Beth E. Myers v. Rising Sun-Ohio County Community School Corporation

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KEVIN W. BETZ MARSHA VOLK BUGALLA
JAMIE A. MADDOX JULIA BLACKWELL GELINAS
Betz + Blevins LUCY R. DOLLENS
Indianapolis, Indiana Frost Brown Todd LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Jan 19 2012, 9:36 am
IN THE CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BETH E. MYERS, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 58A05-1104-CT-193
)
RISING SUN-OHIO COUNTY )
COMMUNITY SCHOOL )
CORPORATION, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge
Cause No. 58C01-0908-CT-5
January 19, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Midway through her first year as a special education teacher in the Rising Sun School
Corporation (“the School District”), Beth E. Myers was injured on the job and filed a
worker‟s compensation claim. She was absent from school intermittently in the winter
months due to the migraine headaches that resulted from her injury. The School District
compiled a list of conduct violations that Myers committed on the days that she was present
at school and during her absences, i.e., failure to leave adequate lesson plans for the
substitute teachers as required by her code of conduct. She was suspended with pay and
eventually was terminated following a hearing.
Myers filed a complaint against the School District asserting that the School District
wrongfully discharged her in retaliation for her worker‟s compensation claim. She also
sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The School District filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
Myers now appeals. Finding that she has failed to establish retaliatory discharge as a
matter of law and has waived argument on her intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, we affirm the trial court‟s entry of summary judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 2008, Myers began working for the School District as a special education
teacher pursuant to a regular teacher‟s contract. On December 18, 2008, she received a
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positive evaluation from her building principal, Gloria Holland.1 The next day, she hit her
head on a bookshelf at school and had to be treated at a nearby hospital. That same day, she
filed a worker‟s compensation claim, stating that her injury caused her to experience severe
migraines and post-concussion syndrome.
After the holiday break, Myers missed eight days of school due to migraines. In
addition, the School District had five days of weather-related closings. On February 6, 2009,
after Myers had returned to work intermittently for thirteen days, Holland issued a suspension
letter to Myers, citing “Professional Conduct Concerns.” Appellant‟s App. at 204. The letter
listed sixteen allegations of Myers‟s inappropriate and unprofessional conduct:
1. On or about January 15, 2009[,] you physically carried a student across
the hallway by his ankles. The Board of School Trustees considers the
inappropriate and dangerous handling of a student to be relevant to the
school corporation‟s interest.
2. On or about January 2, 2009, during a meeting with fellow
professionals in trying to develop a behavior plan you gave no
suggestions and dismissed every idea as unworkable without being
tried. The Board of School Trustees considers the inability to work
with fellow professionals in developing behavior plans relevant to the
school corporation‟s interest.
3. On or about January 5, 2009, your report card grades were not on report
cards as instructed by Principal Holland. The Board of School Trustees
considers not following directions given by the building principal to be
relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
4. On or about January 5, 2009, a teaching assistant was unable to locate
the grade book in order to put on grades. You told the teaching
assistant to give the students the same grades as they received the last
1
We disagree with Myers‟s characterization of the December 2008 evaluation as “excellent,” since it
expressed the administration‟s concerns regarding her truthfulness as well as her relationships with coworkers.
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grading period. The Board of School Trustees considers the lack of
preparedness to be relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
5. On or about January 13, 2009, you misrepresented to a second grade
teacher that Ms. Holland had approved a schedule change when in fact
the change did not occur. The Board of School Trustees considers the
misrepresenting of facts to be relevant to the school corporation‟s
interest.
6. On or about January 19, 2009, you did not follow the procedure
outlined by Assistant Principal Huff in dealing with a student. Instead
of following the procedure, you sent the student directly to Ms. Huff.
The Board of School Trustees considers the failure to following [sic]
directions from a building administrator to be relevant to the school
corporation‟s interest.
7. On or about January 19, 2009, you instructed the teaching assistants not
to follow the procedures outlined by Assistant Principal Huff but to
send students to Ms. Huff immediately. The Board of School Trustees
considers you encouraging the teaching assistants to disobey
instructions given by a building administrator to be relevant to the
school corporation‟s interest.
8. On or about January 20, 2009, you were absent from school and left no
lesson plans. The Board of School Trustees considers the lack of
lesson plans to be relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
9. On or about January 21, 2009, you were observed by the Assistant
Director of Special Education. The Assistant Director noted that no
academic skills were taught or practiced. The Board of School Trustees
considers the lack of teaching academic skills to be relevant to the
school corporation‟s interest.
10. On or about January 22, 2009, you were absent from school and left no
lesson plans. The Board of School Trustees considers the lack of
lesson plans to be relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
11. On or about January 23, 2009, you were absent from school and left no
lesson plans. The Board of School Trustees considers the lack of
lesson plans to be relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
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12. On or about January 26, 2009, you were absent and left partial lesson
plans that covered no more than two hours of the day. The Board of
School Trustees considers the lack of complete lesson plans to be
relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
13. On or about January 26, 2009, it was reported that basic skills had not
been covered in your class since the beginning of the semester. The
Board of School Trustees considers the lack of teaching academic skills
to be relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
14. On or about February 2, 2009, you were absent and left partial lesson
plans that covered no more than two hours of the day. The Board of
School Trustees considers the lack of complete lesson plans to be
relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
15. On or about February 3, 2009, you were absent and left partial lesson
plans that covered no more than two hours of the day. The Board of
School Trustees considers the lack of complete lesson plans to be
relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
16. On or about February 5, 2009, you were absent and left partial lesson
plans that covered no more than two hours of the day. The Board of
School Trustees considers the lack of complete lesson plans to be
relevant to the school corporation‟s interest.
Id. at 216-18.
Upon receipt of this letter, Myers was suspended immediately with pay. On February
19, 2009, the superintendent sent Myers a termination letter that contained not only the
foregoing allegations of insubordination, neglect of duty, and incompetence, but also the
following allegations:
17. Since February 6, 2009, and through this date you have willfully
violated my direct order to “turn in your grade book immediately.”
18. Emergency lesson plans were not turned into the office as directed by
Ms. Holland on or about August 13, 2009 [sic].
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19. On or about October 21, 2008, in violation of the “Teacher Job
Description” you failed to provide a safe learning environment by
placing zip ties on the playground gates, which in effect prevented
egress from the playground.
20. Prior to December 2008, in violation of the “Teacher Job Description”
[you] failed to provide a safe learning environment by placing special
needs students on a motorcycle in order to take their picture.
Id. at 452-53.
Myers requested a hearing before the Board of School Trustees (“the Board”). On
March 11 and March 13, 2009, the Board heard evidence from witnesses. Thereafter, the
School District terminated Myers‟s employment contract.
On August 25, 2009, Myers filed a complaint against the School District, alleging
retaliatory discharge and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 In
her deposition, Myers did not dispute the conduct listed in her termination letter, but offered
justifications for it. On September 23, 2010, the School District filed a motion for summary
judgment, and Myers filed a response in opposition. The trial court granted the School
District‟s motion following a hearing. Myers now appeals.3 Additional facts will be
provided as necessary.
2
Myers eventually agreed to dismiss her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
3
Myers has filed a motion for oral argument, which we deny in an order issued contemporaneously
with this decision.
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Discussion and Decision
Myers challenges the trial court‟s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the
School District.4 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule
56(C). “A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would
dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting
conflicting inferences on such an issue.” Mahan v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 862 N.E.2d 669,
675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We review the trial court‟s decision to grant or deny
summary judgment using the same standard as the trial court, in which all factual inferences
must be construed in favor of the non-moving party and all doubts as to the existence of a
material factual issue must be resolved against the moving party. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930
N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind. 2010). If the moving party fails to make a prima facie showing of no
genuine issue of material fact and appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, then
summary judgment is precluded regardless of whether the non-moving party designates facts
and evidence in response. Clarian Health Partners, Inc. v. Wagler, 925 N.E.2d 388, 392
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. However, once the moving party has carried its initial
burden, the non-moving party must come forward with sufficient evidence demonstrating the
4
We disagree with the School District‟s characterization of this appeal as an appeal from the action of
an administrative agency.
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existence of genuine factual issues, and if she fails to do so, then summary judgment should
be granted. Mahan, 862 N.E.2d at 675-76.
I. Retaliatory Discharge
Myers asserts that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment
on her retaliatory discharge claim. An action for retaliatory discharge exists when an
employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily conferred right, such as filing a worker‟s
compensation claim. Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied (2006). In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251-53,
297 N.E.2d 425, 427-28 (1973), our supreme court held that an employee-at-will who was
discharged for filing a worker‟s compensation claim could file an action for retaliatory
discharge against her employer because the Worker‟s Compensation Act was designed for
the benefit of employees, and as such, its humane purpose would be undermined if
employees were subject to reprisal without remedy “solely” for exercising that statutory
right.5
In Dale v. J.G. Bowers, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), another panel of
this Court interpreted Frampton‟s use of the word “solely” to mean that “any and all reasons
for discharge must be unlawful in order to sustain a claim for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at
5
The School District argues that Frampton applies only to at-will employees and not to employees,
such as Myers, who work under employment contracts. In response, Myers cites as persuasive Coolidge v.
Riverdale Local School District, 797 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ohio 2003), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio cited
and applied Frampton to a contracted teacher‟s claim for retaliatory discharge, stating that teachers should not
be afforded “less protection against wrongful discharges than the common law generally affords to at-will
employees.” Id. We agree with the Coolidge court and therefore apply Frampton‟s analysis in the present
appeal.
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369. In reaching this conclusion, the Bowers court adopted the reasoning of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in Watkins v. Sommer Metalcraft
Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D. Ind. 1994), holding that “the word „solely‟ as used in
Frampton and its progeny was used to mean without an independent lawful reason which
would justify the otherwise unlawful action.” Bowers, 709 N.E.2d at 369 (quoting Watkins,
844 F. Supp. at 1326) (emphasis added).
The question of whether a retaliatory motive exists for discharging an employee is a
question for the trier of fact. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1261-62 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only “when the evidence is such
that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [the] discharge was caused by a prohibited
retaliation.” Id. at 1262 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a
motion for summary judgment by the employer, the employee must show more than her filing
of a worker‟s compensation claim and the discharge itself; instead, she “must present
evidence that directly or indirectly implies the necessary inference of causation between the
filing of the worker‟s compensation claim and the termination,” i.e., proximity in time or
evidence that the employer‟s asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext. Id.As in a wrongful termination discrimination case, a plaintiff bringing a retaliatory
discharge claim must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. At that point, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
discharge. Id. If the employer carries its burden, then the employee has the opportunity to
prove that the reason cited by the employer is a pretext. Id. She may establish pretext by
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showing that the reasons are (1) factually baseless; (2) not the actual motivation for her
discharge; or (3) insufficient to motivate the discharge. Id.Here, the School District provided Myers with a lengthy list of alleged violations,
including: failing to follow stated policies concerning lesson plans and grading; making
misrepresentations to her aides and to administration; and holding a nonverbal autistic
student upside-down by his ankles and carrying him across the hall. With respect to the
incident with the autistic student, Myers claims that holding him upside-down was a
legitimate therapeutic technique to calm him down and that the teacher‟s aide had used the
technique with impunity. To the extent she cites the aide‟s conduct as evidence of
discrimination by the School District, we note that the aide‟s job was to follow the classroom
teacher‟s instructions and that the aide never carried a student across the hall while holding
him upside-down. Thus, Myers and the aide were not “identical … in all relevant aspects.”
Sellars v. City of Gary, 453 F.3d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, even assuming for argument‟s sake that Myers had established
discrimination, the list she received from the School District articulates legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge, i.e., endangering a student/students, making
misrepresentations to administration and instructing others to make similar
misrepresentations, and failing to provide adequate lesson plans during eight days of absence,
which led to eight days of essentially structureless class time. As such, we conclude that the
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School District cited legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging Myers sufficient to
shift to her the burden of proving pretext.
In making her pretext claim, Myers does not refute the factual basis for the allegations
against her. Instead, she cites the close proximity between the filing of her worker‟s
compensation claim and her discharge, as well as the sheer number of alleged violations that
she accumulated in a short amount of time as evidence that the articulated reasons were not
the actual motivation for her discharge. She also notes that the lengthy list of violations came
shortly after her “excellent” evaluation. She was injured on December 19, 2008, and filed
her worker‟s compensation claim on that date. After the holiday break, she returned to
school. However, between five snow days and eight absences due to migraines, she worked
only thirteen days between the date of her claim and February 6, 2009, the date that she
received notice of her suspension. Seventeen of her twenty alleged violations occurred
during that thirteen-day period. In this vein, she claims that she could not possibly have
engaged in so many violations in such a short period. We disagree and note that seven of the
violations involve omissions relating to the days when she was not at work, namely, in failing
to leave complete, or sometimes any, lesson plans. Three of her alleged violations involve
failures relating to grade reporting and/or grade book insufficiencies, which again, were
actions not limited to actual days spent at school. Also, to the extent that she cites the three
allegations that predate her injury and December 18, 2008 evaluation, we note that the
superintendent only learned of the incidents involving the motorcycle and the playground
gate after Myers‟s suspension. Moreover, Myers admitted (and the security video confirmed)
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that she carried the nonverbal autistic student upside-down by his ankles across the hall.
Although she advanced an argument that such conduct was recognized as a calming
technique or “sensory diet,” the occupational therapist in charge of training the special
education teachers and developing specialized programs for the students stated that she
herself would never engage in such an activity and that she never trained Myers to engage in
it either. Appellant‟s App. at 242-43. Finally, we note that even though this dangerous
activity would be sufficient, standing alone, to justify disciplinary action, the School District
emphasized that Myers was terminated because of her accumulation of numerous violations
of the code of conduct.
In sum, Myers has failed to demonstrate that the allegations were not factually-based,
were not the actual reason for her discharge, and were insufficient to motivate her discharge.
As such, we conclude that she has failed to establish pretext as a matter of law.
Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate on her retaliatory discharge claim.
II. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Myers also contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of the School District on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However,
in her appellant‟s brief, she fails to present any argument on this issue. Instead, she addresses
this claim for the first time in her reply brief. As such, she has waived the issue for review
per Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8), which states that the argument section of the
appellant‟s brief must contain the appellant‟s contentions on each issue, supported by cogent
reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raised in the reply
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brief.”). See also Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
claim was waived for review when raised for first time in reply brief).
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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