Cathy Rexroad v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. d/b/a R+L Carriers, r&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, and Richard C. Maples, Sr.

Jul 08 2015, 9:45 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Stephen L. Williams Robert B. Thornburg
Kyle T. Ring Maggie L. Smith
Williams Law Firm Timothy L. Karns
Terre Haute, Indiana Frost Brown Todd LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cathy Rexroad, et. al., July 8, 2015
Appellants-Plaintiffs, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1408-CT-391
v. Interlocutory Appeal from the
Marion Circuit Court
The Honorable Louis F. Rosenburg,
Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. Judge
d/b/a R+L Carriers, R&L The Honorable Mark A. Jones,
Carriers Shared Services, LLC, Commissioner
Cause No. 49C01-1303-CT-9775
and Richard C. Maples, Sr.,
Appellees-Defendants,
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Appellee-Defendant Richard C. Maples, an Ohio resident, was employed as a
truck driver by Appellant-Defendant R&L Carriers, an Ohio limited liability
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 1 of 7
company. The tractor-trailer driven by Maples was owned by Appellee-
Defendant Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. (“Greenwood”). On February 14,
2012, while in the course of his employment, Maples was driving on an Indiana
interstate when he lost control of his vehicle and struck another tractor-trailer
resulting in the death of Arnold Rexroad, Sr. (“Rexroad”), an Illinois resident.
Several members of Rexroad’s family were named as special administrators of
his estate and filed a negligence action against defendants. Ultimately,
Greenwood admitted that it was entirely at fault for the accident. Plaintiffs
requested that the trial court apply Illinois law to the only remaining unsettled
issue, damages. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request and chose to apply
Indiana law. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On February 14, 2012, Rexroad was driving a tractor-trailer on Interstate 70 in
Hendricks County, Indiana when he began experiencing mechanical
difficulties, pulled his tractor-trailer onto the right shoulder, and called for a tow
truck. Lindsey Measel, an Indiana resident, was travelling on the same
interstate and, as Rexroad’s tractor-trailer was being loaded on to the tow truck,
Measel slowed her vehicle in the left-hand lane. Maples, who was driving a
tractor-trailer directly behind Measel, was forced to change lanes in order to
avoid striking Measel’s vehicle. As a result, Maples lost control of his tractor-
trailer and collided with Rexroad’s vehicle. Rexroad died as a result of his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 2 of 7
injuries. At the time of the accident, Maples was operating his tractor-trailer in
the course of his employment with Greenwood.
[3] Rexroad was survived by his wife, Cathy Rexroad, his children, Greta Rice,
Cody Rexroad, Theresa Sutter, Janice Linder, and Arnold Rexroad, Jr., and his
step-children, Shannon Bennett and Mark Gibson (collectively the “Plaintiffs”).
On October 4, 2012, Plaintiffs, who are all Illinois residents, were named as
special administrators of Rexroad’s estate. Plaintiffs brought suit against
Greenwood alleging negligence in the operation of Maples’s vehicle resulting in
Rexroad’s death. Measel was also named as a defendant in the complaint.
[4] The parties met during pre-trial conferences on November 10, 2013 and May
16, 2014. On June 16, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum with the trial court
requesting that the trial court apply Illinois law to the case. On July 1, 2014,
following a hearing on the choice-of-law question, the trial court determined
that Indiana law would apply. The following day, during the final pre-trial
conference, Greenwood admitted to being solely at fault for the accident and
death of Rexroad. Greenwood’s stipulation to being at fault included a
condition that it was effective only so long as Indiana law applied. Plaintiffs
reached a settlement with Measel who was then dismissed from the case. Also
on July 2, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider
its ruling on the choice-of-law issue. On July 18, 2014, the trial court denied
Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. This interlocutory appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 3 of 7
[5] The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly
determined that Indiana law applies. Such an issue is purely a question of law.
Appellate courts evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a
trial court’s determination of such questions. Seel v. State, 739 N.E.2d 170, 172
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000); See also Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2003).
Choice of Law 1
[6] The Indiana Supreme Court established an analysis for addressing choice-of-
law questions in Hubbard Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071
(Ind. 1987). “[I]n tort cases[,] Indiana choice-of-law analysis now involves
multiple inquiries. As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether
the differences between the laws of the states are ‘important enough to affect the
outcome of the litigation.’” Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 804-05 (Ind. 2004)
(quoting Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073). Here, the parties agree that there are
substantial differences between Indiana and Illinois law. 2
If such a conflict exists, the presumption is that the traditional lex loci
delicti rule (the place of the wrong) will apply. Under this rule, the
court applies the substantive laws of the “the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.”
1
As a threshold issue, Greenwood argues that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of Indiana
Trial Rule 44.1(B), and its accompanying statute Indiana Code section 34-38-4-4, by failing to provide
reasonable notice of their intention to apply the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, ergo they should be precluded
from requesting that Illinois law be applied. However, where possible, we prefer to address cases on their
merits. Armstrong v. State, 932 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Furthermore, the trial court heard
Greenwood’s notice argument and, apparently, found it unavailing, choosing instead to address the merits of
the case in its order.
2
Briefly, the relevant difference between the two states’ laws is that “Illinois law permits recovery by all of
the deceased’s children, adult as well as minor, whereas Indiana does not.” Appellee’s App. p. 211.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 4 of 7
[Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073]. This presumption is not conclusive,
however. It may be overcome if the court is persuaded that “the place
of the tort ‘bears little connection’ to this legal action.” Id. at 1074.
Id.
[7] In Hubbard, an Indiana man was killed in Illinois while working on a lift used to
repair street lights. The man’s wife brought a products liability action against
the Indiana company that had built the lift. Id. at 1072. Although the harm
occurred in Illinois, the court found that the issue at the heart of the litigation
was the alleged defective manufacturing of the Indiana company, and that the
location of the harm was insignificant to determine whether the company was
liable. Id. at 1073. As such, they chose to apply Indiana law. Id.
[8] In Simon, the Indiana Supreme Court discussed when it is appropriate to
overcome the presumptive lex loci delicti rule. 805 N.E.2d 798. In short, the
dispute in Simon involved a plane that crashed in Kentucky; however, the
allegedly negligent acts at issue occurred in Indiana (plaintiffs alleged that the
air traffic controllers in Indianapolis negligently cleared the plane for landing).
Next, we must examine whether the place of the tort “bears little
connection” to the legal action. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1074. This is
one of the rare cases in which the place of the tort is insignificant.
The negligence at issue occurred in Indiana and the District of
Columbia, and none of the victims or the parties are residents of
Kentucky (except to the extent that the United States is a “resident” of
every state). The plane flew over multiple states during the course of
the flight, and the crash might have occurred anywhere. In addition,
unlike in cases involving an automobile accident, the laws of the
state where the crash occurred did not govern the conduct of the
parties at the time of the accident. Consequently, we conclude that
the place of the tort was an insignificant contact in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 5 of 7
Id. at 806 (emphasis added). Simon indicates that the presumption of applying
the lex loci delicti rule is strong and should only be overcome in rare cases, and
that automobile accidents were generally not intended to fall under this
exception. The rationale behind lex loci delicti is that the laws of the state where
the tort occurred usually govern the conduct of the parties. As is pointed out by
the court in Simon, in the case of an automobile accident, the laws of the state in
which the accident occurs govern the conduct of the parties. Clearly then,
under this doctrine, the laws of Indiana would be applied to determine liability
in this case.
[9] However, Plaintiffs argue that because Greenwood has admitted fault for the
accident, the only remaining issue is damages, and so the location of the
accident is no longer relevant; thus, this court should apply Illinois law.
Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, this logic would require this court to engage in
dépeçage, which is not a practice that has been accepted in Indiana.
Dépeçage is the process of analyzing different issues within the same
case separately under the laws of different states. Although Indiana
allows different claims to be analyzed separately, it does not allow
issues within those counts to be analyzed separately. For example, an
Indiana court might analyze a contract claim and a tort claim
independently but would not separately analyze and apply the law of
different jurisdictions to issues within each claim. Dépeçage has not
been part of Indiana’s lexicon. Under our history as a lex loci delecti
state, Indiana courts applied the law of the state in which the tort was
committed. [Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073]. Courts did not consider
whether the law of a different state might be more relevant to the
claim, much less to individual issues within the claim.
Id. at 801-02 (footnote omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 6 of 7
[10] Plaintiffs essentially argue that Greenwood’s admission of fault effectively
negates the importance of the location of the accident and, consequently, the lex
loci delecti presumption. We disagree. For one, this approach would cause
peculiar results in cases such as this. At any point during litigation, if the
defendant admits fault, then the applicable state law could change. Such a
precedent would significantly discourage stipulations of fault. Furthermore, we
think it would be improper to so easily disregard the lex loci delecti presumption.
“People do not take the laws of their home state with them when they travel but
are subject to the laws of the state in which they act.” Id. at 807. Indiana law
unquestionably applies to determine liability in this case. To apply another
state’s laws to the issue of damages would require us to engage in dépeçage,
which we cannot do. Id.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 7 of 7