Obed Nyarenchi v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 09 2018, 6:27 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Baldwin Stephen R. Creason
Tyler D. Helmond Chief Counsel for Appeals and
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin Deputy Attorney General
& Webb F. Aaron Negangard
Indianapolis, Indiana Chief Deputy Attorney General
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Obed Nyarenchi, October 9, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-409
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge
Appellee-Respondent Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1501-PC-2906
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] Obed Nyarenchi appeals the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief that
he filed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder and burglary for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-409 | October 9, 2018 Page 1 of 2
breaking into a house in Speedway and attacking another man with a hatchet
and a hammer. His trial attorneys asserted but then withdrew a defense of
mental disease or defect. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (“A person is not
responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental
disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct
at the time of the offense.”). Nyarenchi contends that the attorneys should have
done more to develop that defense and then presented it at trial, and he asserts
that their failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. To
prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Nyarenchi had to show not only that
the failure to develop and present a mental-disease-or-defect defense amounted
to “deficient performance” but also that he was prejudiced by that failure, i.e.,
that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found him not
guilty if his attorneys had developed and presented the defense. See Woods v.
State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. On appeal, Nyarenchi states
that he “has met this burden.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. But that is the extent of
his argument. He does not direct us to a single piece of evidence that would
have supported a mental-disease-or-defect defense. In fact, his three-sentence
argument on this issue does not include any citations to the record, in violation
of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“Each contention must be supported by
citations to . . . the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]”).
As such, he has not shown that the trial court erred by denying his petition.
[2] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-409 | October 9, 2018 Page 2 of 2