Michelle Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 19 2016, 6:04 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick Vaiana Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michelle Williams, February 19, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1505-CR-388
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey Marchal,
Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1311-MR-071046
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Following a jury trial, Michelle Williams was convicted of Murder, a felony,1
and Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, a Class B felony.2 Williams presents one
issue for our review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in rejecting
Williams’s tendered final instruction regarding accomplice liability?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Around 6:20 p.m. on October 19, 2013, David Williamson had his father drop
him off at Donny Bell’s apartment located in Indianapolis. Bell was
Williamson’s cousin and he had agreed to let Williamson move in with him.
Bell returned to his apartment just before 8:00 p.m. that evening and noted that
the front door was unlocked. There was no sign of forced entry. Bell entered
his apartment and discovered that it had been ransacked—furniture had been
turned over and torn up, cabinets and drawers were open throughout, his
mattress had been moved, and the door to his safe was open. Bell walked
through the apartment and found Williamson unresponsive and lying in a pool
of blood on the bathroom floor. Bell called 911. Williamson died as a result of
a gunshot to the back of the head.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) (felony murder).
2
Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (conspiracy); I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (robbery). Effective July 1, 2014, this offense was
reclassified as a Level 2 felony. Because Williams committed this offense prior to that date, it retains its prior
classification as a Class B felony.
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[4] Earlier in the evening, Bell had received a series of text messages from
Williams. Bell owned a tire shop and had a business driving an ice cream
truck. Bell also earned a living selling drugs, principally marijuana and
methamphetamine. Bell was introduced to Williams three to four months prior
and had supplied her with drugs. Williams knew that Bell would on occasion
have large sums of money and/or drugs in the safe located in his apartment.
[5] Williams sent the first text message around 6:16 p.m. stating that she had
money for him. At 6:19 p.m. Williams sent a second text to Bell indicating that
she was approximately five minutes away from his apartment. Bell received a
third text message from Williams at 6:32 p.m. in which Williams said she had
come to see him and asked Bell to “hit her right back.” Transcript at 64. Bell
received yet another message from Williams at 7:51 p.m. saying that she
needed “a basket or two,” which Bell explained was a reference to “[a] ball of
dope, crystal methamphetamines.” Id. at 65. Bell did not respond to any of the
text messages because he did not see them until much later that night when he
was talking to a detective who had come to his apartment to investigate the
shooting.
[6] Within the same timeframe as Williams’s texts, Bell also received a text
message at 7:07 p.m. from Williamson stating, “Hey chelles here wnten a
twenty call me cuz k bub.” State’s Exhibit No. 34. Bell testified that he did not
know anyone by the name of “chelles” but assumed Williamson was referring
to “Michelle” Williams, the defendant. Transcript at 75, 76. A few days later,
Bell discovered that he had received a voice message from Williamson at 7:09
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p.m. on October 19. Bell recognized Williamson’s voice and heard Williams
talking in the background, saying “[w]e’ve got something for him.” Id. at 80.
After a short pause, Bell also heard another man’s voice on the voice message.
Bell shared this information with the investigating detective.
[7] On October 19, Williams and her boyfriend, Chris West, were staying with
Tabitha Dickman. Dickman testified that she overheard Williams and West
talking about “hitting a lick” and how easy it would be. Id. at 172. Dickman
also heard Williams mention someone by the name of “Don.” Id. After this
conversation, Williams and West left, and Dickman fell asleep. Later that
evening, Dickman was awakened when Williams and West came back to the
home. Dickman overheard them talking about what “had went wrong” and
that they also talked about a safe. Id. at 161. She also overheard Williams tell
West to “take a shower” and “to calm down” and to “[w]ash the GSR off your
hands.” Id. at 166-67. As to their demeanor, Dickman noted that Williams
and West were “[r]eal nervous and frantic, sweaty, like they done something.”
Id. at 166.
[8] On November 1, 2013, the State charged Williams with murder, in two
separate counts. In Count I, the State alleged a knowing killing. I.C. § 35-42-1-
1(1). In Count II, the State alleged a felony murder, i.e., a killing in the course
of a robbery. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2). The State also charged Williams with
attempted robbery as a Class A felony, conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class
A felony, and criminal confinement as a Class B felony. A jury trial was held
on April 1 and 2, 2015. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
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granted Williams’s motion for a directed verdict on the criminal confinement
charge, which was ultimately dismissed. The jury found Williams not guilty
with regard to Count I, but returned guilty verdicts for felony murder,
attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. At a May 5, 2015
sentencing hearing, the trial court elected not to enter a judgment of conviction
for attempted robbery based on double jeopardy concerns. The trial court
entered convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery and
sentenced Williams to an aggregate sentence of fifty-eight years.
Discussion & Decision
[9] Williams argues that the trial court erred in failing to give her tendered final
jury instruction regarding accomplice liability. At the conclusion of the
evidence, Williams tendered the following proposed jury instruction on
accomplice liability:
You must not convict the accused of aiding, inducing, or causing
an offense unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused knowingly or intentionally participated in some conduct
of an affirmative nature.
Green v. State, 937 N.E.2d 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Appellant’s Appendix at 88.
[10] The trial court declined to give Williams’s tendered instruction, finding that the
court’s final instruction on accomplice liability was an accurate statement of the
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law and adequately covered that issue. The trial court’s Final Instruction 11,
which was read to the jury, provided:
Mere presence at the scene of the crime, coupled with knowledge
that a crime is being committed is insufficient to establish guilt.
Further acquiescence in the criminal conduct of others, even with
guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding, inducing,
or causing a crime.
To convict . . . a defendant of any crime on an accomplice
theory, that is aiding, inducing, or causing a crime, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended by her own voluntary conduct to cause or facilitate
commission of the particular crime committed by the principal
offender.
Proof of a defendant’s failure to oppose the commission of a
crime, companionship with the person committing the offense,
and conduct before, during, and after the offense may be
considered in determining whether aiding may be inferred.
Id. at 102. Although Williams concedes that the trial court’s instruction was
“accurate,” she nevertheless argues that it is an incomplete statement of the
law. Appellant’s Brief at 8.
[11] The purpose of jury instructions is “‘to inform the jury of the law applicable to
the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case
clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’” Gravens v. State, 836
N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d
1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003)), trans. denied. The manner of instructing a jury lies
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largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial
court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion. Powell v. State, 769 N.E.2d
1128, 1132 (Ind. 2002). In reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we
consider: (1) whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2)
whether there was evidence in the record to support giving the instruction; and
(3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions
given by the court. Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ind. 2001).
[12] In addition, in order to obtain reversal, a defendant must demonstrate that the
trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions prejudiced his substantial
rights. Townsend v. State, 934 N.E.2d 118, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting
Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied), trans. denied.
Jury instructions are not to be considered in isolation, but as a whole and with
reference to each other. Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998). Therefore, an error in the instructions does not constitute reversible
error unless the charge to the jury as a whole misstates the law or otherwise
misleads the jury. Id.[13] Williams asserts that “a successful prosecution of accomplice liability theory
must be supported by conduct of an affirmative nature.” Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Williams maintains that the trial court’s Final Instruction 11 on accomplice
liability informed the jury that Williams had to engage only in voluntary
conduct, which she claims falls short of requiring a showing of affirmative
conduct on Williams’s part in the commission of the crime.
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[14] It has long been the case that the jury must be instructed that accomplice
liability requires proof that the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct in
concert with his accomplice. Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 383 (Ind. 2002)
(citing Small v. State, 531 N.E.2d 498, 499 (Ind. 1988)) (emphasis supplied).
Further, we have found no case law indicating that a showing of “affirmative”
conduct is required to establish accomplice liability or explaining that there is a
difference between affirmative conduct and voluntary conduct.3 We therefore
conclude that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on accomplice liability
and did not abuse its discretion when it declined to use Williams’s tendered
instruction on the same.
[15] Judgment affirmed.
[16] Robb, J. and Barnes, J., concur.
3
Williams cited to Green as support for her tendered instruction setting forth the notion that accomplice
liability required “conduct of an affirmative nature.” Appellant’s Appendix at 88. While the accomplice
liability instruction given in that case referenced “conduct of an affirmative nature,” it also informed the jury
that the defendant must have intended to cause or facilitate the particular crime by “his own voluntary
conduct.” Green, 937 N.E.2d at 928, 929 (emphasis supplied). In any event, the issue addressed on appeal
did not concern use of these terms and does not support Williams’s claim that the instruction given here was
an incomplete statement of the law.
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