Jeremy Lamar Lloyd v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARCE GONZALEZ, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
FILED
Indianapolis, Indiana
Aug 31 2012, 9:19 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
JEREMY LAMAR LLOYD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 45A04-1202-CR-79
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Clarence D. Murray, Judge
Cause No. 45G02-1108-FB-85 and 45G02-1109-FB-87
August 31, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Jeremy Lamar Lloyd (“Lloyd”) appeals his sentences for two counts of burglary1 as
Class C felonies contending the trial court erred in finding the nature and circumstances of
his crimes were aggravating factors and that his aggregate sentence is inappropriate.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lloyd committed two residential burglaries in Lake County, Indiana in August of
2011. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lloyd pleaded guilty to the two burglaries. At
sentencing, the trial court listed as aggravating circumstances the following:
1. The defendant has an extensive history of juvenile adjudications and a
felony conviction. The defendant was convicted in this Court of Robbery, a
Class C Felony and violated the probation component of the sentence.
2. The Court finds the nature and circumstances of the crime to be a
significant aggravating factor in that in both cases the defendant also admits to
having committed the offenses of Burglary as set forth in the Stipulated
Factual Basis. Also, there are multiple offenses being pleaded to and
committed within thirty days of each other.
Appellant’s Br. at 9. The trial court identified Lloyd’s admission of guilt and expression of
remorse as mitigating circumstances and sentenced Lloyd to seven years for each of the
burglaries and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of
fourteen years.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The trial court did not explain why it found the nature and circumstances of Lloyd’s
two burglaries to be an aggravating factor, and nothing in the record supports the conclusion
that either of the burglaries was egregious in nature. The State contends that the trial court
1
See Ind. Code. § 35-43-2-1.
2
was referring to proximity of the offenses in its reference to the nature and circumstances of
the crime, and argues that such proximity is a valid aggravator. We agree. At sentencing, the
trial court identified the nature and circumstances of the crimes as a significant aggravating
factor “in that we have two burglaries committed within thirty days of each other. Multiple
offenses.” Tr. at 30-31.
Moreover, were we to hold that the trial court erred in finding the nature and
circumstances of Lloyd’s offenses was an aggravating circumstance, such error was harmless
because we are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence without
the improper aggravator. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). The
record clearly indicates that the trial court was concerned with Lloyd’s escalating criminal
history calling it “horrendous” for a person his age. Tr. at 29. The trial court told Lloyd at
sentencing, “You are a danger to the community without a doubt and I just don’t think you’re
getting it.” Id. at 29-30. A single aggravating circumstance is sufficient to support enhanced
and consecutive sentences. See Thorne v. State, 687 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Lloyd also argues that his aggregate sentence is inappropriate and asks this court to
revise it pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) which provides that a court “may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Assuming without deciding that the nature of Lloyd’s offenses was not
extraordinary, we find that Lloyd’s aggregate sentence is not inappropriate in light of Lloyd’s
character as disclosed by his extensive criminal history. Lloyd had juvenile adjudications for
3
auto theft, criminal trespass, resisting law enforcement, and fleeing law enforcement. As an
adult, he was convicted of robbery as a Class C felony, for which he was on probation when
he committed the two burglaries at issue here.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MAY, J., concur.
4