Abdullah Alkhalidi v. Indiana Department of Correction

Aug 28 2015, 9:37 am
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Abdullah Alkhalidi Gregory F. Zoeller
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Abdullah Alkhalidi, August 28, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Cause No.
77A01-1406-SC-278
v. Appeal from the Sullivan Superior
Court
Indiana Department of The Honorable Robert E. Springer,
Correction, Judge
The Honorable Ann Smith
Appellee-Defendant.
Mischler, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
77D01-1307-SC-529
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Abdullah Alkhalidi appeals the small claims court’s granting of a motion to
dismiss filed by the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). We reverse
and remand.
Issues
[2] Alkhalidi raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the small claims court had subject
matter jurisdiction to decide his replevin claim;
and
II. whether Alkhalidi was required to prove that
he exhausted his administrative remedies.
Facts
[3] In 2012, Alkhalidi was incarcerated in Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
(“Wabash”), and his personal property was seized in a “strip cell” disciplinary
action. Appellant’s App. p. 32. Alkhalidi was “released from strip cell status”
and some, but not all, of his property was returned. Id. at 32-33. Alkhalidi filed
a grievance to recover the remainder of his missing property and then was
transferred to Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”). After his transfer,
more, but not all, of Alkhalidi’s property was returned. His grievance was
denied on November 7, 2012. Alkhalidi immediately requested a grievance
appeal form from Westville officials and was told to send the request to
Wabash. On December 4, 2012, Alkhalidi sent a letter to Wabash requesting
an appeal form but never received a response.
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[4] In 2013, Alkhalidi attempted to recover the property through an administrative
tort claim proceeding, and his claim was denied. Alkhalidi then filed a small
claims replevin action against the DOC seeking to recover $419.34, the alleged
value of the remaining unreturned property. The DOC filed an Indiana Trial
Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may granted. The motion to dismiss alleged in part that Alkhalidi’s complaint
was not specific enough to put the DOC on notice as to what property was
missing and who was responsible for the alleged loss. The small claims court
denied the DOC’s motion to dismiss.
[5] On May 12, 2014, a bench trial was conducted. At the conclusion of
Alkhalidi’s case-in-chief, the DOC moved for a directed verdict or judgment on
the evidence claiming that Alkhalidi was required to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing his lawsuit. The small claims court allowed the parties to
file briefs on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. On June 10,
2014, after the issue was briefed by the parties, the small claims court granted
the DOC’s motion for judgment on the evidence and concluded that Alkhalidi’s
claim should be dismissed because Alkhalidi “failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and therefore the Court is deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction and should be dismissed pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(1).”
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Appellee’s App. p. 1. The claim was dismissed with prejudice. Alkhalidi now
appeals. 1
Analysis
[6] In determining whether Alkhalidi’s claim was properly dismissed, we consider
Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) 2 which provides in part:
After the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof upon an
issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing
party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the weight of the evidence and the law there has been
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
[7] In ruling on such a motion, “a trial court may weigh the evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses and decide whether the party with the burden of
proof has established a right to relief during the case-in-chief.” Barger v. Pate,
831 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
1
The small claims court certified Alkhalidi’s statement of the evidence explaining, “the only issue decided
by the Court, and briefed by the parties, was once a prisoner begins a grievance process he must exhaust all
grievance remedies before initiating a law suit.” Appellee’s App. p. 36.
2
The DOC moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 50(B), which addresses
whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to a jury. Because the motion was made during a
bench trial, it should have been treated as an Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) motion for involuntary dismissal. See
Taflinger Farm v. Uhl, 815 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
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[8] We review the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss made under Trial Rule
41(B) under the clearly erroneous standard. Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers v.
Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Library, 851 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the
witnesses and will reverse only if the evidence is not conflicting and points
unerringly to a conclusion different from the one reached by the trial court. Id.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[9] As an initial matter, we address the small claims court’s conclusion that
Alkhalidi’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived it of subject
matter jurisdiction. Our supreme court has clarified that “‘[t]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether a court has
jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular case
belongs.’” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Troxel v.
Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000)). “Real jurisdictional problems would
be, say, a juvenile delinquency adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a
judgment rendered without any service of process. Thus, characterizing other
sorts of procedural defects as ‘jurisdictional’ misapprehends the concepts.” Id.
542. Even after K.S., it was arguably unclear whether a party’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies was a question of subject matter jurisdiction or
procedural error. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Town of Gaston, 923 N.E.2d 988, 994 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that claim of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is a claim of procedural error and does not deprive a court of subject
matter jurisdiction).
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[10] Then, in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind.
2014), amended on reh’g, 27 N.E.3d 768, our supreme court summarily affirmed
“that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the exhaustion of
administrative remedies under AOPA is a procedural error and does not
implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” The DOC contends that
it is still unclear whether the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a
defect in subject matter jurisdiction because First American only summarily
affirmed our court’s analysis of subject matter jurisdiction. However, we
believe that our supreme court’s distinction between subject matter jurisdiction
and procedural error in K.S. and its summary affirmation in First American
indicates that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be treated as
procedural error. Thus, the small claims court erroneously considered the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a jurisdictional defect.
[11] Here, there is no dispute that a small claims court has subject matter jurisdiction
to entertain a replevin action for $419.34. Thus, contrary to its conclusion, the
small claims court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide Alkhalidi’s claim.
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
[12] The DOC also contends that, regardless of whether exhaustion of remedies is
treated as a jurisdictional defect or procedural error, dismissal was proper
because Alkhalidi did not prove he exhausted his administrative remedies. The
DOC claims that it was required to timely raise the issue of exhaustion and
that, once the issue was raised, Alkhalidi had the burden of proving what
remedies were available and that he exhausted them or was excused from
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exhausting them. In support of its assertion that Alkhalidi had the burden of
proof, the DOC cites Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. 2008), in
which an inmate filed a petition for educational credit time after the DOC
denied him educational credit. Young appealed the denial of his petition, and
our supreme court clarified that post-conviction relief proceedings are the
appropriate procedure for presenting claims for educational credit time. Young,
888 N.E.2d at 1256. The court also admonished Young that, to prevail in a
post-conviction relief proceeding, he must present evidence supporting each
portion of his claim, including what the relevant DOC administrative grievance
procedures were and that he had exhausted them at all levels. Id. at 1257.
[13] On the other hand, in Jackson v. Wrigley, 921 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
Jackson, an inmate in the DOC, filed a federal §1983 civil rights lawsuit
challenging the DOC’s visitation policy. The DOC moved for and was granted
summary judgment on the basis that there were no genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether Jackson exhausted his administrative remedies. On
appeal, we acknowledged that most, if not all, federal circuits consider the
exhaustion of administrative remedies an affirmative defense in this type of
lawsuit unless the failure to exhaust remedies is readily apparent or
unambiguously established from the face of the record. Jackson, 921 N.E.2d at
512. We rejected the DOC’s argument that Jackson’s amended complaint did
not include what steps he took to exhaust his administrative remedies because
the DOC, as the party asserting the affirmative defense, had the burden of
proving the lack of exhaustion of remedies. Id.
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[14] Although Jackson is not directly on point, we believe its reasoning should apply
here, where we are faced with a civil replevin action as opposed to a post-
conviction relief proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2014). Unlike a post-conviction
relief proceeding, “To recover in an action for replevin, a plaintiff must prove
his title or right to possession; that the property is unlawfully detained; and that
the defendant wrongfully holds possession.” Dawson v. Fifth Third Bank, 965
N.E.2d 730, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Because exhaustion of remedies is not
an element of Alkhalidi’s replevin action, the exhaustion requirement is more
appropriately considered an affirmative defense. See Willis v. Westerfield, 839
N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2006) (explaining that an affirmative defense raises
matters outside the scope of the prima facie case as opposed to controverting an
element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case). The proponent of an affirmative
defense bears the burden of proof. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the DOC,
not Alkhalidi, had the burden of proving that Alkhalidi failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
[15] The limited record before us shows that on November 7, 2012, the day
Alkhalidi’s grievance was denied, he requested an appeal form. The DOC told
Alkhalidi to send his request to Wabash “so they have a record of it.”
Appellant’s App. p. 33. On December 4, 2012, Alkhalidi sent a letter to
Wabash requesting an appeal form but did not receive a response. Upon the
close of Alkhalidi’s case-in-chief, the DOC raised the issue of exhaustion of
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administrative remedies and moved for dismissal on the basis that Alkhalidi
failed to prove he exhausted his administrative remedies. Exhaustion is not an
element of Alkhalidi’s replevin action, and there is no indication that the DOC
offered any evidence proving that Alkhalidi failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies at the trial. 3 In what the DOC describes as an “oddity,” the parties
apparently submitted documentary evidence with their supplemental briefs.
Appellee’s Br. p. 11 n.7. Our review of the limited documentary evidence
provided by the parties in their appendices does not clearly establish that
Alkhalidi failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 4 Thus, based on the
record before us, we must conclude that the DOC has not proven that Alkhalidi
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. As such, the small
claims court’s involuntary dismissal of Alkhalidi’s claim was clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[16] The small claims court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Alkhalidi’s
replevin claim. The DOC, not Alkhalidi, had the burden of proving that
Alkhalidi failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his claim.
Because the DOC did not prove such, the small claims court erroneously
dismissed Alkhalidi’s claim. We reverse and remand.
3
The DOC agrees, “that if a claimant attempts to use an administrative process but the governmental entity
does not respond then the claimant may be excused from the exhaustion requirement.” Appellee’s Br. p. 22.
4
To the extent the DOC contends on appeal that Alkhalidi’s letter to Wabash was not timely, this issue was
not raised to the small claims court and is waived. See N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sloan, 4 N.E.3d 760, 766
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding waiver were an issue was raised for the first time on appeal), trans. denied.
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[17] Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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