John M. Weidman v. State of Indiana

FOR PUBLICATION
Apr 28 2014, 9:33 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANDREW J. BALDWIN
Baldwin Adams & Kamish, PC GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Franklin, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHN M. WEIDMAN, )
)
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 03A01-1306-CR-255
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Judge
Cause Nos. 03C01-1102-FA-898, 03C01-1205-FC-2659
April 28, 2014
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
John M. Weidman (“Weidman”) pleaded guilty in Bartholomew Circuit Court to
Class C felony dealing in marijuana, two counts of Class D felony attempted receiving
stolen property, Class D felony dealing in marijuana, and Class D felony possession of
marijuana. The trial court sentenced Weidman to an executed term of fourteen years, and
Weidman appeals, claiming that he should have been given credit for the time he spent on
electronic monitoring as a condition of bond. Because Weidman specifically agreed in
his plea agreement that he was not entitled to credit for time that he was on electronic
monitoring, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The State charged Weidman on February 14, 2011 under Cause No. 03C01-1102-
FA-898 (“Cause No. FA-898”) with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class B felony
dealing in cocaine, Class C felony dealing in marijuana, two counts of Class D felony
attempted receiving stolen property, and Class D felony dealing in marijuana. The trial
court set Weidman’s bond at $150,000 or 10% cash; thus, Weidman needed $15,000 cash
to bond out. Weidman subsequently filed motions to reduce his bond to $60,000 or 10%
cash, which the trial court granted. After Weidman posted a $6,000 cash bond, he was
released and placed on electronic monitoring on March 21, 2011. Shortly thereafter,
Weidman filed a motion requesting that his bond be increased to $150,000 or 10% cash
and that he be released from electronic monitoring. The trial court denied this motion.
While Weidman was on electronic monitoring, the police discovered a large
amount of marijuana in a house owned by Weidman that was adjacent to Weidman’s own
home. As a result, Weidman was charged on May 23, 2012 with Class D felony
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possession of marijuana in Cause No. 03C01-1205-FC-2659 (“Cause No. FC-2659”).
Weidman did not post bond on this charge.
On December 21, 2012, Weidman and the State entered into an agreement in
which Weidman would plead guilty in Cause No. FA-898 to Class C felony dealing in
marijuana, Class D felony dealing in marijuana, and two counts of Class D felony
attempted receiving stolen property. As part of this plea deal, Weidman also agreed to
plead guilty in Cause No. FC-2659 to Class D felony possession of marijuana. The trial
court held a hearing on the matter on January 24, 2013, and at this hearing, Weidman
argued that he should receive credit for the time he had been released on bond on
electronic monitoring. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court rejected the plea
agreement.
On April 15, 2013, Weidman and the State again entered into a plea agreement in
which Weidman agreed to plead guilty in Cause No. FA-898 to Class C felony dealing in
marijuana, Class D felony dealing in marijuana, and two counts of Class D felony
attempted receiving stolen property; in Cause No. FC-2659, Weidman again agreed to
plead guilty to Class D felony possession of marijuana. The parties also agreed that the
sentences on the dealing in marijuana convictions would be served concurrently and that
the sentences on the attempted receiving stolen property convictions would be served
concurrently but that these two groups of concurrent sentences would be served
consecutively to each other. The agreement also provided that the sentence in Cause No.
FC-2659 would be served consecutively to the sentences in Cause No. FA-898. Lastly,
as part of the plea agreement, Weidman specifically agreed that he was not entitled to
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credit time toward his sentences for the period of time that he was on electronic
monitoring as a condition of his release on bond. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Weidman to the maximum under the terms of
the plea—fourteen years incarceration. Weidman now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Weidman argues that he is entitled to credit for the time he was on electronic
monitoring as a condition of his release on bond. However, as noted above, Weidman
specifically agreed in his plea agreement that he was not entitled to such credit. Absent
any claim that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered, Weidman is bound by
this provision. See State v. Holloway, 980 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“All
parties are bound to the terms of a plea agreement accepted by the court, but the plea
agreement will only be valid if it was knowingly and willingly agreed to.”) (citing Lee v.
State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004); Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008)).
And here, Weidman makes no argument that his plea was involuntary.
Nor does it matter that Weidman now claims that his right to credit time is of
constitutional dimension. A defendant may enter into a plea agreement that provides for
the waiver of constitutional rights; indeed, “[d]efendants waive a whole panoply of rights
by voluntarily pleading guilty.” Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (Ind. 2002).
These waived rights include the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination,
the right of appeal, and the right to attack collaterally one’s plea based on double
jeopardy. See id. Our supreme court has also held that a defendant may waive in a
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voluntary plea agreement the constitutional right to appellate review of a sentence.
Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75.
We therefore conclude that Weidman waived his right to claim that he was entitled
to credit for the time he was on electronic monitoring. To allow such a challenge now
would be to permit him to benefit from the terms of the plea agreement without
upholding his end of the bargain struck in the plea agreement. See Mapp, 770 N.E.2d at
335 (noting permitting defendant to challenge his sentence on double jeopardy grounds
would “deprive both prosecutors and defendants of the ability to make precisely the kind
of bargain that was made here.”). And Weidman did benefit; in exchange for his plea,
the State dismissed serious charges, and the trial court ordered the sentences on some of
Weidman’s convictions to be served concurrently.
Conclusion
Weidman specifically agreed in his plea agreement that he was not entitled to
credit for the time he was on electronic monitoring as a condition of his release on bond.
Accordingly, he may not now claim that he was entitled to credit for the time he was on
electronic monitoring. As this is the only challenge Weidman makes to his sentence, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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