George Powells v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
FILED
Oct 17 2012, 9:29 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
MICHAEL R. FISHER CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
Marion County Public Defender Agency tax court
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
GEORGE POWELLS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1204-CR-255
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Carol J. Orbison, Judge
The Honorable Anne Flannelly, Commissioner
Cause No. 49G22-1105-FC-34769
October 17, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
George Powells appeals his conviction and sentence for battery as a class C
felony. Powells raises two issues, which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the court abused its discretion in excluding certain
evidence; and
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.
We affirm.
The relevant facts follow. Stashia Parson had dated Powells for four years, and
their relationship ended in February or March of 2011. Parson started dating Jeffrey
Hayes and their relationship became more serious in the week prior to May 13, 2011.
At approximately 6:15 a.m. on May 13, 2011, Hayes walked Parson to his car
which was parked in front of Parson’s apartment to take her to work. Hayes opened the
passenger door for Parson, and, as Hayes walked around to the driver’s side of his
vehicle, Powells pulled his vehicle up to within about two feet of Hayes’s vehicle and
stated “how you doing, buddy” and “you don’t remember me.” Transcript at 82. Hayes
responded that he did not remember Powells, and Powells said “I’m George” and “you
disrespected me.” Id. at 83. Hayes stated that he was on his way to work and attempted
to enter his car. Powells then pulled his vehicle up next to Hayes’s car in such a manner
so as to block Hayes from leaving. Powells exited his vehicle, walked around to the
passenger side of his vehicle, reached into the passenger seat area, and pulled out a steel
or iron pipe which was about one and one-half to two feet in length and about one inch
thick. Powells started to approach Hayes with the pipe, Hayes threw his hands up to
defend himself, and Powells struck Hayes on the head. Hayes turned to run down the
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sidewalk, Powells chased Hayes down the street, Hayes turned around to stop Powells
from hitting him, and both men fell to the ground. Powells continued to strike Hayes
with the pipe on Hayes’s head, arm, and knee, and Hayes attempted to block the blows.
Powells eventually stood up and struck Hayes one more time. Powells then stated “are
you going to shoot me now?” Id. at 88. Powells walked away from Hayes and, as he
walked past Parson, stated “Now go get your bitch-ass friend off the ground.” Id. at 122.
Powells entered his vehicle and drove away, and Parson called the police. Hayes felt
blood running down from his head and his blood was on the sidewalk and grass. Hayes
sustained a number of injuries, including to his left arm, the left side of his face, his left
eye which had swollen shut, the top of his head, his left knee, and his right calf.
On May 18, 2011, the State charged Powells with battery as a class C felony. A
jury trial was held on February 23, 2012. Prior to the start of trial on that day, the State
filed a motion in limine requesting that the court exclude any evidence that Hayes
allegedly threatened to kill Powells several months before the charged crime, and the
court granted the State’s motion. In addition, prior to the start of trial, Powells filed a
motion in limine requesting that the court exclude any evidence of his prior convictions
or arrests and any evidence that Hayes made statements in his recorded statement given
to police officers that he thought Powells was trying to kill him, and the court granted
Powells’s requests. During the jury trial, Powells made an offer of proof regarding
Hayes’s alleged threat addressed in the State’s motion in limine. Following arguments by
the parties, the court denied Powells’s request that evidence of the alleged threat be
admitted. The jury found Powells guilty as charged.
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At sentencing, the court found the nature and circumstances of the offense, the fact
that Powells had repeated contact with the criminal justice system for thirty-four years,
and his prior convictions to be aggravating factors, and the court found that Powells’s
suggested mitigating factors that he would respond affirmatively to probation and was
willing to make restitution should be given little weight. The court also noted that it
would not consider the prior causes of battery and murder charges for which Powells had
been found not guilty. The court sentenced Powells to eight years to be served in the
Department of Correction.
I.
The first issue is whether the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of
Hayes’s alleged threat. Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission or
exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134
(Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind.
1997), reh’g denied. “Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be
disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Fleener
v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
Powells argues that the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of his
claim of self-defense. Specifically, Powells asserts that Hayes had previously threatened
to kill him and that evidence of the threat supported his claim of self-defense. Powells
argues that the court sustained the State’s motion in limine to exclude the evidence of
Hayes’s threats “apparently on the basis that the threats were remote in time from the
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date of the alleged offense” and that “[t]his ruling is not grounded in logic because there
is no reason why a threat made two months before would pose any less a threat, or why it
would have any less impact on a defendant’s state of mind, than one made the day
before.” Appellant’s Brief at 9.
Self-defense requires reasonable apprehension of harm by the defendant. Brand v.
State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied. When a
defendant claims that he acted in self-defense, evidence legitimately tending to support
his theory is admissible. Id. Evidence of the victim’s character may be admitted to show
that the victim had a violent character giving the defendant reason to fear him. Id. (citing
Holder v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. 1991)). The victim’s reputation for
violence is pertinent to a claim of self-defense. Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d
574, 576 (Ind. 1997)). The victim’s “reputed character, propensity for violence, prior
threats and acts, if known by the defendant, may be relevant to the issue of whether a
defendant had fear of the victim prior to utilizing deadly force against him” and “a
defendant is entitled to support his claim of self-defense by introducing evidence of
matters that would make his fear of the victim reasonable.” Id. “However, the evidence
introduced by a defendant to show his apprehension of the victim must imply a
propensity for violence on the part of the victim.” Id. (citing Davis v. State, 481 N.E.2d
387, 390 (Ind. 1985)). However, importantly, before such evidence may be admitted, the
defendant must first introduce “appreciable evidence of the victim’s aggression to
substantiate the claim of self-defense.” Id. (citing Holder, 571 N.E.2d at 1254) (“If the
defendant wishes to introduce either type of character evidence, [the defendant] must first
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introduce appreciable evidence of the victim’s aggression to substantiate the self-defense
claim”)).
Here, prior to the start of trial the State filed a motion in limine requesting that the
court exclude any evidence that Hayes allegedly threatened to kill Powells several
months before the charged crime, Powells argued that the evidence was relevant to his
claim of self-defense, the State argued that the evidence did not constitute appreciable
evidence of self-defense, and the court granted the State’s motion. At trial, Powells made
an offer of proof related to the court’s ruling. Powells’s counsel argued that, based on
deposition testimony and in a statement given to police by Hayes, Hayes “appeared at []
Powells’ residence sometime between . . . late February to May at some point, that he
showed up at . . . Powells’ house, to speak to [] Parson” and that “[t]he evidence would
show that at that time [] Hayes and [] Powells had a verbal argument and that during that
time there were things said back and forth that were – that [] Hayes, I don’t think would
be testifying to in terms of the specific threats made, but I believe that there were threats
made to [] Powells from [] Hayes.” Transcript at 35. The court asked “[a]nd what were
those threats,” and defense counsel responded “I will kill you.” Id. The court asked
“And this happened on one occasion sometime between late February and May?” and the
prosecutor responded “Hayes would testify that this happened somewhere actually
around – somewhere March or April, that time frame, one occasion” and “[h]e would not
be testifying that he threatened to kill anybody.” Id. at 35-36. Powells’s counsel argued
“[t]hat’s the part that is vague in terms of what [] Hayes would say,” “[b]ut to go a little
further, [] Hayes was not invited to [] Powells’ residence” and “[h]e showed up
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unannounced and had – somehow had knowledge of [] Powells’s residence address.” Id.
at 36.
The prosecutor argued that Powells was unable to show that the testimony
regarding Hayes’s alleged threat constituted appreciable evidence of self-defense.
Powells argued that excluding testimony of the specific event which led to Powells’s
state of mind of being in fear or in real or apparent danger in essence prevented him from
presenting his self-defense claim. The court then stated: “The date of this alleged
incident is May 13, 2011, and the State is indicating that the alleged victim was at the
defendant’s residence on one occasion in March or April” and that “the Court denies the
defendant’s request to reconsider the State’s motion in limine.” Id. at 38.
According to the argument of Powells’s counsel, the evidence or testimony which
Powells sought to introduce related to an alleged threat by Hayes that he would kill
Powells. The State indicated that the argument during which Powells asserted that the
threat was made occurred in March or April 2011 and that Hayes would not testify that he
threatened to kill Powells. The record does not reveal appreciable evidence of Hayes’s
aggression to substantiate the claim of self defense on May 13, 2011. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in excluding the
testimony regarding Hayes’s alleged previous statement or that the exclusion deprived
Powells of due process of law. See Holder, 571 N.E.2d at 1254 (providing that “[i]f the
defendant wishes to introduce either type of character evidence, [the defendant] must first
introduce appreciable evidence of the victim’s aggression to substantiate the self-defense
claim” and concluding that the exclusion of testimony regarding the victim’s character
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did not deprive the defendant of the due process of law); see also Brooks, 683 N.E.2d at
576-577 (holding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of specific
instances of the victim’s conduct).
II.
The next issue is whether Powells’s sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B) provides that this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule,
the burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Powells argues that the maximum sentence imposed by the court was not
appropriate, that there was nothing about the crime committed that would justify a
sentence beyond the advisory sentence, and that his criminal history and general
character provide no basis for imposing the maximum sentence. Powells further argues
that his criminal activity consists of five misdemeanor convictions for relatively minor
offenses, that although a record of arrests may be properly considered the information
must be placed in the proper context, that it was not clear how the court considered the
cases for which no charges were filed or for which the charges were dismissed.1
With respect to the nature of the offense, the record reveals that Powells attacked
Hayes in the early morning while Hayes was walking Powells’s former girlfriend to the
1
As previously mentioned, at sentencing the trial court noted that it would not consider the
causes of battery and murder charges for which Powells had been found not guilty.
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car. After an initial verbal confrontation with Hayes, Powells blocked Hayes from
driving away, reached into his vehicle for a steel or iron pipe, struck Hayes in the head,
and then chased him down the street. Powells struck Hayes on his head, arm, and knee,
and Hayes attempted to block the blows. Powells sustained a number of injuries due to
the attack.
With respect to the character of the offender, the presentence investigation report
(the “PSI”) indicates that Hayes reported that Powells tried to kill him and that Hayes
would like for Powells to serve time in a secure facility because he felt that Powells
would try to kill him if he is released to the community. The PSI discloses that Powells
was convicted of disorderly conduct in 1978, of “FL SP PREF ST WARR 3” and
disorderly conduct in 1981, possession of marijuana in 1987, possession of
marijuana/hash/synthetic cannibinoid in 2001, and carrying a handgun without a license
in 2005. PSI at 4. The PSI also discloses that Powells was charged with burglary,
battery, and carrying a handgun without a license in 2003, strangulation, battery, and
domestic battery in 2007, criminal recklessness and resisting law enforcement in 2008,
and battery, criminal confinement, and intimidation in 2010, but that each of these
charges were ultimately dismissed due to the absence or the inability to locate essential
witnesses.
After due consideration and under the circumstances, we cannot say that Powells’s
sentence of eight years is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Powells’s conviction and sentence for battery
as a class C felony.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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