DocketNumber: No. 25A04-9011-CV-530
Citation Numbers: 582 N.E.2d 385
Judges: Barteau, Chezem, Miller
Filed Date: 12/9/1991
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
Defendants/Appellants, Timothy Fleck (Fleck) and Town of Akron (Akron), Indiana, appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment, which asserted governmental immunity under Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-3(7).
On July 6,1989, Fleck was employed as a deputy marshal with the Town of Akron and was involved in an accident with Brian Caudill (Caudill). Prior to the accident, Fleck, in his marked squad car, was monitoring traffic with radar when he received a report that a salesman was soliciting door-to-door without a permit in violation of a town ordinance. Fleck began a search for the salesman, arrived at the intersection of Virgil Street and Rochester Street, and stopped his squad car at a stop sign. He then proceeded into the intersection and collided with Caudill’s vehicle.
Fleck raises the issue of whether he was enforcing a law within the meaning of the immunity statute.
We first note that Caudill failed to file a brief in this appeal. Thus, we apply a less stringent standard of review with respect to showings of reversible error. Fleck need only establish prima facie error to win reversal. Stacey-Rand, Inc. v. J.J. Holman, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 527 N.E.2d 726, 727, reh. denied.
If Fleck was acting within the scope of his employment, and was enforcing a law when the loss resulted, he is not liable. IC 36-5-7-4 sets forth the police powers available to a town marshal and his deputies:
The marshal is the chief police officer of the town and has the powers of other law enforcement officers in executing the orders of the legislative body and enforcing laws. The marshal or his deputy:
(1) shall serve all process directed to him by the town court or legislative body;
(2) shall arrest without process all persons who commit an offense within his view, take them before a court having jurisdiction, and detain them in custody until the cause of the arrest has been investigated;
(3) shall suppress breaches of the peace;
(4) may, if necessary, call the power of the town to his aid;
(5) may execute search warrants and arrest warrants; and
(6) may pursue and jail persons who commit an offense.
Here, Fleck was responding to a report that a salesman was soliciting door-to-door without the permit required by town ordi
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded for proceedings. consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
. This section provides: "A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of his employment is not liable if a loss results from the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and
. A municipal ordinance within the limits of the municipality has the same local force as a statute. Town of Walkerton v. New York C. Y St. L.R. Co., (1939), 18 N.E.2d 799, 215 Ind. 206, cert. denied 308 U.S. 556, 60 S.Ct. 75, 84 L.Ed. 467.
. We note that Caudill did not argue that Fleck's conduct was so outrageous as to deny immunity. While Fleck may have been negligent, mere negligence has not precluded immunity under the statute. Seymour National Bank v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1223, modified 428 N.E.2d 203.