Brittney L. Romero v. Teddy Brady and Advantage Tank Lines, LLC

Mar 13 2014, 7:15 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
AMY R. WHEATLEY BRYAN J. DILLON
NICHOLAS F. STEIN F. LARKIN FORE
Law Office of Nicholas F. Stein SARAH M. FORE
New Albany, Indiana Fore Miller & Schwartz
Louisville, Kentucky
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BRITTNEY L. ROMERO, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 72A05-1308-CT-471
)
TEDDY BRADY and )
ADVANTAGE TANK LINES, LLC, )
)
Appellees-Defendants, )
APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Roger L. Duvall, Judge
Cause No. 72C01-1104-CT-5
March 13, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Brittney Romero appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Teddy Brady
and Advantage Tank Lines, LLC., (“Advantage”) (collectively, “the Appellees”). We
reverse.
Issue
Romero raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
Facts
On October 21, 2010, Romero was driving her car southbound on I-65 in Scott
County. Romero was traveling in the left lane, and Brady, who is employed by
Advantage, was driving a tractor-trailer in the right lane behind Jonathan Stigler, who
was driving a box truck. After Romero passed Brady, Stigler swerved into the left lane,
causing Romero to drive off the left shoulder, lose control of her car, and drive
perpendicularly into the right lane, in front of Brady’s truck. Brady’s truck collided with
Romero’s car, and she suffered extensive injuries as a result of the collision.
Romero filed an amended complaint alleging that Stigler, Brady, and Advantage
were negligent. Romero settled with Stigler, and she dismissed her claim against him.
The Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Brady did not owe
Romero a duty to maintain a certain distance behind Stigler’s truck. The Appellees also
argued that, even if Brady was following Stigler’s truck too closely, “there is no dispute
that Brady had no part in causing Romero’s vehicle to leave the roadway or to travel into
his lane of travel.” Id. at 58. Romero responded by arguing that Brady owed her a duty
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of reasonable care. The trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment
because Brady did not owe Romero a duty, Brady did not violate any duty owed to
Romero, and “[t]he link in causation is simply missing as between Brady’s following
distance to Stigler and the impact of Brady’s vehicle with Romero when her vehicle
entered his lane of travel.” Id. at 31. Romero now appeals.
Analysis
Romero argues that the trial court erred in granting of summary judgment in favor
of the Appellees. “We review an appeal of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment using the same standard applicable to the trial court.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964
N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ind. 2012). “Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate only if the
designated evidence reveals ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).
Our review of summary judgment is limited to evidence designated to the trial court. Id.(citing T.R. 56(H)). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence
designated by the parties is construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and we do not defer to the trial court’s legal determinations. Id.“‘The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there
can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law.’” Bushong v.
Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 2003) (citation omitted). Once the moving party
has sustained its burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the
appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must designate
specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial. Id. A factual issue is material for the
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purposes of Trial Rule 56(C) if it bears on the ultimate resolution of a relevant issue, and
a factual issue is genuine if it is not capable of being conclusively foreclosed by reference
to undisputed facts. Id. “As a result, despite conflicting facts and inferences on some
elements of a claim, summary judgment may be proper where there is no dispute or
conflict regarding a fact that is dispositive of the claim.” Id. “If the opposing party fails
to meet its responsive burden, the court shall render summary judgment.” Id.The tort of negligence has three elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the
defendant’s breach. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). “Summary
judgment is therefore appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one
element of a claim.” Id.Romero’s theory of liability rests on the notion that Brady was traveling too
closely behind Stigler. She contends that, had Brady been 400 feet or more behind
Stigler, she would not have crossed Brady’s path when she drove into his lane. She also
argues that, by following Stigler too closely, Brady did not allow himself enough time to
react and avoid the hazard.
On appeal, Romero argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Brady did
not owe her a duty of care. In analyzing this issue, the parties use the three-part test set
out in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991), which focuses on the relationship
between the parties, the foreseeability of harm to the victim, and public policy
considerations. As our supreme court has explained, however, “the three-part balancing
test articulated in Webb is a useful tool in determining whether a duty exists, but only in
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those instances where the element of duty has not already been declared or otherwise
articulated.” Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003).
For example, there is no need to apply Webb to determine what duty a business owner
owes to its invitees or school authorities owe their students because these duties are well-
established. Id.Like the duty owed by business owners to invitees and school authorities to
students, the duty owed by motorists to fellow motorists is well-established. “All
operators of motor vehicles have a general duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuries to
other motorists.”1 Wilkerson v. Harvey, 814 N.E.2d 686, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see
also Cole v. Gohmann, 727 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“A motorist has a
duty to use due care to avoid a collision and to maintain his automobile under reasonable
control.”); Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. Lamb, 361 N.E.2d 174, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“This
State imposes a general duty upon all operators of motor vehicles to use ordinary care to
avoid injuries to other motorists.”). Because it is well-established that Brady had a duty
to use ordinary care to avoid injuring other motorists, including Romero, the three-part
Webb analysis is unnecessary.2 Cf. Key v. Hamilton, 963 N.E.2d 573, 584 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (analyzing the three factors articulated in Webb and holding that a motorist
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Both parties suggest that the drivers of automobiles owe a duty to others lawfully using the public
streets and highways. See Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 623, 98 N.E. 640, 641 (1912). To the extent the
Appellees suggest that, because Romero was operating her car unlawfully when she drove into Brady’s
lane, Brady did not owe Romero a duty of care, we disagree. We believe that one’s purportedly unlawful
use of a public street is more appropriately analyzed in terms of breach and/or comparative fault.
2
It is also well-settled that “a motorist must maintain a proper lookout while operating a motor vehicle as
a reasonably prudent person would do in the same or similar circumstances.” Cole v. Gohmann, 727
N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Romero’s claim does not appear to be based on Brady’s failure
to keep a proper lookout.
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signaling on another driver owed a duty to a third-party motorist who collided with the
signaled driver), trans. denied.
To the extent the Appellees frame the issue as whether Brady owed Romero a duty
not to follow Stigler too closely, we believe that description of the duty owed by Brady to
Romero is too narrowly drawn. As our supreme court has explained in the context of a
school’s duty to its students:
An approach that focuses on rearticulating that duty based
upon a given set of facts is misplaced in our view because to
do so presupposes that an issue which is thought to be settled
must be revisited each time a party frames the duty issue a
little differently. Rather, because a school’s duty to its
students already has been established, the focus shifts to
whether a given set of facts represents a breach of that duty.
Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ind.
2001) (footnote omitted). Similarly, it is well-established that motorists have a duty to
use due care to avoid collisions, and whether a motorist was following another motorist
too closely goes to the issue of breach.
Although we conclude that Brady owed Romero a duty, if the Appellees
established that the element of breach or causation was clearly absent, summary
judgment would still be appropriate. See Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 403
(Ind. 2011) (observing that where there are no genuine issues of material fact and any one
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of the elements of negligence is clearly absent, summary judgment is appropriate).
Romero contends that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding:3
1. Whether Teddy Brady was following Jonathan
Stigler’s box truck at a distance of less than 200 feet to which
he testified or a distance of 40 feet as opined by expert Jay
Nogan;
2. Whether Jonathan Stigler suddenly changed lanes and
forced Brittney Romero off the roadway causing her to lose
control of her vehicle.
Appellant’s Br. p. 14. We disagree that these designated issues of fact present genuine
issues of material fact for trial.
First, for the proposition that Brady was traveling forty feet behind Stigler,
Romero cites the deposition testimony of her expert, Jay Nogan. Although Romero
designated Nogan’s report4 in response to the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment,
she did not designate his deposition. In fact, in her response to the Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment, Romero states that “Brady was following 200 feet behind” Stigler
and that Brady was following Stigler’s truck “at a distance of 200 feet.” App. pp. 124,
125. “No judgment rendered on the motion shall be reversed on the ground that there is a
genuine issue of material fact unless the material fact and the evidence relevant thereto
shall have been specifically designated to the trial court.” Indiana Trial Rule 56(H); see
also Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 831 (“Appellate review of summary judgment is limited to
3
Although Romero asserts there are “numerous genuine issues of material fact” including, but not
limited to, the two she specifically identifies, we decline to search the record for other factual disputes
that would preclude the entry of summary judgment. Appellant’s Br. p. 14.
4
In this report, Nogan concluded that Brady “must have been following Stigler at a distance less than
200 feet . . . .” App. p. 230.
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evidence designated to the trial court.”). Because Nogan’s deposition testimony was not
properly designated evidence, it is not a basis for reversing the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment.
Second, whether Stigler suddenly changed lanes and forced Romero off the
roadway are not material questions of fact because they do not bear on the ultimate
resolution of a relevant issue. See Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 474. Regardless of why
Romero drove off the road, there is no allegation that Brady’s actions caused Romero to
swerve, lose control of her car, and drive into his lane. Thus, even if Stigler did suddenly
change lanes and force Romero off the roadway, Romero has failed to show how that
conduct impacts Brady’s potential liability. This is not a genuine issue of material fact
that precludes the entry of summary judgment.
Romero also asserts that Brady breached the duty he owed to her by failing to give
himself adequate distance to stop in time to avoid colliding with her car. “Whether a
particular act or omission is a breach of duty is generally a question of fact for the jury.”
Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 466. “It can be a question of law where the facts are undisputed and
only a single inference can be drawn from those facts.” Without assessing Romero’s
likelihood of success at trial, we conclude that the Appellees, as the moving party, did not
specifically address the issue of breach in their motion for summary judgment and have
not established that only a single inference can be drawn from the facts. The issue of
breach remains a question for the trier of fact.
Further, Romero contends that Brady caused the collision that injured her. In their
motion for summary judgment, the Appellees argued that Brady following Stigler did not
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cause the collision and that Brady’s involvement in the accident was simply a matter of
timing. In response Romero argued, “Because he was following Stigler’s box truck too
closely, Brady did not allow himself enough time to react and was unable to stop in time
to avoid that hazard.” App. p. 127. An act or omission is the proximate cause of an
injury if the ultimate injury is one that was foreseen, or reasonably should have been
foreseen, as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. Rhodes v.
Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind. 2004). “The question of proximate cause is one
usually left to the jury.” Id. Whether the collision between Brady and Romero was
foreseen or reasonably foreseeable as a natural consequence of Brady following Stigler at
the distance he was is a question for the trier of fact. Because the Appellees have not
negated one of the elements of negligence, the entry of summary judgment was not
appropriate.
Conclusion
Because Brady owed Romero a duty of care and the questions of breach and
proximate cause are not undisputed, the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees was improper. We reverse.
Reversed.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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