Dominee M. Florence v. Review Board of the Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development and Kindred Nursing Centers LTD PTR

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
DOMINEE M. FLORENCE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHY BRADLEY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Mar 16 2012, 9:16 am
IN THE
CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
DOMINEE M. FLORENCE, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1109-EX-867
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT and )
KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LTD PTR, )
)
Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM REVIEW BOARD OF THE
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Case No. 11-R-4055
March 16, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dominee M. Florence appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”) in favor of Kindred Nursing
Centers Ltd. Ptr. (“Kindred”) on her claim for unemployment benefits. However,
because of Florence’s numerous and substantial violations of the Indiana Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we do not reach the merits of her appeal.
We dismiss.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Florence was terminated from her employment with Kindred in April 2011, and
she sought unemployment insurance benefits. On July 15, a claims deputy of the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development determined that Florence was not discharged for
just cause and was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Kindred appealed that
determination, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) assigned to the case scheduled a
telephonic hearing. The ALJ determined that Florence had not filed her telephone
number with the Department as instructed, so the ALJ proceeded with the telephonic
hearing without Florence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ overturned the
decision of the claims deputy and found that Florence was discharged for just cause and
was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Florence appealed that
decision, and the Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. This
appeal ensued.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
It is well settled that a litigant who chooses to proceed pro se will be held to the
same rules of procedure as trained legal counsel and must be prepared to accept the
consequences of her action. Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004). The purpose of the Appellate Rules, especially Rule 46, is to aid and expedite
review, as well as to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and
briefing the case. Id. We will not consider an appellant’s assertion on appeal when she
has failed to present cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record
as required by the rules. Id. “If we were to address such arguments, we would be forced
to abdicate our role as an impartial tribunal and would instead become an advocate for
one of the parties.” Id. “This, clearly, we cannot do.” Id.Here, Florence did not file an appendix, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule
49(A). Further, Florence’s appellate brief does not include a table of authorities, a
statement of the issues, or a statement of the case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(2), (4)
and (5). But the most egregious violations of Appellate Rule 46 occur in the statement of
the facts and argument sections of Florence’s brief. Florence does not include a single
citation to the record in either her statement of the facts or argument sections, and she
does not cite to a single authority in her argument section. See Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(6) and (8).
Again, we will not become an advocate for Florence on appeal. Given the lack of
citations to either the record or authorities in her brief, we are unable to review Florence’s
appeal. Although we prefer to dispose of cases on their merits, where an appellant fails
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to substantially comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, then dismissal of
the appeal is warranted. Hughes v. King, 808 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Here, Florence’s failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is not a mere technical
violation but makes it virtually impossible for us to address her appeal on the merits.
Dismissed.
ROBB, C.J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
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