Clinton Davis v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CLINTON DAVIS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
May 09 2012, 9:25 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
CLINTON DAVIS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A05-1110-CR-547
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Rudolph R. Pyle, III, Judge
Cause No. 48D01-9502-CF-67
May 9, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Clinton Davis, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his fourth motion to
correct erroneous sentence. Because Davis’s argument requires consideration of matters
beyond the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence was
not the appropriate vehicle for Davis to use. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly denied his fourth motion.
Facts and Procedural History1
In 1996, Davis was convicted of three counts of Class A felony attempted murder,
Class D felony criminal recklessness, and two counts of Class D felony resisting law
enforcement. The only sentences at issue on appeal are Davis’s attempted-murder
sentences. The trial court sentenced Davis to forty years for each attempted murder
conviction and ran two of them consecutively and the third concurrently. Thus, the trial
court sentenced Davis to eighty years for these three convictions. The record indicates
that the trial court found the following aggravators: “the location of the first attempted
murder was a church, some of the intended victims were police officers, and defendant’s
post-conviction attitude – lack of remorse, implied threats to the Probation Department,
and blaming the victim.” Appellant’s App. p. 9 (CCS); see also id. at 17 (sentencing
order).
1
Although this case has a lengthy and complicated procedural history, the only documents Davis
includes in his appendix are the CCS from the trial court and his original 1996 sentencing order. Davis
includes neither any of this Court’s previous opinions or orders nor any of the motions or orders from the
courts below. Notably, Davis fails to include the very motion to correct erroneous sentence from which
he now appeals. This failure has made it extremely difficult for us to construct the facts and procedural
history of this case.
2
Davis belatedly appealed, and we affirmed the trial court in a memorandum
decision. Davis v. State, No. 48A02-9703-CR-179 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1998). Our
Supreme Court denied transfer.
Davis then sought post-conviction review, which the court denied. Davis
appealed, and we affirmed the post-conviction court in a memorandum decision. Davis v.
State, 48A02-0402-PC-191 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2004). Our Supreme Court again
denied transfer.
Davis, pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence in September 2007
which, according to the short CCS entry, challenged his consecutive sentencing.
Appellant’s App. p. 13 (CCS). The trial court denied the motion. Id. (CCS). Davis
appealed, but we dismissed it because Davis failed to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed. Davis v. State, 48A02-0712-PC-1155 (Ind. Ct. App. July 7, 2008).
Davis, pro se, filed a second motion to correct erroneous sentence in September
2008. The CCS does not reveal the nature of Davis’s challenge this time. The trial court
denied this motion. Appellant’s App. p. 14 (CCS). Davis appealed, but we dismissed the
appeal with prejudice because Davis failed to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed. Davis v. State, No. 48A02-0807-PC-648 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2009).
Davis, pro se, filed a third motion to correct erroneous sentence in July 2009.
Appellant’s App. p. 15 (CCS). Again, the CCS does not reveal the nature of Davis’s
challenge. The trial court denied the motion, and we dismissed the appeal with prejudice.
Davis v. State, 48A02-0905-CR-382 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009).
3
In September 2011, Davis, pro se, filed a fourth motion to correct erroneous
sentence. Appellant’s App. p. 16 (CCS). As explained above, Davis did not include this
motion in his appendix. The trial court denied the motion. Id. (CCS).
Davis now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Davis appeals the trial court’s denial of his fourth motion to correct erroneous
sentence. The State responds that because the alleged sentencing errors are not clear
from the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence was the
wrong vehicle in which to bring this claim.
An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to
correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not
render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written
notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his
counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion
to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of
law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15; see also Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008). The
purpose of this statute “is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal
process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State,
805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a motion to correct
sentence may only be filed to address a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Neff, 888
N.E.2d at 1251 (citing Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786). Claims that require consideration
of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion
to correct sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Sentencing errors that are not facially
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apparent must be addressed via direct appeal or post-conviction relief. Neff, 888 N.E.2d
at 1251. In addition, a motion to correct erroneous sentence may only arise out of
information contained on the formal judgment of conviction, not from the abstract of
judgment. Id.
The gist of Davis’s argument on appeal is that the “enhancements and consecutive
sentences [for his attempted murder convictions] are not based on principles of
rehabilitation or the nonviolent nature of the defendant as required by Article 1 Sections
16 and 18 of the Constitution of Indiana, and they are not authorized by statute.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 3. This argument, however, falls plainly outside the parameters of
Section 35-38-1-15. Resolution of this issue requires us to go beyond the face of the
formal judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786-87 (noting that a
claim that the trial court imposed the maximum sentence in partial reliance upon
improper aggravators was not appropriate for a motion to correct sentence). Because the
motion to correct erroneous sentence was not the appropriate vehicle for Davis to use,2
the trial court properly denied his fourth motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
2
As detailed above, Davis has already unsuccessfully sought a direct appeal and post-conviction
relief. And he has unsuccessfully tried, for four times now, to challenge his sentence. It appears that his
only avenue of relief at this point is a successive petition for post-conviction relief.
5