Edmond D. Martin v. State of Indiana ex rel. Ronald Jordan, Union County Prosecuting Attorney and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
Apr 03 2012, 8:59 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
TYLER D. HELMOND GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Voyles, Zahn & Paul Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
KATHY BRADLEY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EDMOND D. MARTIN, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 81A04-1112-MI-691
)
STATE OF INDIANA ex rel. RONALD )
JORDAN, UNION COUNTY PROSECUTING )
ATTORNEY AND THE INDIANA BUREAU )
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, )
)
Appellees-Defendants. )
APPEAL FROM THE UNION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Matthew R. Cox, Judge
Cause No. 81C01-1112-MI-250
April 3, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge.
Appellant-Petitioner Edmond Martin appeals following the trial court’s denial of his
petition for judicial review in which he sought to invalidate his driver’s license suspension on
grounds of improper notice. Upon appeal, Martin contends that this lack of proper notice
violated a statutory requirement and his due process rights and that there was insufficient
evidence to support certain of the trial court’s findings. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 2002, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) recorded two
addresses for Martin: 3665 Jobe Road, Brownsville, Indiana, 47325; and Route 1, Box 27,
Brownsville, Indiana, 47325. On May 15, 2008, the Marion Superior Court entered
judgments against Martin for the traffic violations of speeding and driving while suspended.
On March 18, 2009, the BMV sent notice to Martin at his Jobe Road address that his license
would be suspended from April 21, 2009 to April 19, 2019 for being a habitual traffic
violator.
On December 6, 2011, Martin filed a petition for judicial review, seeking to invalidate
his license suspension on the grounds that the notice had been sent to his Jobe Road address
only. Martin claimed in his petition that his last known address was the Route 1, Box 27
address also contained in the BMV records. Following the State’s response seeking summary
disposition, the trial court summarily denied Martin’s petition. In its order, the trial court
found that the BMV had properly mailed notice to Martin at one of his last two known
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addresses which “presumably Martin himself [had] provided to the [BMV].” App. p. 28.
This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Martin challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for judicial review by claiming
that (1) the lack of notice to his Route 1, Box 27 address was statutorily inadequate and
violated his procedural due process rights and (2) the trial court’s finding that the Jobe Road
address was his last known address was unsupported by the record.
I. Standard of Review
A habitual traffic offender proceeding is a civil proceeding which is quasi-
administrative in nature, since it is performed on behalf of the BMV. Purvis v. State ex rel.
Packard, 466 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). When reviewing a trial court’s decision,
this court looks at the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, and we will not
reweigh the evidence. Id. The petitioner bears the burden of proof to prevail in a proceeding
involving a petition for judicial review. See Ind. Code § 9-30-10-7(c) (2008).
II. Analysis
Indiana Code section 9-30-10-5(a) (2008) provides as follows:
If it appears from the records maintained in the bureau that a person’s driving
record makes the person a habitual violator under section 4 of this chapter, the
bureau shall mail a notice to the person’s last known address that informs the
person that the person’s driving privileges will be suspended in thirty (30) days
because the person is a habitual violator according to the records of the bureau.
(Emphasis supplied). Martin contends that the BMV failed to comply with the above
statutory requirement because his last known address was the Route 1, Box 27 address, rather
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than the Jobe Road address to which his notice was mailed. As Martin concedes, both
addresses were on file at the BMV and current at the time. In Martin’s view, when the BMV
has two last known addresses on file, it must mail notice to each address.
Regardless of whether Martin received proper notice, the remedy he seeks—namely,
invalidation of his license suspension—is not automatically available. Untimely or
incomplete notice of license suspension does not justify automatic reversal of the suspension.
State v. Hammond, 761 N.E.2d 812, 815 (Ind. 2002). Rather, the only remedy available to
Martin for this alleged defect in process is an extended time frame during which to challenge
his suspension on the merits. See id. Martin does not challenge the merits of his suspension,
nor does he seek an extension of time to pursue such a challenge.
To the extent Martin contends that the claimed inadequate notice deprived him of
procedural due process, his instant petition for judicial review—which is the very remedy
provided for by statute—demonstrates that it did not. See Ind. Code §§ 9-30-10-6(d) and -7.
Martin makes no argument that any apparent delay in his receipt of notice worked to his
detriment, and he faced no statutory time limitation for filing his petition for judicial review.
Accordingly, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
invalidate Martin’s license suspension based upon a claimed error in notice.
Having concluded that Martin’s challenge to notice does not permit the remedy he
seeks, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the trial court’s fact-findings relating to
such notice are supported by the record.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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