Albert L. Hauck and Mark Wood v. City of Indianapolis

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN F. KAUTZMAN AMEEN R. NAJJAR
M. ELIZABETH BEMIS Office of Corporation Counsel
JOHN A. HENRY Indianapolis, Indiana
Ruckelshaus Kautzman Blackwell
Bemis & Hasbrook
Indianapolis, Indiana
Sep 24 2014, 9:59 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ALBERT L. HAUCK and MARK WOOD )
)
Appellants-Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1403-PL-136
)
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cynthia J. Ayers, Judge
Cause No. 49D04-1205-PL-18087
September 24, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Albert L. Hauck and Mark Wood appeal the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the City of Indianapolis (the “City”). Hauck and Wood raise three
issues, which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in entering summary
judgment in favor of the City and against them. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (the “IMPD”) was
created as the result of the consolidation of the Indianapolis Police Department (the
“IPD”) and the Marion County Sheriff’s Department (the “MCSD”). At the time of the
consolidation, there were approximately 1,235 IPD officers and 398 MCSD deputies.
Hauck and Wood were former MCSD deputies and are now IMPD officers.
The Revised Code of the Consolidated City and County Indianapolis/Marion,
Indiana, Title I, Chapter 279, governs the IMPD. Revised Code § 279-103(f) provides:
The chief,[1] with the approval of the director of the department of public
safety, shall endeavor to assign and maintain members of the department in
a manner to achieve the goal of proportional representation of former police
officers and sheriff’s deputies throughout the divisions and appointed ranks
of the department, including disciplinary board of captains appointments
provided in subsection 279-237(j), through December 31, 2010.
Revised Code § 279-104(b) provides:
For the period from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2010, the chief,
with the approval of the merit board, shall endeavor to promote members of
the department in a manner to achieve the goal of proportional
representation of former police officers and sheriff’s deputies throughout
the divisions and appointed ranks of the department.
1
“Chief means the Chief of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department . . . .” Revised
Code § 279-101.
2
In 2008, the IMPD conducted a promotional process for the ranks of sergeant,
lieutenant, and captain, and Hauck and Wood signed up to participate in the promotional
process for the rank of captain. The promotional processes are typically offered every
two or three years. As a part of the 2008 promotional process for captain, candidates
were assessed upon a number of components which were assigned various weights or
points. Candidates for the promotional process for the rank of captain were given an
information booklet which described the process, the various components, required
reading materials, review and appeals procedures, and the due dates of the testing events.
The components of the promotion process included a multiple-choice examination, an
oral interview, assessment exercises, writing exercises, time in service, time in rank,
education, and military service. The highest possible score for the promotion process
was 100 points, and candidates could lose points for prior disciplinary and attendance
issues.
On or about July 2, 2008, the 2008 captains promotional list was certified by the
IMPD Merit Board. The list contained the names of those persons eligible for promotion
to captain. The list included the names of twenty-one candidates who were ranked based
upon their total scores, which ranged from 78.82 for the candidate who placed in the first
position to 60.35 for the candidate who placed in the twenty-first position. Wood placed
in the tenth position on the promotional list with a total score of 69.92, and Hauck placed
in the thirteenth position on the list with a total score of 68.48. Of the twenty-one
candidates named on the promotional list, four were former members of the MCSD.
3
Hauck and Wood were the highest scoring former MCSD members on the promotional
list.2 The 2008 captains promotional list was to remain in effect for thirty months.
At the request of the Chief of Police and as approved by the merit board, the
candidate in the first position on the promotional list was promoted to captain in
September 2008, the candidate in the second position on the list was promoted to captain
in October 2010, and the candidates in the third, fourth, and fifth positions on the list
were promoted to captain in December 2010. Each of the five candidates promoted to
captain were former members of the IPD.
As a result of the 2008 promotional process, thirty-seven total promotions were
made. During the period from July 2008 through January 2011, no former members of
the MCSD were promoted to the rank of captain, one former member of the MCSD was
promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and five former members of the MCSD were
promoted to the rank of sergeant. The total number of sworn officers holding the rank of
captain in the IMPD were thirty in 2008, four of whom were former members of the
MCSD; twenty-nine in 2009, four of whom were former members of the MCSD; and
thirty-three in 2010, four of whom were former members of the MCSD.
On May 3, 2012, Hauck and Wood filed a complaint which stated that they
participated in IMPD’s promotional process for the rank of captain in 2008, they were
placed on the list with Wood listed in the tenth position and Hauck listed in the thirteenth
position, and they were the highest scoring former deputies on the captains list. The
complaint alleged that during the period the 2008 list was in effect, the City failed to
2
The other former MCSD candidates whose names appeared on the list were placed in the
twentieth and twenty-first places.
4
achieve or maintain proportional representation of former MCSD deputies to former IPD
officers, and the City’s failure to promote Hauck and Wood to the rank of captain during
the period of July 2, 2008 to January 4, 2011 constituted a breach of their employment
contract and Revised Code §§ 279-103 and -104. Hauck and Wood requested specific
performance and damages including promotions, back pay, and accrued seniority.
On August 26, 2013, the City filed a motion for summary judgment together with
designated evidence and a memorandum in support of the motion. On the same day,
Hauck and Wood filed a motion for summary judgment as to the issue of liability
together with designated evidence and a brief in support of the motion. In its
memorandum in support of its motion, the City argued that “[t]he City-County Council
clearly intended to give the Chief of Police discretion to make promotions as he sees fit,
and its language that the Chief ‘shall endeavor’ (i.e., try) is not a mandate that the Chief
must skip other candidates to promote former Marion County Sheriff’s deputies.”
Appellants’ Appendix at 160. The City further argued that, “[i]f the Court accepts
[Hauck and Wood’s] interpretation of Section 279-104(b), the Court will be forced to
omit the legislature’s inclusion of the word ‘endeavor.’” Id. at 174. In their
memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, Hauck and Wood argued
that the City-County Council expressed a clear intent to require the newly formed IMPD
“to endeavor to achieve proportional representation of 25% of former MCSD deputies
and 75% of former IPD officers throughout the appointed ranks of the IMPD” and “to do
so from the period of January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010” and that the City and
its agents failed to do so. Id. at 17. They also argued that the City “failed to even
5
consider or acknowledge the Revised Code or proportional representation in the 2008-
2010 promotional process” and failed to “make any effort whatsoever” to achieve
proportional representation. Id. at 18.
Hauck and Wood designated among other evidence the affidavit of Wood stating
that he was present at a merit board meeting at which Paul Ciesielski, the Chief of Police
for IMPD when four of the five promotions were made from the 2008 captains
promotional list, that Chief Ciesielski indicated he was aware of the city ordinance which
addressed the issue of proportional representation of former IPD officers and MCSD
deputies, that, when asked “if he agreed that the word ‘endeavor’ meant ‘to try really
hard,’ [Chief] Ciesielski said yes,” and that “when asked if he tried really hard to promote
members off of the captains list in order to meet the goal of proportional representation of
former [MCSD] deputies vs. former IPD officers as set forth in the city ordinance,
[Chief] Ciesielski responded ‘no.’” Id. at 149. The affidavit further stated that Chief
Ciesielski testified that “when he was Chief no one under his command was assigned to
monitor the proportional representation of former IPD to former [MCSD] deputies in the
ranks of IMPD.” Id.
In addition, Michael Spears, a former Chief of Police of IMPD, when asked during
a deposition,3 “did you ever skip over people to grab somebody . . . that ranked lower on
the list, to promote them,” responded “[y]es,” that he did so more than one time, that he
thought in “December 2006 on the captains’ eligibility list, I promoted, . . . three
3
The deposition of former Chief Spears was taken in connection with another lawsuit, portions
were designated by the City in support of its summary judgment motion, Hauck and Wood filed a motion
to submit newly disclosed supplemental evidence of other excerpts of Spears’s deposition, and the court
granted their motion and ordered that the additional deposition testimony of Chief Spears be admitted into
evidence.
6
candidates out of order” because “[t]hey were African-American candidates” and the
department “hadn’t had a black male promoted to the rank of captain since 1988 [and
they] were also very [] qualified . . . .” Id. at 313-314. When asked “[w]here a person
lands on that list, does that necessarily mean they’re less qualified . . . for the promotion,”
Spears testified “I think the answer to that is sometimes it does and sometimes it
doesn’t,” that “[i]t depends on the person” and “their past performance [], the work
they’ve done, the problems that they’ve had and all those sorts of things,” and that “[s]o
I’m not sure I could say just yes or no to that.” Id. at 316.
On January 22, 2014, the court held a hearing and entered an order which granted
the summary judgment motion of the City and denied the summary judgment motion of
Hauck and Wood. Under the heading Findings of Fact, the court found that Section 279-
102 of the Revised Code provides for the consolidation of the IPD and MCSD, that at the
time of the consolidation there were approximately 1,235 IPD officers and 398 MCSD
deputies, and that the deputies constituted approximately twenty-five percent of the
IMPD officers. Under the heading Conclusions of Law, the court concluded the language
of Revised Code §§ 279-103 and -104 was not clear and unambiguous on its face and
could be subject to at least two interpretations which therefore require the court to
determine legislative intent. The court further concluded:
The crucial terms to be interpreted in both sections are the words
“shall endeavor”. The parties disagreed on whether that language was
discretionary or mandatory. Ordinarily, the word “shall” means “will” and
the words are used in a mandatory sense. The word “endeavor” generally
means to “attempt”, “make an effort”, “to strive”, or “to try” to do or
“affect” something. An apparent misperception lies in the addition of the
word “shall” in front of the word “endeavor”. On one hand, if the word
“shall” had been used alone, the sentence construction would have
7
compelled a certain course of action by the Chief. On the other hand, if the
word “endeavor[”] had been used alone; the sentence would have been
interpreted to mean that the actor must only try to achieve a particular goal.
However, the sentence contains both words used in conjunction with one
another. Thus, adding the auxiliary verb “shall” to the word “endeavor”, in
the same sentence, did not automatically make the actions by the Chief
(proportional promotions) any more imperative and or certain.
Consequently, the word “shall” has no real effect on the actions taken by
the Chief, other than for him to make a serious attempt at representative
promotions, and sets no objective standards for measurement of the
outcome of the promotional process.
Id. at 11. Finally, the court concluded:
Therefore, the use of the terms “shall endeavor”, in this manner,
dictated no compulsory scheme of promotions when the Chief made
advancement decisions for members of the department. The language of
Section 279-104(b), interpreted plainly, gives the Chief of Police discretion
and requires only that he attempt to make representational promotions of
former police officers and sheriff’s deputies. The final outcome of the
promotional process did not, necessarily, demonstrate that no effort was
made by the Chief to carry out the intent of the ordinance. Accordingly,
summary judgment should be granted for the [City].
Id. at 12.
DISCUSSION
The issue is whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of
the City and against Hauck and Wood. Summary judgment is appropriate only where
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural
Resources, 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn
from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 973.
Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the
trial court. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we
8
may affirm on any grounds supported by the Indiana Trial Rule 56 materials. Catt v. Bd.
of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2002). The entry of specific findings
and conclusions does not alter the nature of a summary judgment which is a judgment
entered when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. Rice v. Strunk,
670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. 1996). In the summary judgment context, we are not bound
by the trial court’s specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. They merely aid
our review by providing us with a statement of reasons for the trial court’s actions. Id.
We review a summary judgment order de novo. Bules v. Marshall Cnty., 920 N.E.2d
247, 250 (Ind. 2010). The fact that the parties make cross-motions for summary
judgment does not alter our standard of review. Sterling Commercial Credit-Mich., LLC
v. Hammert’s Iron Works, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Instead, we
must consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Hauck and Wood argue that the undisputed facts indicate that the City made no
effort whatsoever to effectuate the goal of proportional representation. They argue that
the City-County Council provided plain, unambiguous language in the Revised Code
directing the method, manner, and duration of the proposed measures regarding
consolidation and the duties of the IMPD and the Chief of Police. Hauck and Wood
further maintain that, “[c]ontrary to the City’s numerous assertions in its briefing on
summary judgment, [they] did not ask the trial court and do not ask this Court to ignore,
omit, or in any way diminish the importance of the word ‘endeavor’ . . . .” Appellants’
Brief at 13. Hauck and Wood contend that “a government actor subject to the legislative
9
directive of ‘shall endeavor’ must exert oneself to do or attempt something, . . . [i]n other
words, make a good faith effort to effectuate the legislative directive.” Id. at 14.
Hauck and Wood further state: “In the case at bar, [they] were the highest ranking
former MCSD deputies on the 2008 captains promotional list and the proportion of
former MCSD deputies at the rank of captain was well below the required proportional
representation (12-14% rather than 25%).” Id. They argue that the City in no way tried
or endeavored to promote officers in furtherance of the Revised Code’s goal of
proportional representation, that the “durational language of the ordinance, i.e. between
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010, demonstrates the Council’s intent to create a
binding ordinance,” and that “the factors used to generate the promotional list for
captain—a written test, oral interviews, assessment exercises, writing exercises, time in
service (seniority), time in rank as Lieutenant, education, and military experience” did
not “include or consider in any way promotional candidates’ status as former MCSD
deputies or the proportional representation of such persons in the IMPD at the time the
list was generated.” Id. at 16-17. They contend that “[c]onsidering the rank order alone
in making promotions did nothing to promote, pursue, or in any way consider
proportional representation in the IMPD.” Id. at 17.
The City maintains that the Revised Code “required the Chief of Police to try and
achieve the goal of proportionate representation of former IPD and MCSD officers in the
promoted ranks of the newly merged IMPD, without setting specific restrictions on how a
particular promotional policy be adopted.” Appellee’s Brief at 14. The City argues the
word “endeavor” does not create a right to a necessary outcome or result. And, the City
10
contends, according to Hauck and Wood, the Chief was required to deviate from the
standard promotional policy whenever the representation of former IPD officers and
MCSD deputies “falls outside a 3-1 ratio” in order to return the balance of former IPD
officers and MCSD deputies to that ratio. Id. at 15. The City further argues the Revised
Code “affected the nature of the promotional policy within IMPD as a whole, not merely
in specific instances where the balance tipped one way or the other” and that “[t]he Chief
was therefore required to develop a general promotional policy whereby he endeavored to
achieve the goal of proportional representation.” Id. at 16. The City maintains that, had
the Council intended the Chief to adopt a specific promotional policy, it would have
described or set forth that policy in the language of the ordinance and that, by omitting
any such language, the Council left the specific design of the promotional policy to the
Chief’s discretion. The City asserts that the “promotions [of Hauck and Wood] would
have required the Chief of Police to skip over at least six other more qualified
candidates.” Id. at 18-19.
In addition, the City contends that “[a] better interpretation of the ordinances, as
set forth and adopted by the City, is that the Chief of Police was required to use his
discretion to develop a non-discriminatory promotional policy where all candidates were
given an equal opportunity for advancement, irrespective of their pre-merger employment
status, and where possible and practical, promote former MCSD deputies.” Id. at 19.
The City further maintains:
The Chief of Police was required, by ordinance, to refrain from any form of
favoritism or discrimination on the basis of an officer’s former employer so
that every officer would have an equal opportunity for advancement and
neither group would be able to force their own people into the upper ranks
11
of the IMPD, thus garnering additional power or leverage over the other
during the transitional period.
To carry out the intent of the council, Chiefs Spears and Ciesielski,
with the approval of the Merit Board, developed a promotional process
where individual officers would be promoted on the basis of their
experience, education, disciplinary record, seniority, and performance on
uniformly administered written exams and oral assignments. Candidates
were selected for promotion based on their qualifications and were in no
way discriminated against on the basis of their pre-merger employer.
Id. at 20. The City also notes that “Hauck and Wood . . . are not alleging they were
treated unfairly during the promotional process . . . . Instead, [they] contend that
regardless of the fact of where they finished on the promotional list, they should have per
se been promoted due to their status as former MCSD deputies.” Id. at 20 n.1. The City
also maintains Hauck and Wood were given the same opportunity to be promoted to the
rank of captain as every other officer and that, if the City had been “politicking,” it would
have skipped over the more qualified candidates “because prior to the merger, they were
employed by IPD.” Id. at 22.
In their reply brief, Hauck and Wood argue that they “met their burden to present
prima facie evidence demonstrating a failure to endeavor,” that the “burden then shifted
to the City to contest or provide evidence to the contrary,” and that “[t]he City failed to
contest or offer any evidence in opposition to the statements by former IMPD Chiefs
Ciesielski and Spears in the summary judgment proceedings before the trial court.”
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 3. They also argue that no specific promotional policy was
mandated by the Revised Code, but the Revised Code “demanded a good faith effort to
endeavor, which the City failed to undertake.” Id. at 4. Hauck and Wood further argue
that, “by the City’s reading of the Revised Code, the City can take no affirmative action
12
whatsoever, so long as the promotional process that is pursued was uniform and neutral,”
that “[e]ssentially, the City presents no evidence at all to show that it endeavored to
promote pursuant to the ordinance or even considered the ordinance,” that “[d]espite the
ample evidence presented by [them], the City relies on the absence of evidence to support
its position,” that “[t]he term endeavor requires affirmative action,” and that “[a] neutral
employment policy with no due consideration or attempt to follow the Revised Code
simply cannot be sufficient as a matter of law.” Id. at 9-10.
“When asked to interpret an ordinance, this court will apply the same principles as
those employed for the construction of statutes.” Hamby v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of
Area Plan Comm’n of Warrick Cnty., 932 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
600 Land, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cnty., 889 N.E.2d 305, 309
(Ind. 2008) (quoting T.W. Thom Constr., Inc. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319,
324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The interpretation of an
ordinance is a question of law to which this court owes the trial court’s holding no
deference. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d at 324. The cardinal rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain the intent of the drafter by giving effect to the ordinary and
plain meaning of the language used. Id. Thus, we are not at liberty to construe a statute
that is unambiguous. Id. Where possible, every word must be given effect and meaning,
and no part is to be held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute.
Id. If a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, we must try to ascertain the
legislature’s intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent. Cook v.
Atlanta, Ind. Town Council, 956 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied,
13
trans. denied. We presume the legislature intended logical application of the language
used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results. Id. In addition, we will avoid
an interpretation that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id.
(citing City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l Utilities, 829 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind. 2005)
(explaining that the Court will avoid interpretations that render part of a statute
meaningless, bring about an absurd result, or create an illogical application)).
Revised Code § 279-103(f) provided in part that “[t]he chief . . . shall endeavor to
assign and maintain members of the department in a manner to achieve the goal of
proportional representation of former police officers and sheriff’s deputies throughout the
. . . appointed ranks of the department . . . through December 31, 2010.” (Emphasis
added). Revised Code § 279-104(b) provided in part that, “[f]or the period from January
1, 2007, through December 31, 2010, the chief . . . shall endeavor to promote members of
the department in a manner to achieve the goal of proportional representation of former
police officers and sheriff’s deputies throughout the . . . appointed ranks of the
department.” (Emphasis added).
In City of Indianapolis v. Ingram, this court addressed a statute which, in
establishing the police merit board, provided in part that “[t]he director shall endeavor to
appoint to the merit board one (1) experienced person from each of the following fields . .
. .” 176 Ind. App. 645, 656, 377 N.E.2d 877, 883 (1978) (emphasis added). This court
noted that “[t]he term ‘shall endeavor’ is not a term of art,” that “[o]rdinarily the term
‘shall’ in a statute is used in a mandatory sense,” and that “[h]ad the legislature intended
the language to be merely directory a more descriptive word could have been used, like
14
‘may.’” 377 N.E.2d at 884. We also noted that “[e]ndeavor” was defined to mean “to
exert oneself to do or effect something; to make an effort; strive; (2) to attempt; try.” Id.
We concluded: “Therefore, we believe the phrase could reasonably be read to mean, “The
director shall try to appoint . . . .” Id.
The record reveals that Wood placed in the tenth position and Hauck placed in the
thirteenth position on the 2008 promotional list for captain, that they were the highest
scoring former MCSD deputies on the list, and that the candidates in the first through
fifth positions on the list were promoted to captain from 2008 and 2010. While Chief
Ciesielski indicated at a meeting, according to the affidavit of Wood, that he did not try
“really hard” to promote members off of the captain’s list in order to meet the goal of
proportional representation, Appellants’ Appendix at 149, the designated evidence
includes information regarding the criteria and components used to generate the 2008
promotional list for captain and assess or score the candidates. According to the
informational booklet in the record, a certain number of points were assigned to the
various components of the promotion process; for example, the multiple-choice
examination was worth thirty-five points, the oral interview was worth fifteen points, and
the assessment exercises were worth twenty-five points. In addition to the various listed
components, candidates could lose up to eight points for prior discipline and up to five
points for prior attendance issues. The booklet described in detail how a candidate could
obtain points for education based on earned college credit hours and points for years of
service and time in rank. The criteria and components of the scoring process provided
equal opportunity for advancement. Had the scores been equal or close to equal between
15
a candidate who was a former IPD member and a candidate who was a former MCSD
member, the language of the ordinance may have required that the candidate who was a
former MCSD member be given the promotion. However, Wood placed in the tenth
position and Hauck placed in the thirteenth position in the promotional process. To have
overlooked the higher-scoring candidates would have shown a favoritism not
contemplated by the ordinance.
Moreover, even if it were shown that the City did not endeavor to maintain
proportionality in this case, Hauck and Wood cannot show damages or prevail given the
total number of former MCSD members holding the rank of captain following the
challenged promotions. The record shows that, prior to the promotions based on the 2008
captains list, approximately 13.3 percent of the total IMPD members holding the rank of
captain were former MCSD members, and following the promotions, approximately 12.1
percent of the total IMPD captains were former MCSD members, which is just 1.2
percent less than the pre-promotion percentage.4 In addition, of the thirty-seven total
promotions made within the IMPD to the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain during
this time period, approximately 16.2 percent of the promotions were awarded to former
MCSD members.5 Hauck and Wood cannot show, given the 1.2 percent difference
between the percentage of captains who were former MCSD members prior to the
promotions and that percentage following the promotions, that the City failed to maintain
4
The total number of members holding the rank of captain in the IMPD were thirty in 2008, four
of whom were former members of the MCSD, and thirty-three in 2010, four of whom were former
members of the MCSD.
5
Of the thirty-seven total promotions, one former MCSD member was promoted to lieutenant
and five former MCSD members were promoted to sergeant.
16
proportional representation of former MCSD and IPD members throughout the divisions
and appointed ranks of the IMPD.
As the trial court determined, the word “endeavor” as used in the ordinance is to
be given its plain and ordinary meaning, that is to “attempt to” or “try to.” Appellant’s
Appendix at 12. Based on the record, the City demonstrated that the IMPD Chief of
Police endeavored to promote members in a manner to achieve proportional
representation of former IPD and MCSD members, and Hauck and Wood cannot
establish that the City failed to maintain proportional representation of former MCSD and
IPD members throughout the divisions and appointed ranks of IMPD as contemplated by
Revised Code §§ 279-103(f) and -104(b). Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s
rulings on the parties’ summary judgment motions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment
in favor of the City and against Hauck and Wood.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
17