Carlos D. Staten v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 19 2017, 10:43 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Randy M. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Chandra K. Hein
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlos D. Staten, April 19, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1611-CR-2612
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1605-F2-11
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Defendant Carlos D. Staten and Danette Sanchez began dating in
2014 and had one child together, but by April of 2016 were no longer in a
relationship. On the morning of April 10, 2016, Sanchez was in her home
when Staten entered, locked the door, and confronted her about talking to
somebody on her telephone. Staten punched Sanchez in the face with his fist
several times, eventually knocking her to the ground, and continued to punch
her as he sat on her back. Staten also punched Sanchez seven to ten times in
the face as he sat on her chest and pinned her arms down with his knees. At
some point, Staten kicked Sanchez in the face, breaking one of her teeth.
Sanchez eventually shot a gun in Staten’s direction, causing him to flee.
[2] Following a jury trial, Staten was found guilty of several charges and eventually
sentenced for Level 5 felony battery and for being a habitual offender. Staten
contends that Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) failed to
produce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction or to rebut his claim of self-
defense. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Staten and Sanchez began dating in 2014 and had one child together, but by
April of 2016 were no longer involved. On April 10, 2016, at approximately
10:40 a.m., Sanchez was allowing her car to warm up outside her Fort Wayne
home when Staten came from the rear of the home, locked the front door, and
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said, “[b]****, let me see your phone. I know you’re talking to somebody.” Tr.
p. 62. When Sanchez told Staten that she was “not about to do this with him
right now[,]” he jumped on her and began to hit her in the face with his fist. Tr.
p. 62. Staten punched Sanchez in the face “[t]oo many [times] to count[,]” and
when she was knocked to the ground, sat on her back while examining her
telephone and continuing to punch her. Tr. p. 63.
[4] Apparently after seeing a picture sent to Sanchez by a male friend, Staten told
her to get up and then “body slam[med]” her on her son’s swing. Tr. p. 64.
Sanchez was now on her back, and Staten sat on her chest, held her arms down
with his knees, and continued to punch her in the face seven to ten times.
Staten told Sanchez to crawl into the bedroom, and, when she began to crawl
on her hands and knees, kicked her back down to the floor. Sanchez “kind of
like army crawled” into the bedroom. Tr. p. 65. When Sanchez asked Staten
to stop and told him that she loved him, he said that she did not love him,
grabbed her by the hair, and kicked her in the mouth, breaking off more than
half of one tooth. Staten briefly left the bedroom, giving Sanchez the
opportunity to retrieve a gun that was under the pillows. When Staten
returned, Sanchez fired once in Staten’s direction, and he fled. Sanchez
sustained a quarter-inch laceration on her lower lip that did not heal for a
month; was unable to see out of her right eye for several weeks; and had bruises
on her arms, ears, and head. Staten kicked out one of Sanchez’s front teeth,
which could not be fixed at the hospital. Staten’s beating of Sanchez caused her
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pain of between eight and nine on a scale from one to ten, with ten being the
highest.
[5] On May 10, 2016, the State charged Staten with Level 2 felony burglary, Level
3 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony domestic
battery, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor interference
with the reporting of a crime. On June 15, 2016, the State amended the
charging information to include a habitual offender enhancement. On
September 19, 2016, the State dismissed the burglary charge. On October 5,
2016, following jury trial, the jury found Staten guilty of battery, domestic
battery, and intimidation and found him to be a habitual offender. On
November 4, 2016, the trial court sentenced Staten to five years of
incarceration, with two suspended to probation, and enhanced his sentence by
six years due to his habitual offender status. The trial court vacated Staten’s
convictions for domestic battery and intimidation.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] Staten contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for Level 5 felony battery. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility.
Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995). We look only to the evidence
of probative value and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which
support the verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative
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value from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v.
State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993).
[7] In order to convict Staten of Level 5 felony battery on Sanchez, the State was
required to establish that he “knowingly or intentionally … touche[d her] in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner [when t]he offense results in serious bodily
injury” to Sanchez. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c), -1(g)(1). In challenging his
conviction, Staten argues that the central evidence presented at trial was
unreliable and insufficient to support his convictions.
[8] Staten points to many alleged inconsistencies in Sanchez’s testimony and
suggests several other possible scenarios that he claims are consistent with the
physical evidence. Sanchez testified unequivocally that Staten was the person
who caused her rather extensive injuries by beating her with his fist and kicking
her. The jury was entitled to credit Sanchez’s testimony, and it did so. It is
well-settled that a criminal conviction may rest upon the testimony of a single
witness, even if uncorroborated. See, e.g., Slaughter v. State, 531 N.E.2d 185, 186
(Ind. 1988) (“A conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony
of a single witness.”). Staten’s argument is nothing more than an invitation to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
II. Self-Defense
[9] Staten also argues that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his claim of self-
defense. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise
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criminal act. Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997). The defense is
defined in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(c): “A person is justified in using
reasonable force against another person to protect the person or a third person
from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.”
[10] When a person raises a claim of self-defense, he is required to show three facts:
(1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and
(3) he had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm. Wallace v. State,
725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). Once a person claims self-defense, the State
bears the burden of disproving at least one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly,
by affirmatively showing the person did not act in self-defense, or by relying
upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the State has met its
burden is a question of fact for the factfinder. Id. The trier of fact is not
precluded from finding that a person used unreasonable force simply because
the victim was the initial aggressor. Birdsong, 685 N.E.2d at 45.
[11] If a person is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if
no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State
beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ind. 2002).
The standard on appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to
rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of
the evidence claim. Id. at 801. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
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credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to
support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be disturbed. Id.
[12] Staten suggests that the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that
Sanchez pulled her gun on him at the beginning of the altercation and that any
injuries he inflicted upon her were in self-defense. We disagree, to say the least.
As mentioned, the jury was entitled to believe Sanchez’s testimony that Staten
was the initial aggressor, and it did. As with Staten’s previous argument, this
claim is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will
not do.
[13] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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