D.B. and V.G. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

FILED
Sep 15 2016, 8:11 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Brian A. Karle Robert J. Henke
Lafayette, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D.B. and V.G., September 15, 2016
Appellants-Defendants, Court of Appeals Case No.
54A01-1603-JT-607
v. Appeal from the Montgomery
Circuit Court
Indiana Department of Child The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
Services, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
54C01-1510-JT-246,
54C01-1510-JT-247,
54C01-1510-JT-248,
54C01-1510-JT-249,
54C01-1510-JT-250
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] D.B. (Father) and V.G. (Mother) appeal following the involuntary termination
of their parental rights. On appeal, they argue that the termination of their
rights was improper because the termination petition was prematurely filed.
Additionally, Father argues that the Department of Child Services (DCS)
presented insufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental rights.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History1
[3] During the time relevant to this appeal, Mother and Father (collectively, the
Parents) had two daughters together, Bi.B and Br.B. (collectively, the Girls),
who were born in 2012 and 2013, respectively.2 Mother also has three older
sons, Ra.G., H.G., and Ru.G (collectively, the Boys), who were born in 2005,
2006, and 2008, respectively, from a previous relationship. The Boys’ father is
deceased.
[4] DCS became involved in April 2014 after receiving a report that the home was
in poor condition, the Parents were using illegal drugs, and the Boys had been
left at home alone. When law enforcement and a DCS investigator arrived at
the home, they found Ra.G. and H.G., who were then eight and seven years
1
Because Mother challenges only the timeliness of the termination petition, our recitation of the facts is
largely limited to those relevant to Father’s argument that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support the
termination of his rights.
2
While this case was pending, Mother gave birth to another child. That child is not a subject of these
proceedings.
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old, alone and without a working telephone. The investigator also discovered
that the home was dirty, with trash and dirty dishes piled up and a mouse
infestation. When the Parents returned home after receiving a phone call from
the DCS investigator, Mother submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for
methamphetamine. Father refused a drug screen but admitted to using
marijuana three weeks earlier.
[5] As a result of these events, DCS filed petitions alleging that all five children
(collectively, the Children) were Children in Need of Services (CHINS). On
May 8, 2014, the Children were adjudicated CHINS following the Parents’
admission to the allegations in the CHINS petitions. On June 6, 2014, the
CHINS court issued its dispositional order, pursuant to which the Children
were made wards of DCS but remained in the Parents’ home. The court also
ordered the Parents to participate in a number of services, including home-
based case management, substance abuse treatment, and random drug screens.
[6] On July 14, 2014, DCS received a report that there had been an incident of
domestic violence between the Parents. DCS Family Case Manager (FCM)
Charlene Tolley made contact with Mother, who confirmed that the Parents
had been in a physical altercation while the Children were present. Mother also
admitted that she and Father had used methamphetamine together a few days
earlier and had driven with the Children in the car less than an hour later.
Father again refused to submit to a drug screen. In light of these developments,
DCS removed the Children immediately. The Boys were placed in one foster
home and the Girls in another. A detention hearing was held the next day, and
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the CHINS court entered an order approving the Children’s removal and
continued placement in foster care. The Parents were subsequently ordered to
participate in supervised visitation.
[7] The Parents’ participation in reunification services was sporadic throughout the
underlying CHINS proceedings. Father refused to submit to random drug
screens for the first several months of the CHINS proceedings. Father
eventually submitted to a total of thirty-five drug screens throughout the course
of the underlying proceedings, twenty-three of which were positive for
marijuana, methamphetamine, or both. Father was also referred for an eight-
week intensive outpatient program (IOP) for substance abuse. Due to his poor
attendance and failed drug screens, Father did not complete the program in the
allotted time frame. Father completed IOP after receiving a one-month
extension. Father was then referred to a relapse prevention program, and
although he did not begin that program when he was originally supposed to, he
did eventually complete the program. Despite completing treatment, he
continued to test positive for marijuana and methamphetamine.
[8] The Parents were also referred for couple’s counseling, but Father stopped
attending after only two sessions. Father testified that he stopped going to
couple’s counseling because he “didn’t want to go no more[.]” Transcript at 32.
Father was also referred for individual therapy, but he did not attend a single
session.
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[9] The Parents’ participation in home-based services was limited. According to
home-based case manager Jamie Selby, the Parents refused to work on
budgeting and “were reluctant or resistant to complying with services or
recommendations.” Id. at 59. Additionally, Father exhibited ongoing
disrespectful behavior toward Selby. When she would attempt to redirect him,
he would yell at her and tell her that she did not know how to do her job. Selby
thought that Father might take better direction from a man, so she brought on a
male case worker. Father made some limited progress for a few months until
the male case worker was reassigned to another location and Father had to
begin working with Selby again.
[10] During supervised visits, Parents struggled with engaging with the Children and
imposing discipline. Additionally, Father exhibited disruptive behavior. For
example, when a visit at a park was ended early due to inclement weather,
Father became very loud and argumentative in the presence of the Children.
On other occasions, visits were ended early because Mother and Father got into
heated arguments and continued “to cuss and holler” in front of the Children
after being told to stop. Id. at 66. Father fell asleep during a number of visits
and at other times appeared to be under the influence. Additionally, the
Parents sometimes failed to show up for visits at all, eventually resulting in the
implementation of a policy requiring them to arrive for scheduled visits thirty
minutes early in order to prevent the Children from being transported to the
visitation facility only to find that the Parents were not there.
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[11] On May 18, 2015, the CHINS court found that the Parents were not compliant
with the case plan and changed the permanency plan to reunification with a
concurrent plan of adoption. On September 23, 2015, the CHINS court
changed the permanency plan to adoption only and relieved DCS of the
obligation to provide services other than supervised visitation. DCS filed its
termination petitions on October 9, 2015. An evidentiary hearing was held on
March 9, 2016, and approximately one week later, the trial court entered its
order terminating Mother’s rights to all five of the Children and Father’s rights
to the Girls. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[12] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,
265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence
and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to
the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its
judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
In re L.S., 717 N .E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Thus, if the
evidence and inferences support the decision, we must affirm. Id.
[13] The trial court entered findings in its order terminating the Parents’ parental
rights. When the trial court enters specific findings of fact and conclusions
thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of
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Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine
whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether
the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only
when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by
inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is
clearly erroneous only if the findings do not support the court’s conclusions or
the conclusions do not support the judgment thereon. Id.
[14] We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise
their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for
the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet
their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those
of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In
re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating
parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect their children. Id.
1. Timeliness
[15] The Parents first argue that the termination of their parental rights was
improper because the termination petition was prematurely filed. Ind. Code §
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A) provides that a termination petition must allege that at least
one of the following is true:
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(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that
reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not
required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date
of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
under the supervision of a local office or probation department
for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the
home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
services or a delinquent child[.]
[16] Although the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this matter
unequivocally established that the Children had been removed from the Parents
under a dispositional decree for well over six months, the termination petitions
regarding the Girls contained no allegation that subsection (i) had been
satisfied.3 Instead, those petitions alleged only that the requirements of
3
The termination petitions regarding Ra.G. and Ru.G. did contain allegations under subsection (i) that
Ra.G. and Ru.G. had been removed for at least six months under a dispositional decree. See Mother’s
Appendix at 41, 45. The trial court’s finding that Ra.G. and Ru.G had been removed for at least six months is
clearly supported by the record, and Mother makes no argument to the contrary. Because the termination
petition regarding H.G. does not appear anywhere in the record presented to us on appeal, any argument
challenging the trial court’s finding under subsection (i) with respect to H.G. has been waived. See Ramsey v.
Madison Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children, 707 N.E.2d 814, 817-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that “[o]n the
points assigned as error, the appellant has the burden of presenting both a cogent argument and the
appropriate portions of the record to establish the error[,]” and that an appellant who fails to do so waives
consideration of those issues). In any event, even if we assume that the termination petition for H.G. did not
contain an allegation under subsection (i), our resolution of the timeliness issue with respect to the Girls
would apply with equal force to H.G. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to reversal of the trial court’s
termination of her parental rights to the Boys.
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subsections (ii) and (iii) had been met. It is undisputed, however, that
subsection (ii) is inapplicable here. It therefore appears to us that DCS intended
to make allegations under subsection (i) in the petitions regarding the Girls, but
inadvertently made allegations under subsection (ii) instead.4 Indeed, DCS
argued at the evidentiary hearing that the requirements of subsections (i) and
(iii) had been satisfied, with no mention of subsection (ii).
[17] Father argued below that DCS’s failure to include an allegation under
subsection (i) in its termination petitions regarding the Girls precluded the trial
court from granting the petitions on that basis, and that the petitions were
prematurely filed for the purposes of subsection (iii). Specifically, he noted that
the Girls were removed from the home on July 14, 2014 and the termination
petition was filed on October 9, 2015. Thus, the petition was filed five days
short of the fifteen-month waiting period set forth in subsection (iii). The trial
court entered findings that both subsection (i) and subsection (iii) had been
satisfied with respect to all five of the Children.
[18] On appeal, both Parents reassert the timeliness arguments Father made below.
DCS concedes that at the time the termination petitions were filed, the Girls
had not yet been removed for 15 of the most recent 22 months as set forth in
subsection (iii). In order for the petitions to have been timely filed under that
4
This issue could have been avoided entirely if DCS had simply exercised adequate care and attention in
drafting and filing its termination petitions in this matter. In the future, we urge DCS to proofread its filings
with greater care.
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subsection, they would have to have been filed five days later—on October 14,
2015 instead of October 9, 2014. Nevertheless, citing In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d
1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, DCS claims that this court has held that
the requirements of subsection (iii) are satisfied so long as a child has been
removed from a parent for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months
immediately preceding the termination hearing. Because the termination
hearing in this case was not held until March 9, 2016, DCS argues that the
fifteen-month requirement was satisfied. Father responds that J.W. is
inapposite and that the outcome in this case is controlled by In re Q.M., 974
N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, in which this court held
that time requirements of I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii) must be satisfied at the
time the termination petition is filed.
[19] We agree that DCS’s reliance on J.W. is misplaced. In that case, the parents
argued that the fifteen-month waiting period set forth in I.C. § 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(A)(iii) should be tolled during any period in which DCS fails to provide
services to a parent. This court held that the statute simply requires DCS to
demonstrate compliance with the statutory waiting period, with no requirement
that DCS provides services to the parent during that time. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii) “is
unambiguous and simply requires the DCS to demonstrate that a specific
waiting period has occurred—namely, fifteen of the most recent twenty-two
months immediately prior to the termination hearing—with a child removed from
the parent.” J.W., 27 N.E.3d. at 1190 (emphasis supplied). We note, however,
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that whether the children had been removed for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months was not at issue in J.W. The only issue before the court was
whether the fifteen-month waiting period should be tolled due to DCS’s failure
to provide services.
[20] In Q.M., on the other hand, this court was squarely presented with the issue we
now confront—whether the children had been removed for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months as required by I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii). This
court held that “[a]n involuntary termination petition must allege, and the State
must prove by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was . . . removed
from the family home at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months ‘at
the time the involuntary termination petition was filed.’” Q.M., 974 N.E.2d at 1024-
25 (quoting In re D.D., 962 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)) (emphasis
supplied). Because the children in that case had been removed from the home
for only approximately thirteen months at the time the termination petitions
were filed, DCS conceded that it had not satisfied “the jurisdictional
requirements” of I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii).5 Id. at 1024. Concluding that
5
Our Supreme Court has noted a “tendency in procedural law to treat various kinds of serious procedural
errors as defects in subject matter jurisdiction[.]” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind. 2014)
(quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 2006)). “The question of subject matter jurisdiction entails a
determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular case
belongs.” K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 542. There is no question that the court in this case has jurisdiction over
proceedings to terminate parental rights. The issue presented here is therefore one of legal or procedural
error, not subject matter jurisdiction.
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DCS had not satisfied the requirements of I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii), this
court reversed.
[21] Because this court directly addressed the issue of the date by which the fifteen-
month requirement set forth in I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(a)(iii) must be satisfied in
Q.M., we find that case controlling on that issue. As DCS filed its petitions to
terminate the Parents’ rights to the Girls on October 9, 2015—five days before
the fifteen-month waiting period expired—its petition was premature and did
not satisfy the requirements of the statute. This is so regardless of the fact that
the Children had been removed for well over fifteen of the most recent twenty-
two months by the time of the termination hearing.
[22] This does not, however, end our inquiry. The Parents have made no argument
that they were prejudiced in any way by the premature filing. DCS was
relieved of its obligation to provide services in the CHINS case and the
permanency plan was changed to adoption on September 23, 2015—before the
termination petitions were filed. Thus, the five-day-early filing had no effect on
the provision of services to the Parents, and we are unaware of any other way
they were harmed. It is well settled that this court will not reverse a trial court’s
judgment where the decision does not prejudice the substantial rights of a party.
See Ind. App. Rule 66(A) (providing that “[n]o error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is
ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in
light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the
substantial rights of the parties”); Ind. Trial Rule 61 (providing that “[t]he court
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at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”).
[23] Perhaps anticipating this response, Father cites Q.M. for the proposition that
DCS must strictly comply with the termination statutes “[b]ecause parents have
a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children[.]”
974 N.E.2d at 1024. We agree that failure to strictly comply with the
termination statutes amounts to error, but this does not preclude application of
the harmless error rule. Indeed, Indiana courts regularly apply harmless error
analysis in cases involving the termination of parental rights and alleged
violations of other important constitutional rights. See In re the Involuntary
Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 241 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007) (applying harmless error analysis to a parent’s argument that the
termination petition did not contain all information required by statute); see also
Hernandez v. State, 761 N.E.2d 845, 853 (Ind. 2002) (holding that “[a] denial of
the right to be present during all critical stages of the proceedings, like the right
to counsel at a critical stage, is a constitutional right that is subject to a harmless
error analysis”); Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2000) (finding a denial
of the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation to be harmless). For the
reasons set forth above, we conclude that any error resulting from the
premature filing of the termination petitions was harmless, and the Parents are
therefore not entitled to reversal on that basis.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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[24] Next, Father argues that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support the
termination of his parental rights to the Girls. In addition to the waiting period
requirements discussed above, when DCS seeks to involuntarily terminate a
parent’s parental rights, it must allege and prove by clear and convincing
evidence:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). DCS must also prove by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(C).
[25] Father challenges only the trial court’s finding that I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i)
had been satisfied—i.e., that DCS had established by clear and convincing
evidence a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Girls’
removal and placement outside the home will not be remedied. In making such
a determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or
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her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. The court must also evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns
of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future
neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. In conducting this inquiry, courts may
consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse,
history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and
employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244,
1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The court may also consider the
parent’s response to the services offered through DCS. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office
of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
“A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate
with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions,
support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions
will change.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210. Moreover, the failure to exercise
visitation demonstrates a “lack of commitment to complete the actions
necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372
(quoting In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)) (alteration in
original).
[26] In his brief, Father focuses solely on whether the conditions resulting in the
Girls’ initial removal have been remedied. However, the language of Indiana’s
termination statute makes clear that “it is not just the basis for the initial
removal of the child that may be considered for purposes of determining
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whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in
the continued placement outside of the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[27] The trial court made the following relevant findings in support of its conclusion
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Girls’
removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied:
The children were removed from their parents in July 2014. The
DCS has offered reunification services to both parents but neither
parent was able to participate in these services in order to
overcome their parenting deficits. [Father] has been particularly
uncooperative and difficult. For many months he refused to
participate in any services or take drug screens. His relationship
with [Mother] is combative and sometimes violent. Neither
parent did anything to protect the children from [the Parents’]
toxic relationship. [Father] continued to abuse marijuana and
methamphetamine. His visits with the children were inconsistent
and he often ended the visits early. He has not visited with the
[B]oys for two months at the time of the termination hearing and
he has not visited more than twice with the [G]irls in the last two
months. [Father] has made no progress and there is no reason to
think that any services can be offered to him that would improve
his poor parenting, substance abuse or domestic dysfunction.
Father’s Appendix at 56.
[28] On appeal, Father argues that the problems in his relationship with Mother had
been remedied because Mother and Father were in the process of separating.
We acknowledge that Mother testified that she and Father were no longer
romantically involved at the time of the termination hearing. Although they
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were still living together, Mother testified that she was “moving out slowly.”
Transcript at 44. Mother testified that she had moved “four or five boxes” to her
mother’s house. Id. at 46. Mother acknowledged that she had said she was
going to move out in the past, but never did so. When asked if he and Mother
were going to continue living together, Father testified that he was “leaving it
up to [Mother.]” Id. at 32. As our Supreme Court has noted, “[r]equiring trial
courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from
finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.”
In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, the trial court was free
to attribute greater weight to the Mother’s pattern of not following through with
her threats to leave than to her current claims that she was moving out.
Moreover, the Parents failed to complete couple’s counseling. After only two
sessions, Father stopped attending because he “didn’t want to go no more[.]”
Transcript at 32. The trial court’s finding that there was a reasonable probability
that the Parents’ combative and sometimes violent relationship would not be
remedied is not clearly erroneous.
[29] With respect to his drug abuse, Father argues that the evidence presented on
this point was “thin.” Father’s Brief at 11. Father acknowledges testimony that
he submitted to a total of thirty-five drug screens throughout the course of the
underlying proceedings, twenty-three of which were positive for marijuana,
methamphetamine, or both. He notes further, however, that the positive drug
screens were not admitted into evidence and argues that it is unclear when his
last positive drug screens occurred and how many drug screens were positive for
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marijuana only, which he calls “a much less destructive substance.” Id. at 12.
Father has not acknowledged that in its May 18, 2015 order changing the
permanency plan from reunification to concurrent plans of reunification and
adoption, the CHINS court found that Father had completed relapse
prevention, but nevertheless “continues to test positive for marijuana.” Exhibit
2. In its September 23, 2015 order changing the permanency plan to adoption
only, the CHINS court found that Father “continues to use various substances,
including THC and methamphetamine.” Id. Moreover, Father admitted to
FCM Tolley that he provided Mother with drugs in July 2015, and FCM Tolley
testified at the termination hearing that Father was “still positive for drugs.”
Transcript at 159. This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that there was a reasonable probability that Father’s drug use would not
be remedied.
[30] The evidence presented at the termination hearing also supports the trial court’s
findings that Father did not visit with the Girls consistently, and when Father
did show up for visits, his behavior was often inappropriate and disruptive. He
got into loud verbal altercations with Mother and the visitation supervisor in
the presence of the Children, he repeatedly fell asleep during visits, and
sometimes appeared to be under the influence.
[31] In sum, Father has made no real progress toward addressing his parenting
deficiencies. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that there is reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in the Girls’ removal and continued
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placement outside the home will not be remedied is amply supported by the
evidence.
[32] Judgment affirmed.
[33] Bradford, J. and Pyle, J., concur.
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