Tyrone Causey v. State of Indiana

Nov 20 2015, 8:12 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyrone Causey, November 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1503-CR-185
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Cook
Appellee-Plaintiff Crawford, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49F09-1401-FD-2850
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Tyrone Causey appeals his conviction for Intimidation, 1 a Class D felony.
Finding insufficient evidence to support this conviction, we reverse.
Facts
[2] At about 2:00 a.m. on January 19, 2014, an anonymous woman called the
police to report a disturbance at Causey’s residence in Indianapolis. Officers
Juanita Wilkins and Michael Faulk were dispatched to investigate the situation.
Upon arriving and approaching the front porch, the officers noticed that the
glass on the outer storm door was broken. The officers listened for any sounds
coming from inside the residence but could not hear anything. They then
knocked on the door.
[3] Causey opened the door and the officers asked him to step outside and speak
with them. Causey stated that everything was fine and that the officers had no
business there and slammed the door shut. The officers knocked again. This
time, when Causey answered, the officers asked him if they could come inside
to see if there was someone who might need help. Causey told the officers that
he was there by himself and again told them that they had no business there.
Causey then stated “you won’t take me alive,” and slammed the door. Tr. p.
120. The officers went back to their vehicles and called for backup.
1
Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1. Our criminal code was revised effective July 1, 2014. We cite the provision of the
code as it existed on the date Causey committed the alleged offense.
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[4] While the officers waited for backup to arrive, Causey opened the door and
yelled: “[G]et off my property. You don’t belong on my property. If you come
any closer I’ll shoot.” Id. at 121-22. Sergeant Steve Rivers arrived a few
minutes later and spoke with Officers Wilkins and Faulk. As the three spoke,
Causey again opened the door and began yelling in an unintelligible manner.
Sergeant Rivers later testified that, although he could not understand what
Causey was saying, he recalled hearing the words “shoot” and “kill.” Id. at
200. Sergeant Rivers then called in a SWAT team out of concern that Causey
may have been holding somebody hostage.
[5] Prior to the SWAT team’s arrival, Causey’s fiancée, Ashley Jones, arrived at
the residence with her three-year-old son. Jones told the officers that Causey
was the only one inside, but the officers informed her that it was a hostage
situation and prevented her from entering. The SWAT team, which was
composed of about twenty people and one robot, eventually entered the
residence and arrested Causey, who was alone in the house.
[6] The State charged Causey with class D felony intimidation, class B
misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and alleged that he was an habitual offender.
Following a jury trial, Causey was convicted of class D felony intimidation. 2
The trial court sentenced him to 545 days, with 180 days executed on home
detention and 365 days on probation. Causey now appeals.
2
Prior to trial, the State dismissed the disorderly conduct charge and, following trial, the trial court found
that Causey was not an habitual offender.
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Discussion and Decision
[7] On appeal, Causey argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. When reviewing a claim for insufficient evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ransley v. State,
850 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We consider only the evidence most
favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We
will affirm if substantial evidence of probative value supports the trier of fact’s
conclusion. Id.
[8] Our intimidation statute provides:
(a) A person who communicates a threat to another person,
with the intent:
(1) that the other person engage in conduct against the
other person’s will; [or]
(2) that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation
for a prior lawful act . . .
commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.
I.C. § 35-45-2-1. The offense is raised to a class D felony if the threat is
communicated to a law enforcement officer. Id.
[9] In this case, the State charged Causey as follows:
On or about January 19, 2014, in Marion County, State of
Indiana, the following named defendant Tyrone Causey, did
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communicate a threat to Juanita Wilkins and/or Michael Faulk,
a law enforcement officer with the Indianapolis Police
Department, said threat being: to shoot the officers, with the
intent that said officer be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior
lawful act, to wit: responding to a disturbance run at 3438
Leatherbury Lane.
Appellant’s App. p. 23.
[10] Causey argues that the State presented insufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that he intended to place the officers in fear of
retaliation for having responded to a disturbance. Rather than intending to
place the officers in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, Causey maintains
that he was attempting to prevent the officers from taking future action. He
points out that his statement—“If you come any closer I’ll shoot”—was
directed toward the officers’ potential future acts, rather than any prior lawful
ones. Tr. p. 122.
[11] We agree. Here, the State charged Causey with intimidation under Indiana
Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(2). To find Causey guilty under this statute, the State
had to prove that (1) Causey communicated a threat to the officers (2) with the
intent that they be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. Gaddis v.
State, 680 N.E.2d 860, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). In Casey v. State, we examined
this language of the intimidation statute and concluded the following: “[I]t is
apparent that the legislature intended to require the State to prove that the
victim had engaged in a prior act, which was not contrary to the law, and that
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the defendant intended to repay the victim for the prior lawful act.” 676 N.E.2d
1069, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
[12] Accordingly, this Court has held that statements that are “conditional and
aimed at future, rather than past, conduct,” will not support a finding that the
defendant intended to place the victim in fear of retaliation for prior acts. C.L.
v. State, 2 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing Ransley, 850 N.E.2d
443). Here, rather than being aimed at the officers’ prior acts, Causey’s
statement was conditional, resembling the statement at issue in the seventeenth
century English case of Tuberville v. Savage, where one party had warned
another: “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.”
(1669) 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B.) 1 Mod. Rep. 3 (holding that such a statement
was not an assault).
[13] The State is correct to point out that intent must often be proven by
circumstantial evidence and that the “fact finder is entitled to infer intent from
the surrounding circumstances.” Hightower v. State, 866 N.E.2d 356, 368 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). However, such inferences must be reasonable and drawn from
evidence which is probative of the defendant’s intent as to a particular act.
Here, a jury could only infer that Causey’s threat related to the officers’ prior
acts if it ignored the plain meaning of the words Causey spoke—“If you come
any closer I’ll shoot.” Tr. p. 122. Such an inference would not be reasonable.
[14] The State next argues that Causey “ignores the surrounding circumstances,”
including his “other statements during his interaction with police.” Appellee’s
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Br. p. 8-9. The State points out that Causey “was angry and agitated from the
time of first contact,” that he “stated that the officers had no right to be there,”
and that he “told the officers that they were not going to enter his apartment.”
Id. at 9. The State argues that these words and actions are evidence of Causey’s
“intent to harm the officers in retaliation for their presence at his residence and
their investigation.” Id. The State believes that Causey’s statement—“If you
come any closer I’ll shoot”— is “only a narrow piece of evidence” and it
criticizes Causey for putting undue emphasis on it. Appellee’s Br. p. 8.
[15] We are not sure what the State means by this. The intimidation statute
criminalizes threats made with a certain intent. I.C. § 35-45-2-1. Thus, for
purposes of the intimidation statute, the threat is the actus reus of the crime. Id.
Just as one would not characterize a defendant’s act of killing another as “only
a narrow piece of evidence” in a murder trial, one would not so characterize a
threat in the intimidation context. Appellee’s Br. p. 8.
[16] To the extent that the State is arguing that another threat was made in this case,
it has not identified this threat, and we find no other threats in the record.
Assuming that the State may wish to characterize Causey’s unintelligible rant
following Sergeant Rivers’s arrival as a threat, we do not believe that sufficient
evidence would support this characterization. The intimidation statute defines
“threat” as “an expression, by words or action,” of an intention to, among
other things, “unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person.” I.C.
§ 35-45-2-1. As to Causey’s rant, Sergeant Rivers testified: “I recall hearing the
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words shoot and kill and a lot of profanities, but as far as exactly what was said,
I don’t recall.” Tr. p. 210.
[17] We cannot hold that such a vague and uncertain description of a statement
constitutes sufficient evidence that the statement is a “threat” for intimidation
purposes. While the words “shoot” and “kill” may relate to injury, they do not
necessarily relate to unlawful injury, as would be required to constitute a
“threat” under the statute. I.C. § 35-45-2-1. Furthermore, even if such
language could be construed as a threat, there is no indication that it did not
relate to the officers’ future acts, as had Causey’s earlier statement.
[18] In sum, the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Causey communicated a threat to the
officers that was intended to place them in fear of retaliation for responding to a
call at his residence. While Causey threatened the officers, who were indeed
responding to a call at his residence, we have previously held that:
[M]ere proof that the victim is engaged in an act which is not
illegal at the time the threat is made is not sufficient. Rather, the
State must establish that the legal act occurred prior to the threat
and that the defendant intended to place the victim in fear of
retaliation for that act.
Casey, 676 N.E.2d at 1072. To hold otherwise would effectively do away with
the statute’s intent element, as victims can always be said to be engaged in some
form of lawful act.
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[19] As a general matter, we agree that one should not threaten a police officer.
However, such behavior, in and of itself, does not constitute intimidation as
defined by the statute. Here, the State has not clearly identified what it believes
Causey’s threat to be, nor has it pointed to evidence indicating that this threat
was made with the required intent. “Due process requires that a penal statute
clearly define the prohibited conduct so that it provides adequate and fair notice
as to what precisely is proscribed.” George v. NCAA, 945 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind.
2011). Accordingly, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. Id. The State’s
argument that we must look to the totality of the circumstances in this case
appears to be little more than a request that we ignore this principle.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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