In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.G. (Minor Child), and N.R.G. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services

FILED
Oct 06 2016, 7:59 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Laura M. Longstreet Gregory F. Zoeller
Longstreet Law, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary October 6, 2016
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of N.G. (Minor 71A04-1602-JT-346
Child), Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
Court
and The Honorable James N. Fox,
Judge
N.R.G. (Mother), Trial Court Cause No.
Appellant-Respondent, 71J01-1407-JT-111
v.
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] N.R.G (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental relationship with her
daughter, N.G. She raises three issues, one of which we find dispositive:
whether the trial court’s findings of fact are sufficient to satisfy the statutory
mandate found in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c). Concluding that the trial
court’s findings of fact are deficient, we remand for proper findings that support
the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In January 2013, four-year-old N.G. and her sixteen-year-old brother D.W.
were removed from the home of Mother and D.G.W. (“Father”) on a report of
physical abuse, stemming from an incident in which Father allegedly punched
D.W. in the face. Shortly thereafter, the St. Joseph County Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to have N.G. designated a Child in
Need of Services (“CHINS”). 1 The trial court entered an order designating
N.G. a CHINS and ordering services for both Mother and N.G., with a goal of
reunification.
[3] In July 2014, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental
relationship with N.G. At the time of the petition, N.G. was residing in relative
1
Older brother D.W. was also designated a CHINS, but he is not a subject of the present termination order.
We limit our discussion accordingly.
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placement with her aunt (“Aunt”). At some point before the September 2015
final hearing, Aunt indicated that she could no longer keep N.G., and N.G. was
placed in a pre-adoptive foster home.
[4] In January 2016, the trial court issued an order terminating the parental
relationship between Mother and N.G. 2 The findings of fact and conclusions of
law are as follows:
[N.G.] is the biological child of [Mother];
[Father] is the biological father of [N.G.];
The parental rights of [Father] were previously terminated by this
Court;
That the Court found [N.G.] was a removed from the care of her
parents on January 17, 2013;
On February 6, 2013 the Court entered a dispositional decree;
In October of 2013 [N.G.] made new disclosures of sexual abuse
at the hands of a brother;
In October [M]other stopped complying with the dispositional
decree;
Mother stopped attending her individual therapy at that time,
and was no longer keeping in contact with FCM Martin.
In June of 2015 the Court ordered that [M]other’s visits be
changed to supervised therapeutic visits, as this was in the best
2
Father’s parental rights were previously terminated, and he is not participating in this appeal.
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interest of the child;
On July 20, 2014, DCS filed Mandatory Involuntary
Termination Petitions as [N.G.] had been out of the home for a
period of fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months;
The child has made progress in therapy with the help of the foster
parents;
The Court finds that while [M]other has made some progress in
her own therapy, that [M]other’s trauma has posed significant
barrier to the ability to reunify [M]other and [the] child;
The Court finds that continuation of the parent child relationship
would pose a threat to the child;
The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the child that the
parent child relationship be terminated;
The Court notes that [sic] finds that adoption is a satisfactory
plan for the child.
The Court now finds that the Department of Child Services has
met the burden by presenting clear and convincing evidence that
the parent child relationship be terminated, and all rights powers,
privileges, immunities, duties and obligations, including the right
to consent to adoption, pertaining to that relationship are hereby
permanently terminated.
Appellant’s App. at 14-15.
[5] Mother now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Mother maintains that the trial court’s findings of fact are deficient as entered.
In recognition of the seriousness with which we address parental termination
cases, Indiana has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof
and a clearly erroneous standard of review. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225,
1230 (Ind. 2013) (requiring State to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by
parent’s continued custody); see also, Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family &
Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (emphasizing that reviewing court
may set aside trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous). Our review
for clear error requires that we determine first whether the evidence supports the
trial court’s findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. In re
E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). This means that the trial court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law are crucial to our review. Parks v. Delaware Cnty.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1280-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However,
where the findings of fact and conclusions of law are sparse or improperly
stated and do not adequately address each of the requirements of the
termination statute, 3 we cannot conduct an adequate review. Id. at 1281.
3
To obtain a termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and N.G., DCS was required to
establish in pertinent part:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional
decree.
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[7] In Parks, another panel of this Court held that where most of the trial court’s
findings were merely recitations of testimony rather than the adoption of that
testimony as fact, they were not proper findings. Id. at 1279, 1281. As such,
the Parks court emphasized that an appellate court is “not at liberty to scour the
record to find evidence to support the judgment” and remanded for proper
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 1280-81. When Parks was
decided, the trial court was not required to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in termination cases unless specifically requested by the
parties. Id. However, in 2012, the legislature amended Indiana Code Section
31-35-2-8 to read: “(c) The court shall enter findings of fact that support the
entry of the conclusions” terminating a parent-child relationship. (Emphasis
added.)
[8] Here, the trial court’s unnumbered findings and conclusions comprise little
more than one page. Appellant’s App. at 14-15. With respect to the
….
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses
a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
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requirements for termination outlined in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2),
the trial court made an ultimate finding that termination is in N.G.’s best
interests without any supporting facts, except to say that it was in N.G.’s best
interests that “Mother’s visits be changed to supervised therapeutic visits.” Id.
at 15. Similarly, the trial court made an ultimate finding concerning DCS’s
satisfactory plan of adoption (presumably by the foster parents), with only a
brief mention that N.G. “has made progress in therapy with the help of the
foster parents.” Id. Because N.G. had initially been placed in relative care with
Aunt, it would facilitate appellate review to indicate how long she had been
with the foster parents, especially given the implications for her stability and
best interests.
[9] The most fact-specific findings relate to Mother’s prospects for remedying the
conditions that led to N.G.’s removal. 4 Yet, there is no ultimate finding on the
reasonable probability of unremedied conditions. Instead, the trial court made
an ultimate finding that the “continuation of the parent child relationship
would pose a threat to the child.” Id. While the termination statute does not
require the trial court to find both a reasonable probability of unremedied
conditions and a threat to well-being, we note that the only finding supporting
the threat to N.G.’s well-being is not a finding at all because it merely recites
that N.G. “made new disclosures of sexual abuse at the hands of a brother.” Id.
4
These include references to Mother’s failure to comply with the dispositional decree or to complete therapy
and a finding that Mother’s unspecified “trauma has posed [a] significant barrier to the ability to reunify”
with N.G. Id.
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at 14. See Parks, 862 N.E.2d at 1279 (emphasizing that mere recitations of
testimony are not proper findings absent trial court’s adoption of testimony as
fact). The termination order gives no indication that the trial court ever
adopted or substantiated N.G.’s statements regarding the alleged sexual abuse.
[10] Simply put, the trial court’s findings are so sparse that we cannot discern
whether it based its termination order on proper statutory considerations. As
we are not at liberty to scour the record to find evidence to support the
judgment, we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter proper
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the termination of Mother’s
parental rights.
[11] Remanded.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
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