Harrison County Sheriff's Department v. Leandra Ayers, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Britton

FILED
Jan 31 2017, 8:44 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Knight Matthew J. Schad
Byron D. Knight George A. Budd, V
Lisa A. Baron Schad & Schad, P.C.
Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, Ltd. New Albany, Indiana
Schererville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Harrison County January 31, 2017
Sheriff’s Department, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 22A01-1605-CT-1080
Appeal from the Floyd Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable J. Terrence Cody,
Leandra Ayers, Personal Judge
Representative of the Estate of Trial Court Cause No.
Christine Britton, Deceased, 22C01-1104-CT-558
Appellee-Plaintiff
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A01-1605-CT-1080 | January 31, 2017 Page 1 of 9
[1] The Harrison County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff) appeals the trial court’s
denial of its motion to correct error in which the Sheriff argued that it was
entitled to judgment on the evidence. The trial court’s order came after a jury
returned a verdict in favor of Leandra Ayers, representative of the Estate of
Christine Britton (the Estate), for $1.2 million. The jury found the Sheriff
vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Christine’s
husband, Sheriff’s Deputy John Britton, knew that Christine had expressed
suicidal thoughts but left her in a room by herself with his gun. The Sheriff
argues that there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, that John was
acting in the scope of his employment during the incident, and that the trial
court made several errors in the admission of evidence and in its jury
instructions. Finding that John’s actions were undertaken in a purely private
capacity and had no connection to his employment as a sheriff’s deputy, we
reverse and remand with instructions to grant the Sheriff’s motion to correct
error.
Facts 1
[2] On March 29, 2009, Christine called her husband, John, to tell him that they
had dinner plans that evening. He arrived home after 3:00 p.m., and Christine
invited him into bed. After having sex, the couple showered together and spent
time watching television. They began to get ready to leave, but they were
1
We held oral argument on January 10, 2017, in Indianapolis. We thank the attorneys for their stimulating
and informative oral advocacy.
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running late. John asked Christine whether she was “genetically unable to be
anywhere on time.” Tr. p. 486.
[3] This set off an argument. Christine began by telling John that she always had
to do the work around the house, but she quickly progressed to making
comments like, “you make me so mad I could kill myself,” to which John
responded, “oh whatever.” Id. at 488.2 John called the other couple to let them
know that he and Christine would not be attending dinner.
[4] As a Sheriff’s Deputy, John always wore his personal weapon when he went
out, even when he was off duty. Since he had been planning to go out, he had
his gun on him during this argument. After they argued some more, Christine
reached for John’s gun but he bear hugged her so that she could not reach it.
He told her, “don’t touch my gun.” Id. She responded, “I’ll just get one out of
the safe.” Id. at 489.3 After Christine again threatened to kill herself, John said
“fine,” took his gun out, and laid it on the bed. Id. at 497. He walked out of
the bedroom and toward the front door. Before he exited the house, he heard a
gunshot. He ran back to the bedroom and saw that Christine had shot herself.
John attempted to administer first aid, and he called the police. Christine died
as a result of the gunshot.
2
John testified that this was not the first time Christine had threatened suicide, and she had even put a gun to
her temple before, but that she typically calmed down and went on as if nothing had happened.
3
John later testified that, in addition to the guns in the safe, they also regularly kept a loaded shotgun under
the bed, a loaded pistol on each side of the bed, and an AR-15 in the bathroom.
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[5] A forensic investigation confirmed that Christine had pulled the trigger, not
John. Although there was blood on his sweater, there was no impact splatter,
indicating that he was not in the room at the time of the gunshot. Christine did
have impact splatter on her, except for the palm of her hand, indicating that she
was holding the gun. Expert witnesses later testified, with a reasonable degree
of scientific certainty, that the gunshot was self-inflicted.4
[6] The Sheriff brought disciplinary action against John and recommended his
termination. It charged that John did not conform to laws, engaged in conduct
unbecoming an officer, and improperly used his weapons.
[7] The Estate filed a civil complaint against the Sheriff and John for Christine’s
death, but John was later dismissed from the case. The Estate had four legal
theories in its amended complaint: 1) Christine’s death was caused by John’s
negligence and the Sheriff was vicariously liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior; 2) Christine’s death was caused by the excessive force used
by John to restrain her, and the Sheriff was liable under respondeat superior; 3)
Christine’s death was caused by the Sheriff’s negligent entrustment of John with
guns and ammunition; and 4) Christine’s death was caused by the Sheriff’s
negligent retention of John as an employee.
4
John was charged by the State with assisting a suicide, and ultimately pleaded guilty to and was convicted
of criminal recklessness.
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[8] A jury trial was held on February 1-5, 2016. Following the presentation of
evidence, the Sheriff filed a motion for judgment on the evidence, arguing that
the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any of its claims. The trial court
granted the motion as to the final three counts, but allowed the trial to proceed
on the Estate’s first theory. The jury found in favor of the Estate and awarded
it $1.2 million. The Sheriff filed a motion to correct error, reiterating its
argument in its earlier motion for judgment on the evidence, but the trial court
denied the motion.5 The Sheriff now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] The Sheriff argues that, as a matter of law, it cannot be held liable for John’s
actions. Although it has several theories supporting this conclusion, we will
focus on one that is dispositive—whether John was acting within the scope of
his employment during the relevant time period.
[10] When this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the
evidence, we apply the same standard as the trial court, considering only the
evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the nonmoving party.
City of Fort Wayne v. Moore, 706 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Judgment on the evidence is appropriate only if there is no substantial evidence
or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom to support an essential element
5
The trial court granted one portion of the motion to correct error, remitting the $1.2 million award to
$700,000, pursuant to the statutory cap in the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-4(a)(1)(C).
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of the claim. Id. A judgment on the evidence should be entered only if the
evidence points unerringly to a conclusion not reached by the jury. Id.[11] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, vicarious liability will be imposed
upon an employer where an employee has inflicted harm while acting “within
the scope of his employment.” Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind.
2003). An employee acts within the scope of his employment when the act is
incidental to the conduct authorized by an employer or if it, to an appreciable
extent, furthers the employer’s business. Id. An employee does not act within
the scope of his employment when it occurs within an independent course of
conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.
Id. at 284.
[12] Criminal acts of an employee may produce vicarious liability if the act arises
out of the context in which an employer put the employee. For example, in
Stropes v. Heritage House Children Center, our Supreme Court approved the
application of vicarious liability to an employer whose employee sexually
assaulted a resident of the center because the sexual assault stemmed from the
employee’s authorized act of bathing the victim. 547 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ind.
1989). In such circumstances, the test is whether the employee’s actions were at
least for a time authorized by his employer. Id. If some of the employee’s
actions were authorized, the question of whether any unauthorized acts were
within the scope of employment is one for the jury, but if none of the
employee’s acts were authorized, the matter is a question of law. Konkle v.
Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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[13] Regarding the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Estate’s central argument is
that a police officer is always on duty. The current county Sheriff testified that
the department has a “sheep dog philosophy and that sheep dog philosophy is
one that the sheep dog is always protecting the flock.” Tr. p. 424. More
specifically, the Estate argues that John was furthering his employer’s interests
when subduing Christine and preventing her from reaching his gun because the
Sheriff is charged with the authority to apprehend any individual who appears
mentally ill and in need of treatment. Ind. Code § 12-26-4-1. The Estate argues
that, at a minimum, several of John’s acts were authorized by the Sheriff, and
that therefore the issue should be considered a question of fact for the jury
rather than a question of law.
[14] We cannot agree that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply to the
particular facts of this case. In all of his relevant acts, John was acting as a
husband, not a sheriff’s deputy. He was not standing in his own bedroom by
dint of the Sheriff’s authorization—he was in the bedroom in a purely private
capacity, in the most intimate setting possible, of one spouse engaging with
another spouse. Under these circumstances, John’s conduct can in no way be
tied or attributed to his employer, the Sheriff. The Estate is correct to note that
an employee can still be within the scope of his employment if there is a
mixture of motives, and that the Estate is not required to “show that the acts of
the employee were motivated solely or predominately by the desire to serve the
employer.” Dodson v. Carlson, 14 N.E.3d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But we
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find that the evidence in this case, construed in the Estate’s favor, shows that
John was acting solely, not just predominately, in a private capacity.
[15] Although we have held that where some acts of the employee are authorized by
his employer, the issue of whether the employee was acting within the scope of
his employment becomes a question for the jury, we do not believe that the
word “authorized” should be read as broadly as simply “not unauthorized.” In
every case upholding the vicarious liability of an employer, there is some
minimal nexus between the employee’s work and the facts of the case. See, e.g.,
Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 245 (employer instructed, and therefore authorized,
employee to bathe resident of facility, which then shifted into sexual assault);
Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(employer instructed, and therefore authorized, equipment manager to fit boys
with uniforms, which then shifted into that manager committing molestations);
Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 224-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (employer
instructed, and therefore authorized, private security officer to maintain order
in apartment complex, which then shifted into that officer committing several
crimes). In the present case, we cannot point to any instruction given by the
Sheriff to John that placed him into the situation that resulted in Christine’s
death. Indeed, we cannot find a single act or omission committed by John that
he would not have done as a member of an entirely different profession.
Because there is not even a slight nexus between his job as a sheriff’s deputy
and his actions in his own bedroom, none of his acts were “authorized” for
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purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and the question of his scope of
employment should have never gone before the jury.
[16] If we were to accept the Estate’s argument, we can find little reason that any
police department would not be found vicariously liable for every act of its
officers and deputies. Every police department has an interest in its employees
advancing its goal of crime prevention. Because every officer is at all times
authorized to reduce the level of crime, whether on or off duty, the Estate’s
position would turn every crime or tort committed by an officer into a question
of fact for a jury. Perhaps there would be some limit based on the officer’s
jurisdiction, as in Moore, 706 N.E.2d at 604, where we found that the city could
not be held liable for the actions of an officer committed outside of the city. But
that would not be a viable limit for county deputies, whose jurisdiction extends
over hundreds of square miles. It certainly would not be a viable limit for State
Troopers, whose jurisdiction extends over the entire state.
[17] In short, because John’s actions took place in the most private and intimate of
circumstances, during an argument between two spouses, while he was off
duty, in an encounter to which the Sheriff had absolutely no connection, as a
matter of law the Sheriff cannot be held vicariously liable for his crimes.
[18] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to
grant the Sheriff’s motion to correct error consistent with this opinion.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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