James Broxton v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, the Department of Indiana Workforce Development, and Sodexo

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES,
Review Board and The Department
C. RICHARD MARTIN of Workforce Development
Martin & Martin
Boonville, Indiana GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
KATHY BRADLEY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JAMES BROXTON, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1301-EX-79
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF )
INDIANA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, AND) Jan 09 2014, 10:15 am
SODEXO, )
)
Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Cause No. 12-R-3680
January 9, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
James Broxton appeals the denial of his request for unemployment benefits by the
Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”). We
affirm.
Issues
Broxton raises five issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the Review Board properly determined that
his employer was not required to give notice under
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5(c);
II. whether the Review Board properly denied
unemployment benefits to him pursuant to Indiana
Code Section 22-4-3-5;
III. whether the Review Board properly determined that he
was not regularly and customarily employed on an “on
call” or “as needed basis” under Indiana Code Section
22-4-3-3;
IV. whether the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana
Code Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with other statutory
provisions of the Indiana Employment Security Act
(the “Act”), Indiana Code Article 22-4; and
V. whether the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana
Code Section 22-4-3-5 violates the policy behind the
Act.
Facts
Broxton has been employed by SDH Education Service West, LLC, also known
as Sodexo Food Services (“Sodexo”), since 2008 as a cook at St. Joseph’s College in
Rensselaer. From August through May, Broxton works full time. During the summer
months, he is only “on call.” Appellant’s App. p. 13. He is required to call Sodexo each
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Tuesday to find out if work is available. If he fails to call in, Broxton could lose his job.
In 2012, Broxton was on call from May 7th to August 18th, but he was never called in to
work.
In prior summers, Broxton received unemployment insurance benefits. Broxton
filed a claim for unemployment benefits, and on August 13, 2012, a claims deputy
concluded that Broxton was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he “was on a
vacation week mandated by the employer.” Id. at 20. Broxton appealed that
determination to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and Sodexo did not participate in
the appeal. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded:
Although the Claimant is on an on-call or as needed basis
with the Employer during summer break every year, the
period is a reduction in hours that regularly occurs as “a
matter of practice, policy or procedure of which the Claimant
was aware and to which the Claimant has agreed,” 646 IAC
5-8-1 (2011). Alternatively, the time is also a scheduled
period during which activity is suspended, or a vacation, that
is part of the Employer’s regular policy or practice and the
Claimant has reasonable assurance of employment when the
period ends. The Claimant is ineligible for benefits based on
[his] employment status with this Employer during the
summer break period.
Id. at 38. Thus, the ALJ affirmed the claims deputy’s determination that Broxton was
ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Broxton appealed the ALJ’s determination to the Review Board. There was no
hearing before the Review Board, and no additional evidence was admitted. The Review
Board adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact but struck the ALJ’s conclusions of law and
concluded that Broxton was “not partially or part-totally unemployed” because he
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“agreed to perform services for the Employer during the school year,” he was aware of
the summer break, and he “agreed to this reduction or suspension of work hours during
scheduled breaks through continued employment with the Employer.” Appellee’s App.
p. 2.
The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was not entitled to benefits due to
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, which denies unemployment benefits to certain
employees on “a vacation week” without remuneration pursuant to a contract or regular
policy. Although the Review Board noted that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was
inapplicable if an employer “fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding
the filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection with an individual,
group, or mass separation arising from the vacation period,” the Review Board also noted
that the “Department currently has no rules or policies requiring employers to file a
notice regarding a claim arising out of a vacation period, nor is the Department statutorily
required to enact a policy on this matter.” Id. at 3 (discussing Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5(c)).
The Review Board held that the term “vacation week” referenced “an employer-
mandated period in which work is not performed.” Id. Further, the Review Board
concluded that, “[b]ecause [Broxton] was on an unpaid vacation period and had
reasonable assurance of employment following the summer break, [Broxton] was not
totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed.” Id. at 4.
The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was “voluntarily unemployed
during the summer break” due to his “assent” to Sodexo’s practices. Id. at 5. Thus, the
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Review Board found that Broxton was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Broxton
now appeals.
At the Review Board’s request, in May 2013, this appeal was consolidated with
numerous other appeals raising similar issues based on the Review Board’s interpretation
of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. In June 2013, after a pre-appeal conference, this
appeal and two other appeals, D.B. v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev.,
No. 93A02-1301-EX-71, and Amerson v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., No. 93A02-1301-EX-67, were designated as “test cases” and allowed to proceed.
The remaining appeals were held in abeyance pending completion of the test cases. On
November 5, 2013, a panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits in
D.B., __ N.E.2d __, No. 93A02-1301-EX-71 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013), and on
November 26, 2013, another panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment
benefits in Amerson, No. 93A02-1301-EX-67 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013).
Analysis
Broxton argues that the Review Board erred when it denied his request for
unemployment benefits. On appeal, we review the Review Board’s (1) determinations of
specific or basic underlying facts; (2) conclusions or inferences from those facts, or
determinations of ultimate facts; and (3) conclusions of law. McClain v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind. 1998). The Review
Board’s findings of basic fact are subject to a “substantial evidence” standard of review.
Id. In this analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board’s findings.
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Id. Reversal is warranted only if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review
Board’s findings. Id. (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Next, the Review Board’s
determinations of ultimate facts, which involve an inference or deduction based upon the
findings of basic fact, are generally reviewed to ensure that the Review Board’s inference
is reasonable. Id. at 1317-18. Finally, we review conclusions of law to determine
whether the Review Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. McHugh v. Review
Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
When interpreting a statute, we will give great weight to an interpretation of the
statute by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, unless such
interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v.
Two Market Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 679 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. 1997). This same
rule of deference applies to agency interpretation of administrative regulations that it has
drafted and is charged with enforcing. Id. “Deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute becomes a consideration when a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of more than
one reasonable interpretation.” South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Lucas, 881 N.E.2d 30,
32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). When faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one
of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, we
defer to the agency. Id. If we determine that an agency’s interpretation is reasonable, we
terminate our analysis and will not address the reasonableness of the other party’s
proposed interpretation. Id. “Terminating the analysis recognizes ‘the general policies of
acknowledging the expertise of agencies empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and
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increasing public reliance on agency interpretations.’” Id. (quoting State v. Young, 855
N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
I. Notice Requirement under Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5
Broxton first argues that the Review Board erred when it interpreted the notice
provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. That statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) and subject to
subsection (b), an individual is not totally unemployed,
part-totally unemployed, or partially unemployed for
any week in which the department finds the individual:
(1) is on a vacation week; and
(2) has not received remuneration from the
employer for that week, because of:
(A) a written contract between the employer
and the employees; or
(B) the employer’s regular vacation policy
and practice.
(b) Subsection (a) applies only if the department finds that
the individual has a reasonable assurance that the
individual will have employment available with the
employer after the vacation period ends.
(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an individual whose
employer fails to comply with a department rule or
policy regarding the filing of a notice, report,
information, or claim in connection with an individual,
group, or mass separation arising from the vacation
period.
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Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5.1
The Department of Workforce Development (“Department”) issued a policy
regarding Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 on February 3, 2012. See Appellant’s App. p.
39; DWD Policy 2011-07, Planned Shutdown Effects upon Unemployment Insurance
Benefits (“Policy”). In the Policy, the Department determined that it would consider
several factors when deciding whether a mandated or planned facility shutdown would be
considered a vacation week. One of the factors is whether “the employer, on their own
initiative, has provided the Department with advance notice of any vacation week or
1
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was added in 2011 by Pub. L. No. 2-2011, § 3, effective July 1, 2011,
and was amended by Pub. L. No. 6-2012, § 162, effective February 22, 2012. The statute previously
provided:
(a) An individual is not totally unemployed, part-totally
unemployed, or partially unemployed for any week in which the
department finds the individual:
(1) is on a vacation week; and
(2) has not received remuneration from the employer for
that week, because of:
(A) a written contract between the employer and the
employees; or
(B) the employer’s regular vacation policy and
practice.
(b) Subsection (a) applies only if the department finds that the
individual has a reasonable assurance that the individual will
have employment available with the employer after the vacation
period ends.
(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an individual whose employer
fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding the
filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection
with an individual, group, or mass separation arising from the
vacation period.
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shutdown period.” Appellant’s App. p. 41. The Department did not issue a rule or policy
that required an employer to file “a notice, report, information, or claim in connection
with an individual, group, or mass separation arising from the vacation period.” I.C. §
22-4-3-5(c).
On appeal, Broxton argues that the Department is “attempting to render subsection
(c) a nullity by not requiring such notice prior to applying subsection (a).”2 Appellant’s
Br. p. 8. Despite Broxton’s arguments, we conclude that subsection (c) of the statute
does not mandate that an employer file a notice in the event of a “separation arising from
the vacation period.”
The relevant portion of the statute provides: “Subsection (a) does not apply to an
individual whose employer fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding the
filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection with an individual, group, or
mass separation arising from the vacation period.” I.C. § 22-4-3-5(c). The statute gives
the Department discretion to create a “department rule or policy” regarding such a notice.
See also I.C. § 22-4-19-1 (“The board shall have the power and authority to adopt,
amend, or rescind such rules and regulations . . . and take such other action as it may
deem necessary or suitable for the proper administration of this article.”). The statute
2
The Review Board argues that Broxton waived this argument by failing to raise it below. The issue of
whether Broxton received adequate notice involves a legal, not a factual conclusion. We have previously
declined to find waiver of an issue not raised in an administrative proceeding where resolution of the
issue did not require any factual determinations, and required only legal conclusions. See Tokheim Corp.
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 440 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); cf. Highland
Town Sch. Corp. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 892 N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (“The ALJ is not required to brainstorm about every possible legal theory that might be available to
a pro se claimant.”). The arguments on appeal concern the interpretation of statutes, which are legal
conclusions. Consequently, we will address Broxton’s argument on the merits.
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does not specifically require an employer to provide such a notice. If the legislature had
intended to require such a notice, it could have provided so in the statute. Instead, the
statute merely requires an employer to comply with the Department’s rule or policy; it
does not specify the content of the rule or policy. Given the Department’s substantial
discretion, we conclude that Broxton’s argument regarding the notice provisions of
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5(c) fails.
II. Denial of Benefits under Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5
Next, Broxton argues that the Review Board erred when it concluded that he was
on a “vacation” under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 during the summer of 2012.
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 disqualifies an individual from receiving unemployment
benefits if: (1) the individual “is on a vacation week”; (2) the individual “has not received
remuneration from the employer for that week, because of: (A) a written contract
between the employer and the employees; or (B) the employer’s regular vacation policy
and practice;” and (3) the Department “finds that the individual has a reasonable
assurance that the individual will have employment available with the employer after the
vacation period ends.”
Broxton argues that he was not on a “vacation” during the summer of 2012. In
support of his argument, Broxton relies on American Bridge Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Division, 121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951), and Indiana State
University v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2008). We do not find that either case is
controlling here.
10
In American Bridge, this court held that employees subject to a company
shutdown for the purpose of taking inventory were entitled to unemployment benefits.
American Bridge, 121 Ind. App. at 578-84, 98 N.E.2d at 194-96. However, our supreme
court distinguished American Bridge in Adams v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
Division, 237 Ind. 63, 143 N.E.2d 564 (1957). In Adams, the employees were subject to
a shutdown for a vacation period covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The
court pointed out that the shutdown in American Bridge was distinguishable because it
was for inventory purposes rather than vacation purposes. Adams, 237 Ind. at 71, 143
N.E.2d at 568. Similarly, American Bridge is not persuasive because the “vacation” at
issue here is more similar to that in Adams than the temporary shutdown for inventory
purposes in American Bridge.
In LaFief, our supreme court held that an assistant professor who was notified that
his one-year contract would not be renewed was entitled to unemployment benefits.
LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 185. However, the facts in LaFief are not comparable to the facts
here. In fact, the court in LaFief noted:
This holding does not alter the general rule that employees
who contractually agree to mandatory vacation periods or
temporary shut downs are not eligible for unemployment
benefits so long as they have reasonable assurance that they
will continue to be employed after the mandatory vacation
period or temporary shut down ends. See Ind. Code Ann. §
22-4-14-7(a) (individuals employed by educational
institutions are not entitled to unemployment benefits during
the period between two successive academic years if they
were employed during one period and there is a reasonable
assurance that they will be employed during the successive
term); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-14-8 (individuals whose
employment consists of participating in sports are not entitled
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to unemployment benefits between seasons if they were
employed during one season and there is a reasonable
assurance that they will be employed during the successive
season); Pope v. Wabash Valley Human Serv., Inc., 500
N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“Where the
employment contract or collective bargaining agreement
provides for a shutdown or vacation period, the employees
who signed or assented to the contract are not ‘unemployed’
within the meaning contemplated by the [Unemployment
Compensation Act]”).
LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 187.3
The Legislature has not defined “vacation” in the context of unemployment
insurance benefits, and the Review Board found that the term “vacation” as used in
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was ambiguous. The Review Board pointed out that
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 required reasonable assurance of employment after the
vacation, which would not normally be required by an employee taking a traditional
vacation for leisure or pleasure. Thus, the Review Board determined that the traditional
definition of “vacation” was inapplicable and that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 must
concern “an employer-mandated period in which work is not performed.” Appellant’s
App. p. 4. Given the great weight we must give to an interpretation of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, we cannot say that the Review
Board’s interpretation of the term “vacation” in Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 is
unreasonable. See Two Market Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 679 N.E.2d at 886 (“When
3
We also note that LaFief was decided in 2008, prior to the enactment of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5.
Some of the language of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 is similar to the language found in LaFief.
Compare LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 187 (“[E]mployees who contractually agree to mandatory vacation
periods or temporary shut downs are not eligible for unemployment benefits so long as they have
reasonable assurance that they will continue to be employed after the mandatory vacation period or
temporary shut down ends.”); with I.C. § 22-4-3-5.
12
the meaning of an administrative regulation is in question, the interpretation of the
administrative agency is given great weight unless the agency’s interpretation would be
inconsistent with the regulation itself.”).
With the Review Board’s interpretation of the term “vacation” in mind, we must
determine whether Broxton was properly denied benefits pursuant to Indiana Code
Section 22-4-3-5. The Department has determined that it will consider several factors in
determining whether an employee is on a vacation week under Indiana Code Section 22-
4-3-5, including:
1. Whether a written contract between the employer and
the employee provides for a paid or unpaid vacation
week designation;
2. Whether a vacation week was the result of an
employer’s regular vacation policy and practice;
3. Whether an employer provided a reasonable assurance
to the employee that they would have employment
available with the employer after the vacation period
ends. Such an assurance is not required to be provided
by explicit declaration or direct communication but
may be inferred by past employer or employee
conduct, policy, practice, or custom, such that the
employee knew or should have known of their
employment availability. Additionally, such an
assurance shall provide more than a speculative date of
return to employment in order to be reasonable;
4. Whether, as part of the above-mentioned reasonable
assurance, an employer gave reasonable notice to the
employee concerning the vacation week or facility
shutdown. Such notice is not required to be provided
by explicit declaration or direct communication, but
may be inferred by past employer or employee
conduct, policy, practice or custom, such that the
13
employee knew or should have known of the vacation
week or mandated facility shutdown;
5. Whether the employer, on their own initiative, has
provided the Department with advance notice of any
vacation week or shutdown period.
Appellant’s App. pp. 40-41. This list of factors is “not exclusive,” and the Department
makes determinations on such “vacation” issues “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 41.
Here, Broxton states that he was employed “under a labor agreement,” but there is
no evidence of such agreement in the record. Appellant’s Br. p. 12 n.10. During the
college’s summer break, it was Sodexo’s regular practice to reduce its services because of
the lack of students. Broxton regularly does not work and is unpaid from May to August,
except that he is “on call” and must call Sodexo each Tuesday to see if work is available.
Tr. p. 4. Broxton had worked for Sodexo since 2008 and was clearly aware of the
summer “vacation” practice and had reasonable assurances that he would return to
employment in August when the students returned. The Review Board applied the
relevant factors and concluded that, under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, Broxton was
not totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed.
The Review Board’s determination that Broxton was on an unpaid “vacation
week” because of Sodexo’s regular vacation policy and practice and had a reasonable
assurance of employment after the vacation period ended is reasonable. Based on the
factors set out by the Department, we cannot say that the Review Board erred when it
determined that Broxton was ineligible for unemployment benefits due to Indiana Code
Section 22-4-3-5.
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III. On Call
Next, Broxton argues that he was totally unemployed because no “on call” work
was available to him during the summer of 2012. In support of his argument, he relies on
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3, which provides:
An individual is not totally unemployed, part-totally
unemployed, or partially unemployed for any week in which
the individual:
(1) is regularly and customarily employed on an on call or
as needed basis; and
(2) has:
(A) remuneration for personal services payable to
the individual; or
(B) work available from the individual’s on-call or
as needed employer.
The Review Board held that this statutory provision was inapplicable because Broxton
was “not regularly and customarily employed on an ‘on call’ or ‘as needed’ basis.”
Appellant’s App. pp. 3-4.
Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3 provides an exception to the definition of totally
unemployed, part-totally unemployed, or partially unemployed. If the employee falls
under the exception, he or she is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Because the
Review Board found that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3 was inapplicable, it did not use
this statutory provision to deny unemployment benefits to Broxton. On appeal, the
Review Board argues that “although Broxton is ineligible for unemployment
compensation benefits based on other statutory sections, any claims or arguments made
15
by Broxton based on Section 22-4-3-3 need not be addressed because they are immaterial
to whether . . . Broxton was properly denied benefits.” Appellee’s Br. p. 24. We agree
with the Review Board. Because we have determined that the Review Board properly
denied Broxton benefits under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, we need not address this
argument.
IV. Inconsistent with Other Provisions
Next, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s decision is inconsistent with other
provisions of the Act. Specifically, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s application
of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with: (1) the eligibility provisions of the Act;
(2) the Act’s seasonal work provision found at Indiana Code Section 22-4-14-11; (3)
provisions that “focus on claims by unemployed individuals with respect to specific
weeks of unemployment;” and (4) the notice provision of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5.
Appellant’s Br. p. 20.
We have already held that the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana Code
Section 22-4-3-5’s notice provisions is reasonable. Broxton admits that the seasonal
worker provisions do not apply to him. As such, we fail to understand how the seasonal
worker provisions conflict with the Review Board’s interpretation. As for the remaining
arguments, Broxton offers neither cogent arguments nor citations to relevant authority in
support of these assertions; the arguments are therefore waived. Doughty v. Review Bd.
of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
V. Purpose of the Act
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Finally, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana Code
Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with the purpose of the Act. The Act provides:
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this
article, the public policy of this state is declared to be as
follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is
declared hereby to be a serious menace to the health, morale,
and welfare of the people of this state and to the maintenance
of public order within this state. Protection against this great
hazard of our economic life can be provided in some measure
by the required and systematic accumulation of funds during
periods of employment to provide benefits to the unemployed
during periods of unemployment and by encouragement of
desirable stable employment. The enactment of this article to
provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed
through no fault of their own, to encourage stabilization in
employment, and to provide for integrated employment and
training services in support of state economic development
programs, and to provide maximum job training and
employment opportunities for the unemployed,
underemployed, the economically disadvantaged, dislocated
workers, and others with substantial barriers to employment,
is, therefore, essential to public welfare; and the same is
declared to be a proper exercise of the police powers of the
state. To further this public policy, the state, through its
department of workforce development, will maintain close
coordination among all federal, state, and local agencies
whose mission affects the employment or employability of
the unemployed and underemployed.
I.C. § 22-4-1-1. The Act is “given a liberal construction in favor of employees because it
is social legislation meriting such construction in order to promote its underlying
humanitarian purposes.” Scott v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 725
N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
According to Broxton, the Review Board’s interpretation conflicts with the
purpose of the Act to provide unemployment benefits to those workers involuntarily
17
unemployed. Broxton argues that his summer unemployment is not voluntary and occurs
through no fault of his own. Although we acknowledge the general policy behind the Act
and sympathize with the hardship that Broxton and similarly situated employees suffer,
we must also acknowledge the Review Board’s argument that its “interpretation of this
statute prevents employers from using unemployment benefits to subsidize employees
who have a reasonable assurance of returning to work after a regularly scheduled
vacation break.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9. We simply cannot say that the Review Board’s
interpretation of the relevant statutes is unreasonable.
Conclusion
We cannot say that the Review Board erred when it denied unemployment benefits
to Broxton pursuant to the provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. We affirm.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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