Timothy J. Canfield v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Jun 28 2012, 8:33 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
LEANNA WEISSMANN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TIMOTHY J. CANFIELD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 15A01-1112-CR-576
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jonathan N. Cleary, Judge
Cause No. 15D01-0808-FB-8
June 28, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Timothy J. Canfield appeals the trial court’s imposition of 730 days of his
previously suspended sentence following the revocation of his probation. Canfield raises
a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered him to serve 730 days of his previously suspended sentence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 28, 2009, Canfield pleaded guilty to burglary, as a Class B felony.
Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Canfield to ten years, with eight
years suspended to supervised probation. On June 16, 2010, the State charged Canfield
with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. As a result of
the June 2010 charge, the trial court revoked one year of Canfield’s previously suspended
sentence, but the court permitted him to serve six months of that one year on in-home
detention.
As part of Canfield’s in-home detention, he was required to contact the
Southeastern Regional Community Corrections Program (“SERCC”) if he left work early
and when he arrived home from work. Canfield was also required to return directly to his
residence if he left work or was released from work early. He began his in-home
detention on May 5, 2011.
Less than two months later, on July 1, 2011, SERCC worker Kayla Skipton was in
Greendale at about 2:55 in the afternoon checking on another probationer when her
scanner picked up the signal from Canfield’s ankle bracelet. Canfield later testified that
he had passed out at work from heat exhaustion and went to his sister’s house in
2
Greendale to borrow money so he could see a doctor. Canfield never saw a doctor, and
his employer testified that he did not recall Canfield getting sick that day and that no one
had reported Canfield having passed out at work.
The State filed its notice of probation violation on July 14, 2011. Canfield
admitted to the violation. In determining Canfield’s sanction, the court noted that he had
been given an opportunity to serve most of his sentence through alternatives to
incarceration despite the seriousness of the underlying offense. The court also noted that
this was Canfield’s second probation violation. The court then ordered him to serve 730
days of his previously suspended sentence. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Canfield appeals the court’s order that he serve 730 days of his previously
suspended sentence. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation
rather than incarceration, “the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. 2007). If this discretion were not
given to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges
might be less inclined to order probation. Id. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing
decision for a probation violation is reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.
Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. If a trial court finds that a person has violated
his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part
of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-
3(g).
3
Here, Canfield argues that the trial court abused its discretion because “his
violation was minor” and the “exact facts of this violation were disputed.” Appellant’s
Br. at 7. Insofar as Canfield’s argument on appeal is based on facts not favorable to the
judgment, we will not consider his argument. And Canfield’s argument that his violation
was “minor” ignores the whole point of in-home detention.
Probation, including placement in an in-home detention program, is a matter of
grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Cox. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547,
549 (Ind. 1999). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Canfield to
serve 730 days of his previously suspended eight years. Canfield admitted to violating
SERCC’s rules when he left work without informing SERCC and without proceeding
directly to his residence. This was his second violation of his probation within one year.
And he violated SERCC’s rules less than two months after having been given a second
chance following his first probation violation. The court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
4