Ryan D. Smith v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 15 2014, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFRY G. PRICE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Peru, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RYAN D. SMITH, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 85A05-1403-CR-103
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WABASH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Robert R. McCallen III, Judge
Cause No. 85C01-1302-FB-90
September 15, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Following a jury trial, Ryan D. Smith was convicted of residential entry1 as a Class
D felony, resisting law enforcement2 as a Class A misdemeanor, and criminal mischief3 as
a Class A misdemeanor. Smith’s sole issue on appeal is whether the State presented
sufficient evidence that he entered his victim’s residence in order to sustain his residential
entry conviction.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During the late hours of February 7 and early hours of February 8, 2013, Shane
Sadler and his fiancée, Amanda McCracken, were at home in Lagro, Indiana. They heard
loud music outside, and upon investigating, Sadler saw that Smith, his cousin, was on the
front porch. Smith and Sadler had had a falling out over the fact that Smith purportedly
had an affair with McCracken while Sadler was in prison. Smith told Sadler to let him in
so that they could settle their differences. Sadler did not open the door and told Smith to
come back later when Smith was not intoxicated.
Smith did not go away, but instead, retrieved a shovel from the neighbor’s house,
which he used to shatter the glass of Sadler’s front door. Sadler was inside holding the
door closed. Smith reached through the broken window with his hand and attempted to
unlock the door’s deadbolt. Smith eventually made his way into the home. McCracken,
1
See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. We note that, effective July 1, 2014, new versions of the residential
entry statute and the statutes underlying Smith’s other convictions were enacted. Although the substance
of the statutes remained the same, we note that we are applying the version of the residential entry statute
in effect at the time of Smith’s offense.
2
See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1.
3
See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2.
2
who was hiding behind the bedroom door, saw Smith walk through the door of the
bedroom, turn around, and leave. Smith then had a confrontation with a concerned
neighbor who disarmed Smith of the shovel and knocked Smith unconscious with it. When
he regained consciousness and heard police sirens approaching, Smith fled. Smith did not
heed the orders of police officers to stop. The police cornered and apprehended Smith.
The State charged Smith with residential entry as a Class D felony, resisting law
enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, criminal mischief as a Class A misdemeanor, and
battery as a Class B misdemeanor.4 Following a jury trial, Smith was convicted on all
counts but the battery count. The trial court sentenced Smith to an aggregate sentence of
four years. Additional facts will be added as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Smith contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of entry to support
his residential entry conviction. Our standard of reviewing claims of sufficiency of the
evidence is well settled. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State,
867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness
credibility. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an
4
The State dismissed additional counts of burglary and battery before and during trial,
respectively.
3
inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id.In order to make its case against Smith, the State was required to show that he
knowingly or intentionally broke into and entered the dwelling of another. Ind. Code § 35-
43-2-1.5. Even partial entry of a defendant’s body into the dwelling is sufficient to prove
the “entry” element. See Anez v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(evidence of defendant’s hands and arms inside broken window sufficient); see also Lee v.
State, 349 N.E.2d 214, 216, 169 Ind. App. 470, 472 (1976) (Lee’s foot and shoulder entered
victim’s home).5
The evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict is that Smith shattered the glass
of the front door, reached in with his hand in an attempt to unlock the door’s deadbolt, and
eventually made his way into the home such that he was seen by McCracken entering the
bedroom. On appeal, neither party references McCracken’s testimony that Smith entered
the home. At trial, the State argued that the evidence showed that Smith made full or partial
entry into the home. Tr. at 184-85. Therefore, even if the jury chose not to believe
McCracken’s testimony, pursuant to Lee and Anez, evidence that Smith reached into the
broken front door glass with his hand is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Smith’s
argument on appeal is based upon evidence that he argues shows that only his shovel
entered the home. That argument requires us to consider evidence that does not support
the jury’s verdict, which we cannot do. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
5
Lee and Anez are burglary cases. Burglary and residential entry share the elements of breaking
and entering a structure, and therefore, burglary cases assist us in our analysis.
4