and is guaranteed to provide savings of at
least $100 million.
On November 22, 2011, following the hearing, the Commission approved the
Contract. In its order, the Commission did not address the scope of the term “retail end
use customer,” but instead suggested that the issue could be discussed in non-adjudicative
“technical conferences,” whereby the parties could resolve how the gas utilities should
collect funds from retail end use customers. Alternatively, the Commission found that
the IFA could file a separately docketed proceeding to address the issue in the event that
the parties could not reach an agreement on the definition of “retail end use customer.”
On December 12, 2011, the Industrial Group filed a petition for reconsideration,
asking the Commission to find that industrial transportation customers were exempt from
being classified as retail end use customers under the statute and, therefore, did not have
to pay the pass-through costs of the SNG under the Contract. On December 21, 2011,
Vectren filed a notice of appeal, and the next day the Industrial Group, Citizens Groups,
and three members of the Six LDCs—the three members that, along with Vectren,
constitute “the Utilities”—filed their own notices of appeal. The parties subsequently
filed a complex series of motions, the end result of which was that the Commission again
declined to make a finding on the definition of “retail end use customer.” Instead, the
Commission reiterated that it would address disputes over the term in a “separately
docketed proceeding,” should such a proceeding be filed, but that the issue was not ripe
9
for consideration until that time. On March 22, 2012, Vectren filed an amended notice of
appeal to include the Commission’s order.
The Utilities, the Citizens Groups, and the Industrial Group now appeal.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
JUSTICIABILITY
Because the IFA, IG, and Lincolnland present us with a threshold procedural
matter in their appellee’s brief, we will first address whether the Industrial Group and the
Utilities’ claims are justiciable. The IFA, IG and Lincolnland argue that they are not
because 1) the issues are not ripe; 2) the Industrial Group and the Utilities do not have
standing because they have not proven that they will suffer adverse effects as a result of
the Contract; and 3) the Industrial Group is not an entity that has a right to appeal because
it is “an ad hoc collection of industrial transportation customers whose ‘membership’ has
changed over the course of these proceedings.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 23).6 We will address
each of these issues separately.
A. Ripeness
The basic rationale behind our ripeness doctrine is “to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
6
While the OUCC is also an Appellee, it filed a separate brief, which we will hereafter designate as “the
OUCC’s Br.”
10
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523
U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998). A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon “contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v.
U.S., 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). In addition to preventing this court from prematurely
entangling itself in an abstract agreement, “there is also a ‘usually unspoken’ underlying
rationale [for ripeness] relating to the doctrine of mootness: a claim may be unripe where
‘if we do not decide [the claim] now, we may never need to.’” Alcoa Power Generating,
Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 643 F.3d 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Devia v.
Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 492 F.3d 421, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
When reviewing a ripeness challenge, we consider the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship caused to the parties by withholding court
consideration. Hardy v. Hardy, 963 N.E.2d 470, 474 n.3 (Ind. 2012). With respect to the
“fitness” prong of this standard, we may consider whether the issue is purely legal,
whether consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and
whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 643 F.3d
at 967. With respect to the “hardship” prong, we will find there to be hardship when a
delay would cause an immediate and significant change in a party’s conduct of its affairs
with serious penalties attached for noncompliance. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 743 (1997).
1. The Industrial Group
11
The Industrial Group is a group of industrial transportation customers who
purchase natural gas in the competitive interstate market and rely on gas utilities only for
local transportation services. The Group claims that the Contract will subject
transportation customers to charges under the UMAs, whereas the Legislature did not
intend to include transportation customers within the definition of “retail end use
customers” who may be charged pursuant to the SNG Act. The Contract specifies that
the term “retail end use customer” has the meaning “set forth in [I.C. §] 4-4-11.6-10;
provided that, for the absence of doubt, ‘retail end use customer’ means all Indiana
customers of each applicable local gas distribution company except for industrial
transport customers with an annual volume level of 50,000 dekatherms or greater.”
(Industrial Group’s App. p. 384). In contrast, section 4-4-11.6-10 of the SNG Act defines
“retail end use customer” as
a customer who acquires energy at retail for the customer’s own
consumption:
(1) from a gas utility that must apply to the [C]omission under [I.C.
§] 8-1-2-42 for approval of gas cost changes; or
(2) under a program approved by the [C]omission through which the
customer purchases gas that would be subject to price adjustments
under [I.C. §] 8-1-2-42 if the gas were sold by a gas utility.
I.C. § 4-4-11.6-10. The Industrial Group points to the difference between these two
definitions as evidence that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in approving the
Contract because the Contract will allow the IFA to pass-through charges to
transportation customers with an annual volume of less than 50,000 dekatherms.
12
Addressing the fitness component of a ripeness claim, we first focus on the
legality and the “concrete” setting of the particular issue brought before us. With respect
to the legality of the issue, we note that questions of statutory interpretation fall within
the exclusive province of the judiciary and are the responsibility of the court. MicroVote
General Corp. v. Ind. Election Comm’n, 924 N.E.2d 184, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Because we must interpret the SNG Act to review whether the Contract’s definition
conforms with the Legislature’s intent, the question before us is purely legal. Further,
because the issue is not dependent on factual circumstances, our determination will not
benefit from a “more concrete setting.” See Alcoa Power Generating Inc., 643 F.3d at
967. The IFA, IG and Lincolnland argue that there are still factual contingencies because
the future negotiation of the UMAs will clarify the issue. However, the Industrial
Group’s claim is not that the terms of the UMAs will cause transportation customers to
receive excessive charges; rather, the Group’s argument is that transportation customers
should not be subject to the UMAs at all. Awaiting the clarification of the terms of the
future UMAs will therefore not benefit our analysis.
It would only benefit us to delay our review if the establishment of the UMAs in
general were speculative. This is because the issue of whether the Industrial Group is
subject to the UMAs would become irrelevant if the IFA were to decide not to establish
any UMAs at all. However, it is clear under the terms of the Contract that the
establishment of the UMAs is inevitable.
Article XIV of the Contract provides:
13
[The IFA] covenants and agrees that [the IFA] will not take or permit any
action or fail to take or permit any action that would . . . otherwise limit,
alter, or impair the ability of [the IFA] to satisfy its contractual obligations
hereunder, including the establishment and collection of the price of SNG
from retail end use customers, in each case, until this [Contract] has been
terminated. [The IFA] further acknowledges and agrees that any action,
omission, or failure to act by the State or any agency thereof to cause [the
IFA] not to establish a sufficient revenue requirement, or not to collect rates
or to pay [IG] in each case would constitute a breach of this [Contract].
(Industrial Group’s App. p. 359). Pursuant to this provision, the IFA may not fail to take
any action that would limit its ability to collect the price of SNG from retail end use
customers without breaching the Contract. Thus, we conclude that the establishment of
the UMAs is unavoidable.
Turning to the hardship prong of the ripeness challenge, we note a split in the
federal circuits concerning whether the “fitness” and “hardship” test constitutes a two-
part test or two independent bases for ripeness.7 This is an issue of first impression in
Indiana.
We decline to go so far as to declare that a petitioner need not satisfy the hardship
prong of the test. Instead, we choose to follow the majority of circuits who hold that both
prongs of the test must be satisfied at least to a minimal degree. This approach balances
the concerns of the court in judicial economy and the concerns of the parties in avoiding
hardship or undue litigation. As in some circuits, we interpret this test as a “sliding
scale” in which “a very powerful exhibition of immediate hardship might compensate for
7
For more information and a list of cases in favor of either alternative, see South Dakota v. Mineta, 278
F.Supp. 1025, 1028 (D.S.D. 2003).
14
questionable fitness, [] or vice versa.” Ernst & Young v. Depositors Economic Protection
Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 1995).
Hardship can be established where a delay would cause an immediate and
significant change in a party’s conduct of its affairs with serious penalties attached to
noncompliance. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 743. [Al]though the hallmark of cognizable
hardship is usually direct and immediate harm, other kinds of injuries may occasionally
suffice.” Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 536. If the operation of a challenged statute is
inevitable, ripeness is not defeated by the existence of a time delay before the statute
takes effect. Id.Here, the Industrial Group will suffer direct harm if it is subject to pass-through
charges and we deem that those charges are unauthorized under the SNG Act. However,
it is questionable whether this impact will be “immediate” because charges will first be
paid out of the $150 million Consumer Protection Reserve Account. Nevertheless, we
conclude that the Industrial Group’s claim is ripe for our review. The First Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that ripeness is not defeated by the existence of a time delay when
the operation of a statute is inevitable, and we conclude that the same principle holds
when the operation of a contract is inevitable and there are no contingent factual issues.
See id. This interpretation is in harmony with our determination that “fitness” and
“hardship” should operate on a sliding scale. As there is great evidence of “fitness” in
the instant case and at least minimal evidence of hardship, we balance any remaining
question of hardship in favor of ripeness.
15
2. The Utilities
Turning to the Utilities, we note that their challenge to the Commission’s
jurisdiction has two components. First, they assert that the Contract is not final, which is
a prerequisite for Commission review under I.C. § 4-4-11.6-13, and second, they argue
that the Contract does not satisfy the SNG Act’s requirement that any SNG purchase
contract must provide guaranteed savings for retail end use customers. See I.C. § 4-4-
11.6-7. The IFA, IG, and Lincolnland do not address ripeness within the context of the
Utilities’ contract claim, but argue that the Utilities’ guaranteed savings claim is “a UMA
issue, not an SNG Contract issue.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 23).
In regards to the finality of the Contract, we have held that the interpretation of a
contract is a legal issue. Battershell v. Prestwick Sales, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992), trans. denied. It is also significant that the interpretation of the finality of the
Contract here is not dependent on any contingent factual issues and will not be more
“concrete” at a later date if we delay our review. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue
is judicially fit for review.
Hardship is somewhat more difficult to establish as none of the parties have
addressed the issue of ripeness within the context of the Utilities’ contract claim.
However, it is clear here that the Contract is integral to the construction of the 2.7 billion
dollar Plant, IG’s attainment of a federal loan guarantee from the DOE, and the IFA’s
negotiation of the underlying UMAs. A delay in reviewing the finality of the Contract
would possibly have enormous repercussions. Although most Circuit courts have
16
recognized that the burden of participating in further administrative hearings and judicial
proceedings does not constitute sufficient hardship, some courts have nevertheless
acknowledged an exception where delaying resolution would inhibit or delay investment.
In Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
analyzed the Federal Regulation and Development of Power Act and found that because
the statute set the hydroelectric project license term at not less than 30 nor more than 50
years, Congress had recognized that significant capital investments in hydro power could
not be made without the certainty and security of a multi-decade license. Alcoa Power
Generating Inc., 643 F.3d at 970. As a result, the D.C. Circuit Court held that it would
be a hardship for a power generating company to endure a delay in its application for a
new 50-year license. Id.Similarly, our General Assembly acknowledged in the SNG Act that “[l]ong term
contracts for the purchase of SNG between the [IFA] and SNG producers will enhance
the receipt of federal incentives for the development, construction, and financing of new
coal gasification facilities in Indiana.” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-12. Towards that end, the General
Assembly provided that an SNG purchase contract must have a thirty year term. I.C. § 4-
4-11.6-12. It is clear from these provisions that the General Assembly recognized the
importance of investment in SNG development and would consider a delay in our review
of the finality of a purchase contract a hindrance to such investments. As such, we will
consider the issue.
17
Turning to the second component of the Utilities’ claim, that the Contract does not
provide the requisite guarantee of savings to retail end use customers, we reject the IFA
and IG’s argument that this is a UMA issue rather than a purchase contract issue. It is
clear that the SNG Act considers purchase contracts and UMAs as being independent of
each other. I.C. § 4-4-11.6-22 provides that the IFA may request the Commission to
order gas utilities to enter into UMAs with the IFA, and I.C. § 4-4-11.6-14 provides that
the IFA may enter into purchase contracts with SNG producers and submit those
contracts to the Commission for approval. By addressing these two forms of contracts in
separate provisions, the Legislature has clarified that although a purchase contract and its
corresponding UMAs are related, they are nevertheless independent.
Thus, because they are independent, we conclude that the parties to a purchase
contract must provide a guarantee of savings for retail end use customers in that purchase
contract, not its corresponding UMAs. The definitions listed in the SNG Act support our
interpretation. Pursuant to I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7, a purchase contract is a contract that
“provides a guarantee of savings for retail end use customers.” (emphasis added). In
contrast, § 4-4-11.6-22, which governs the establishment of UMAs, does not mention
savings for retail end use customers. In light of this construction, and because the parties
have already negotiated and received approval for the Contract, we find that the issue of
whether the Contract has provided an adequate guarantee is ripe for our review.
With respect to hardship, this claim relates to whether the Commission had
jurisdiction to approve the Contract. As a result, there might be a significant hardship
18
with respect to investments if we delay our review. Accordingly, we conclude that both
of the Utilities’ arguments are ripe for review.
B. Standing
Having found that the claims at issue are ripe for appeal, we will now address
whether the Industrial Group and the Utilities have standing to bring those claims.
Standing is a fundamental, threshold, constitutional issue that must be addressed by this,
or any, court to determine if it should exercise jurisdiction in the particular case before it.
Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans.
denied. The issue of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper
party to invoke the court’s power. Midwest Psychological Center, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of
Admin., 959 N.E.2d 896, 902-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Under our general
rule of standing, only those persons who have a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation and who show that they have suffered or are in immediate danger of suffering a
direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct will be found to have standing. Id.
at 903.
Our General Assembly has codified Indiana’s common law standing requirement
with respect to judicial review of Commission orders in I.C. § 8-1-3-1, which states that
“[a]ny person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, city, town, or
public utility adversely affected by any final decision, ruling, or order of the
[Commission] may . . . appeal to the court of appeals of Indiana [] under the same terms
and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions” (emphasis added). The IFA,
19
IG, and Lincolnland argue that neither the Utilities nor the Industrial Group has standing
because neither party has proven that it has or will be adversely affected by the
Commission’s order.
Our standard for “adversely affected” under I.C. § 8-1-3-1 is similar to the
“hardship” standard for ripeness. A party is “adversely affected” when it has sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of an order. Home
Builder’s Ass’n of Ind., Inc. v. Ind. Utility Reg. Comm’n, 544 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989). In their reply brief, the Utilities make two arguments with respect to the
Contract’s adverse effect: (1) an increase in gas bills caused by the Contract will impact
the Utilities’ ability to competitively retain customers; and (2) the Contract will impact
the Utilities’ ability to add new customers vis-à-vis alternative forms of energy such as
propane, geothermal, and electric, and thereby spread their fixed costs across a larger
customer base.
We have found that the imposition of the UMAs is inevitable. In light of this
finding, it is clear that the Utilities will be bound to use SNG and will not, as they allege,
have the freedom to choose from among alternative forms of energy. We conclude that
this consequence is sufficiently adverse to satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 8-1-3-1.
Likewise, as we stated above, the Industrial Group is in danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of the Contract. The Industrial Group will suffer direct harm if it
is subject to pass-through charges and if we find that those charges are not authorized
20
under the SNG Act. As a result, we conclude that the Industrial Group is adversely
affected by the Commission’s order and has standing to appeal.
C. Right to Appeal
The IFA, IG, and Lincolnland’s final challenge with respect to justiciability is that
the Industrial Group is not an entity that has a statutory right to appeal the Commission’s
order. I.C. § 8-1-3-1 provides that “[a]ny person, firm, association, corporation, limited
liability company, city, town, or public utility . . . may . . . appeal to the court of appeals
of Indiana.” The IFA, IG, and Lincolnland note that the Industrial Group is an “an ad hoc
collection of industrial transportation customers whose ‘membership’ has changed over
the course of these proceedings.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 23).
In United States Gypsum, Inc. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc., 735 N.E.2d 790, 793-94
(Ind. 2000), our supreme court described the evolution of industrial transportation
customers such as the entities that comprise the Industrial Group. It explained:
Historically, LDCs purchased both gas and transportation of that gas as a
single “bundled” product from interstate pipelines. Beginning in 1978,
Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [] took steps to
stimulate competition, leading interstate pipelines to offer transportation as
a separate service. This created a competitive market for the gas itself and
allowed customers to sell or “release” pipeline capacity that they did not
need. With these changes emerged interstate marketers who sell gas to
LDCs and large volume consumers. These large volume consumers are
known as transportation customers because they buy gas directly from the
marketer but rely on LDCs to provide local, intrastate pipeline
transportation.
Id. The Industrial Group here is comprised of such transportation customers— customers
who rely on LDCs for local, intrastate pipeline transportation.
21
On January 26, 2011, when the Industrial Group filed its original petition to
intervene, it was comprised of Arcelor Mittal USA, Eli Lilly & Company, and the United
States Steel Corporation. On December 12, 2011, it filed an amendment to Appendix A
of its petition to reflect the withdrawal of Eli Lilly & Company and the United States
Steel Corporation. On December 21, 2011, it filed a second amendment to Appendix A
to reflect the addition of Haynes International, Inc., Rochester Metal Products
Corporation, and Vertellus Specialties, Inc. Finally, on January 18, 2012, the Industrial
Group filed a third amendment to Appendix A to reflect the addition of Countrymark
Refining & Logistics, LLC and Corn Products International, Inc. The IFA and IG admit
that the Industrial Group most closely resembles an association, but point to the Industrial
Group’s amendments to Appendix A as evidence that it is merely “a collection of
whomever wants to participate in this case at any given time,” rather than an association.
(Appellee’s Br. p. 24).
The IFA and IG made the same argument before the Commission, and it was
rejected when the Commission noted that at least one member had remained in the group
from the start of the proceedings until the present. We agree and also find that the
Industrial Group has the qualities of an association. The IFA, IG, and Lincolnland cite
Hanson for the premise that an association is “formed by mutual consent for the purpose
of promoting a common enterprise or prosecuting a common objective.” Hanson v.
United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 n.5 (Ind. 1998). As the Industrial
Group asserts, at all points during the proceedings, its members have been industrial
22
transportation customers that purchase natural gas in the competitive interstate market
and rely on gas utilities only for local transportation services. Also at all points, its
members have shared the common objective of ensuring that they are not charged fees
under the Contract as retail end use customers. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Industrial Group is an association and has standing under I.C. § 8-1-3-1.
APPEAL
I. Jurisdiction
Next, we address the jurisdictional issue raised by the Utilities and the Citizens
Groups: whether the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the SNG Act when it
approved the Contract. The SNG Act provides that the IFA “shall submit a final
purchase contract to the [C]omission for approval.” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-14(b). The Act
defines a “purchase contract” as “a contract that: (1) is entered into by the [IFA] and a
producer of SNG for the sale and purchase of SNG; (2) has a thirty (30) year term; (3)
provides a guarantee of savings for retail end use customers; and (4) contains other terms
and conditions determined necessary by the [IFA].” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7. Citing I.C. § 4-4-
11.6-14(b) and the Act’s definition of “purchase contract,” the Utilities and the Citizens
Groups argue that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in approving the Contract
because the Contract omits essential terms, is not final, and is not a valid purchase
contract.
An agency action is always subject to review as contrary to law. U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
23
An agency’s decision is contrary to law when that agency fails to stay within its
jurisdiction and to abide by the statutory and legal principles that guide it. Citizens
Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986). The Commission, as an administrative
agency, “derives its power and authority solely from the statute, and unless a grant of
power and authority can be found in the statute, it must be concluded that there is none.”
Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc. v. Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, 715 N.E.2d 351, 354 n.3 (Ind. 1999).
This court owes no deference to the Commission’s interpretation of statutes that restrict
its regulatory jurisdiction and reviews such legal decisions de novo. U.S. Steel Corp.,
951 N.E.2d at 551. Any doubt about the existence of the Commission’s authority must
be resolved against a finding of such authority, and any act by the Commission in excess
of its statutory power is ultra vires and void. Planned Parenthood of Ind. v. Carter, 854
N.E.2d 853, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
The first step in any statutory interpretation is determining if the Legislature has
spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. If a statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face, no room exists for judicial construction. Thatcher v. City of
Kokomo, 962 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ind. 2012). However, when the language is susceptible
to more than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to judicial
interpretation. Id. When construing a statute, the Legislature’s definition of individual
words is binding upon us. Ind. Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Wolfe, 735 N.E.2d 1187,
1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. If the Legislature has not defined a word used
24
in a statute, the word will be given its “plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.” Planned
Parenthood of Ind., 854 N.E.2d at 866. Every word must be given effect and meaning,
and no part of the statute should be held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest
of the statute. Lex, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Town of Paragon, 808 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
The SNG Act provides that the IFA must submit a final purchase contract to the
Commission for approval. I.C. § 4-4-11.6-14(b). On its face, this provision is clear and
unambiguous—it grants the Commission the authority to approve a final purchase
contract. Significantly, though, this is the only provision in the SNG Act where the
Legislature has granted the Commission authority to approve a contract for the purchase
of SNG. We conclude therefore that, because an agency only has authority where
expressly granted, the Commission does not have authority to approve a contract that is
not a final purchase contract as defined in the statute. See Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 715
N.E.2d at 354 n.3.
The Utilities and the Citizens Groups make three arguments against the validity of
the Contract as a final purchase contract. First, they argue that the Contract does not
fulfill the common law requirements for an enforceable contract because it is missing
essential terms. Due to these same “missing” terms, as well as unexecuted related
agreements, they also argue that the Contract is not final. Lastly, they argue that the
Contract is not a purchase contract because it does not provide a guarantee of savings to
25
retail end use customers as required by the SNG Act’s definition of “purchase contract.”
See I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7.
A. Common Law Contract
According to to the SNG Act’s definition of “purchase contract,” a purchase
contract must, first and foremost, be a contract. See I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7 (stating “‘purchase
contract’ means a contract that . . . .”) (emphasis added). The existence of a contract is a
question of law, and the basic requirements of a contract are offer, acceptance,
consideration, and a “meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.” MH Equity
Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938 N.E.2d 750, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied (quoting Batchelor v. Batchelor, 853 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). A
valid and enforceable contract must also be reasonably definite and certain in its material
terms so that the intention of the parties may be ascertained. Conwell v. Gray Loon
Outdoor Marketing Group, Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2009). This court cannot
make a contract for the parties; nor are we at liberty to revise a contract or supply omitted
terms while professing to construe it. Zuckerman v. Montgomery, 945 N.E.2d 813, 819
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
The Utilities first argue that the Contract is missing material terms because it does
not include IG’s Subordination and Intercreditor Agreement (Subordination Agreement)
with the DOE, which will clarify IG’s financing obligations to the DOE. One of the key
mechanisms through which IG can satisfy the “Guaranty Savings Amount” under the
Contract is a sale of the Plant after the 30-year contract term. However, section 2.6(d) of
26
the Contract provides that the IFA may not sell the Plant without the DOE’s consent, “as
provided in the Subordination Agreement between IG and the DOE.” (Industrial Group’s
App. p. 320). Likewise, section 2.8 of the Contract provides that if there are any amounts
outstanding under the DOE’s financing agreement with IG, the IFA’s mortgage on the
Plant will be subordinated to the DOE’s mortgage. (Industrial Group’s App. pp. 321-22).
The Subordination Agreement is therefore relevant to the Contract but has not yet been
negotiated.
In determining whether terms of a contract are essential, “[a]ll that is required is
reasonable certainty in the terms and conditions of the promises made, including by
whom and to whom.” McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Johnson v. Sprague, 614 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). In the end, the
contract must “provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy.” Id.The Subordination Agreement is relevant to the Contract, but we conclude that it
is not an essential part of the Contract. Instead, we find that the Contract is complete
without the Subordination Agreement. As required by the common law standard for a
contract, it is clear who the parties to the Contract are, what promises they have made and
to whom, the basis for determining the existence of a breach, and appropriate remedies.
Although the mortgage for the Plant is collateral for the promises made under the
Contract, it is not necessary for us to know the terms of the Subordination Agreement to
know that IG is obligated to pay the IFA the Contract Savings Guaranty Amount,
27
regardless of whether the Contract identifies sufficient collateral. This conclusion should
not be construed to read that the Subordination Agreement is not material to the issues
presented in this case. The Agreement is material, but its materiality relates to whether
the Contract has fulfilled the “guaranteed savings” requirement under the SNG Act, not
to whether the Contract is a legally binding contract under our common law.
In addition, we do not find that the term “retail end use customer” is a “missing”
term simply because the parties disagree with its definition. The Utilities’ issue with the
term “retail end use customer” is not that the parties have omitted it or that it is
ambiguous, but merely that the Contract’s definition deviates from the statute’s definition
and that the scope of the term therefore needs to be negotiated. This argument relates to
the interpretation of the Contract, not its completeness. By extension, if we find that the
definition does in fact inappropriately deviate from the statute, that finding is relevant to
whether the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act, but is not relevant to our
determination of whether the Contract is legally enforceable under our common law. In
order to determine that the Contract is legally enforceable, we need only find that the
Contract contains its essential terms. This contract does contain the term “retail end use
customer,” and its definition is clear on its face, notwithstanding the issue of whether it
conforms to the SNG Act.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the term “retail end use customer” is
essential. Its inclusion clarifies from whom the IFA will receive the proceeds necessary
to pay for the SNG but does not alter the IFA’s obligation to pay. No matter how many
28
entities qualify as retail end use customers, and will therefore receive pass-through
charges under the Contract, the IFA must still pay the full price for the SNG. The terms
of the Contract are clear to us without identifying the entities qualifying as retail end use
customers.
Finally, we also find that there was a meeting of minds concerning the terms in the
Contract. It is clear from the record that the parties to the Contract—the IFA and IG—
have the same understanding of the Contract and its implications. It is merely the parties
to this appeal that do not have a meeting of minds with respect to the definition of the
terms. It would be ludicrous for us to hold that in order for a contract to be binding and
enforceable, parties outside of the contract must have the same interpretation of the
contract as the parties to the contract. We therefore find that the Contract meets the
common law definition of an enforceable contract.
B. Finality
In a related argument, the Utilities assert that because the Subordination
Agreement, the UMAs, and the scope of the term “retail end use customer” have not been
negotiated or clarified, the Contract is not final as required by I.C. § 4-4-11.6-14(b). It is
a well-settled rule that “a formal written contract, which seems to be complete, will be
presumed to be the repository of the final intentions of the parties, in regard to the
subject-matter of the agreement . . . .” Straub v. Terre Haute & L.R. Co., 35 N.E. 504,
506 (Ind. 1893). We have already found that the Contract is not missing any essential
terms, so based on Straub, we similarly conclude that it is final.
29
This finding is consistent with our determination that the SNG Act contemplates
that SNG production and delivery will require many independent contracts, rather than
one ultimate purchase contract. Because the Legislature addressed purchase contracts
and the UMAs in different provisions of the SNG Act, we conclude that the Contract may
be final even if related contracts such as the Subordination Agreement or the UMAs have
not yet been negotiated.
C. Savings Guarantee
Finally, the Utilities argue that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction when it
approved the Contract because the Contract failed to provide a guarantee of savings to
retail end use customers. See I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7. We disagree.8
The Utilities’ primary contention is that the Contract’s “Contract Savings
Guaranty” provision is illusory because even though it guarantees that the retail end use
customers will save $100 million under the Contract, the collateral for that promise is
insufficient. Pursuant to the Contract, there are three different mechanisms by which IG
may fulfill its $100 million guarantee: (1) it may pay any shortfall in cash; (2) extend the
Contract at a lower SNG price; or (3) allow the IFA to sell the Plant. The Utilities argue
that the first mechanism is insufficient because it assumes the Plant will be profitable and
that IG will have the funds to pay cash at the end of the Contract term. Likewise,
8
The IFA, IG, and Lincolnland ask us to find that the Utilities have waived this argument by failing to
raise it before the Commission. We decline to do so because it is clear from the record that the issue of
whether the Contract provides a guarantee of savings was raised and extensively argued before the
Commission.
30
extending the Contract up to an additional twenty years also assumes that the Plant will
be profitable and that such an extension will provide an opportunity for the IFA to make
up the shortfall. As to the third mechanism, the Utilities note that the Contract specifies
that the IFA may not receive proceeds from a forced sale of the Plant until the provisions
of the Subordination Agreement have been met. They claim that all of the proceeds from
such a sale might go to repay the $1.875 billion in financing from the DOE, rather than
the IFA. Alternatively, even if the IFA is eligible to receive proceeds from the sale of the
Plant, the Utilities assert that there is no assurance the Plant will be worth enough to
cover the savings shortfall.
As a subsidiary issue, the Utilities and the Citizens Groups also argue that the
Contract does not guarantee savings to retail end use customers because the collateral
listed in the Contract may not be realized until after the primary term. They argue that
when it enacted the SNG Act, the Legislature intended guaranteed savings to be provided
to retail end use customers throughout the term of a purchase contract, rather than at the
end of the contract’s term. The Utilities support this argument by noting that the SNG
Act specifies that a purchase contract is a contract that “provides” rather than “will
provide” a guarantee of savings. See I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7.
The SNG Act does not explicitly clarify whether a purchase contract guarantee of
savings must include evidence of collateral supporting the guarantee or whether the
guarantee must specify that retail end use customers will realize savings throughout the
primary term of a purchase contract. Accordingly, we will first interpret the Legislature’s
31
intention in providing for a “guarantee” of savings in the SNG Act, and then we will
interpret the Contract to decide whether the Contract complies with our interpretation of
the Legislature’s intent.
A. Interpretation of the SNG Act
Our primary issue is the Legislature’s meaning in its usage of the word
“guarantee.” According to the Utilities, “guarantee” means that retail end use customers
must realize savings and the Contract must therefore specify that there will be sufficient
collateral to ensure such savings. In response, the IFA, IG, Lincolnland, and the OUCC
contend that the Contract must merely provide an assurance—which they interpret as a
“promise”—of savings. According to the OUCC, “[the Utilities’ arguments] confuse the
actual guarantee of savings itself with the forms of collateral backing the guarantee that
exists in the Contract.” (the OUCC’s Br. p. 25). In light of the plain language of the
SNG Act, we agree with the IFA, IG, Lincolnland and the OUCC.
As stated previously, the first step in any statutory interpretation is determining if
the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.
Thatcher, 962 N.E.2d at 1227. If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, no room
exists for judicial construction. Id. However, when the language is susceptible to more
than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to judicial interpretation.
Id. When construing a statute, the Legislature’s definition of words is binding upon this
court. Wolfe, 735 N.E.2d at 1191. If the Legislature has not defined a word used in a
statute, we will give the word its “plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.” Planned
32
Parenthood of Ind., 854 N.E.2d at 866. We must give every word effect and meaning,
and we will not hold any part of the statute meaningless if it can be reconciled with the
rest of the statute. Lex, Inc., 808 N.E.2d at 109.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “guarantee” as “[t]he assurance that a contract or
legal act will be duly carried out.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (8th ed. 2004). Black’s
further defines “assurance” as “[s]omething that gives confidence; the state of being
confident or secure.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 135 (8th ed. 2004). This definition is
akin to a “promise” that the contract will be carried out, rather than a requirement for
security or collateral. In other words, IG was only required to promise that retail end use
customers will realize savings throughout the term; it was not required to provide proof
of collateral to ensure fulfillment of that promise.
Turning to the issue of whether the Legislature intended a purchase contract to
guarantee savings throughout the purchase contract's term, we reject the Utilities’
analysis of the verb tense used in I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7. The SNG Act defines a purchase
contract as a contract that: “provides a guarantee of savings for retail end use
customers.” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-7. The Utilities point to the verb “provides” and argue that
because it is present tense, as opposed to the future tense “will provide,” the Legislature
intended savings to be realized throughout the contract’s term. However, we conclude
that “provides” modifies the word “guarantee” rather than “savings.” Thus, although it is
clear that the Legislature intended a purchase contract to provide a guarantee during the
33
term of a purchase contract, it is not clear whether the Legislature intended retail end use
customers to realize savings during the same term.
As the remainder of the SNG Act is silent with respect to when retail end use
customers must realize guaranteed savings, and this is a critical issue to our analysis, we
will engage in judicial construction in order to determine the Legislature’s intent. In the
SNG Act, the Legislature expressly indicated that one of its primary goals was that gas
prices should be reasonable as a result of an SNG purchase contract. In particular, the
Legislature found that “[t]he furnishing of reliable supplies of reasonably priced natural
gas for sales to retail customers is essential for the well being of the people of Indiana”
and “obtaining low cost financing for the construction of new coal gasification facilities
is necessary to allow retail end use customers to enjoy the benefits of a reliable,
reasonably priced, and long term energy supply.” I.C. § 4-4-11.6-12 (emphasis added).
The Legislature also implied that one impetus for encouraging SNG production contracts
was to mitigate price volatility because “[n]atural gas prices are volatile, and energy
utilities have been unable to mitigate completely the effects of the volatility.” See I.C. §
4-4-11.6-12.
Based on these expressed goals, we interpret the SNG Act in a manner consistent
with ensuring that SNG prices will be reasonable and will mitigate the otherwise volatile
nature of the natural gas market. See Wolfe, 735 N.E.2d at 1191 (“[W]e presume the
Legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the
statute’s underlying policy and goals.”). Therefore, we find that the Legislature intended
34
retail end use customers to be guaranteed savings throughout the term of an SNG
purchase contract. If we were to decide that a purchase contract could merely guarantee
savings after its primary term, it is possible that retail end use customers could endure
substantial losses for thirty years or more before finally realizing savings in the form of
one lump sum. Such a result would be contrary to our Legislature’s goal of providing
energy at reasonable prices and mitigating the volatile natural gas market.
B. Contract Interpretation
Mindful of our interpretation of the SNG Act, we now turn to the Contract to
determine whether it conforms to our construction of the Legislature’s intended meaning
when it provided for a “guaranteed savings to retail end use customers.” We conclude
that it does.
Under the terms of the Contract, it is clear that IG made a promise that retail end
use customers will realize savings throughout the Contract’s primary term. Section 2.5 of
the Contract provides that “[o]ver the course of the Primary Term, [IG] guarantees that
[the IFA] will realize the Contract Savings Guaranty Amount.” (Industrial Group’s App.
p. 157). The Contract then defines “Contract Savings Guaranty Amount” as:
the aggregate savings guaranteed by [IG] to [the IFA] under [the Contract],
which is equal to One Hundred Million Dollars ($100,000,000) in real 2008
dollars, from [the IFA’s] purchase of [c]onforming SNG pursuant to [the
Contract] over the Primary Term and any Shortfall Term . . .
(Industrial Group’s App. p. 207). This provision promises that there will be savings in
the amount of $100 million and that the savings will be realized “over the course of the
[p]rimary [t]erm.” (Industrial Group’s App. p. 207). Thus, we conclude that the Contract
35
contains IG’s promise to provide savings to retail end use customers and its promise that
the savings would be realized throughout the primary term of the Contract. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Commission did not exceed its statutory jurisdiction when it
approved the Contract.9
II. Retail End Use Customer
The petition filed by the IFA and IG requested Commission approval of the
Contract that the two parties had entered into. The petition also requested Commission
approval, if necessary, requiring Indiana regulated energy utilities to enter into a UMA
with the IFA.
However, in the November 22, 2011 Order, the Commission did not make any
ruling on the merits of the issue raised concerning the definition of “retail end use
customers.” The Commission approved the SNG Contract but declined to address the
merits of the proposed UMAs.
While the Commission did not address the issue raised of the meaning of “retail
end use customers,” the Contract’s terms deviates from the SNG Act’s definition.
Accordingly, we will address whether the Contract’s term “retail end use customers”
inappropriately deviated from the SNG Act’s definition.
The SNG Act defines “retail end use customer” as:
a customer who acquires energy at retail for the customer’s own
consumption: (1) from a gas utility that must apply to the [C]ommission
9
Because we have concluded that IG was not required to prove that its collateral was sufficient to support
its guarantee, we will not further address whether the Contract appropriately limited the Plant’s CO2 costs.
36
under [I.C. §] 8-1-2-42 for approval of gas cost changes; or (2) under a
program approved by the [C]ommission through which the customer
purchases gas that would be subject to price adjustments under [I.C. §] 8-1-
2-42 if the gas were sold by a gas utility.
I.C. § 4-4-11.6-10. None of the parties argue that industrial transportation customers
acquire energy at retail from gas utilities, as would satisfy the first prong of the
definition, so the only issue we must consider is whether industrial transportation
customers receive energy under a program approved by the Commission through which
they purchase gas that would be subject to price adjustments under I.C. § 8-1-2-41 if the
gas were sold by a gas utility.
Industrial practice distinguishes between two types of natural gas consumers:
“industrial transportation” customers and “sales” customers. It equates “sales” customers
with retail end use customers falling under the first prong of the SNG Act’s definition.
“Sales” customers purchase a full-service product from gas utilities. Under this
arrangement, the gas utility is responsible for purchasing the gas, nominating and
scheduling the deliveries of the gas, addressing imbalances, and hedging the purchase
price of the commodity for the “sales” customer. In contrast, “industrial transportation”
customers hold full responsibility for purchasing the gas as well as nominating and
scheduling the deliveries of gas. They are responsible for any imbalances between the
quantities nominated and scheduled for receipt and delivery and actual quantities
received and delivered on both the interstate and gas utility systems. Interstate pipelines
and gas utilities generally have no obligation to provide gas to the gas utilities’ city-gate,
or if there is a failure of the supply upstream, to deliver the gas to transportation
37
customers. In effect, the gas utility is simply a transporter of the transportation
customer’s gas.
Likewise, there is also a difference in the way that transportation customers and
sales customers are charged. Sales customers are billed in a separate charge by the gas
utility, referred to as a Gas Cost Adjustment (GCA) charge, which is a weighted average
rate applicable to all gas utility retail customers. Transportation customers pay their
suppliers for the cost of natural gas based on individual negotiations between the
transporter and gas supplier. Charges to the transportation customer are based on a
number of factors, including a market-based commodity only charge, a charge with both
a commodity and a reservation charge, and a charge reflecting both gas costs and
transportation costs to the gas utility if the gas supplier provides delivery service into the
gas utility on behalf of the transportation customer. Transportation customers then pay
gas utilities for transportation services according to tariffs approved by the Commission
under I.C. § 8-1-2-87.7.
Based on these differences between sales customers and industrial transportation
customers, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to include transportation
customers within the definition of “retail end use customer.” First, transportation
customers do not purchase energy through a program approved by the Commission.
Although transportation customers pay gas utilities for transportation services based on a
tariff system approved by the Commission, the gas utility tariffs do not require the
Commission to examine and approve the commodity purchase contracts between the
38
transportation customers and the third-party marketers and suppliers. See I.C. § 8-1-2-
87.7. Second, the transportation customers do not necessarily purchase energy that
would be subject to price adjustments under I.C. § 8-1-2-42 if the gas were sold by a gas
utility. The price adjustments governed by I.C. § 8-1-2-42 are public utility rate
schedules. See I.C. § 8-1-2-42. Because transportation customers purchase energy on the
open market, the price is not governed by rate schedules. Martin J. Marz (Marz), an
energy advisor, testified that transportation customers will pay their suppliers for the cost
of natural gas based on individual negotiations. The charge may be calculated in a
variety of ways. As stated above, the charge could be a market-based commodity only
charge, a charge with both a commodity and a reservation, or a charge reflecting both gas
and transportation costs. Accordingly, the energy that transportation customers purchase
would not necessarily be subject to price adjustments if the gas were sold by a gas utility.
Instead, the second prong of the definition of “retail end use customer” more
appropriately applies to energy customers such as those that purchase energy through
programs approved by the Commission under the Alternative Utility Regulation Act. See
I.C. § 8-1-2.5-1. One such example is the Northern Indiana Public Service Company’s
(NIPSCO) customer choice tariff. Marz testified that users of this program may choose
to obtain its gas from a NIPSCO pre-approved list of gas suppliers. Once the customer
has chosen a preferred supplier, however, the customer is not responsible for nominating
and scheduling deliveries or for any balancing-related charges or penalties. In this
respect, a customer under this program fits the mold of a traditional “sales” customer.
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In light of this distinction, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend
industrial transportation customers, who utilize gas utilities only for their transportation
services, to be subject to the SNG Act as retail end use customers. Thus, we find that the
Contract’s definition of “retail end use customer” deviated from the statutory definition.
We reverse the Commission’s regulatory approval of the Contract.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) the Utilities and the Industrial
Group’s claims are justiciable; (2) the Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction when it
approved the Contract; and (3) the Contract’s definition of retail end use customer
inappropriately included industrial transportation customers, even though the Legislature
did not intend industrial transportation customers to be subject to the SNG Act as retail
end use customers. We reverse the Commission’s order approving the Contract.
Reversed.
DARDEN, S. J. concurs
ROBB, C. J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion
40
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
INDIANA GAS COMPANY, INC, and )
SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS AND )
ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al,. )
)
Appellants-Respondents, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1112-EX-1141
)
INDIANA FINANCE AUTHORITY and )
INDIANA GASIFICATION, LLC, )
)
Appellees-Respondents. )
ROBB, Chief Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part
I concur in all but the final disposition of the well-considered opinion of the
majority in this case. The majority reverses the Commission’s regulatory approval of the
Contract because the definition of “retail end use customer” in the Contract deviates from the
statutory definition. I do not believe reversal of the Commission’s approval of the Contract in its
entirety is necessary.
The Commission has the authority to approve a final purchase contract so far as the contract
comports with the statutory requirements of the SNG Act. See Ind. Code § 4-4-11.6-14. As noted by the
41
majority, the Contract at issue does comport with the statute but for the provision which includes
transportation customers within the Contract’s definition of retail end use customers. It is this inclusion
which renders the Contract definition of “retail end use customers” incompatible with the statutory
definition.
As a general proposition, a contract made in violation of a statute is void and unenforceable.
Jaehnen v. Booker, 806 N.E.2d 31, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. However, if a contract contains
an unauthorized provision that can be eliminated without frustrating the basic purpose of the contract, the
remainder of the contract may be enforced. Harbour v. Arelco, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. 1997)
(holding that if remainder of car rental contract had conformed with statutory requirements, the inclusion
of a provision for recovery of attorney fees not authorized by statute would not have rendered entire
contract invalid because the primary purpose of the contract would not be frustrated by eliminating that
provision). Because the transportation customers are an easily identifiable group, I believe we could
merely exclude that part of the Contract which includes transportation customers in the definition of retail
end use customers without frustrating the primary purpose of the Contract. Accordingly, I would hold,
with the exclusion of that part of the Contract definition of retail end use customers which applies to
transportation customers, that the Contract was properly approved by the Commission.
42