Robert Campbell v. State of Indiana

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY T. ARNOLD GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Richmond, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Oct 02 2014, 8:58 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ROBERT CAMPBELL, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 89A04-1312-CR-634
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Charles K. Todd, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 89D01-1203-MR-5
October 2, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Robert Campbell (Campbell), brings an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court’s Order granting the State’s Motion to Withdraw from Plea Agreement.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Campbell raises one issue on interlocutory appeal, which we restate as follows:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State’s Motion to Withdraw
from Plea Agreement.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 20, 2012, police officers discovered the deceased body of Mike Sekse
(Sekse) inside a shed in Richmond, Wayne County, Indiana. Five males, including
eighteen-year-old Campbell, were subsequently arrested in connection with Sekse’s death.
On March 28, 2012, the State filed an Information charging Campbell with one Count of
murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; one Count of felony murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2); two
Counts of robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, Class A felonies, I.C. § 35-42-5-1(1);
one Count of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-
5-1(1); two Counts of conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury,
Class A felonies, I.C. §§ 35-42-5-1(1), 35-41-5-2; and two Counts of conspiracy to commit
robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Class B felonies, I.C. §§ 35-42-5-1(1), 35-41-
5-2. On May 9, 2012, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9, the State filed an
Information seeking to sentence Campbell to life imprisonment without parole.
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On May 16, 2013, Campbell and the State entered into a Plea Agreement, in which
Campbell agreed to plead guilty to Count I, murder. In exchange for Campbell’s
acknowledgment that he intentionally killed Sekse during the commission of a robbery, the
State agreed to dismiss the eight other charges. The Plea Agreement provided that the trial
court would have the discretion to determine Campbell’s sentence, including the possibility
of life imprisonment without parole. As part of the deal, Campbell “agree[d] to voluntarily
and completely testify at any proceeding regarding the facts of this offense or other
offenses originally charged, including the role of any co-defendant.” (Appellant’s App. p.
313).
At a hearing on May 22, 2013, Campbell withdrew his initial plea of not guilty and
pled guilty to the sole Count of murder. On May 28, 2013, the trial court accepted the Plea
Agreement and entered a judgment of conviction for murder. A bifurcated sentencing
hearing was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2013.
On September 11, 2013, the State filed a Motion to Withdraw from Plea Agreement.
In its Motion to Withdraw, the State asserted that Campbell had “refused to honor” the
terms of the Plea Agreement. (Appellant’s App. p. 342). Specifically, during the trial of
one of Campbell’s co-defendants, Campbell refused to testify. Because Campbell had been
granted derivative and use immunity, the trial court subsequently found Campbell to be in
direct criminal contempt of court and sentenced him to two-and-one-half years of
incarceration.1 As a result of Campbell’s breach of the Plea Agreement, the State requested
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Campbell appealed his two-and-one-half-year sentence for contempt. In a memorandum decision, this
court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reduce Campbell’s sentence to a term of six
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that the trial court vacate its judgment of conviction and permit the State to withdraw from
the Plea Agreement. On September 26, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
State’s Motion to Withdraw. During the hearing, Campbell stipulated to the fact that he
had breached the terms of the Plea Agreement. However, Campbell argued that,
notwithstanding his breach, the State still received some benefit by virtue of the Plea
Agreement and, therefore, should remain bound by its terms.
On October 10, 2013, the trial court issued an Order granting the State’s Motion to
Withdraw from Plea Agreement. By refusing to testify at his co-defendant’s trial, the trial
court found that Campbell had breached a provision “of substance” and was not entitled to
receive the benefit of being sentenced in accordance with the Plea Agreement.
(Appellant’s App. p. 471). Accordingly, the trial court vacated Campbell’s judgment of
conviction and ordered the case to proceed to trial as originally charged.
On October 29, 2013, Campbell petitioned the trial court to certify its Order for
interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted Campbell’s request on November 27, 2013.
On February 3, 2014, our court accepted jurisdiction. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Campbell claims that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to
withdraw from the Plea Agreement. It is long settled “that plea agreements are in the nature
of contracts entered into between the defendant and the State.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d
months or less because anything greater would require a determination of guilt by a jury. See Campbell v.
State, No. 89A04-1309-CR-490, slip op. at 4-5 (Ind. Ct. App. May 9, 2014).
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35, 38 (Ind. 2004). Both the defendant and the State “bargain for and receive substantial
benefits from the agreement.” Wright v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
A trial court has discretion to either accept or reject a proposed plea agreement, and once
the trial court has accepted the plea agreement, the “court is bound by all the terms in the
plea agreement which are within its legal power to control.” I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e); Reffett v.
State, 571 N.E.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Ind. 1991). In general, the trial court may not revoke its
acceptance of a plea agreement. Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1230.
Campbell, the State, and the trial court are in agreement that Indiana courts have not
yet decided this precise situation. Thus, Campbell relies on firmly established case law
that holds the State may only withdraw from a plea agreement prior to the trial court’s
acceptance, as long as the defendant has not relied to his detriment on the plea agreement
and the State has not materially benefitted from the deal. See Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d
546, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Because the trial court had already accepted
the Plea Agreement and entered a judgment of conviction at the time of the breach,
Campbell contends that the trial court had no authority to rescind the Plea Agreement.
Rather, Campbell maintains that the trial court was obligated to enforce the Plea Agreement
by imposing a sentence in accordance with its terms. We disagree.
Because a plea agreement is an explicit contract between the State and a defendant,
we look to the principles of contract law for guidance. Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572,
574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. We interpret plea agreements with the primary
goal of giving effect to the parties’ intent. Wright, 700 N.E.2d at 1155. Terms that are
clear and unambiguous are conclusive of this intent; as such, the reviewing court must
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apply the contractual provisions without construing the contract or considering extrinsic
evidence. Id. Ambiguity will be found in a contract only where reasonable people would
find it “subject to more than one construction.” Id.
In this case, the language of the Plea Agreement unequivocally requires Campbell
to “voluntarily and completely testify at any proceeding” concerning the robbery and
murder of Sekse. (Appellant’s App. p. 313). It is undisputed that Campbell refused to
testify when called upon by the State at his co-defendant’s trial. While the Plea Agreement
explicitly provides that if Campbell appeals either his judgment or sentence, the deal will
be considered repudiated and the State may reinstate all nine charges, it does not include
any such specific remedy for his refusal to testify. See, e.g., Spivey v. State, 553 N.E.2d
508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding plea agreement was void based on defendant’s
refusal to provide truthful information where provision specified that defendant’s
deception would annul the deal). Nevertheless, we must presume that the parties included
each provision in the Plea Agreement for a purpose. Ind. Gaming Co. v. Blevins, 724
N.E.2d 274, 278-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. We find that the provision
obligating Campbell to testify in his co-defendants’ trials would be rendered meaningless
if Campbell could unilaterally break the Plea Agreement after acceptance by the trial court
and still receive the same benefits as if he had fully performed.
Consideration—i.e., “a ‘bargained for exchange’ whereby the promisor accrues a
benefit or the promisee accepts a detriment”—is an essential element of every contract.
Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. It is clear
that Campbell “receive[d] the full benefit of his bargain” when the State dismissed eight
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charges. Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013). Despite his breach, Campbell
contends that “the State did receive a benefit by [his] testimony at his plea hearing[,]”
which provided the State with “a valuable benefit (sic) about other co-defendants.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 7). Notwithstanding the lack of evidence in the record to support this
assertion, we find that by refusing to testify at his co-defendant’s trial, Campbell failed to
tender the consideration specifically contemplated in the Plea Agreement. Griffin, 756
N.E.2d at 575. Thus, we agree with the trial court that it would deprive the State of its end
of the bargain to sentence Campbell in accordance with a contract that he did not fully
satisfy. Moreover, as it was Campbell—not the State—who breached the Plea Agreement,
we find little merit in Campbell’s argument that the State’s real motive for withdrawing
was due to its realization that it had “made a bad deal” after Campbell’s co-defendant
received a ninety-year sentence. (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).
In addition, our courts have emphasized that due process concerns require that
criminal defendants have adequate safeguards during plea negotiations. Epperson v. State,
530 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Although a defendant does not have a
constitutional right to receive a plea bargain, if the State does make a promise to a
defendant, which promise constitutes part of the inducement or consideration for executing
a plea agreement, any subsequent breach by the State renders the defendant’s guilty plea
involuntary. Lineberry v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Roeder v.
State, 696 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Because the State cannot be “permitted to
violate plea agreements without impunity,” a defendant may be entitled to one of several
remedies, including specific performance or withdrawal of the guilty plea. Epperson, 530
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N.E.2d at 745. See I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b) (permitting defendant to withdraw from guilty plea
at any point prior to sentencing “for any fair and just reason”).
While a defendant’s breach of a plea agreement does not give rise to the same due
process concerns that permit a defendant’s withdrawal from a plea deal that the State has
breached, our court has recognized “that to permit a defendant to enter a plea bargain
binding on the court and thereafter retain the benefit of the bargain, while relieving himself
of his burden, would operate as a fraud upon the court.” Spivey, 553 N.E.2d at 509.
Furthermore, public policy considerations support the determination that the State should
have the same opportunities as a defendant to seek redress in the event of a defendant’s
breach of a plea agreement. Plea agreements are a valuable tool to the administration of
justice because pre-trial disposition of criminal charges “facilitate[s] the essential
conservation of limited judicial and prosecutorial resources.” Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d
203, 204 (Ind. 1986). A public perception that prosecutors will renege on plea deals could
“impair[] the reliability and usefulness” of plea agreements. Id. Similarly, to find that
Campbell has the prerogative to purposefully violate a provision of his Plea Agreement
“and consequently benefit himself . . . would greatly diminish the usefulness and finality
of plea agreements as parties would not be able to rely upon them.” Downs v. State, 827
N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Our supreme court has acknowledged the benefits that inure to the public when a
prosecutor “withhold[s] prosecution of one individual in exchange for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of a person deemed more dangerous to the public welfare.”
Bowers, 500 N.E.2d at 204. Here, Campbell was one of five individuals charged in
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connection with Sekse’s murder. The State promised to dismiss eight of Campbell’s
charges in exchange for, in part, testimony that would help secure the convictions of his
co-defendants. If we were to adopt Campbell’s argument that upon the trial court’s
acceptance of a plea agreement, the State may not withdraw under any circumstances and
the trial court must proceed directly to sentencing, the floodgates would be thrown wide
open for criminal defendants to make duplicitous promises to prosecutors in order to reduce
their own penal exposure, knowing that their negotiated sentences would be preserved
regardless of their non-compliance. Such a holding would “undermine the integrity and
credibility of the criminal justice system.” Id. Accordingly, even though the trial court
had already accepted the Plea Agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, we
conclude that Campbell’s subsequent breach warranted the State’s withdrawal from the
Plea Agreement prior to the imposition of any sentence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by granting the State’s Motion to Withdraw from Plea Agreement, vacating the judgment
of conviction, and ordering the case to proceed to trial.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J. and CRONE, J. concur
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